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Commiftee for the Study of Safety Benefits and Costs of Using Citizens Band Radios on Intercity Buses B. J. CAMPBELL, Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Chairman DON M. BENSON, Canton, Ohio ROBERT BRANDWEIN, Policy and Management Associates, Boston, Massachusetts DONALD L. DEAN, CALTRANS, Sacramento, California RONALD L. EYRE, Eyre Tour and Travel, Ltd., Gleneig, Maryland ROBERT J. FORMAN, Trailways, Inc., Dallas, Texas ROBERT L. HESS, University of Michigan Transportation and Safety Institute, Ann Arbor JOHN R. LoPRESTO, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York ROBERT R. MACKJE, Human Factors Research Division, Essex Corporation, Goleta, California A. JAMES McKNIGHT, National Public Services Research Institute, Alexandria, Virginia ROBERT A. MOLOFSKY, Amalgamated Transit Union, Washington, D.C. JOHN J. RENNER, Advanced Technology Systems, Inc., Arlington, Virginia Liaison Representatives KENNETH R. MOORE, United Transportation Union, Clevelan4, Ohio ELIZABETH A. PINKSTON, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. TIMOTHY RAFTIS, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Tom Harkin, Washington, D.C. DONALD SHOEMAKER, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C. JAMES K. WILLIAMS, Transportation Research Board Transportation Research Board Staff DAMIAN J. KULASH, Assistant Director for Special Projects FRANCIS P. MULVEY, Project Manager LINDSAY I. GRIFFIN, Consultant V. WESLEY BOYAR, Consultant MARGARET HECKARD, Consultant
Preface Whether the use of citizens band (CB) radios by drivers of intercity buses would enhance or decrease public safety has been debated by bus company officials and drivers' union representatives for more than a decade. As a step toward resolving the dispute, Congress, in the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 (49 U.S.C. Section 10101 et seq.), asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the effect of CB radio use by such drivers on highway safety in general and on the safety, health, and convenience of intercity bus passengers in particular and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation. This report, prepared by the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Research Council, is the result of that study. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act further provides that, after reviewing the National Research Council study, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding on the issue. To determine the safety benefits or liabilities of allowing CB radios on intercity buses, the National Research Council convened a committee of experts in several relevant subject areas. The panel included representatives of bus companies and of drivers as well as specialists in mobile communications, highway safety, human factors, public policy, and medicine. The Committee identified seven major areas for investigation: Types and frequency of on-board emergencies and the likelihood that these emergencies might be prevented or ameliorated by CB radio use; Types and frequency of bus accidents and the likelihood that the consequences of these and other roadside accidents might be prevented or ameliorated by CB radio.use; Potential for drivers to use CB radios to evade speed law enforcement; v
vi Probability that CB radios would distract bus drivers and reduce operating safety; Likelihood that passengers would be annoyed by the noise and chatter, especially obscene language, coming over the CB radio; Effectiveness of CB radios in relaying emergency calls; and Existence of cost-effective alternative communications devices. Each of these seven areas is addressed in a separate chapter of this report. A number of previous studies (e.g., 1,2) have established the need for an effective communications system for the nation's highways. Such a system is needed for warning motorists of weather- and route- related hazards and for getting help to motorists when emergencies arise. Research sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration (1) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2) has highlighted the need for a mobile communications system and has identified its potential for improving highway safety. The question the Congress has asked the Academy to address must be viewed in the larger context of estab- lishing a reliable communications system to enhance highway safety. Although there is a wealth of informa- tion on how improved communications might foster highway safety, gaps were found in a number of the areas of t investigation idenified by the Committee. Therefore, the Committee directed TRB staff to gather original data on how CB radios are used by bus drivers employed by companies that currently permit the devices. Several field visits to bus companies and a number of rides on intercity buses were necessary to develop these data. Because conclusive answers to all the questions raised in this study would require a very large budget and protracted periods of time, some issues, such as the effect of using communications devices on vehicle operating safety, could not be addressed in this study. Nevertheless, the Committee believed that the available resources were adequate to develop sufficient information on which to base a recommendation to the Secretary of Transportation on the narrow question of whether compa- nies should be required to allow their drivers to use CB radios on board,. Even though the Committee did not reach a consensus on all issues, a majority believed that the information available was sufficient to arrive at a recommendation.
vii Some Committee members-believed that the available evidence supported the need for a federal rule requiring bus companies to allow drivers to use CB radios aboard buses. Indeed, some Committee members saw the need for improved communications among all highway users to be a dothinant question, of which the question of CB radios on intercity buses is but a specialized aspect. They believed that this report would be remiss if it did not recognize the overwhelming body of literature and policy statements on the need to encourage communications capabilities to promote safe and effective use of the highways. Other Committee members believed that the benefits anticipated from allowing CB radios aboard intercity buses were insufficient to warrant federal intervention. One member of this Committee (Robert A. Molofsky of the Amalgamated Transit Union) did not approve the final report. The willingness of the study's sponsor, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety; of officials at a number of bus companies; and of many bus drivers to share information and make suggestions is gratefully acknowledged. This report represents the collective efforts of the Committee for the Study of Safety Benefits and Costs of Using Citizens Band Radios on Intercity Buses, chaired by Dr. B.J. Campbell, Director of the Highway Safety Research Center of the University of North Carolina; Dr. Damian Kulash, Assistant Director, and Dr. Francis Mulvey, Project Manager, both of TRB Special Projects Division; ano the following consultants: V. Wesley Boyar, Dr. Lindsay Griffin, and Dr. Margaret Heckard. Special thanks go to Nancy Ackerman, TRB Publications Manager, and Dr. Elizabeth W. Kaplan, Assistant Editor, for editing the report and to Lori Ann Weaver and Frances E. Holland for typing it. REFERENCES J. Stephany. Use of Citizen Band Radio Service for Transportation Safety: Report to the Deputy Secretary of Transportation. Washington, D.C., 1975. New York State Police. Citizen Band Radio Highway Safety Evaluation Project, Vols. I and II. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1979.
Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 1 Background, 1 Study Approach, 2 Findings, 2 1 INTRODUCTION..................................5 Divergent Views on CB Radios, 6 Previous Attempts to Resolve the Dispute, 7 Questions Addressed, 11 2 ON-BOARD INCIDENTS............................14 Driver Testimony, 15 Interviews with CB-Permitting Bus Company Management and. Employees, 17 Analysis of Incident Files, 18 3 CB RADIOS AND HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS...............29 Methodology and Data Sources, 29 Bus Accidents, 29 Reporting of Other Highway Accidents, 30 Weather- and Route-Related Hazards, 36 Combined Potential Uses of CB Radios on Buses, 39 4 CB RADIOS AND BUS SPEEDS......................42 Methodology, 44 Findings, 45 viii
ix 5 DRIVER DISTRACTION AND STIMULATION . 49 Methodology, 49 Findings on Distraction, 50 Findings on Enhanced Alertness, 53 Summary, 53 6 ANNOYANCE AND CONVENIENCE.....................55 Methodology, 55 Findings on Annoyance, 55 Findings on Passenger Convenience, 58 Summary, 59 7 EFFECTIVENESS OF CS RADIOS AS COMMUNICATIONSDEVICES......................60 Methodology, 61 Findings on Likelihood of Response, 62 Findings on Response Time, 64 Technical Characteristics of CB Radios, 66 Summary, 67 8 ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES................. .................... 69 Cellular Telephone, 70 Satellite-Enhanced Systems, 72 Personal Radio Communications Service, 74 Private Land-Mobile Radio Service, 74 Ainplitude-Companded Sideband, 75 General Mobile Radio Service, 76 Amateur Radio Service, 76 Domestic Public Land-Mobile Service, 76 Findings, 77 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION................78 Findings, 78 Conclusions, 82 Policy Options, 82 Recommendation, 84
x APPENDIXES AOwners of Buses Ridden..........................85 B Interview Questions for Jefferson Lines, Boise Winnemucca Stages, and Peerless Stages Personnel.....................................86 Representative Motor Vehicle Injuries by Abbreviated Injury Scale Level................88 Study Committee Biographical Information.............90
Executive Summary The nation's principal intercity bus operators, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and Trailways Lines, Inc., enforce a policy that forbids drivers to bring citizens band (CB) radios on board their buses. The drivers have long objected to this prohibition and have argued for a change in this bus company policy over the bargaining table, in arbitration proceedings, at hearings held by federal agencies, before state legislatures, and, finally, before the U.S. Congress. In the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate the safety impacts that would result if the Secretary of Transportation were to issue a rule requiring bus companies to allow drivers to use CB radios on board buses. BACKGROUND Drivers claim that CB radios are needed to report on-board emergencies and highway accidents to appropriate authorities. Drivers also contend that all other for-hire transport modes have communications capabilities and intercity buses, which carry one-third of all fare-paying intercity travelers, should not be an exception. Bus company managements counter that CB radios could distract drivers and divert their attention from the road. Noise, chatter, and frequent obscenities emanating from the CB radios could annoy or offend many bus passengers. Also, bus drivers might use the radios to evade highway patrols and drive the buses at excessive speeds. Finally, the companies argue that CB radios 1
2 have a number of technical limitations that make them unreliable and, therefore, inappropriate as a safety device. STUDY APPROACH A Committee of 12 individuals with expertise in a number of areas relevant to the questions raised by this study was formed to evaluate the claims and counterclaims. Because there was little research directly applicable to these questions, the Committee had to collect and analyze the necessary information. Transportation Research Board (TRB) staff visited several bus companies, including some that allow their drivers to use CB radios. Staff members, unidentified to drivers, also rode a number of buses to gain firsthand experience with how CB radios are used by bus drivers who work for companies that allow them. The Committee examined the incident files of Trailways to determine the types and frequency of on-board emergencies faced by the nation's bus drivers and to estimate the probable use of CB radios should they be permitted universally. The Committee also reviewed the accident records of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety to decide how often CBs might be needed to call for police and medical assistance in the case of bus accidents. Finally, the Committee examined a number of alternative mobile communications systems to determine if there are any cost-effective alternatives to CB radios. FINDINGS The Committee found that bus drivers are faced with various kinds of incidents, some quite serious, and that a number of these incidents represent occasions when drivers might use CB radios. Extrapolating from Trailways' experience yields an estimate of approximately 2,000 on-board medical and disruptive incidents nationwide each year. However, based on the experience of Trailways, in most cases a driver would not have found a CB radio useful. Further, in even fewer cases would use of the CB radio have effectively influenced the outcome of an on-board emergency.
3 The Committee also found that intercity buses are involved annually in about 400 accidents in which someone is killed or seriously injured, or property damage exceeds $2,000. Fatalities are usually pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles, not bus passengers. In addition, each year an intercity bus could potentially be the first CB-equipped vehicle on the scene of as many as 200 or 300 accidents not involving a bus. In these cases, a CB-equipped bus might be able to reduce emergency vehicle response times. The Committee found little evidence to support management's principal concerns; however, the available evidence is limited. For example, the presence of CB radios did not appear to make much difference in bus speeds, but speeds of only a few buses with CB radios on board were measured. Other studies suggest that CB-equipped vehicles generally travel slightly faster than do non-CB-equipped vehicles, although cause and effect can only be inferred. The Committee found no studies that showed that operating a CB radio represents a major distraction that might seriously impair a driver's ability to handle a vehicle. The problem of passenger annoyance appears moot. If drivers wear earpieces while listening to the CB radio, passengers will not be disturbed. Finally, drivers are more likely to carry CB radios with them when they expect to encounter weather or other route- related problems. Although CB radios are the only means of mobile communication presently available to intercity bus drivers, the devices have a number of drawbacks that make them less than fully reliable. The number of individuals who voluntarily monitor CB transmissions is declining and these monitors are concentrated in urban areas--places where more reliable alternatives, such as regular telephones, are readily available. In rural areas, where most fatal highway accidents occur and where alternatives are not as plentiful, there is less CB monitoring. There are a number of alternative systems on the horizon, but those that might substitute for CB radio are either much more expensive or are too limited in their applications to be effective substitutes. Therefore, the Committee focused on the narrow issue of whether it should recommend that the Secretary of Transportation issue a rule overriding management's
policy prohibiting CB radios. The Committee did not address the broader issue of the need for improved highway communications. Although there was general agreement among the Committee members on the accuracy of the information developed for the study, Committee members drew different conclusions about whether the available evidence was sufficient to warrant federal involvement. By a narrow majority, the Committee voted to retain the status quo and not recommend that the Secretary of Transportation issue a rule requiring bus companies to allow drivers to bring CB radios aboard buses. The majority concluded that although benefits might accrue, they do not appear to be large enough or sufficiently certain to warrant federal intervention in this dispute. The Committee recognized the importance of improved communications on the highways, but also recognized that CB radios have many drawbacks and are not sufficiently reliable to warrant recommending universal use on intercity buses.
Introduction For more than a decade, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and Trail- ways Lines, Inc., the nation's largest intercity bus com- panies, have been at odds with their drivers over whether the drivers should be allowed to use citizen band (CB) radios on buses. Both sides claim that safety is the principal concern. The companies argue that the drivers would have less control over the bus if they used CB radios while driving and that CB radios are often used to evade speed law enforcement. The companies also claim that passengers would be annoyed by CB chatter. The drivers who want to use CB radios point to the need for communications capabilities to report on-board and roadside emergencies. Any question that concerns the safety of nearly one- third of the nation's fare-paying intercity travelers (1) is obviously important. Bus routes crisscross the nation in webs far more intricate and complete than pas- senger railroad or airline networks. Buses serve more than 14,000 communities, whereas the major airlines serve only about 600 and Amtrak serves around 500. Each year approximately 14,500 bus drivers transport 125 mil- lion passengers for 16 billion passenger-miles on regu- larly scheduled intercity bus routes (1). Although most of these billions of miles are traveled safely, intercity buses do, nevertheless, have accidents that result in death and injury. Although the accident death rate for intercity bus passengers in 1982 was only 0.04 per 100 million passenger-miles, compared with 1.10 for automobiles (2), Class I buses (those operated by firms with more than $3 million in annual revenues) are involved in approximately 400 accidents each year in which someone is killed or injured, or where property damage exceeds $2,000. Bus drivers also encounter 5
6 accidents involving other vehicles where faster emer- gency vehicle response times could affect the outcome. The question is whether highway bus travel can and should be made safer through the increased use of CB radios. The issues raised by the companies and their drivers about the need for and the effectiveness of CB radios on intercity buses. are the subject of this report. The principal arguments for and against having CB radios on board the buses are evaluated below. DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CB RADIOS Both Greyhound and Trailways have long forbidden their drivers to bring audio devices of any kind on board buses. (Passengers may play audio equipment only if they wear earphones.) In 1974 this prohibition was extended to include CB radios. Many drivers strongly object to this policy because it treats a two-way communications device, such as CB radio, like other types of audio equipment that are used mostly for entertainment. The drivers, through their unions (the Amalgamated Transit Union and the United Transportation Union), have fought management's proscription on the grounds that CB radios Provide a means of calling help in case of on-board medical emergencies or criminal behavior by passengers; Provide a means of calling tow trucks or other assistance in the event of mechanical problems; Provide a means of calling police and ambulances in case of accidents involving buses; Provide a means of reporting other accidents, break- downs, or hazardous highway conditions; Enable drivers to learn of road and weather condi- tions ahead; and Help drivers stay alert, particularly at night on long-distance trips. The drivers argue that their use of CB radios could be policed by the companies in much the same way that man- agement enforces other regulations governing employee conduct. Greyhound and Trailways counter with the following claims:
7 ⢠on-board emergencies are relatively rare; Operation of CB radios would distract drivers from their primary task of operating the vehicle; Chatter and frequent obscenities coming over the CB would annoy passengers; Drivers would use the radios to evade police speed enforcement; CB radios are subject to range and other limitations that make them unreliable; Drivers could damage company equipment by attempting to install their own CB radios; and Setting rules for driver conduct, including prohib- iting CB radio use, is simply a management prerogative. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE Since 1974 this issue has been aired in several dif- ferent arenas, but it has not been resolved. Although it has. been brought up in regular labor-management ne- gotiations, no solution has been reached through col- lective bargaining. The drivers have pressed their case in arbitration proceedings, before public hearings con- ducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation, and be- fore state legislatures and the U.S. Congress. A brief review of what has occurred in these forums follows. A rh4 4- r4- I r..n In 1976 Rocky Mountain Lines, a Trailways subsidiary, suspended a driver for using a CB radio. An arbitrator was asked to rule on the validity of the company ban on CB radios and on whether the disciplinary action was just and reasonable under the circumstances. However, the arbitrator concluded that the policy prohibiting CBs was not arbitrable, and he declined to rule on whether management's arguments were valid. The arbitrator held that this was a matter best left to collective bargain- ing. Thus, the issue came down to a conventional disci- plinary case involving the suspension of an employee for violating a company rule, and the arbitrator upheld the company's right to suspend the driver (3).
