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The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Its Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Resolution
Pages 569-616

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From page 569...
... Its performance may thus serve to illustrate the power of liberal institutionalist ideas about international relations. Using the OSCE as a case study of a regional security regime, I thus propose to examine the proposition that regional security organizations can restrain anarchy in international political relations and promote cooperation to solve common problems and resolve violent or potentially violent conflicts.
From page 570...
... In contrast to the realists, most liberal institutionalists have argued that it is possible to construct cooperative arrangements among sovereign and independent states within an anarchic international "society"3 on the basis of international "regimes." Regimes have been defined by Stephen Krasner as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."4 Most early treatments of regimes within the liberal tradition focused on their operation outside the realm of security, especially on issues such as the economy or the environment, and most analyses of security issues were largely conceded to the domain of the realists. A notable exception is found in the work of Robert lervis, who has argued that it is possible to have regimes in the domain of security as well, defined as "those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate."5 Jervis goes on to note that a security regime must facilitate cooperation that goes beyond following the dictates of short-run self-interests in order to qualify.
From page 571...
... It has also emphasized the development of common political, economic, and social principles based on the ideas of liberal democracy and market economies in an effort to create a "zone of peace."7 Finally, the OSCE has created a set of structures intended to prevent conflicts, to mediate ceasefires in times of violent conflict, to manage and resolve those underlying issues that have produced violence, and to assist states and regions that have experienced violence to rebuild their security in order to rehabilitate their political, social, and economic structures. The many roles that the OSCE has attempted to fulfill may be evaluated in terms of a model of conflict escalation and abatement, along the lines suggested by Michael Lund.8 Although not all of these functions have been undertaken by the OSCE in the first decade since the end of the Cold War, most of them have been attempted by at least one of the OSCE missions or organs involved in conflict prevention.
From page 572...
... The CSCE negotiations opened with a foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki on July 3-7, 1973, comprising 35 delegations, including two North American countries the United States and Canada plus all states of Europe big and small, from the Soviet Union to the Holy See, with the sole exception of Albania.9 The working phase of negotiations took place in Geneva from September 18, 1973, until July 25, 1975. During this phase, issues were grouped together in three major substantive "baskets." Basket I focused primarily on a set of principles to govern relations among states in the realm of security and on specific "confidence-building measures." The latter are military provisions intended to create transparency and reduce tensions by requiring countries to provide assurances to potential adversaries that their military preparations are essentially defensive and nonthreatening.
From page 573...
... The effort to enhance individual human rights and the rights of minority groups has necessarily brought the organization to intervene into what many states consider to be their internal affairs, and during the Cold War period the communist states especially insisted that principle six took precedence over all others. With the disappearance of the East-West conflict, however, a broad consensus has developed within the OSCE that, when states have freely accepted certain principles, including those in the decalogue, this gives other member states limited rights of intervention in order to uphold the agreed norms.
From page 574...
... The first CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977-1978 was characterized largely by rhetorical attacks and counterattacks, with Western governments criticizing the human rights performance of the communist bloc countries, and the latter accusing the former of blatant interference in their internal affairs. Nonetheless, this meeting did set a precedent for legitimizing CSCE involvement in the internal affairs of member states when they might have consequences for regional security.
From page 575...
... . In addition, a Conflict Prevention Center was created in Vienna, an Office for Free Elections (subsequently renamed the Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights ODIHR)
From page 576...
... One of the most significant accomplishments in Helsinki was the adoption of a proposal by the Netherlands to create the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Based in the Hague, the high commissioner was mandated to engage in early warning, preventive diplomacy, and informal conciliation in an effort to prevent and resolve some of the most significant conflicts that have emerged in Eurasia since the end of the Cold War, where the status and treatment of ethnonational minorities is a major issue.
From page 577...
... . The largest single item, about 40 percent of the overall budget, went to support the 14 OSCE missions and field activities.
From page 578...
... officials, the OSCE had become by the end of the twentieth century an institutionalized European security organization. It is charged with dealing with a wide range of activities: preventing violent conflicts, mediating cease-fires, helping to resolve conflicts in regions that had previously experienced violence, and helping to rebuild security in the aftermath of traumatic conflicts.
From page 579...
... I focus on the principal instruments that the OSCE uses to intervene in conflict situations, primarily the missions of long-term duration, the high commissioner on national minorities, and the chairman-in-office. While I will occasionally discuss specific techniques that these OSCE representatives have used in their interventions, my main focus is directed toward an assessment of the role that a regional security organization may play to monitor and assist parties confronting different stages of the conflict process.
From page 580...
