Balancing the National Interest U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (1987) / Chapter Skim
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7. Findings and Key Judgments of the Panel
7. Findings and Key Judgments of the Panel
Pages 150-166
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From page 150... ...
THE PRACTICAL BASIS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS The fundamental objective of the national security export control regime maintained by CoCom is to deny-or at least to delay- the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies access to state-of-the-art Western technology that would permit them to narrow the existing gap in military systems. Yet, there are no well-defined criteria that can be used to determine whether a given technology will enhance significantly the Soviet military capability.
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From page 151... ...
Thus, adopting, as a basis for national security export controls, the policy objective of constraining exports of Western technology that could have a significant impact on Soviet bloc military capabilities is problematic because it offers no precise identifiable threshold or definition of military criticality. Without more precision, policy implementation must depend on the world view of the decisionmaker.
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From page 152... ...
National Security Export Controls Undermines Their Electiveness U.S. national security export controls are not generally perceived as rational, credible, and predictable by many of the nations and commercial interests whose active cooperation is required for an effective system.
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From page 153... ...
Companies National security export controls impede the ability of U.S. companies to compete in world markets.
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From page 154... ...
national security export controls, especially the requirement for reexport authorization, are having an increasingly corrosive effect on relations with the NATO allies and on the close bilateral relations that exist with Japan and certain other friendly countries. These controls are now viewed abroad as a signal of U.S.
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From page 155... ...
National security export control efforts cannot succeed unless two conditions are met: (1) there is an effective CoCom process in which the other major CoCom countries accept responsibility for regulating their exports (including reexports from their territory)
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From page 156... ...
Although the Department of Defense has a legitimate role to play in providing technical input to the foreign availability process, it has acquired de facto veto authority over Commerce Department foreign availability determinations with which it does not agree-a role not prescribed within the provisions of the Export Administration Act.
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From page 157... ...
Although awarding "CoCom-like status" to cooperating countries is in principle a desirable approach, agreements that in practice restrict only the reexport of U.S.-origin goods and technology and do not restrict similar items produced indigenously or obtained from other CoCom sources unfairly disadvantage U.S. companies in international trade without achieving the intended export control objective.
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From page 158... ...
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS 1. The United States Must Clearly Distinguish Foreign Policy Export Controls from National Security Export Controls There is a substantial consensus-both domestic and international-on the need for more narrowly defined national security export controls.
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From page 159... ...
Further efforts, however, will be required on the part of all participating countries to bring about greater harmonization of national policies and to work toward a more rational and fully multilateral-system of national security export controls. Among the most important issues now facing CoCom are: (1)
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From page 160... ...
6. Unilateral Controls Are of Limited Efficacy and May Undermine Allied Cooperation The imposition by the United States of unilateral national security export controls for items of dual use technology can be justified only as a stopgap measure pending negotiations for the imposition of multilateral controls or in rare cases in which the United States determines that critical national security concerns are at stake and unilateral restrictions are required.
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From page 161... ...
2. Unequal Effort by and Resources of the Three Principal Line Agencies Have Led to Conflict, Confusion, and Unbalanced Policy The Department of Defense's determined efforts to reinvigorate the national security export control regime have been useful in raising the general level of awareness of the need for national security export controls among government agencies, high-technology industry, the governments of friendly countries, and world public opinion.
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From page 162... ...
Thus, the internal policy process within the line agencies responsible for national security export control matters must be capable of striking an adequate balance between the application of stricter controls and the promotion of trade and open scientific communication, all of which help foster the economic and technological strength upon which our defense ultimately rests.
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From page 163... ...
Export Control Policies and Procedures, Such as the Export Administration Regulations, Discourages Compliance The complexity of U.S. national security export controls discourages compliance, especially by foreign firms and small- to *
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From page 164... ...
The Department of Commerce, for example, has not used its own data bases to measure the effectiveness of its licensing activities or the impact of national security export controls on firms of different sizes and on different industrial sectors. There also appear to be serious statistical discontinuities between the licensing application data main
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From page 165... ...
government reacted to mounting evidence of Soviet bloc technology acquisition efforts and to the emergence of new sources of militarily significant dual use technology by largely revamping and revitalizing the U.S. and CoCom national security export control systems.
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From page 166... ...
In the final chapter of this report, the panel sets forth a series of recommendations for changes in the existing national security export control regime. These changes are designed to bring better balance to the development and management of our future course of action on this important national and international matter.
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