8 U.S. Department of Transportation Hearings The drivers turned to the federal government and re- quested that a rule be enacted that would require bus companies to allow drivers to bring personal CB radios on board buses. In 1979 the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), both divisions of the Federal Highway Administration, held public hearings in Wash- ington, D.C., and Salt Lake City, Utah. After hearing from bus drivers, who related personal experiences in which a CB radio might have been useful, and spokespersons for management, the agencies reaf- firmed existing federal policy encouraging the use of citizens band radios, but promulgated no new rules. Federal policy on CB radios was articulated in a 1978 joint memorandum issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Transportation, and the Federal Communications Commission: Policy: Because CB radio, as an in-vehicle communi- cation system, can offer a significant contribu- tion to safety and service on the highways, it is Federal policy to encourage its use to promote highway safety and service. Inherent in the Federal encouragement of CB use is the understand- ing that CBs will be used in a lawful manner within the spirit and the letter of the Federal Communica- tions Commission's Rules and Regulations and not for avoidance of State and local enforcement and surveillance activities (4). This policy statement notwithstanding, the hearings examiners concluded that they lacked the authority to force management to permit the use of CB radios on buses. The examiners stated that federal intervention required evidence demonstrating that CB radios would directly and positively affect bus operating safety. The examiners found that the drivers had not shown that allowing CB radios would directly affect the safety of intercity bus operations.
State and Federal Legislation The issue gained renewed life in 1980 when Greyhound suspended a driver who used a CB radio to thwart a pas- senger attempting to hijack a bus. The punishment of a bus driver whose actions were otherwise heroic infuriated many drivers, and the incident rallied CB proponents. Bus drivers began lobbying both state legislatures and the U.S. Congress to enact laws that would circumscribe management's authority to forbid drivers to use CB radios while driving. Advocates of the use of CB radios were most successful in Missouri in 1982; Section 8 of the Missouri Bus Bill (5) contained the following clause: A bus transportation company shall allow the driver or operator of a bus to temporarily install and operate in the bus a citizens band radio, techni- cally limited to transmit and receive frequency of 27.065 megahertz and 27.185 megahertz, including earphones, antenna and any necessary equipment purchased and installed by the licensed driver or operator of the bus. The act was challenged and struck down on the basis of the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution and the preemption clause of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act. This ruling was appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the lower court (6). Efforts at the national level resulted in the introduction of H.R. 1914 as a companion bill to the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982. As was the case with efforts at the state level, this bill did not require that CB radios be installed on intercity buses; it simply would have barred the prohibition of drivers' bringing their own sets on board. This bill eventually evolved into a request for a National Academy of Sciences study of the issue. Section 25 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act (49 U.S.C. Section 11111) reads: Section 25. (a) The Secretary of Transportation shall undertake to enter into appropriate arrange- ments with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of the use of citizens band radios on motor vehicles providing transportation of pas- sengers subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
10 state Commerce Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of title 49, United States Code, by the operators of such vehicles. Such study shall deter- mine, at a minimum, the following: the effect on safety if such operators are authorized to use such radios; and the effect on safety, health, and convenience of the passengers of such vehicles if such operators are authorized to use such radios. The Secretary of Transportation shall request the National Academy of Sciences to submit to the Secretary and the Congress, within one year after entering into such arrangements with the National Academy of Sciences for conducting the study under subsection (a) of this section, a report on the results of such study along with its recommendations concerning whether operators of motor vehicles providing transportation of passengers should be allowed to use citizens band radios. The Secretary shall furnish to such Academy, at its request, any information which such Academy deems necessary for the purposes of conduct- ing such study. Not later than 60 days after the National Academy of Sciences submits its report to the Secretary of Transportation under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether operators of motor vehicles providing transportation of passengers subject to the juris- diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of title 49, United States Code, should be allowed to use citizens band radios in such vehicles. In making such determination, the Secretary of Transportation shall give substantial weight to the recommenda- tions and conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences. Such rulemaking proceeding shall be completed not later than 120 days after such pro- ceeding is commenced. If the Secretary issues a rule or regulation which recommends that operators of such vehicles be allowed to install temporarily and operate citizen band radios in such vehicles, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations establishing guidelines for the use of such radios in such vehicles in order to ensure that the public safety is adequately protected.
11 Thus, Congress asked for an objective evaluation of the arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of CB radio use on intercity buses. A committee comprised of a dozen individuals with backgrounds in a number of areas pertinent to the questions raised was formed to study the issues and develop recommendations based on their findings. This report is the result of those efforts. The central issue addressed by this study is whether the safety and other benefits that might result from permitting CB radios on board intercity buses are sufficient to warrant recommending federal intervention in what would otherwise appear to be a simple labor- management dispute. QUESTIONS ADDRESSED The following questions were addressed in the study to determine whether the use of CB radios on intercity buses would enhance highway safety. What kind of emergencies occur on intercity buses and how frequent are they? Is it likely that CB radios could help prevent or ameliorate the consequences of such incidents? Can CB radios effectively help speed medical, police, and repair vehicles to the scene of bus accidents? Would bus drivers use CB radios to frustrate speed law enforcement efforts and drive their buses at il- legally high speeds? Does operating a CB radio while driving a bus con- stitute a safety hazard? Would passengers be annoyed by the chatter or noise coming over a CB radio? Is CB radio an effective way to communicate infor- mation about emergency situations on highways? These are questions that, for the most part, have not been addressed by previous research, especially in this particular context. Therefore, TRB staff collected and developed primary data from a number of sources. Bus company files were reviewed to learn about the types and frequencies of on-board incidents and acci- dents. TRB staff rode a number of buses to gather first- hand information on how drivers with CB radios operate
12 their vehicles and to compare their behavior with that of drivers who are not CB equipped. Thirty buses of nine different carriers were ridden (see Appendix A). All of the companies whose buses were ridden, except Greyhound, permit their drivers to use CB radios or have installed other types of two-way communications. Although 21 of the trips were made on buses operated by CB-permitting firms, on only 12 occasions did the driver actually have a CB radio on board. The staff monitored how drivers used CB radios and attempted to judge whether passengers were annoyed by CB chatter. Speed data were collected by using a stopwatch and recording how long it took the buses to travel between successive mileposts. However, on 11 of the 30 rides no speed measurements were made, because either there were no appropriate mile markers or the observer was unable to sit in a seat from which the mile markers were observable. Although 15 of the 19 rides on which speeds were recorded were made on buses owned by CB-permitting companies, only on 7 of these 15 speed- recorded rides were CB radios used by the drivers. For several of the questions raised by this report, the sample data collected are not sufficient for statis- tical analysis. Ultimately, the Committee had to decide whether to devote more study resources to collecting data from bus rides, or to accept that the patterns evident in the small samples were indicative. The Committee chose the latter course for two reasons. First, the universe of CB-equipped buses is relatively small. Second, the routes operated by these companies are widely dispersed geographically and service is relatively infrequent, which makes data collection costly. Furthermore, it did not appear that added observations would alter the findings based on this evidence. In addition to having TRB staff ride buses, the Committee sought to gain insights into the operations, policies, and views of bus companies that allow two-way communications by interviewing managers and drivers at such companies. Visits were made to Jefferson Lines in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Boise Winnemucca in Boise, Idaho; Airport Service (which operates intercity service) in Anaheim, California; and Peerless Stages in Oakland, California. The managers and drivers of the three CB-permitting companies (Airport Service uses two-way radios) were asked the same questions (see Appendix B). The answers to these questions and the general discus- sion of the CB issue form the basis of the statements on
13 bus company policy and perceptions that are made throughout this report. The following chapters present the evidence offered in support of the main arguments of both proponents and opponents of the use of CB radios. REFERENCES Bus Facts. American Bus Association, Washington, D.C., 1982. 1983 Annual Report. American Bus Association, Washington, D.C., 1983. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Arbitration File No. 77K00652, Wallace--CB Radios Grievance, Joseph Lazar, impartial arbitrator, Dec. 12, 1977. Adopted June 16, 1978; cited in FHWA Notice 79-8, Policy on Citizens Band Radios, Jan. 9, 1980. Mo. Ann. Stat., Section 307.176 (Vernon Supp. 1983). Greyhound Lines, Inc., and Trailways, Inc., v. Christopher Bond, 725 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1984).
2 On-Board Incidents Many bus drivers maintain that they need CB radios to protect themselves and the bus-riding public in emer- gency situations. Operators of all other modes of inter- city passenger transport are able to communicate with the outside world, they argue, and bus drivers should be no exception. TRB staff gathered data on the numbers and the kinds of incidents that occur on board intercity buses. The Committee used this evidence to determine whether allowing drivers to bring their own CB radios on board would meaningfully enhance bus travel safety. Press and driver accounts of on-board incidents were reviewed, and a number of bus company employees were intetviewed, to elicit firsthand experiences with medical and criminal emergencies. However, although such anec- dotes are interesting, they fail to convey any infor- mation about how often drivers are faced with emergen- cies. Management claims that emergencies are infrequent and that CB radios would rarely make a difference even when emergencies arise. To determine the frequency of various types of incidents, the record of such incidents at Trailways for the calendar year 1983 was thoroughly reviewed and evaluated. This review was lin4ted to events that took place aboard buses in regular-route, intercity service and excluded emergencies arising on charters or on other bus operations. Even though charters are not immune to on-board emergencies, the issue raised by the drivers concerns the use of CBs on regularly scheduled buses, and the nature of charter bus service is sufficiently different to warrant its exclusion. Futhermore, many charters operated by Greyhound and Trailways are equipped with CB radios because the companies permit charter groups to bring their own radios on board if 14
15 they wish. In that case the charter group leader operates the device. Finally, charter bus services comprise only a small portion of Greyhound and Trailways intercity bus services. Nearly all regular-route services are provided by Class I carriers. DRIVER TESTIMONY Unusual events occur and emergencies arise on intercity buses, as they do on all transportation modes. Russel J. Lett, a Greyhound driver who has actively campaigned against the anti-CB policy of bus management, described to the Committee the types of incidents that occur on intercity buses. He related several personal experiences that he suggested might have been handled more effec- tively had he had access to a CB radio. Lett also sub- mitted to the Committee a number of newspaper accounts of assaults on drivers and passengers and other in- cidents that occurred on intercity buses. Accounts contained in the record of the public hearings convened by the U.S. Department of Transportation sup- plement those provided by Lett and also demonstrate the kinds of situations bus drivers sometimes face. Several examples from the Salt Lake City hearing conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation provide the flavor of situations encountered (1). Another incident that happened just recently, January 20, at 3:20 p.m., about 83 miles west of Salt Lake City, a young Black lady came to the front of the bus and tried to get off while the coach was in motion, screaming, trying to get out the door. The other passengers tried to calm her down and finally had to sit on her. It took three of them to sit on her. I had to drive another seven miles to get to a public telephone to get to notify the Sheriffts Department to send a car out. The first thing they brought up to me after they had sat on her was a big hunting knife that she was carrying on her (testimony of James Bowers, an advocate of CB radios for intercity buses, p. 55). I know for sure that if I had had a CB a year ago when I was on the Rock Springs run, I would have saved a passenger's life.
16 The lady took sick at Echo, Utah. She had been reported sick when she transferred from a South Dakota bus at Cheyenne. I took very much concern about her when we gave her a rest stop at Echo, Utah. I asked her if she needed any medication then. "No," she says, "Mr. Scott, I've taken my medication and I'll be all right if you will get us to our next transfer point," which was Salt Lake City, going to the Northwest. She had a fatal heart attack between Ogden and Salt Lake City, so they carried her off at our depot at Salt Lake City (testimony of Oliver Scott, an advocate of CB radios for intercity buses, pp. 52-53). I have another situation that happened just recently, in January of 1 79, between Wellington, Colorado, and Cheyenne, Wyoming. One stretch of land there is 32 miles long with absolutely nothing. There are no towns; there are no farmhouses. I had a lady come up and say, "Excuse me, ma'am, but I fear I'm having a heart attack." At this point I had her sit in the right front seat and she contin- ued to tell me her medical card was in her purse, and so on and so forth. I tried several times to flag down other vehicles, to no avail. I got within the city of Cheyenne and saw a police car. I flashed my lights three times; I had the warning flashers on and I'm going like this [indicates]. The cop looked at me; I blew the railroad tracks; I pulled into the depot. He went straight. It took 15 minutes to get an ambulance six blocks from the hospital. This lady almost died. (testimony of Mairi J. Ralston, an advocate of CB radios for intercity buses, pp. 141-142). These accounts demonstrate the kinds of situations bus drivers believe could be ameliorated by having access to a CB radio. However, these examples were provided by drivers who voluntarily came forward to attest to the need for on-board communications. To determine if this view is widespread, TRB staff spoke with drivers and officials at several bus companies.