... These activities are most intensive in times of unstable peace, including both conditional and precarious peace, when the possibility of violence looms somewhere over the horizon. The view that conflicts are easier to resolve before they become violent than afterward has been expressed forcefully by Max van der Stoel, the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities: It is evident from the experience of Bosnia, of Chechnya, of NagornoKarabakh, of Georgia and elsewhere, that once a conflict has erupted, it is extremely difficult to bring it to an end.
From page 581...
... Parties to disputes may come directly to OSCE missions and field offices to report threats to the peace that they have witnessed or experienced. Indicators of incipient conflicts may include nationalist claims to establish separatist regimes, irredentist claims of secession and unification with another state, concerns about the possible "spillover" of an ongoing conflict across international borders into
From page 582...
... The principal organs of the OSCE available to perform this conflict prevention function include the chairman-in-office, who may decide to call the OSCE into action or may intervene directly himself or through his special representatives; the Conflict Prevention Center, which receives warnings from the OSCE missions and offices in the field about brewing conflicts and offers suggestions or instructions about how to respond; the high commissioner on national minorities, who may travel to areas of potential conflict involving national minority issues on a moment's notice and issue warnings to the Permanent Council or, in cases of great urgency, may intervene himself to try to assist the disputants to resolve their conflicts; and the Permanent Council, which generally receives reports from the Conflict Prevention Center, the high commissioner on national minorities, and the field missions which may decide to authorize
From page 583...
... The OSCE high commissioner on national minorities, Max van der Stoel, visited Ukraine in February and May 1994. As a result of those visits, he recommended the creation of an OSCE mission of long duration in Ukraine, with a branch office in Crimea.
From page 584...
... The OSCE mission began intensive consultations with Ukrainian officials, and a meeting of OSCE ambassadors was held at the Hungarian Embassy in Kiev. They arrived at a mixed conclusion.
From page 585...
... High Commissioner van der Stoel organized a conference in Locarno, Switzerland, on May 11-14,1995, which came on the heels of an announcement by the Crimean parliament of its intention to hold a referendum on the reinstatement of the 1992 constitution. On May 15 the high commissioner proposed a formula that recommended drafting parallel language in the constitutions of Crimea and Ukraine to grant Crimea irrevocable autonomy in many key areas, a right to appeal to the Ukrainian Constitutional Court if it considered that Ukrainian legislation infringed on its autonomy, while also acknowledging Crimea's status as an autonomous republic within the state of Ukraine.
From page 586...
... The situation was especially explosive due to the threat of Russian intervention, made more likely by the disputes between the Russian Federation and Ukraine over the status of the Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the fleet's headquarters, which had long been a bastion of Russian military influence on the Black Sea. By intervening rapidly, the OSCE mission, supported closely by Ambassador van der Stoel, was able to strengthen the forces of moderation on both sides and push for a solution granting substantial autonomy to the region without full independence.
From page 587...
... The behavior of the Russian Federation troops clearly represented a violation of many CSCE norms and principles. The massive military activity in the region, which was undertaken without the presence of international observers, represented a formal violation of the many confidence-building agreements most recently incorporated into the so-called Vienna Document 1994.
From page 588...
... After much discussion and debate in Vienna, however, the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya was created by the Permanent Council on April 11, 1995, with a mandate to "promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles." In addition, the OSCE group was assigned to monitor compliance with the human dimension norms, including human rights, the unfettered return of refugees to their homes, and allowing for the operation of international humanitarian organizations in Chechnya. Finally, they were mandated to "promote dialogue and negotiations between the parties in order to achieve a ceasefire and eliminate sources of tensions," the first such mandate of this kind.
From page 589...
... Indeed, Russian human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov was quoted as saying: "If the OSCE had insisted elections were against the interests of peace, Moscow would not have been able to go ahead with them."37 Even the OSCE mission head acknowledged after the elections that its influence had been severely limited and that it could only be effective in the near future in the fields of humanitarian aid and human rights, not in promoting further negotiations toward another cease-fire.38 In lanuary 1996, however, leadership of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya was turned over to Ambassador Tim Guldimann of Switzerland, who took a much more activist role as a mediator between the parties to the conflict. In February he went to Moscow and met with Interior Minister Kulikov and Emil Payin, Yeltsin's adviser on ethnic issues on the Presidential Council.
From page 590...
... On January 27, 1997, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Chechnya, monitored by 72 observers from the OSCE, and Asian Maskhadov was elected president. Subsequently, the attention of the OSCE mission in Chechnya shifted to postconflict rehabilitation.
From page 591...
... Early efforts to contain the conflict seemed to many critics in fact to legitimate Russian actions in defense of their territorial integrity. However, once Russian military excesses became apparent to all, especially as the OSCE mission was taken over by an activist mission head, the OSCE played a much more proactive and effective role in mediating several cease-fires and an eventual peace agreement between the warring parties.
