Balancing the National Interest U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (1987) / Chapter Skim
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2. Evidence on the Technology Transfer Problem
2. Evidence on the Technology Transfer Problem
Pages 40-53
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From page 40... ...
For example, evidence provided by the few cases uncovered to date of espionage and diversion of militarily significant technology in all likelihood offers only a limited-and perhaps not fully representative indication of the overall volume of such activities. Moreover, because intelligence often becomes available relatively late in the development of national security export control policy, it is not yet possible to assess the impact of the changes in national security export controls that have been undertaken during the past few years.
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From page 41... ...
Farewell provided an extraordinary opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the Soviet acquisition of Western technology as it is perceived by the Soviets themselves-extraordinary because information on Soviet intentions usually has been episodic and of insufficient quality or quantity to allow accurate assessments of the Soviet acquisition program. Although the panel recognizes that internal Soviet documents such as the Farewell papers must be viewed with caution (because of the possibility that the authors had an interest in inflating the successes of the acquisition program in their reports to superiors)
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From page 42... ...
, State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) , the KGB, and the Ministry of Defense.4 This structure administers the three main arms of the Soviet technology acquisition effort: espionage, diversions, and legal sales.
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From page 43... ...
· Richard Mueller, a West German citizen, is still wanted today in that country and in the United States for a number of cases involving illegal exports to the Soviet Union of CoCom-controlled computers, microelectronics, and other products. Mueller's involvement with illegal technology acquisition on behalf of the Soviet bloc dates back to the early 1970s.
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From page 44... ...
Moreover, the level and effectiveness of customs enforcement efforts to prevent diversions differ, both within CoCom and among other technologically advanced Free World countries. There often is little likelihood that customs inspectors will identify violations once goods have left the original shipper and have been manipulated by experienced diverters because the volume of trade is great, the- number of inspectors is comparatively small, and the detection of mislabeled equipment requires sophisticated technical skills.
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From page 45... ...
Therefore, although the success of the Soviet espionage effort serves to reveal Soviet intent, it cannot be used to justify the change in export controls on dual use products. Indeed, an assessment of the policy significance of the Soviet bloc's collection activities, which requires examining the various channels for loss, would be improved by greater discrimination on the part of the Intelligence Community in categorizing different types of Soviet collection activities as espionage, diversion, or open acquisition.
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From page 46... ...
These data on savings, however, may be conservative: The ruble figures probably reflect operating costs (e.g., salaries, elimination of test range activity) and exclude capital costs.6 Given such uncertainties about available data on Soviet costs and savings, the United States has had no persuasive analysis of either the value of Western technology acquisitions to the Soviet R&D process or the ruble expenditures avoided through such efforts.
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From page 47... ...
By the standards of Western productivity the Soviets are generally weak in automated manufacturing techniques. Consequently, a prevalent judgment in the United States, at least since the 1976 Bucy report, has been that the emphasis of national security export control policy should be on constraining the flow of essential technologies and manufacturing equipment incorporated in some turnkey plants rather than on the end products of the manufacturing process.
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From page 48... ...
Although the West generally remains ahead in the most advanced weapon systems, the strong Soviet emphasis on the development and production of military hardware has resulted in many items or equipment in the field that in many weapon system categories often are as modern as those deployed in the West. Assessing the significance of this fact for export controls is difficult, however; often, the technology in Western military hardware lags behind what is widely available in the commercial sector.7
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From page 49... ...
. Although it would be foolhardy for the United States and the other technologically advanced countries of the West to facilitate Soviet access to militarily critical technology, the panel considers it unlikely that an influx of Western technology will enable the Soviet Union to reduce the current gap substantially as long as the West continues its own rapid pace of innovation.
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From page 50... ...
Moreover, line managers often ignore ministry directives calling for innovation because they fear the consequences~of not meeting short-term quotas as specified in the current plan. Recently, additional changes reportedly have been made to encourage risk-taking through the implementation of technical innovations; these changes allow production quotas in the current plan to be reduced for a period of time following the introduction of a new instrument or new process.9 Soviet defense projects consistently receive top priority in the allocation of resources to research and development.
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From page 51... ...
2. Based on its review of Intelligence Community evidence, the panel agrees that a legitimate need for appropriately designed export controls continues to exist.
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From page 52... ...
The white paper Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update provides extensive discussion of the key Soviet organizations involved in the acquisition of Western technology.
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From page 53... ...
12. From a speech to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 1986, reported by Gary Taubes and Glenn Garelik in '~Soviet Science: How Good Is It?
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