17 INTERVIEWS WITH CB-PERMITTING BUS COMPANY MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES Although Greyhound and Trailways prohibit CB radios, a number of intercity bus companies allow their drivers to bring CBS on board. The Committee thought that the experience of these firms with CB radios might indicate how the devices would be used if Greyhound and Trailways drivers had access to them. If, in fact, the radios contribute to travel safety, this improvement should be evident in the operations of companies already using two-way communications. Personnel at several CB-permitting companies (and at one company using another type of two-way radio) were interviewed to determine if the communications devices had ever mitigated any on-board incidents. A spokes- person for Airport Service, a California bus company that uses two-way radios on all its buses, noted that in the course of almost 4 million bus-miles of service in 1983, only four passengers were ejected for inappro- priate behavior. However, there was one particularly dramatic incident: a man armed with a revolver hijacked a bus. The radio was not useful in dealing with this hijacking, because the hijacker held the revolver to the driver's temple throughout the incident. A driver for Boise Winnemucca Stages, which permits the use of CB radios, related how he used his CB radio in a medical emergency. On a run to Lewiston, Idaho, a woman went into labor. The driver knew that no hospital was nearby, so he used his CB to locate the nearest doctor and was able to get the woman to the doctor before the baby arrived. Whether the mother's or the baby's condition would have been impaired had they not reached a doctor is unknown, but the CB radio certainly allowed for greater peace of mind and for delivery under less traumatic circumstances. Although the search for cases in which the use of a CB radio has had an important ameliorating effect on on-board emergencies was far from exhaustive, no other cases were reported to THE staff by drivers or officials at bus companies that allowed the use of the radios. However, these firms are relatively small; the intercity bus travel market is, in effect, a virtual duopoly. Greyhound carries 60 percent of all intercity riders and Trailways carries 20 percent. The lack of observed cases at the smaller firms cannot preclude the possi- bility that CB radios could be beneficial if permitted on Greyhound and Trailways buses.
18 ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT FILES Although interviews, testimony, and newspaper accounts provide a rough indication of the types of situations encountered by drivers, they do little to establish the prevalence of such situations. To determine how often various kinds of on-board incidents occur, the Committee asked several bus companies to make their incident files available for review. Incident files contain accounts of unusual events that occur during day-to-day opera- tions. Events that take place in terminals and garages, as well as out on the road, are included in these files. Six companies provided access to their files: Trail ways, Greyhound, Jefferson, Airport Service, Peerless Stages, and Boise Winnemucca Stages. The last four were chosen for review because they permit two-way communi- cation devices on their buses; therefore, their files might reveal cases in which the radios were used in ways that promoted highway travel safety. However, the materials provided by all the companies except Trailways were, in the opinion of the Committee, either insufficient or unreliable. The CB-permitting companies reported relatively few incidents and did not segregate incident records from driver personnel files. Personnel files were not available to TRB staff. Charter bus incidents were not recorded separately by- the smaller carriers, and, finally, the incident files of smaller companies usually did not indicate whether a CB radio was on board at the time any incident occurred. Greyhound's incident files were not used because of the unexpectedly small number of reports: only 400 reports of incidents for all of 1983 were on file at the Company's Phoenix headquarters. of those incidents on file, 173 occurred aboard buses. For many areas of the country, there were no reports at all of any incidents: no incidents were recorded for Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Detroit, Miami, New York City, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. One incident was reported for Houston and one for Washington, D.C. Trailways, in contrast, recorded about 2,000 incidents in 1983, even though it is only one-third as large as Greyhound. (Greyhound personnel agreed that data must be missing.) Because Greyhound provides the major share of regular- route bus services, TRB staff tried to determine why Greyhound's incident records may have been incomplete. James Renforth, Greyhound's Director of Safety, who
19 attended Committee meetings on October 21, 1983, and June 12, 1984, discussed his company's efforts to locate the missing data. Greyhound sent letters to regional offices in areas where few or no incidents were reported, requesting that incident reports not already submitted to Phoenix be forwarded; only a handful of additional cases were produced. There was some reason to believe that many incidents had been misclassified as accidents and were included in the acc,ident files maintained by Greyhound in its Cleveland, Ohio, office. A Greyhound employee in Cleveland told a staff member there were a "couple of thousand" recent reports on file. The Commit- tee requested permission to examine these data; however, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Greyhound Lines, Inc., Frank Nageotte, responding to a letter from Dr. Campbell, the Study Committee chairman, claimed that the files in Cleveland were not pertinent and contained information on cases that might eventually result in litigation and claims against the company. Trailways did not allow access to its accident files either, but the Trailways incident files appeared reasonably com- plete. As a result, only Trailways data were relied on, and it was assumed that Trailways' experience is represen- tative of the entire intercity bus industry. Most Committee members accepted the assumption that Trailways data should be representative of the industry as a whole. However, some Committee members were doubtful about the representativeness of Trailways incident data; because Greyhound is so dominant, the company might experience a wider variety of incidents and a different distribution of the types of emergencies that occur aboard intercity buses. Trailways is the nation's second largest carrier and handles about 20 percent of regular-route bus traffic (2). This is a sizable share of the total bus travel market. Like Greyhound, Trailways operates a national system, although its route network is not quite as exten- sive. The two largest carriers often compete directly in major markets and offer similar services at compa- rable prices. There may be some operating differences that could affect the numbers and types of incidents that occur, but the Committee could not identify any differences so great as to invalidate the assumption that Trailways' ridership and experiences are represen- tative of the industry as a whole. Nevertheless, some Committee members were concerned that Trailways' incident
20 files, although more complete than Greyhound's, might not adequately reflect the industry-wide frequency of on-board incidents. Trailways' incident file for 1983 occupies approxi- mately 4 feet of shelf space. Many events recorded in these files are not germane to the present study and were omitted from consideration. Among the types of incidents not included in the tabulations discussed below are Incidents in terminals and depots (everything from damaged luggage to armed robbery); Incidents that occurred during charter operations; Minor property-damage accidents (e.g., sideswipes, other vehicles striking parked buses, buses striking fixed objects when backing, and buses striking wildlife); and Minor on-board incidents (e.g., child falling and bumping head, passenger cutting finger, passenger falling while exiting bus). In all, 401 relevant on-board incidents during regular- route operations were identified from the Trailways 1983 incident file. The circumstances surrounding each inci- dent were analyzed focusing 4 n the question: If a CB radio had been available, is it likely the driver would have used it to call for help? For 17 (4.2 percent) of these 401 incidents, the answer was yes. For 165 (41.2 percent), the answer was no. For the remaining 219 (54.6 percent) incidents, it was not clear from the recorded accounts whether the driver would have chosen to use a CB radio if it had been available. Obviously categorizing these incidents on the basis of whether a driver might have used a CB radio required establishing a set of criteria for deciding how to clas- sify individual pases. In general, when a bus driver tried to summon police or medical aid by some other means s4uile in a remote location or in traffic, the incident was coded "yes (a CB radio might have been used). Similarly, whpq an incident involved a serious medical situation where a shortened ambulance response time might have been beneficial, the incident was coded "yes." Serious medical situations are those in which the assistance of a physician might reasonably be sought. When on-board incidents occurred near terminals or other locations where telephones were available, the incident was coded "no" (a CB radio probably would not
21 have been used). Those incidents that took place, over a protracted period of time (e.g., a passenger was drunk and disorderly for several hours) during which the driver had many opportunities to seek assistance (e.g., stops at several terminals) but, in fact, did not seek help were coded "no." The remaining incidents were coded "don't know." The following narratives drawn from the Trailways file provide an indication of how these incidents were classified. Potential Incident CB Use Narrative Stroke, No I was eating inside heart attack, McDonald's. A passenger chest pains came for me saying a male passenger was having a stroke. Stroke, Don't Black, male passenger in his heart attack, Know late 50s was in the bus chest pains restroom. Complained to other passenger he was in pain. I laid him down on seat, checked to see if he was taking any medicine, had "Nitro," called ambulance. He was removed from bus and taken away by ambulance. Stroke, Yes Mrs. approached me in heart attack, Hope, Arkansas, and said chest pains she was sick and had chest pains. She asked me how far it was to the nearest bus station. I told her and she said she thought she could make it. Upon arrival in Texarkanashe said she could walk to the hospital but she desired to use an ambulance so
22 Potential Incident CB Use Narrative she asked me to have someone to call. So one of the ticket agents called from the bus station. Drugs, drunk, No Passenger complained disorderly that_ made advances toward females while I was unloading luggage (Oceanside, California). Drugs, drunk, Dontt Man got drunk on bus. disorderly Know Police took in Hickory. Drugs, drunk, Yes Young man got on in disorderly Pittsburg, Kansas. I did not see the bottle if he had one, might have been drugs. He started cursing and yelling, going beserk. I told him to keep still, which he did not. Passenger got scared of him and moved up front. I pulled into Louisburg, Kansas, where I flagged - a Kansas Highway patrol- man. He resisted and had to be handcuffed and hauled away by patrol officer. When it is noted that a driver probably would have used a CB radio to deal with an incident, it does not necessarily follow that the radio would have been effective in preventing, ending, or ameliorating the incident. As will be seen later, assessment of the likelihood that the device would be effective depends on a number of assumptions about CB radios and the CB-monitoring network.
23 Incident Rates Incident rates were calculated to determine how frequently a driver would have occasion to use a CB radio in an emergency situation. In 1983 Trailways buses traveled 137 million miles in regular-route service, with individual drivers averaging 60,000 miles. Therefore, in 1983 Trailways accrued 2,283 driver-years of exposure in regular-route service. Incident rates were calculated as years of driving per incident (i.e., 2,283/I, where I equals the number of recorded incidents). Three incident rates were calculated. The first approach, a conservative one, included only those incidents in which a CB radio probably would have been used--those coded "yes." This would yield a low esti- mate of how frequently the devices would be used. The second approach yields a liberal estimate by adding the incidents coded "don't know" to those coded "yes." Finally the "most likely" estimate of the number of incidents in which a driver would use a CB radio is derived by assigning only a portion of the ambiguous cases. It was unfortunate that such a large proportion of all incident reports contained insufficient infor- mation for a more definitive assignment, but it is not possible to reconstruct the data. Therefore, although it might be true that a disproportionate share of "don't know" incidents might be cases in which a CB radio would be useful, there are no strong a priori reasons for believing this would be the case. In the absence of such evidence, the most objective course was to assign the uncertain incidents on the basis of the ratio of "yes" to "no" incidents for each incident category to arrive at the middle or "most likely" estimate. Results A summary of the incidents reported by 20 Trailways subsidiaries in 1983 is given in Table 1. A more detailed breakdown of those incidents as well as an indication of whether a CB radio might have been used by the bus driver is given in Table 2. The category "drugs, drunk, disorderly" is the most common on-board problem with 172 reported incidents. In 7 of these cases (4 percent) it appeared likely that a CB radio would have been used had it been on board. In 67 cases (39 percent)
24 a CB radio probably would not have been used, and in 98 incidents (57 percent) it is unclear if a driver would have chosen to use a CB radio had it been available. TABLE 1 Incidents on Trailways Buses in 1983 by Type of Incident Type of Incident No. of Incidents Inside Bus Drugs, drunk, disorderly 172 Assault or fight 27 Medical 108 Theft or robbery 30 Outside bus _64 Total 401 There were 108 serious medical incidents in the Trailways file, 7 of which (7 percent) were considered to be cases in which a CB radio would have been used. In 55 incidents (51 percent) it was uncertain whether a CB radio would have been used if it had been available. There were 30 reported on-board thefts or robberies in the Trailways file, but in 28 cases (93 percent) it appeared clear that a CB radio would not have been helpful--for example, when the theft was reported as passengers were disembarking. Assaults and fights are described in 27 reports. However, in only one of these incidents (4 percent) would a driver probably have used a CB radio to summon assistance. In 17 cases (63 percent) there was insuf- ficient information to decide whether a driver would probably have used a CB radio. Table 3 gives incident rates in terms of years of driving per incident by type of incident and offers a range of estimates (low, middle, high) of how frequently bus drivers might use CB radios. Years of driving per incident range from 22 to 2,283 for the various types of incidents. For example, bus operators can expect to
25 TABLE 2 Incidents on Trailways Buses in 1983 by Type of Incident and Potential Use of CS Radio Potential CB-Use Dontt Type of Incident Yes No Know Total Inside bus Drugs, drunk, disorderly 7 67 98 172 Assault or fight Knife 1 3 4 8 Gun _a - 1 1 No weapon - 6 12 18 Medical problem Seizure 1 22 17 40 Stroke, heart attack, chest pains 3 5 13 21 Hemorrhage 1 - 1 2 Fainting - - 2 2 Other 2 19 22 43 Theft or robbery - 28 2 30 Outside bus Rendering aid - - 3 3 Objects thrown at bus 1 10 27 38 Mechanical problems - 5 10 15 Other 1 - 7 8 Total 17 165 219 401 a Dash indicates no incident reported. drive between 10 and 134 years between opportunities to use CS radios for reporting an on-board emergency. Although the calculated incident rates in these analyses are low, the annual number of driver-years of exposure accumulated by the intercity bus industry is large. Given that Trailways accounts for approximately 20 percent of all intercity regular-route service (2) and assuming, for the reasons stated previously, that' the Trailways incident rates are representative of those of all intercity carriers, it might be anticipated that nationwide approximately 2,000 serious incidents occur in intercity, regular-route services each year.
26 TABLE 3 Expected Driver-Years per Incident on TraliwayS Buses Based on 1983 Experience Incident Rates Type of (driver-years Type of Incident Estimation per incident) Inside bus Drugs, drunk, disorderly Low 326 Middle 140 High 22 Assult or fight Low 2,283 Middle 846 High 127 Medical Low 326 Middle 160 High 37 Theft or robbery Low Middle 1,142 High 1,142 Outside bus Low 1,142 Middle 303 High 40 All Types Low 134 Middle 61 High 10 aTh S rate cannot be calculated because no incidents were recorded for "theft or robbery." Incidents classified as "drugs, drunk, and disorderly" would occur 860 times per year throughout the industry. It is estimated that in 81 cases a CB radio would prob- ably be used to deal with the situation. Similarly, assaults and fights would total 135 per year industry- wide. In 14 (10 percent) of these, a CE radio probably would be used to summon assistance. Medical problems would total 540, with CBradios being of potential use in 71 (13 percent) cases. Thefts or robberies would occur some 150 times per year, but little or no benefit
27 would be derived from the use of a CB radio. Finally, operators of regular-route, intercity buses might expect to encounter 320 external incidents (e.g., rocks thrown at a bus) each year. A CB radio might be used in dealing with 38 (12 percent) of these incidents. Altogether, intercity bus drivers might have occasion to use CB radios to report on-board incidents about 200 times a year based on the middle or most likely estimate of CB usefulness. Likely Effectiveness Although there may be a few more than 200 opportunties a year for bus drivers to use CB radios to seek assistance in dealing with on-board emergencies of one type or another, CB radios will not effectively mitigate an equal number of on-board problems. First, the driver must have chosen to take a radio on board. A rule that simply allows drivers to bring CB radios on board if they so choose provides no assurance that drivers actually will do so. Many drivers employed by companies that permit drivers to take CB radios with them do not do so. Roughly half of the drivers at CB-permitting companies did not have radios with them when they were observed by the TRB staff. Although the number of drivers observed was small, this conclusion' was reinforced by estimates made by officials at several CB-permitting companies. Therefore, if 50 percent is an accurate indication of the proportion of drivers who would purchase and use CB radios if permitted to do so by federal regulation, the possible effectiveness of CBs in ameliorating on-board emergencies is immediately halved. On the other hand, a change in management attitude at Greyhound and Trailways could have a dramatic effect on CB use. For example, according to spokespersons for their associations, most independent owner-operator truckers use CB radios. However, officials at several truck fleets reported that fewer than half of their drivers still use CB radios. In the absence of convincing evidence.to the contrary, the estimate that the devices, if permitted, will be available about half of the time appears reasonable. Nonetheless, several Committee members believed that 50 percent was too low an estimate of the likelihood that drivers would carry CB radios on board. These members also noted that the drivers who
28 are most likely to encounter bad road or weather conditions or other emergency situations would also be most likely to take along a CB radio. Even if the bus driver has a CB radio on board and uses it, it does not necessarily follow that a call for help will be answered or that the appropriate response will result. The driver might not be able to raise anyone, especially in areas where the airwaves are congested or in very sparsely populated places where there is no one nearby monitoring CB transmissions. Moreover, the person raised might not be in a position to help. Finally, even if help is secured, the reduced response time might not have any meaningful impact on the outcome of an incident. It is difficult to deter- mine the joint probability of a driver bringing a radio on board, the driver being able to raise someone who can help, the help arriving faster than otherwise, and the help making a difference in the outcome. For the sake of illustration, if drivers have CB radios on board 50 percent of the time, roughly 100 on-board incidents would be affected each year. If the driver is able to raise someone 50 percent of the time and if 50 percent of those raised can help speed emergency assistance, the outcome of 25 incidents each year could potentially be influenced by having CB radios aboard buses. How often emergency assistance would make a difference in these 25 cases is impossible to determine. These estimates are simply illustrative, but they point out that there is a considerable difference between whether a CB radio might be used and whether using it might be effective in mitigating the conse- quences of on-board emergencies. Precisely how wide one believes this disparity to be depends on judgments about how effective CB radios are as communications devices. This topic is treated in more detail in Chapter 7. REFERENCES Public Hearing in the Matter of Use of Citizen Band Radios by Commercial Motor Carriers of Passengers for Hire. U.S. Department of Transportation, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 17, 1979. Bus Facts. American Bus Association, Washington, D.C., 1982.