From page 592...
... The kind of situations the OSCE has confronted in the former communist countries have often been very challenging since they typically involve questions of ethnic or national identity. A person's sense of identity may be defined by the social group with which he or she affiliates subjectively, which gives that individual a feeling of having a place in the universe of social relations.
From page 593...
... Third parties may assist the disputants in reframing the issues so that they no longer appear to be "zero-sum" in nature, help them to overcome stereotyped images of their adversaries, aid them to locate possible formulas that merge their joint interests rather than divide them, or even provide assistance in making concessions that will not entail losing face or opening oneself to exploitation by the other party.43 Thus, the third party may assist the disputants to find ways to resolve their conflict that they would be unlikely to stumble on by themselves. Within the OSCE, these third-party roles may be played by key individuals such as the chairman-in-office, the high commissioner on national minorities, or a head of mission, all of whom assume a special role as a representative of a regional international organization whose principles have been subscribed to by all states involved in the ongoing dispute.
From page 594...
... A cease-fire was reached in Moscow on July 6-7, 1992, after approximately 800 people had lost their lives, and a peacekeeping force of Russian, Moldovan, and Transdniestrian forces was established to police the cease-fire. In the aftermath of the Moscow cease-fire agreement, the CSCE mission in Moldova was created to oversee the performance of the peacekeeping forces, report on the human rights and security situation, and assist the parties in achieving a permanent political settlement that would recognize some form of autonomy for the Transdniester region in the Moldovan state.
From page 595...
... Direct negotiations between President Snegur of Moldova and Igor Smirnov, self-proclaimed president of Transdniestria, based on these principles articulated by the OSCE mission, opened on April 9, 1994. They agreed to set up a working group made up of five experts from each party along with representatives of the OSCE and the Russian Federation.
From page 596...
... He pressured them to add an article to the still-unsigned memorandum committing the parties to build their relationship "in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as of January 1990.-47 This agreement was signed in Moscow on May 8, 1997, by President Lucinschi of Moldova and Igor Smirnov of Transdniestria. In addition, the three mediators the OSCE chairmanin-office, President Yeltsin of Russia, and President Kuchma of Ukrainesigned a supplementary joint statement, originally proposed and drafted by the OSCE mission, affirming their understanding that any agreement must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova under international law.
From page 597...
... As a result, the OSCE mission wanted to redirect its attention to finding solutions to specific issues involving the relationship between the central government and Transdniestrian authorities, especially regarding a specific division of competencies that would define the precise nature of Transdniestria's "special status." On May 24 Lucinschi and Smirnov met and established a negotiating commission to meet once a week, alternating between Chisinau and Tiraspol; four working groups on foreign economic activities, customs services, education, and criminality; and an additional group to prepare a proposal regarding the role of the guarantor states, Russia and Ukraine. In August 1997 several actions by the Transdniestrian authorities appeared to undermine the negotiations.
From page 598...
... But it also illustrates dramatically the difficulties inherent in resolving conflicts in the aftermath of violence, especially when the parties to a dispute are not under strong internal pressure to reach an agreement rapidly. The division of Moldova and the appearance of a separatist regime in Transdniestria called into question the reality of the territorial integrity of the country despite the strong reaffirmation of that status in principle by virtually the entire international community.
From page 599...
... Known as Operation Alba, it was sanctioned by both the UN and the OSCE.48 Shortly thereafter the OSCE decided to establish its presence in Albania, and one of its major tasks was to assist in the preparation, monitoring, and implementation of elections scheduled for March 9, 1998. The mandate adopted by the OSCE Permanent Council on March 27 was even broader, however, asking the mission to provide "the coordinating framework within which other international organizations can play their part in their respective areas of competence, in support of a coherent international strategy, and in facilitating improvements in the protection of human rights and basic elements of civil society." Specific areas of OSCE specialization would include, as in many other missions, responsibility for preparing and monitoring elections; oversight of democratization, media and human rights; and monitoring the collection of weapons.
From page 600...
... Following the election, the OSCE mission was reduced in size, and the Multinational Protection Force was withdrawn as political stability returned for the most part to Albania. The OSCE continued to make some progress in overseeing the return of some of the 1 million to 1.5 million light weapons, mostly Kalashnikovs, looted from storehouses during the violence49 and in restoring some of the foundations for civil society in Albania.
From page 601...