3 CB Radios and Highway Accidents Approximately 44,000 people died in 1983 on U.S. high- ways, and 1.6 million more suffered disabling injuries (1). Although intercity bus is the safest travel mode, bus accidents do occur (2). When a bus is involved in an accident, its passengers usually fare better than do the occupants of other involved vehicles or pedestrians. The Committee examined how often CB radios might be used to speed police, repair, and emergency vehicles to the scenes of bus accidents and whether bus drivers might have the opportunity to report accidents they spot along the highways to appropriate authorities. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES To determine the potential of CB radios use for report- ing accidents involving intercity buses, the Committee relied on three sources of bus accident information: interviews with bus company officials and drivers, bus company incident files (which contain some accident information), and the motor carrier accident records of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The bus companies submit. accident reports to the BMCS, and these records were used to determine how frequently bus accidents occur in which a CB radio might be used to call for help. BUS ACCIDENTS Although bus accident rates are low, typically nearly 40 persons are killed and almost 1,000 are injured each year in accidents involving regular-route, Class I 29
30 intercity buses (Table 4). Fewer than 10 percent of those killed are bus passengers or drivers. A vast majority are either pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles. However, because buses carry more passengers than do automobiles or trucks, bus riders account for nearly two-thirds of those injured when a bus is involved in an accident. Obviously, because of their size and weight, buses afford their passengers more protection from death and serious injury in a collision. The BMCS bus accident file for 1983 was carefully examined to gain more insight into the nature of inter- city bus accidents. Bus companies are required to report to the BMCS any fatal accidents, injury, accidents requiring medical attention away from the scene of the accident, and accidents involving property damage in excess of $2,000. Of the 722 accidents reported to the BMCS in 1983, 226 (31.3 percent) involved buses in regu- lar-route service and occurred outside of central busi- ness districts. These are the accidents for which a CB radio would, presumably, be most useful. The 226 acci- dents caused 28 fatalities and 193 persons to be in- jured. One-half of the fatalities and 88 (45.6 percent) of the injuries occurred in 129 accidents and involved Greyhound or Trailways buses on which, it is reasonably certain, no CB radios were present. There is no infor- mation on whether CB radios were on other buses and no evidence that any accidents were caused by a bus driver manipulating a CB radio. REPORTING OF OTHER HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS Bus drivers who want permission to bring CB radios on board often cite, as a potential public benefit, an increased ability to report accidents they come upon on the highways. An Airport Service executive noted that his firm's buses come upon one or two accidents every day and that the bus drivers relay information to the dispatcher who, in turn, notifies the appropriate authorities. CB radios on intercity buses would add to the highway accident surveillance network and could help improve overall highway safety by helping to speed police and emergency medical services to accident victims. This is another area where there was a dearth of prior research that would help in the evaluation. The Com- mittee wanted to determine what potential benefits might
TABLE 4 Accidents Involving Class I Carriers Engaged in Regular-Route, Intercity Service (2,3) Deaths Injuries Accidents Occupants Occupants Per of Other of Other No. of Million Vehicles Vehicles Acci- Vehicle- Bus and Bus and Year dentsa Miles Passengers Pedestrians Total Passengers Pedestrians Total 1977 382 .61 7 27 34 490 276 766 1978 510 .84 3 35 38 675 479 1,154 1979 351 .56 3 19 22 560 331 891 1980 379 .58 1 31 32 568 268 836 1981 435 .70 2 63 65 769 391 1,160 5-year average 411 .66 3 35 38 612 349 961 alncludes fatal accidents, injury accidents requiring medical attention away from the scene of the accident, and all accidents involving property damage of $2,000 or more.
32 accrue if the number of vehicles on the road with com- munications capabilities was increased by equipping in- tercity buses with CB radios. The Committee did not attempt to assess directly the probability that a real benefit would result, but rather sought to estimate the probability that the opportunity for producing such a benefit would be enhanced if CB radios were allowed on the buses of companies that now prohibit them. There- fore, the Committee estimated the number of times per year a Class I intercity bus in regular-route service would be the first CB-equipped vehicle to arrive at the scene of either a fatal accident or a serious-injury ac- cident in a rural area. The Committee focused on rural areas because the chances are good that any accidents first reported by intercity bus drivers will be in rural rather than urban areas. In urban areas, other forms of communication are readily available and generally are more reliable. In 1981 there were 683 billion vehicle-miles of travel on rural highways (4, p. 168). Class I intercity buses accounted for less than one-tenth of 1 percent of this traffic, or about 600 million miles (2). Approximately 40 billion miles were accumulated by combination trucks, and the remaining 641 billion miles were accumulated by other vehicles (e.g., passenger vehicles, single-unit trucks) (4). Table 5 gives the relative proportion of rural vehicle-miles accumulated by these three classes of vehicles. A first approximation of the probability that a vehi- cle of a given class will be the first vehicle at the scene of an accident is simply its proportion of total travel. For example, the probability that a Class I, intercity bus will be the first vehicle to arrive at the scene of a rural accident is .0009. The probability that the first vehicle at the scene will be a combi- nation truck is .0593, and the probability that the first vehicle at the scene will be some "other vehicle" is .9398. In 1981 there were 24,742 fatal accidents and 626,851 injury accidents in rural areas (5, p. 1). When the pro- portions in Table 5 are applied to these accident totals, Class I regular-route, intercity buses are estimated to have been the first vehicles on the scene of 22 fatal accidents and 564 injury accidents in rural areas in 1981 (Table 6).
33 TABLE 5 Rural Vehicle-Miles Traveled (1981) Million Vehicle Class Vehicle-Miles Proportion Buses (Class I, intercity operations) 600 .0009 Combination trucks 40,460 .0593 All other vehicles 641,466 .9398 Total 682,526 TABLE 6 Estimates of the Number of Times Different Vehicle Classes Arrived First at Rural Accidents (1981) Fatal Injury Vehicle Class Accidents Accidents Buses (Class I, intercity operations) 22 564 Combination trucks 1,467 37,172 All other vehicles 23,253 589,115 Total 24,742 626,851 This estimate of potential usefulness must be con- sidered inflated for several reasons. First, most bus travel takes place on Interstate highways, which are much safer than other primary and secondary roads. Greyhound and Trailways both estimated that roughly two-thirds of their mileage is accrued on Interstates. The carriers were unable to break down their traffic further into rural and urban Interstate shares. None- theless, fewer than 10 percent of all fatal accidents occur on Interstate highways, and intercity buses repre- sent roughly 0.13 percent of the total vehicular traffic on these roads. This suggests that buses on these roads would be first to encounter about 5 fatal accidents on Interstates each year. The remaining one-third of inter- city bus traffic would include the first vehicle to
34 encounter approximately 8 fatal accidents on other rural roads. Second, it should be noted that a large proportion of fatal and injury-producing motor-vehicle accidents occur on weekends and between the hours of midnight and 4 a.m. Intercity bus travel does not exhibit similar peaks. It appears that fatal accidents occur dispro- portionately both at times when and on roads where in- tercity buses are not traveling. A third reason for believing that the initial estimate is high is the assumption that all bus drivers would bring CB radios on board. If only one-half did so, the number of times a CB-equipped bus would be first at an accident scene is likewise halved. TEE staff rode 21 buses operated by CB-permitting companies, and obvserved that only about one-half of all drivers actually had the radios on board. This is a small sample, and it is dif- ficult to generalize from it to the behavior of the en- tire bus driver population if CB radios were allowed on all intercity buses. Spokespersons for CB-permitting bus companies offered a range of estimates of how many of their drivers used the devices. Boise Winnemucca, whose routes pass through some of the harshest terrain and weather conditions in the nation, claimed that 90 percent of its drivers use the radios. A number of drivers at different companies said they only take CB radios when they expect adverse weather. Other companies estimated that between 40 and 50 percent of their drivers used the radios. Jefferson Lines, a company that supports CB radio use and even sponsors a CB club for its drivers, reported that about one-half of its drivers carry their own CB radios on board. The determination of the probability that an intercity bus equipped with a CB radio would be the first vehicle with communications capabilities to arrive at the scene of an accident also requires some estimate of the number of vehicles equipped with CB radios. Based on discus- sions with a number of officials at trucking firms, it was estimated that between 50 and 90 percent of all combination trucks have CB radios on board. Much less is known about current CB radio use in passenger cars and other vehicles. However, there are about 125 mil- lion passenger cars registered in the United States, compared to about 3 million over-the-road trucks. If truckers had 2 million of the 14 million CB licenses
35 that were valid in 1979, then about 10 percent of pas- senger cars might have been equipped with CB radios (6). It was assumed that between 5 and 20 percent of all other vehicles have CB radios and that this range brackets the true proportion of CB-equipped vehicles, other than combination trucks, on rural roads. To determine just how sensitive these estimates are to the probability of CB availability aboard different classes of vehicles, sensitivity analyses were under- taken. The probability of CB availability aboard inter- city buses was allowed to range from 0.25 to 0.75. For combination trucks, the probability of CB availability was allowed to range from 0.50 to 0.90, and for other vehicles the range was from 0.05 to 0.20. Finally, of the injury accidents encountered, only about 10 percent might be characterized as serious- injury accidents, based on data for 1981 contained in a report of the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis- tration (NHTSA) (7). A serious injury is defined as an injury on the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) of 3 or above (see Appendix C). Table 7 gives estimates of the number of times each year a CB-equipped bus will be the first CB-equipped vehicle to arrive at a fatal accident in a rural area, and Table 8 gives similar estimates for rural, serious- injury accidents. A midpoint estimate would be the case where 50 percent of bus drivers, 70 percent of truckers, and 10 percent of all other motorists have CB radios (Table 9). In that environment, an intercity bus would be the first CB-equipped vehicle at 80 rural fatal accidents and 200 rural serious-injury accidents annually. Again, these are liberal estimates because of the assumptions in- volved in the temporal and locational distribution of accidents and bus traffic. In some cases, a CB-equipped bus might be the first CB-equipped vehicle at the scene, but some other vehicle might already have spotted the accident and called for help by other means. Although many police departments monitor CB transmissions, police and emergency medical services are notified of accidents through a number of communications channels and the origin of a call for help is not always clear. Obviously, company policy will also influence how ef- fective CB radios are for reporting highway accidents to appropriate authorities. Some companies claim that
36 TABLE 7 Estimates of the Number of Rural Fatal Accidents per Year Where a CB-Equipped Bus Would Be the First CB-Equipped Vehicle at the Scene Probability of CB Availability on Buses Probability of CB Avail- ability on Other Vehicles Probability of CB Availability on Combination Trucks .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 .25 .05 71 66 61 57 54 .10 44 42 40 38 37 .15 32 31 30 29 28 .20 25 24 24 23 23 .50 .05 141 131 122 115 108 .10. 88 84 80 77 74 .15 64 61 59 58 56 .20 50 49 47 46 45 .75 .05 211 196 183 172 162 .10 131 125 120 115 110 .15 95 92 89 86 84 .20 75 73 .71 69 67 their policy is to require their drivers to report acci- dents they come upon but not to stop. In contrast, other companies encourage their drivers to render aid to motorists in distress. A driver from one such company related two cases in which his CB radio proved valuable. In one instance, the driver witnessed an accident in which a car radiator exploded and burned two people. He placed the victims on his bus, radioed ahead to inform the hospital they were coming, and took them to the emergency room.' Another time, he saw a lumber truck skid on an icy road and then slide into a river. He radioed the information to the police and then rescued the people from the river. By the time he got them out, the police had arrived. In this case, the radio prob- ably reduced the police response time. WEATHER- AND ROUTE-RELATED HAZARDS Drivers interviewed at CB-permitting companies often said that the ability to find out about weather and road
37 TABLE 8 Estimates of the Number of Rural, Serious-Injury Accidents per Year Where a CB-Equipped Bus Would Be the First CB-Equipped Vehicle at the Scene Probability of CB Availability on Buses Probability of CB Avail- ability on Other Vehicles Probability of CB Availability on Combination Trucks .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 .25 .05 177 165 154 144 135 .10 110 105 100 96 92 .15 80 77 75 72 70 .20 63 61 59 58 56 .50 .05 354 328 306 287 270 .10 220 210 200 192 184 .15 159 154 149 144 140 .20 125 122 119 116 113 .75 .05 529 491 459 430 405 .10 329 314 300 288 276 .15 239 231 223 216 210 .20 187 182 178 173 169 conditions was their primary reason for bringing CB radios on board. Several drivers said that they use the radios only when expected weather or road conditions war- rant. Monitoring weather and road conditions via CB radio might help prevent accidents and protect pas- sengers. For example, a Minneapolis-based driver related his. experience with a snowstorm that hit the Alden, Iowa, area suddenly â¢and unexpectedly. An 18-wheel truck jack- knifed on an icy road, blocking traffic traveling in both directions. When the bus driver learned of the incident by means of his CB radio, he pulled off the road. The bus passengers sat out the several-hour delay in a warm, comfortable motel lobby instead of being stranded out in the cold. Boise Winnemucca Stages contends with one of the rough- est weather-route combinations imaginable. The company's buses travel north from Boise to Lewiston, Idaho, passing through the Bitterroot Mountains. The route to Lewiston is a rough, narrow, two-lane, twisting, uphill road with few guardrails and many sheer dropoffs. During the
38 TABLE 9 Midpoint Estimates of the Number of Times CB-Equipped Vehicles of Different Classes Would Be the First CB-Equippped Vehicle at the Scene of an Accident (1981) Accident Severity Probability Serious- of CB on Injury Vehicle Class Board Fatal Injury Accidents Buses (Class I, intercity 0.50 operations Combination trucks 0.70 All other vehicles 0.10 Total 80 2,006 200 7,554 191,378 18,929 17,108 433,467 42,871 24,742 626,851 62,000 winter, vehicles are routinely required to use chains on this road. Boise Winnemucca buses also travel south through the barren deserts of eastern Oregon and Nevada. Both routes are isolated. On the Lewiston route, for which there is no practical alternative, the bus travels over ID-55 through Banks, Idaho. Until recently this road was mostly closed by a reconstruction project necessitated by massive rock- slides. For 10 minutes every hour, vehicles were al- lowed to pass through the barriers. According to the drivers, if they radioed ahead, the highway workmen would often keep the road open a few extra minutes to let the bus through. On the southern route to Win- nemucca, according to drivers, the CB radio can alert them to blinding sandstorms, which come up suddenly. Near Rome and Jordan Valley, Oregon, the bus passes through open-range country, and the drivers say that the CB communication often warns them when cattle are on the road. Finally, motorists sometimes use CB radios to warn of erratic drivers on the highway. Personnel at Jefferson Lines related an incident in which one of their drivers received a series of warnings on his CB radio that an
39 oncoming pickup truck was weaving its way down the high- way. Even with these warnings, however, the Jefferson bus driver was unable to avoid a head-on collision with the truck. Both truck passengers were killed, and all but one of the bus passengers were injured. In this case, information made available by the CB radio did not prevent the accident; however, the radio may have hastened the arrival of medical assistance at the scene. Police in the area were monitoring CB transmissions before the accident occurred. COMBINED POTENTIAL USES OF CB RADIOS ON BUSES As discussed previously, in addition to monitoring weather and road conditions, drivers could use CB radios to report on-board incidents, bus-involved accidents, and other accidents they see on the highways. There are about 700 occasions annually when a bus driver might have the opportunity to use a CB radio to summon aid (Table 10). The potential for CB use varies throughout the United States depending on weather, terrain, high- way, and traffic conditions. In areas where drivers ex- pect to encounter difficulties, CB use will be corre- spondingly greater and the benefits more probable. It should be reiterated that the estimates of probable CB use given in Table 10 are not coincident with the number of times CB radios will materially affect highway safety. As suggested in Chapter 2, a number of things must happen if the outcome of any highway emergency is to be mitigated by use of a CB radio.