... This may be illustrated by the rapid intervention by High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel in the Crimean situation in Ukraine; the active leadership of Ambassador Tim Guldimann as head of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya to mediate an end to the war with the Russian Federation; and the leadership shown by Franz Vranitzky as head of the OSCE presence in Albania to prevent the collapse of that country, which almost certainly would have further destabilized the fragile Balkan region. The OSCE has thus provided the necessary institutional support and legitimacy for the efforts of talented and innovative individuals to broker solutions to complex problems in several significant conflicts.
From page 602...
... The OSCE needs high-profile leadership at the very top. Where it has been most successful in conflict management, individuals have stepped forward to assume creative leadership roles, but, with the exception of the high commissioner on national minorities, so far no such role has been institutionalized.
From page 603...
... 2. The OSCE missions need to be infused with more professional personnel, including the heads of mission and all professional supporting staff.
From page 604...
... 5. The OSCE needs to strengthen both the mandate and resources of the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities without making it overly bureaucratized.
From page 605...
... The success of the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities since its creation in 1992 has largely been the result of the dedicated and brilliant work of its first incumbent, former Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel, and a small, hard-working, and intelligent professional staff. It is by no means certain that future high commissioners will interpret their mandate as broadly, engage themselves as actively, and perform to the high professional standards set by the original set of officials in the Hague.
From page 606...
... The United States has occasionally resisted OSCE actions that might have impinged on its ability to intervene unilaterally in conflict situations. And the Russian Federation, which professes strong support for the OSCE as an alternative to NATO, has occasionally blocked consensus or prevented the OSCE from acting decisively in some of the most significant areas where it works, since most of these conflicts fall within Russia's "near abroad" or at least within its perceived "sphere of influence." If Russia wants to make a credible case for making the OSCE the centerpiece of the European security architecture,
From page 607...
... As a consequence, the OSCE might become even more effective at producing common security, in a positive spiral of mounting confidence and capability, perhaps eventually forming a fullfledged security regime. Conversely, in the absence of such support the OSCE will inevitably fall short of the expectations generated for it.
From page 608...
... For example, the ARE has entered into confidence-building measures in dangerous regions, such as the South China Sea, but has been extremely cautious about intervening in disputes that might in any way be construed as falling within the internal affairs of states. Thus, it has avoided any attempt to develop an agreed set of norms comparable to the Helsinki Decalogue, to say nothing of relatively intrusive measures like the OSCE missions of long duration or the high commissioner on national minorities, even though such ideas may be of interest to some states in the region.
From page 609...
... The OSCE has founded its security role on a firm basis of normative principles, including human rights and democratic governance, that make it more than a narrow security organization. These "shared values" have been accepted by European states despite the substantial diversity of values that existed in the region, at least until 1989.
From page 610...
... Insofar as the OSCE is successful at contributing to European security, that is in large part because of its many complex linkages with other institutions such as NATO, the Western European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and so forth. Without these reinforcing institutions to assist the OSCE in fulfilling its functions or to fill in the gaps in the fabric of European security not covered by the OSCE, it is
From page 611...
... Since this environment simply does not exist in any other global region, it is unlikely that any regional security institution can be developed that will be able to replicate all of the many attributes that the OSCE now possesses. That said, the OSCE has invented and developed more fully than any other regional organization certain techniques and institutional structures to deal with violent conflict that might usefully be applied elsewhere, either by regional security organizations or the UN in its activities in those regions of the world in which it still is likely to be the institution of first choice whenever threats to the security of states and peoples arise.
From page 612...
... 1lTwo other documents also were adopted under CSCE auspices in 1990, namely the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the 1990 Vienna document on confidenceand security-building measures. Since these documents dealt mostly with arms control measures, they had less of an impact on the normative and institutional underpinnings of European security while nonetheless strengthening the European security regime through greater transparency, limitations on military activities, and significant reductions of conventional armaments.
From page 613...
... He also interviewed all heads of the OSCE missions during their regular reporting visits to Vienna, and he visited on site the OSCE mission in Moldova, traveling with the mission head to Transdniestria. He interviewed senior officials of the Conflict Prevention Center, the high commissioner on national minorities, and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Vienna, the Hague, and Warsaw, respectively.
From page 614...
... Unfortunately, his concerns in this regard appear to have been largely borne out by the intensifying conflict and increasing violence that appeared in Kosovo in 1998, more than one year before NATO began its aerial bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One can only speculate about the lives, resources, and human misery that might have been spared had political leaders in the major states, especially in Washington, heeded the "early warnings" generated by several OSCE missions and officials such as Ambassador van der Stoel in late 1997, rather than waiting almost a year to act, at which time the cycle of escalation had become firmly entrenched and the potential for effective preventive diplomacy had been greatly reduced.
From page 615...
... 18/96, OSCE Mission to Moldova, 11 July 1996. 470SCE Mission to Moldova, Monthly Report No.


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