40 TABLE 10 Estimates of the Number of Times per Year CB Radios Might Be Used for Purposes of Safety During Regu1ar-Route,. Intercity Service Estimated Situation Number Source of Estimate Inside Bus Drugs, drunk, disorderly 81 Assault or fight 14 Medical 71 Theft or robbery 0 Outside Bus 38 Subtotal 204 Trailways incident file Bus-involved accidents 226 BMCS file Other accidentsa Fatal accidents 80 Serious-injury 200 accidents Subtotal 280 FUWA and ABA reports- Total 710 aCases where a CB-equipped bus would be the first CB- equipped vehicle to arrive at the scene assuming 50 percent of buses have CB radios and 70 percent and 10 percent of combination trucks and all other vehicles, respectively, have CB radios. REFERENCES B. Carraro. 1983 Traffic Deaths: The Downward Trend Continues. Traffic Safety, May-June 1984. Bus Facts. American Bus Association, Washington, D.C., 1982. Accidents of Motor Carriers of Passengers. BMCS, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1977 (and sub- sequent years).
41 Highway Statistics 1982. FHWA, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1982. Highway Safety Performance--1981: Fatal and Injury Accident Rates on Public Roads in the United States. FHWA, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1983. Motor Vehicle Facts and Trends 1981. American Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association, Detroit, Mich., 1982. National Accident Sampling System 1981. NHTSA, U.S. Department of Transportation, July 1983.
4 CB Radios and Bus Speeds Spokespersons for Greyhound and Trailways claim that one reason bus drivers want CB radios is to evade speed law enforcement. It is commonly believed that many motorists use the radios to locate highway patrols and adjust their speeds accordingly. Several sources report that when CB radio users inform other drivers about the location of speed enforcement stations, motorists begin slowing down for several miles in each direction (interviews with Lt. Raymond Cotton, Maryland State Police; Robert Tall, Executive Director of Associated Public Safety Communi- cations Officers; and Gerald Reese, President of Radio Emergency Associated Citizen Teams, International, March 23, 1984). Presumably, when no patrols are reported in the area, motorists speed up. One attempt to judge the effect of CB radios on speed limit compliance found that CB-equipped cars traveled slightly faster than other cars and were somewhat less likely to comply with the 55 mph speed limit (1). The study compared the speeds of vehicles with CB antennas to those of vehicles without antennas. The study did not determine whether the CBs were actually being used at the time the speeds were recorded. In fact, many vehicles sporting antennas may no longer have a CB radio in them. Speeds were recorded on two successive weekends in North Carolina in 1978. The results of the speed monitoring are given in Table 11. The North Carolina researchers also examined whether the presence of highway patrol cars had a differential effect on the speeds of vehicles equipped and not equipped with CB radios. The speed data collected revealed that both CB-equipped and non-CB-equipped cars responded about the same when highway patrol cars were present. 42
TABLE 11 ,Speeds of CR-Equipped and Non-CB-Equipped Vehicles in North Carolina (1) Weekend 1 Weekend 2 Percentage Percentage Complying Complying No. Average With No. Average With Vehicle of Speed 55 mph of Speed 55 mph Type Vehicles (mph) Limit Vehicles (mph) Limit CB 500 62.6 31 613 60.9 46 antenna present No CR 876 61.7 37 974 60.2 53 antenna present -
44 Another study focusing on Texas motorists found a small (usually less than 1 mph) but statistically significant difference between CB-equipped and non-CB- equipped vehicles when no patrol cars were present. The difference disappeared when there were patrol cars in the vicinity. The slightly larger drop in speeds of CB-equipped cars suggests some causal relationship (2). Bus company managements have also expressed concern that bus drivers would participate in a communications network the chief purpose of which would be to thwart speed law enforcement efforts. Such participation could compromise the bus driver's image as a safety profes- sional, at least in the eyes of some passengers. There are, therefore, two questions that must be addressed: (a) Do drivers of buses equipped with CBs drive faster than drivers of buses without them? (b) Do drivers of CB-equipped buses actively participate in a network that locates and reports highway patrol activities? METHODOLOGY To answer the question of whether CB radios would be used by bus drivers to evade speed law enforcement, TRB staff rode intercity buses operated by companies that permit the devices. Bus speeds were recorded by using a stopwatch to clock the time the bus took to travel between successive mileposts. Readings were taken pre- dominantly in clear daylight conditions on relatively level roads in free-flowing traffic. Whenever possible, observers sat where they could observe the driver's use of the radio but not be seen by the driver. Buses of companies that prohibit CB radios were also ridden. The principal purpose of riding the buses was to observe how CB radios are used by bus drivers. There was no intent to develop a data base adequate for statis- tical analyses; indeed it is probably not possible to do so. Although the Committee identified about a dozen bus companies that use CB radios, these companies are relatively small and operate only a handful of sched- ules. Ideally, the speeds of CB-equipped buses should be compared with those of similar Trailways or Greyhound buses operating over the same routes. Unfortunately, such direct competition seldom takes place, making it difficult to analyze any difference through standard statistical procedures.
45 The decision to ride buses, therefore, was not made to generate a random sample of bus speeds for formal statis- tical analysis. If such an effort had been possible it would have quickly exhausted Committee resources. The bus-riding effort was a clinical approach to the problem. The Committee wanted firsthand information on how drivers were actually using CB radios when they had them. FINDINGS A total of 30 bus rides were taken by TRB staff. Buses of CB-permitting and CB-prohibiting companies were ridden in Arizona, California, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, and Minnesota. In some cases road or traffic conditions precluded measuring speeds, although the way the driver used the CB radio was still monitored. Speeds were recorded on 19 bus rides and a total of 226 speed read- ings were taken. Because two rides were in mountainous territory, the speeds recorded were atypically low (Tables 12 and 13). Although 15 of the trips for which speeds were recorded were made on buses of companies that permit CB radios, only 7 drivers had brought their radios along on the observed trip. As a result, the number of observations is small and the findings about speed are tentative at best. Nevertheless, speeds achieved by bus drivers with CB radios were about the same as those recorded for drivers without them. If there is a difference in average speed, it is probably not large. It would have been necessary to monitor several hundred bus trips to have a reason- able chance of detecting the effect of the use of CB radios on speed--if, indeed, such an effect exists. The Committee agreed that isolating the effect of CB radios on speed from all the other factors in the driving environment would be difficult to attempt within the scope of this study. Thus, there might be small dif- ferences between speeds of those drivers with CB radios and those without them. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that a limited number of bus trips on CB- equipped vehicles did not reveal a large difference in average driving speeds. The most direct comparison of bus speeds was made in Arizona where 36 speed readings were taken on 3 Greyhound buses and 38 speed measurements were made on 3 CB- equipped buses traveling over the same route. The Greyhound buses averaged 61.0 mph and traveled at speeds
TABLE 12 Results of On-Board Monitoring of Individual Intercity Bus Speeds Range CB-Permit- CB-Prohibit- of Stan- No. of ting Co. ing Co. Mean Speed dard Observa- CE CE Not CB not Route and Bus Company Speed (mph) Deviation tions Present Present Present 1-94, Indian Trails 64.6 59.5-67.4 2.4 9 X AZ-60/89, Greyhound 64.0 58.1-70.6 3.2 11 X 1-94, Indian Trails 63.6 62.5-65.8 0.9 15 X AZ-60/89, Sun Valley 63.1 59.0-65.5 2.4 12 X AZ-60/89, Las Vegas- Reno-Tonopah 63.0 52.2-73.5 4.8 15 X 1-35, MN 77/62, Jefferson Lines 62.7 52.2-72.0 4.5 13 X AZ-60/89, Sun Valley 62.7 57.1-67.9 3.1 11 X 1-94, Indian Trails 62.3- 60.6-63.6 1.1 13 X AZ-60/89, Greyhound 62.1 50.0-67.9 5.4 12 X MN-77, 1-35, Jefferson Lines 60.2 56.3-66.7 2.4 13 X 1-94, Indian Trails 60.0 55.6-67.0 3.7 14 X 1-94, Greyhound 60.0 53.7-68.4 3.8 15 X AZ-60/89, Sun Valley 59.6 51.4-63.2 3.3 13 X AZ-60/89, Sun Valley 59.0 52.2-64.3 4.3 13 X MN-3, Jefferson Lines 58.6 56.8-61.0 1.8 6 X AZ-60/89, Greyhound 56.8 51.4-63.2 3.8 13 X 1-35, Jefferson Lines 55.5 48. 6-61.0 4.2 6 X ID-55, Boise Winnemucca 48â¢2a 34.9-57.1 9.3 10 X ID-55, Boise Winnemucca 450a 34.3-57.1 9.1 12 X Total 7 8 4 aSpeeds are atypically low because they were recorded in mountainous terrain. They are not included in the summaries given in Table 13.
47 TABLE 13 Summary of Results of On-Board Monitoring Range of No. of Mean Speed Standard Obser- Trip Spead (mph) Deviation vations With CB on board (N = 5) 61.2 51.4-72.0 1.9 68 Without CB on board (N = 12) 61.0 50.0-73.5 3.0 136 All trips (N = 17) 61.1 50.0-73.5 2.6 204 ranging from 50.0 to 70.6 mph, whereas the CB-equipped coaches averaged 61.2 mph and traveled at speeds ranging from 51.4 to 73.5 mph. In other words, the CB-equipped buses traveled only marginally faster than the Greyhound buses. This inconsequential difference does not support the notion that CB-equipped buses are driven much faster than are non-CB-equipped buses. As the data in Table 12 indicate, the average speeds of CB-equipped buses fell in the middle of the distribution of all recorded bus speeds. In addition to measuring speeds, TRB staff listened to the drivers' CB radio conversations to determine if drivers were using the radios to evade law enforcement or to alert other motorists to enforcement activities. Twelve trips were taken on buses equipped with CB radios, including several on which speeds could not be recorded. On one trip the bus driver constantly chatted on the CB radio and informed the rest of the motoring public of the location of an unmarked patrol car he had spotted. However, this behavior was atypical of the drivers monitored. No other bus drivers were heard discussing highway patrol activities. Indeed, most drivers did not speak into their handsets at all during the time they were observed. Although CB radios may allow some bus drivers to speed in some circumstances, the Committee was unable to find evidence to support the argument that this would be a major or widespread problem if the radios were permitted industry-wide. Moreover, even if it could be shown that CB radios do result in somewhat higher travel speeds, it is not clear what the safety impacts might be. Studies
48 indicate that slower highway travel speeds as a result of the 55 mph speed limit have reduced the highway fatal- ity rate and saved thousands of lives. However, it is not obvious that a small increase in average bus speeds will result in more highway accidents. Finally, active driver participation in CB networks reporting highway patrol activities could be controlled by establishing company policy forbidding such practices. Bus companies periodically monitor driver behavior and could establish rules and penalties covering misuse of CB radios if drivers are allowed to carry them aboard. Passengers, too, are likely to lodge complaints if bus drivers use the radios to thwart speed law enforcement or drive the bus at excessive speeds. REFERENCES 1.. B.J. Campbell. Speed Compliance During Operation Case. Highway Safety, Vol. 12, No. 4, Nov. 1978. 2. D.R. Harrison. The Effects of Enforcement on the Behavior of Citizen Band and Non Citizen Band Radio Equipped Vehicles. M.S. thesis. Texas A&M University, College Station, 1978.
5 Driver Distraction and Stimulation The possibility that operating a CBradio might distract bus drivers and reduce safety is the most serious nega- tive consequence that could result from allowing drivers to have CB radios on intercity buses. On the other hand, CB radios might enhance highway safety if they help stimulate intercity bus drivers who might otherwise become tired on long, tedious, overnight trips. In con- sidering these opposing possibilities, the Committee looked at two kinds of effects on vehicle control: those that might result from manipulating the controls of a CB radio and those that might'arise from simply listening to and talking over a CB radio. METHODOLOGY Although there have been no studies relating CB radios and driver distraction, there have been several studies of how other in-vehicle systems affect driving perfor- mance. These studies were examined for any indications of the relative difficulty of operating a CB radio while driving. Bus drivers who had CB radios on board were observed in order to judge how they actually used the instrument. Although such observations could not be translated directly into measures of distraction, the Committee believed that if using a CB radio seriously interfered with the driving task, such interference could be quali- tatively assessed. In addition, several drivers and management officials were interviewed to ascertain their views on how CB radios affect driving performance. 49
50 FINDINGS ON DISTRACTION Not only has there been no previous research on how CB radios affect driving, there have been surprisingly few studies on how any type of in-vehicle communications system affects driving performance. What little research there is in the public domain relates to cellular radio telephone and its impact on driving control. These studies used driving simulators, specially equipped vehicles on test tracks, driver opinion surveys, and market preference studies to estimate how handling car telephones of different designs affects motorist control. There has also been some research on how different auditory signals (e.g., speech, music) affect driving performance. Although none of this research specif- ically targeted CB radios, two studies that focused on the more generic issue of whether in-vehicle communi- cation systems distract drivers have some relevance to the present study. In 1978 Bell Laboratories undertook a study of how different cellular radio configurations affect the driving task (1). The study did not compare using a car telephone to having no telephone at all; rather, it compared different car telephone designs. After subjects had driven vehicles equipped with several different designs of car telephones, they were asked to assess the degree to which 14 different motor tasks would adversely affect their ability to drive a car. Their assessments were quantified along a 10-point subjective rating scale with 1 representing "no difficulty at all" and 10 repre- senting a task "so difficult I would never do it while driving." The mean rating scores are given in Table 14. The. mean distraction associated with conversing on a mobile telephone was 1.8, slightly less distracting than adjusting a car heater or air conditioner (2.2), although more so than talking with other passengers (1.3). Dial- ing a mobile telephone is rated at 4.6, about the same as lighting and smoking a cigarette (4.7). In qualitative terms, these results suggest that listening to and talking on a mobile telephone consti- tute some distraction, although dialing a mobile tele- phone appears to be more of a distraction. Using CB radios does not require dialing, but does require manipulating a channel selector and squelch control. These tasks are probably similar to tuning a car radio, which was rated 2.8 by the subjects in the Bell study. This research reveals only a rough indication of the
51 TABLE 14 Mean Responses to Bell Laboratory Task Difficulty Questions (1) Activity Difficulty Conversing with other people in the vehicle 1.3 Hearing the mobile telephone ring 1.3 Conversing on the mobile telephone 1.8 Answering a call on a mobile telephone 1.8 Adjusting a car heater or air conditioner 2.2 Looking for a landmark on the road 2.6 Talking into a tape recorder 2.7 Tuning a car radio 2.8 Drinking coffee or other beverage 3.5 Getting change from pocket or purse to pay toll 4.3 Dialing a mobile telephone 4.6 Lighting and smoking a cigarette 4.7 Writing something down 7.7 Reading a map 7â¢9 perception of the difficulty of operating in-vehicle communications equipment and is far from definitive. It will probably be several years before there are suffi- cient data from real-world experience with car tele- phones to determine their true impact on highway safety. The research offers only the roughest indication of the effect of operating a CB radio on driver attention and control. The impact on driving performance of listening to a radio has been tested under experimental conditions in Great Britain (2). One study tested the hypothesis that driving performance was measurably impaired by listening to a car radio, particularly under conditions requiring full attention to the driving task (e.g., heavy traffic). Driving performance was measured by connecting micro- switches to the vehicle controls and recording pedal and steering wheel movements, as well as the timetaIçen by subjects to drive over a preselected route. In bath light and heavy traffic, listening to speech Iiadà n insignificant effect both on the number of conâ¬rol move- ments (i.e., movements of the accelerator, brake, clutch,
52 or steering wheel) and on the time taken to complete the preselected circuit. Listening to speech did not impair driving performance. Most bus drivers who were observed using a CB radio primarily listened to CB transmissions and did little talking over the radio. This research suggests that driving performance probably would be little affected if drivers were allowed to carry their own CB radios on board. Other work by the same author in Great Britain examined control movements under conditions of fatigue and increased "perpetual load." It was found that listening to speech on a radio did not increase driver stress above that experienced under quiet conditions (2). Many drivers have testified that, under circumstances of long, tedious driving, particularly at night, listen- ing to the CB radio helps keep them alert to road condi- tions and thereby contributes to highway safety (3). The drivers also contend that operating a CB radio is inherently no more of a distraction than operating an AM-FM radio or operating the hand microphone sometimes required by management to provide passengers with infor- mation. On one trip during which driver use of a CB radio was monitored, the driver talked continuously over the radio. However, the extent, if any, to which this impaired his ability to control the vehicle could not be judged. In the majority of instances in which two-way communications were used, drivers did not talk but only listened to the radio while wearing an earpiece. The Committee considered using a driving simulator or an instrumented vehicle to test whether operating a CB radio compromises a driver's ability to control the vehicle, especially in emergency situations. However, the Committee decided against this approach. Most members believed that isolating the impact of operating a CB radio from the myriad of other factors affecting driving control would have yielded only marginally use- ful information. Also, bus driver performance in a simulated environment might not be transferable to the real world, especially in cases in which the effect being studied is expected to be small and have con- sequences only in emergency situations. Finally, even if a simulator or instrumented vehicle registered a statistically significant difference in one or more measures of performance, it is not clear what such a difference might mean in terms of safety. As a result, the Committee deemed that devoting study resources to
53 attempt to stimulate the effect of CB radios on driving performance would be unproductive. FINDINGS ON ENHANCED ALERTNESS The issue of increased alertness is somewhat different from that of distraction, especially as it affects safety. If CB radios distract drivers, then allowing bus drivers to take these devices aboard could cause an increase in highway accidents and injuries. On the other hand, to bring about an improvement in safety, enhanced alertness would have to reduce the number of fatigue-related accidents that presently occur. However, the Committee found no evidence that driver fatigue is a cause of bus accidents involving the major carriers. The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety reported that, for the first half of 1984, of roughly 500 reported bus accidents, only one was believed to be related to driver fatigue. This accident involved a Greyhound driver who had been on the road only 5 hours and involved property damage only. Furthermore, there are rules governing the number of hours bus operators may drive. If many drivers are becoming fatigued and if highway safety is being impaired, it would seem that the problem should be addressed by enforcing or changing the rules governing hours worked. However, there may be some drivers, especially those making long overnight runs, who might benefit from listening to a CB radio. Available information did not provide an adequate basis from which to draw a firm conclusion. SUMMARY The Committee found no conclusive evidence that CB radios either distract or stimulate drivers sufficiently to produce a noticeable impact on driving performance or highway safety. There may be minor effects, or the radio might have an impact in an exceptional situation, but these possibilities could not be measured in this study. REFERENCES 1. A.J. Kaines. A Study of the Effects of Mobile Telephone Use on Driving Behavior. Institute of
54 Electrical and Electronics Engineers Transactions, Vol. VT-27, No. 4, Nov. 1978. I.D. Brown. Effect of a Car Radio on Driving in Traffic. Ergonomics, Vol. 8, No. 4, Sept. 1965. Public Hearings in the Matter of Use of Citizen Band Radios by Commercial Motor Carriers of Passengers for Hire. U.S. Department of Transportation, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 17, 1979, and Washington, D.C., April 10, 1979.
6 Annoyance and Convenience Constant chatter and obscene language or other illegal uses of CB radios might offend many bus passengers, according to management. Bus drivers counter that earpieces effectively eliminate any potential for passen- ger annoyance. Further, they note that a CB radio on board an intercity bus provides passengers with an added convenience: availability of two-way communication for such uses as notification of bus schedule delays and calling ahead to arrange for medical and other forms of traveler assistance. METHODOLOGY There have been several attempts in the past to determine the content of CB transmissions. There have been a num- ber of surveys of CB radio users (1-3) as well as several studies by university researchers and government agen- cies. The Committee reviewed these sources and inter- viewed several individuals involved in highway safety, telecommunications, and intercity bus operations to elicit informed judgments on this issue. Finally, TRB staff observed some bus drivers using their CB radios and recorded whether the drivers wore earpieces and whether much chatter that might annoy riders took place. The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety rules on hearing stan- dards for bus drivers also were consulted to determine what restrictions on wearing an earpiece are presently in effect. FINDINGS ON ANNOYANCE The question of whether obscene language and CB chatter annoy passengers appears to be moot. In nearly all 55
56 instances when intercity bus drivers use a CB radio, they also wear an earpiece over one ear. Although one driver who did not use an earpiece was observed, the noise from the air conditioning system and the bus drive train, as well as ambient highway noise, overwhelmed the audio transmissions. However, if mechanical or highway- 'related noise is low and the driver does not wear an ear- piece, obscene language 'may be a problem.' Participants in a nationwide survey of CB radio users in 1979 (3) were asked to rank the least desirable attri- butes of the radios. Failure to enforce Federal Communi- cations Commission (FCC) rules was ranked the most undesirable attribute of CB radio. The respondents ranked the undesirable attributes in descending order as follows: FCC rules not being enforced, Overcrowding of channels, Use of obscene language, Noise or interference with TV signals, and Static. The obscene language problem was evaluated in another study in which Radio Emergency Associated Citizens Teams (REACT) volunteers observed, taped, and later coded more than 1,000 conversations in 18 locations throughout the country (3). The frequency of problems noted by the researchers was as follows: Did not use call sign at beginning or end of the conversation (89.8 percent); Interrupted conversations prematurely (17.3 percent); Used channel 9, the emergency channel, for "chit-chat" (1.7 percent); Interrupted others' calls to make obscene comments (1.1 percent); Used obscene language in conversation (0.9 percent); and Did not permit emergency callto go through channel (0.1 percent). About one in a hundred conversations contained obscene language. A similar number of conversations were inter- rupted by pranksters who made obscene remarks. Whether this level of frequency constitutes a serious problem for bus operators is debatable. However, there is addi-
57 tional evidence that indicates a substantial number of CB radio users believe that obscenity on theairwaves is a problem (1). A survey of 754 purchasers of CB equip- ment in the late 1970s, including a question on the severity of the obscene language problem, provided the following results: Major problem (21 percent of responses), Somewhat of a problem (19 percent), Slight problem (27 percent), and Not a problem (33 percent). This evidence suggests that enough people consider obscene language a problem to warrant drivers wearing earpieces. The bus companies that prohibit CB radios argue that earpieces would interfere with the bus drivers' ability to monitor traffic and to hear what is happening aboard the bus. The BMCS has no specific regulations on ear- pieces, although the bureau does require specific hearing levels. Apparently, the use of a single earpiece, par- ticularly the type that covers the external ear and is not inserted into the ear canal (called a 0novi-piece) and the type most often used by drivers, meets BMCS hearing level standards. In March 1984, the BMCS stated the following position in response to an inquiry about the use of earplugs or earmuffs to protect drivers who must work in noisy environments for prolonged periods of time: Although there is nothing in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety regulations that prohibits their use, if the use of either device impairs the driver's hearing so that the driver cannot pass the prescribed test [Section 391.41(b) (11) of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations], then its use is prohibited while operating the motor vehicle (Letter from G.J. Davis, Chief, Regulations Division of Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety to J.E. Sprinson of Standard Oil Company of California, March 1, 1984). A driver's part of a conversation cannot be heard beyond the first two or three rows of seats. As pointed out previously, most drivers, perhaps cognizant of their passengers' feelings, rarely spoke into their micro- phones. Management's concern--that the driver's image as a safety professional would be tarnished if CB radios
58 were permitted on board buses--does not appear to be well founded. FINDINGS ON PASSENGER CONVENIENCE The bus drivers contend that there are a number of instances when having CB radios on board would promote passenger convenience. Among the more likely cases are Calling ahead when a bus will be a little late so that passengers do not miss their connections; Asking directions when a driver is in unfamiliar territory; Calling for assistance in case of mechanical failures; Learning of impassable road conditions ahead and taking an alternate route; Learning about adverse weather conditions, especially severe thunderstorms, tornado sightings, and other short-term weather problems, and waiting until the threat subsides; and Arranging for assistance for handicapped or minor passengers at the station. TRB staff were informed about several cases in which CB radios were alleged to have been used to avoid traf- fic jams and stay on schedule or to help regular-route passengers make connections when their bus would arrive late. One staff member's experience in riding buses for this study is informative. The bus was nearly an hour late arriving at a college campus bus stop. This delay necessitated a long wait in the cold. Several times the college secretary, who also sold bus tickets, called a nearby bus station to find out if the bus was on its way. The secretary explained that the driver had not radioed ahead as he usually did if he was going to be late. As mentioned earlier, Boise Winnemucca drivers used their CB radios to keep open a road, which was under construction, in order to avoid excessive delays. The potential for CB radios to contribute to passenger convenience appears to be largely related to situational differences faced by various carriers or over various routes. In places characterized by frequent storms, dense fogs, and other aberrant weather patterns, CB radios might be used to avoid unnecessary delays or
59 allow the driver and passengers to wait out a storm in more comfortable surroundings. Many drivers at CB-permitting companies told TRB staff that they only brought their CB radios along when they believed that there was a high probability of encountering weather- related problems. Thus, even though on a nationwide scale there might be relatively few opportunities for using CB radios to foster passenger convenience, they might be important locally under special circumstances. As matters now stand, the drivers, not the companies, choose whether to use a radio. The potential for improving passenger convenience exists, especially in areas where weather and terrain cause frequent delays and unsafe travel conditions, but unless company policy prescribes that CB radios be used for such purposes, there is no assurance the potential will be realized. SUMMARY On the basis of staff observations, CB radios are not an annoyance, especially when drivers wear earpieces. Although CB transmissions often contain obscene language, nearly all drivers observed wore earpieces that effectively eliminated the problem of passenger annoyance. Many of the concerns expressed by management could be addresáed by establishing rules and regulations governing the way CB radios are used, if the drivers are allowed to bring them on board. The radios are also potentially a convenience, but only if company policy promotes such use. REFERENCES The Goodbuddy Phenomenon: A Profile of CB Purchasers. TIME Marketing Research Report 1997. Time, Inc., New York, 1977. B.E. Foodstadt, A.P. Ronamczuk, and P.C. Burger. Implementation of User Demand and Satisfaction Model for Personal Radio Series. Advanced Research Resources Organization, Bethesda, Maryland, 1977. Denver Research Institute, University of Denver. The Citizens Band Personal Radio Service: A Socio- Technological Assessment. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1979.
7 Effectiveness of CB Radios as Communications Devices The need for an effective system of mobile communications has been recognized by the Federal Highway Administration and other government agencies for a number of years. Considerable effort has been spent trying to identify the characteristics of such a service and. its probable benefits. The need to promote safety on the highways through the use of radio was expressed by the Congress in the High- way Safety Acts of 1966 and 1973. The need for a motor- ist radio service was documented in a report for FHWA in 1972 (1) and also identified in a 1974 report by the Committee on Communications of the Transportation Research Board (2). The use of CB radios for transportation safety was specifically recommended in policy statements made by the Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) in 1975 (3). That 1975 report contains a bibliography identifying 114 references that describe research and analyses that bear on the need for highway safety communications. These points are further elaborated in U.S. DOT comments to the Federal Communications Commission in response to an inquiry (4). In these comments the U.S. DOT recognizes the values derived from use of CB radios by the general public and recommends that the FCC take steps to establish an allocation of spectrum and regulatory guidelines for the structuring of a reliable new service that would have the express purpose of promoting the safe and effective use of the highways by the motoring public., Reliability is a critically important' feature of any communications system that is intended to enhance high- 60
61 way safety. Among the features essential for a reliable System are Base station control over use, Minimal use of voice transmissions, Digital communications to minimize the, need for voice, Adequate capacity, Multiple channels, Complete coverage, and Low-cost mobile units. CB radios only partially fulfill these requirements (3), making this equipment less than ideal for meeting the highway safety needs of the motoring public. Although previous chapters have focused on the poten- tial benefits and the possible problems of allowing CB radios on board intercity buses, the benefits will not be realized and the problems will not be encountered unless a significant number of people use - the devices. Public safety will not be enhanced by allowing CB radios on intercity buses if no one is listening for emergency calls or if few other vehicles have CB radios. On the other hand, the radios will not be an' effective way of improving highway safety if the airwaves are so congested that calls for help get blocked out. Calling for assistance via a CB radio may not produce a helpful response or, indeed, any response at all. For the radios to be effective in preventing or ameliorating emergen- cies, there must be someone out there who could receive the transmission; that person must contact the appro- priate authorities; and the actions taken must influence the outcome. The Committee examined the technical characteristics of CB radios and the CB radio network.to determine whether the CB radio is an effective conununi- cations system for improving overall highway travel safety. METHODOLOGY As is the case in the other areas examined by the Committee, there has been little previous research on the effectiveness of CB radios inreducing- response times to highway emergencies. In a- search of the - literature, the- Committee found only twostudies, both- performed by state highway patrol agencies, on how CB
62 radios affect emergency vehicle response times (5,6). In addition to reviewing the literature, the Committee examined the activities of the three main CB-monitoring networks: Affiliated League of Emergency Radio Teams (ALERT), REACT, and National Emergency Aid Radio (NEAR). Survey data on the types of calls handled by REACT were tabulated and analyzed. Individuals at CB-permitting bus companies also were interviewed to determine if there was any firsthand evidence that CB radios had made a dif- ference in an emergency situation. Finally, the Commit- tee considered the technical characteristics of CB radios to determine whether limits on its transmitting and receiving range restrict its reliability. FINDINGS ON LIKELIHOOD OF RESPONSE The CBnetwork is highly informal if, indeed, it can be called a network at all. When an emergency call goes out, there is no guarantee that anyone will respond. No one may be listening at the time and in the region in which the message is sent. Although there can never be a guarantee that a message sent will be received, some systems are more reliable than others. The number of currently active CB radio users is unknown because the FCC no longer requires that they be licensed and has no recent count of operators. In 1979, the last year for which official information on the number of licenses is available, there were approximately 14 million licensed CB radio users (and several million additional unlicensed users) who owned more than 20 million transceivers (7). The number of users is believed to have declined in recent years (interview with Gerald Reese, Executive Director, REACT, Inter- national, March 23, 1984), but the fact that about 1 mil- lion transceivers are imported into the United States annually indicates that CB radio use continues to be widespread (8). Nonetheless, the decline in popularity is reflected in the shrirkage of emergency broadcast monitoring. ALERT has disbanded. The only organization that still actively monitors channel 9, the CB emergency channel, is REACT. REACT's membership and the number of calls it monitors have been declining since 1977 (Table 15). In 1983 REACT had about 18,000 volunteers organized in 1,400 teams distributed around the nation. These teams monitor channel 9, report serious incidents, and try to get help
63 TABLE 15 REACT Membership (1977-1984) (9, p. 7) Year No. of Members 1977 73,000 1978 54,000 1979 43,000 1980 32,000 1981 25,000 1982 22,000 1983 18,000 1984 (est.) 15,000 to motorists in need. Between 1.5 and 2 million hà urs are monitored each year (excluding those hours monitored by nonresponding REACT members). Between 55,000 and 60,000 accidents, road obstructions, and major traffic jams are reported each year. In addition, REACT volun- teers handle hundreds of thousands of minor incidents, ranging from requests for road information to requests for help for stalled vehicles. However, REACT monitor- ing sites reflect the geographic distribution of the population. One study found that 74 percent of base station coverage occurs in 2 percent of the geographic area of the United States. Urban areas are well covered, but rural coverage is sparse, and it is on rural roads where a majority of fatal accidents occur (3). Many state police departments, in addition to the volunteers, monitor channel 9. In 1977, 48 state police agencies monitored emergency broadcasts, but that number has since fallen (interview with Robert Tall, Associated Public Safety Communications Officers, March 23, 1984). Part of the reason for the decline is the cutback in federal funds for the National Emergency Aid Radio (NEAR) program. This program was sponsored by the U.S. Depart- ment of Transportation and was designed to promote coordination of voluntary efforts with those of public safety agencies. Finally, CB emergency transmissions can be picked up by other mobile users and the information relayed to appropriate authorities. As a result, it is difficult to measure precisely the coverage of CB transmissions. A large number of calls are received by volunteers, but
64 there is no way of knowing how many calls go unanswered. Supporters of CB radios point out that even though CB coverage is not complete, it is still widespread and better than no system at all. Opponents counter that coverage is spotty and declining. CB radios would offer, critics argue, little more than a false sense of security. If a two-way communication capability is needed for travel safety purposes, there must be some assurance that there is a reasonable chance that the system will function in an emergency. Officials of one bus company visited by TEB staff recognized the need for reliable monitoring by a dispatcher or a person designated to receive messages. Airport Service installed a two-way radio system in each of its 103 buses at a cost of $3,000 apiece and has someone on duty to ensure that the drivers' messages are received. Jefferson Lines, a firm that supports driver CB radio use, is considering setting up a system of base stations along their routes to make their CB radios more reliable. FINDINGS ON RESPONSE TIME Assuming that a call for help is received by the proper authorities, the question remains of whether the time it takes to respond will be reduced. Two studies, one conducted by the New York State Police (5) and the other by the California Highway Patrol (6), investigated this question. In both studies some police cars were equipped with CB radios, and results from these cars were compared with results from control groups of vehicles without CB radios. The New York study examined the effect of CB radios on reducing the time it takes police and other emergency services to respond to highway accidents. Response time was divided into several components: Detection time--time elapsed from the time the incident occurred to the time the incident was detected by the person reporting. Notification time--time elapsed from the time the incident was detected to the time the first report of the incident was received. Response delay time--time elapsed from the time the report of the incident was received to the time a response vehicle proceeded to the incident.
65 Physical response time--time elapsed from the time the driver of the emergency vehicle started to respond to the time the vehicle arrived at the scene of the incident. This study found that notification time and physical response time were both significantly reduced by police monitoring of CB transmissions. Notification time was 2.5 minutes shorter and physical response time was about 1 minute shorter. There were significant increases in the reporting of unsafe driving acts, traffic violations, unsafe driving conditions, accidents, and disabled vehicles. The other two categories of response time were not affected. The study (5) concluded that Relative to telephone, personal contact, call boxes, etc., as a communication means for motorists to assist in improving effective exchange of safety related information, the experiment demonstrated that CB radio is highly effective (p. 112). The study sponsored by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) found that only 0.6 percent of police activities could be traced to patrol car CB radio contacts. According to the authors of the California study, these results cast doubt on the worth of CB radios in CHP cars (6). CB radio reports, from patrol cars, of highway accidents actually lagged an average of more than 5 minutes behind reports of the same events received over regular CHP communications links (e.g., telephones, REACT). Reports of drunk drivers increased only 0.1 percent in CHP areas with CB radios, and detection and apprehension of other extrahazardous drivers likewise increased only marginally (6). A major difference between the two studies was that the New York State project included monitoring by base stations, whereas the CHP analysis was of patrol, car use only. The majority of calls to the New York police was received at the base stations. Together these studies suggest that base station coverage is important if CB radio is to be an effective communications device for enhancing highway safety. These findings do not conclusively resolve the question of whether CB radios would be effective on intercity buses, especially if base stations are not simultaneously established. At best, the two highway patrol sponsored reports suggest that CB radios on
66 intercity buses would probably result in some emergency calls being handled faster than otherwise, but how frequently this would be the case and how often it would make a difference are still open to debate. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CB RADIOS The effectiveness of CB radios in emergencies is limited by some of the technical characteristics of the equip- ment. Only AM signals can be transmitted, although both single sideband and double sideband emissions can be used on all 40 channels. This allow5 between 4 and 12 watts of power output, which is an important determi- nant of the distance over which CB signals can be sent and received. A second determinant of range is antenna height. The height of a directional antenna is limited to 20 feet above the ground or above the object on which the antenna is mounted; the height of an omnidirectional antenna is limited to 60 feet above the ground. of course, CB vehicular antennas are much shorter. Output, antenna height, and FCC restrictions on bandwidth, frequency tolerance, and other technical characteristics give CB a short range, usually no more than 2 to 10 miles. In addition to range limitations, the use of CB radios is subject to other drawbacks (10) Shared spectrum--The lowest 23 CB channels are shared with industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment. Electrical noise--The CB spectrum is close to the spectrum of electrical noise produced by automotive ignitions and electric motors, and AM signals offer poor resistance to interference. Skip--CB signals may be propagated by reflecting off various levels of the ionosphere. Depending on atmospheric conditions, these skywave signals at times can be detected hundreds of miles away either as noise or as coherent signals. Inefficient channel use--Because all channels (except 9) are available for all purposes, certain channels get overcrowded while others remain unused. Channel abuse--Many CB radio conversations, which are social and casual, can interfere with emergency communications. Further, CB radio users can be undisciplined in their use of channels or can congest
67 the emergency channel at the scene of an accident, thus impeding emergency assistance. Equipment abuse--Some CB radio users connect amplifiers or power microphones to their units. Higher power output can create interference with other CB radios. Further, increasing the power output on a mobile unit can cause damage to a vehicle's electrical sy stern. SUMMARY Although the preceding chapters suggest that there may be times when bus drivers would find two-way communi- cations on board useful, there is considerable doubt about how effective CB radios would be. The two formal studies conducted to date yield different results but suggest that base station monitoring is critically important if emergency vehicle response times are to be reduced. There are no other systematic studies that show that CB radio is the answer to the nation's need for better highway communications. Although CB radios are inexpensive and readily available, they suffer from technical problems that seriously limit their relia- b i 1 ity. The information on effectiveness of CB communications is, in the final analysis, too weak to permit any strong conclusions to be drawn. Although the present size and activities of REACT suggest that there are still many individuals monitoring emergency broadcasts, REACT monitoring occurs mostly in urban areas, and the majority of serious accidents occurs on rural roads. Without reliable support for any of the probabilities, estimates of the likely effectiveness of allowing intercity bus drivers to bring CB radios on board remain little more than speculation. Yet, because there was some evidence that bus drivers might have at least an occasional need for two-way communications, and because CB radios appeared to be a less than a fully adequate solution to meet that need, the Committee examined the potential and availability of several newer and potentially more effective forms of mobile communications.
68 REFERENCES J.J. Renner and A.D. Owen. A.MotoriSt Radio Service. Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1972. W.G. Trabold and G.H. Reese. Performance of Volunteer Monitors Using Citizen Band Radio for a Highway Communication Service. In Transportation Research Record 495, TRB, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 25-34. J. Stephany. Use of the Citizen Band Radio Service for Transportation Safety: Report to the Deputy Secretary of Transportation. U.S. Department of Transportation, 1975. Comments on Federal Communications Commission Notice of Inquiry, Creation of an Additional Personal Radio Service. PR Docket 79-140. FHWA, U.S. Department of Transportation, Nov. 1979. New York State Police. Citizens Band Radio Highway Safety Evaluation Project, Vol. I and II. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1979. Evaluation of Citizens Band Radio for Use by the California Highway Patrol. Traffic Safety Center, Institute of Safety and Systems Management, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1978. Denver Research Institute, University of Denver. The Citizens Band Radio Service: A Socio-Techno-- logical Assessment. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1979. Imports and Exports of Communications Electronic Products. Marketing Services Department, Electrical Industries Association, Washington, D.C., 1984. The Reactor, Vol. 17, No. 3, May-June 1983. System Development Corporation. The Role of the Citizens Band Radio Service and Travelers Information Stations in Civil Preparedness Emergencies. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 1978.
8 Alternative Communications Devices Recently, interest in mobile telecommunications systems has surged, largely because of the well-publicized inauguration of cellular radio telephone service in several markets. The Committee investigated a number of these systems to ascertain whether they are effective alternatives to CB radio. One attribute of CB radios, which argues strongly in their favor, is that they are much less expensive than most alternative communications systems. . The current arrangement between management and drivers at CB-permit- ting bus companies, and the one called for in the rule proposed by the drivers, is for the drivers to provide their own CB radios. The drivers often provide the antennas as well. A CB radio costs the driver about $100 and an antenna about $18. In most cases, the only cost to the companies is for installing an electrical hookup. This cost runs between $15 and $75 per bus depending on whether the buses are equipped with 12- or 24-volt systems (telephone interview with Peerless Stage official, June 5, 1984). In 1981 Greyhound and Trailways operated approximately 6,000 buses (1). The total cost to these carriersfor providing electrical hookups would be between $90,000 and $450,000. If the companies also provided antennas, another $100,000 would be incurred. Thus, the total initial cost to the main CB-prohibiting companies wà uld be approximately $190,000 to $550,000. The other systems examined by the Committee were all considerably more expensive. 69
70 The alternative two-way communications technologies were reviewed taking into account the following questions: Does the alternative mitigate any of the problems associated with the use of CB radios on intercity buses? What is the cost of the alternative compared with that of CB radio? Is the alternative now available or will it be available in the near future? An increasing variety of mobile communications systems is available. These systems are compared in terms of basic performance features and cost in Table 16. Many of the newer technologies, including those that have not yet been licensed by the FCC, have the potential for pro- viding high-quality transmissions and reception at a reasonable cost. As new systems become more popular and as competition increases, lower prices for given levels of service can be expected. There is a difference between a technology and a service. Technologies, such as traditional VHF, UHF, or FM band communications systems or newer trunking, single sideband, or cellular systems, can be compared in terms of their operational characteristics (e.g., spectral efficiency range and channel availability). Services, on the other hand, refer to specific areas of spectrum that the FCC has allocated for various purposes, such as maritime, aviation, or private land-mobile radio. The Committee examined six systems. They are briefly described, in descending order of potential importance, in the following sections. CELLULAR TELEPHONE Cellular telephone was developed to overcome the congestion problems of other radio services. The FCC approved cellular service in 1982. Cellular systems can accommodate thousands of users. By dividing an area into small sectors or "cells," each containing a low- powered repeater station, cellular systems can use the same frequencies several times in a service area. Thus, more users can communicate without interference than is possible with conventional car telephones. Each repeater station is connected to a central mobile telephone exchange (MTX). To place telephone calls,
TABLE 16 Mobile Communicationsa Radio Legal Equipment Service Service Application Eligibility Cost (B) Cost Range' comments Personal radio Short-range mobile Unlimited Communications COmmunications; service (PRCS) extension of exist- ing telephone for personal use Citizens band Recreational use; tale- Unlimited phone interconnect difficult Amateur Hobby/personal use; (mobile) telephone inter- portion) connect very limited Private land- Basiness use only; mobile and telephone inter- specialized connect available mobile Domestic public Primarily business land-mobile telephone Unlimited Cellular Primarily business tele- Unlimited phone, with broad potential Land-mobile Particularly useful Unlimited satellite in nonarban areas service )LMSS) 400-500 Repeater ser- 3-5 miles Proposed service; any lawful vice optional direct, use permitted; alternative at $10/no 15 miles to CB over the long tern with repeater Less than None Normally Nondirected, nonprivate 100 5 miles communication: heavy inter- ference in many areas; criticized by bus companies Repeater club Metro area Business use strictly membership at with prohibited $10-$20/yr repeater Repeater and Metro area. Personal use prohibited interconnect with at $50/mo repeater 11000- $100/mo Metro area Conventional car telephones; 2.000 and up heavily congested; limited availability; no bus applicability 1,200c $100/m0 Metro area, Advanced feature car/portable and up and up plus telephone; potentially an alternative to CB HAd NAd Throughout Still in experimental stages; contiguoas potentially an alternative states to CB over long tern Technical 250-500 competence requ i red Limited by 500- type of 2,500 business aBased on Cobb )2) bThe range for many services is extended by the wide distribution of use, as is the case with CB. Therefore, range is given here only for comparison purposes. Cpresent average v $2,300. dNA = not available.
72 users send a signal from their radios to the nearest repeater station. The repeater then signals the MTX, which activates the telephone interconnection and starts the billing timer. If the user drives out of the cell and into another cell during the conversation, the system "hands off" the call to the new cell. The driver can remain in contact as long as he remains within any of the cells of the system. Although currently limited to urban applications, if cellular telephone proves popular, repeaters may be stationed along the entire Interstate highway system. Under such a long-term scenario, cellular telephone could provide an alternative to CB radios for intercity buses. Applications to provide cellular service for the 90. largest metropolitan areas in the United States have been received by the FCC. Cellular telephone is a common carrier service, and two cellular business licenses will be granted in each market--one to the local telephone company and one to a private radio carrier. Cellular mobile telephones currently cost between $1,200 and $2,500. Monthly equipment rental rates have been advertised at below $100 (2). Although there is potential for intercity bus applications over the long term, current costs are far above those for CB radio, and the level of service and availability of repeaters outside a few metropolitan areas make cellular telephone impractical for intercity vehicles in the near term. SATELLITE-ENHANCED SYSTEMS Through the technology of bouncing radio waves off a satellite, broader access is possible, particularly to areas less likely to be served by cellular or other services. Three petitions for such systems--from NASA, Mobilsat, and the Geostar Corporation--are before the FCC. In addition, Transit Communications, Inc., is currentry testing and marketing a land-mobile satellite service. In 1982 NASA requested FCC permission to create a commercial land-mobile satellite service (LMSS) that would focus primarily on the two-way land-mobile needs of rural America. NASA stressed that its system would not compete with existing and proposed terrestrial cellular and noncellular land-mobile systems but would augment them (3).
73 NASA's proposal emphasized that its LMSS would meet emergency medical, law enforcement, interstate transportation, and other needs relating to long-distance, land-mobile services throughout the United States rather than just in major markets. The system would use the MSAT spacecraft in geostationary orbit 22,300 miles above the equator. The large antenna proposed would allow virtual blanket coverage of the United States. Fixed ground terminals would inter- connect the switched network, and mobile ground terminals would interconnect the equipment in users' vehicles. All three LMSS applications to the FCC assume that the land-mobile needs of metropolitan areas would be served by cellular telephone. The various proposals differ in terms of availability dates of service (NASA, 1993-1998; Geostar, 1985; and Mobilsat, 3 years after FCC approval). The costs would exceed those of CB radio but would be competitive with cellular service: NASA's petition indicated $140 per month for regular service and $23 per month for limited base-to-mobile and mobile-to-base (i.e., no interconnection to the switched network) service. An important point made by NASA is that the satellite would be used by drivers only when thir vehicles were out of range of the terrestrial system or out of range of some geographic region. The NASA and Mobilsat systems would require using the land-mobile reserve spectrum, which has been reserved for expansion of cellular systems. The Geostar proposal is the only one that does not have such requirements (4). High costs for some potentially required components such as steerable antennas might limit LMSS use by intercity bus drivers. An experiment by Transit Communications, Inc., indicates that there might be some potential intercity bus applications. Currently available transceivers cost about $1,000 but are available at lower cost if purchased in quantity according to a company spokes- person. Vehicle position and identification could be automatically monitored by a single dispatch station for the contiguous 48 states. The option of data-only com- munications would decrease the cost substantially and would appear to provide the potential to overcome manage- ment objections to on-board, two-way communication devices (3). Actual costs are not available at present because the product is still in the developmental stages. This alternative would appear to eliminate most CB-related problems cited by management.
74 PERSONAL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE Personal radio communications service (PRCS), proposed by General Electric and now awaiting FCC approval, has been dubbed "a poor man's cellular." This character- ization is based on an estimated capital cost of $400 to $450 for base and mobile units together and a $10 per month service fee. PRCS has little in common with today's CB radios. Whereas CB channels are crowded and users must access them through the "party-line" mode, PRCS would provide private one-to-one communications. Unlike CB radio, PRCS uses the switched telephone network to allow a user to dial another party. These radios have built-in timers to limit the duration of calls during peak use periods (a feature similar to cellular technology) so that overcrowding will be lessened. PRCS is intended as a local service, with a mobile-to-- base range of 5 to 15 miles if the user subscribes to a repeater service that would cost approximately $10 per month. PRCS has a 2-mile mobile-to-mobile range. When a user is out of range of the base station, it will not be possible to connect to the switched telephone network. If PRCS service is successful and repeaters are placed along Interstate highways, an agreement might be made to allow 911 priority access without subscription to a particular repeater service. Technologically, PRCS could serve as an alternative to CB radio for communications access during long-haul driving, although that is not the design purpose of the proposed service. PRCS would eliminate annoyance problems as well as those associated with potential idle conversations by drivers. Although relatively inexpensive compared with many other technol- ogies, PRCS equipment nevertheless would cost five times as much as CB equipment and a currently unknown amount for access to repeater services necessary to provide full highway coverage. This service has not yet been approved by the FCC, although General Electric claims it will be widely available within 1 or 2 years (3). PRIVATE LAND-MOBILE RADIO SERVICE Private land-mobile radio (PLMR) service includes most of the radios operated by municipal, industrial, and business licensees. Typical applications include taxi dispatch, forestry operations, and highway maintenance.
75 Personal use is prohibited. Radio prices are generally more than $500 for portable units and $1,000 for mobile units. PLMR user organizations are extremely concerned that they will be precluded from expansion if PRCS is granted some of the spectrum. However, it is entirely possible that many businesses will find PRCS adequate for their needs, thereby reducing the need to have private, dedicated PLMR radio systems. The resulting smaller number of users on such systems could have a positive effect, namely, reduced congestion. This could be an alternative to CB radio if lower-cost equipment becomes available. The companies rather than the drivers would control the communications in this case. However, the cost would exceed that of CB radio tenfold (5). AMPLITUDE-COMPANDED SIDEBAND Amplitude-companded sideband (ACSB) systems represent another recent technological development receiving wide attention. The FCC 'has issued developmental licenses in the 150 megahertz band on private, common carrier, and broadcast (remote pickup) frequencies. ACSB technology using a repeater has been shown to have a range of up to 40 to 50 miles. ACSB technology has operational characteristics that permit it to operate in narrowband channels that can be created between exist- ing FM channels with normal levels of protection of radio stations in use. The word "compand" is a shortened term for audio compression and expansion, a process that essentially lowers the peaks and raises the lows in the audio signals transmitted on radio waves so that much less spectrum space is needed. As a result, high- quality, low-blocking, and low-interference transmission is possible. An additional technological advance is the use of a pilot tone that, before the actual two-way conununications, tells the receiver the exact frequency of the transmitter. The pilot tone also allows continual signal sampling to automatically adjust and make listen- ing clearer, avoiding the need for manual control to minimize the impact of interference, which is required by CB radio. Because ACSB has all the characteristics of regular FM transmissions (e.g., minimum static, less interference), it may be appropriate for intercity bus applications. Greater range, clearer transmissions, and spectral eff i-
76 ciency are several advantages of ACSB. However, use of the system would require a series of base stations and repeaters to provide the geographic coverage necessary. The equipment, at approximately $1,200 to $1,500, is more expensive than that of CB radio. ACSB is not being marketed as an alternative to CB or cellular radio. A mobile user in a vehicle would not expect the amount of monitoring that occurs with CB radio, but the user also would not encounter the many communications problems common to CB radio, including overcrowding, interference, abuse, and lack of privacy and centralized control (3). GENERAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICE General mobile radio service (GMRS) is not a mass market service. As a result, equipment prices have remained higher ($500 and up) than CB radio prices. Although GMRS is a personal radio service, it has come to be dominated by business users because of its higher cost. Licensing procedures for GMRS are lengthy and complex, and telephone interconnection is not allowed. However, GMRS equipment generally does have greater range, no limit on conversation time, and the ability to involve many parties in a single conversation. Thus some of the problems associated with CB radio are mitigated. How- ever, it is unlikely that GMRS could meet intercity bus needs in its present form (5). AMATEUR RADIO SERVICE Amateur radio service equipment is widely available for less than $500. However, business communications are strictly forbidden. Although telephone interconnection is allowed in amateur radio, the use of mobile stations is usually tightly controlled by radio clubs. VHF and UHF amateur bands are available for land-mobile communications, but licenses are required and some types of conversation are prohibited. This does not appear to be an alternative for intercity bus service (5). DOMESTIC PUBLIC LAND-MOBILE SERVICE Domestic public land-mobile radio service (DPLMR) is the conventional common carrier mobile telephone. There are
77 no restrictions on content of conununications, but DPLMR is primarily a business service because of cost//arid scarcity of spectrum. Users pay $100 and more5 per month plus $1,000 to $2,000 for equipment. The DPLMR spectrum is heavily congested; call blocking rates are more than 50 percent in some areas. There is commonly a 7- to 10-year wait for a mobile telephone; an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 people are on waiting lists, and coverage is poor in rural areas. Therefore, this is an inappropriate alternative to CB radio for intercity bus use (5). FINDINGS CB radio is the only mobile communications device cur- rently available that can serve the public at large. Some new technologies are being developed, but they are either too costly or too limited in their applications to effectively substitute for CB radio. Therefore, if an effective in-vehicle communication system is to be developed in the near future, CB radio will probably serve as the basis for that system. The ways and means by which CB radio might be made more effective are currently being studied by the U.S. Department of Transportation. REFERENCES Bus Facts 1982. American Bus Association, Washington, D.C., 1982. B. Kobb. The Development of a New Personal Radio Communications Service. M.S. thesis. University of Colorado, Denver, 1983. Future Private Land Mobile Telecommunications Requirements. Private Radio Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 1982. The Sierra Tests. Geostar Corporation, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. Private Radio Services. Informational Bulletin 7. Federal Communications Commission, April 1980.
9 Conclusions and Recommendation After reviewing the available evidence on the probable impacts of permitting drivers of intercity buses to bring CS radios aboard, the Committee considered a number of possible courses of action to recommend to the Secretary of Transportation. Because of uncertainties in the data concerning several key issues, the Committee had to exercise considerable judgment in interpreting the available information. FINDINGS Although the Committee was in fundamental agreement about the accuracy of the factual materials gathered by TRB staff, there was less agreement about the implications for a proposed rulemaking by the Secretary of Transportation. The Committee's findings are summarized below. On-Board Incidents The incident reports of Trailways were reviewed to assess whether CS radios might be helpful in dealing with such on-board incidents as medical emergencies, drunkenness, disorderly behavior, assaults, fights, and theft. Greyhound, which carries about 60 percent of all scheduled bus traffic, did not maintain incident files that were sufficiently complete to use for this purpose. Trailways, which has about 20 percent of the market, maintains a fairly comprehensive record of incidents and made this record available. Therefore, Trailways data were used to represent the industry. Representatives 78
79 of both Greyhound and Trailways agreed that Trailways' experience is probably typical of the industry as a whole, although some Committee members questioned this as sump t ion. When the Trailways data are extrapolated to the entire industry, it appears that there are about 2,000 medical, disruptive behavior, or other incidents aboard intercity buses throughout the United States each year. Based on an assessment of Trailways incidents, it appears that in about 200 of these cases a bus driver would use a CB radio if one were available. Highway Accidents Although intercity bus is a relatively safe way to travel, buses, nonetheless, are involved annually in about 400 accidents in which someone is killed or in- jured or there is property damage in excess of $2,000. These are accidents for which a CB radio might be useful in securing medical or police assistance. In addition, if drivers were allowed to use CB radios, they could participate in the network of vehicles reporting acci- dents and other roadside emergencies. An intercity bus could be the first CB-equipped vehicle at the scene of as many as 200 to 300 fatal or serious-injury accidents each year, although this is probably a liberal estimate given the different distributions of bus traffic and highway accidents. Finally, in some cases, CB radios might enable bus drivers to learn of weather or other route-related problems and take evasive actions. If many drivers chose to bring CB radios along when con- ditions warranted, some might avoid encountering emergency situations. Bus Speeds The speeds of both CB-equipped and non-CB-equipped buses were measured by an on-board observer to determine if the buses with CB radios were moving faster. A total of 19 buses were observed, 7 with CBs and 12 without. The mean speed observed for buses equipped with CB radios was 61.2 mph, whereas for buses without CB radios it was 61.0 mph. Two other studies of CB radios and speeds in passenger cars revealed a similar small difference in
80 average speeds. The use of CB radios might have some effect on speeds, but it is probably small. Distraction and Stimulation Virtually no previous research has been conducted on how CB radios might interfere with driver control of a vehicle. Research on how cellular telephones and other audio devices affect driving was reviewed in the hope it might provide some insights into the present case. However, the technologies involved are different, and much of the research is based on subjects' perceptions rather than on direct measurements of the difficulty of using the device while driving. The Committee was unable to find sufficient evidence to determine whether CB radios distract drivers or can serve as a way to keep them more alert on monotonous trips. CB radios might be helpful to some drivers, but this is an area in which existing research does not permit a definitive answer. However, the Committee did not find any evidence to suggest that bus driver fatigue was an important cause of intercity bus accidents. Annoyance Content analyses of recorded CB transmissions reveal that obscene language occurs frequently. When the driver of a bus is using a CB radio without earphones, passen- gers in the first two or three rows of the bus may over- hear obscene language and be offended. However, most bus drivers observed using CB radios wore earpieces (11 of 12 CB-using drivers had earpieces.) When drivers wear earpieces, passengers cannot hear the CB chatter, and obscenity is not a problem. Convenience There are a number of situations in which the presence of a CB radio on board could contribute to making intercity bus travel more convenient. Drivers and bus company officials related several instances to TRB staff, but under present conditions the potential depends on driver choice. Unless bus companies adopt policies detailing how CB radios are to be used, there is no
81 guarantee that the radios will promote bus passenger convenience. Cost CB equipped is inexpensive compared with other forms of two-way mobile communications. Under the current ar- rangement between management and drivers in CB-permit- ting companies, the drivers provide their own CB radios and, often, the antennas. The cost to the driver is about $100 for the radio and about $18 for the antenna. In most cases the only cost to the companies is that of installing an electrical hookup. This cost is approxi- mately $15 to $75 per bus. Thus, between $90,000 and $450,000 would be needed to add hookups to the 6,000 buses nationwide that are currently owned by the prin- cipal CB-prohibiting companies. Effectiveness CB radios suffer from a number of technical and other limitations that make them a less than fully reliable method for summoning aid in emergency situations. CB transmissions are still monitored by many highway patrols and REACT volunteers, but monitoring has declined in recent years and coverage is far from complete. Many truckers still use CB radios, although use by other motorists appears to be declining. The range of CB radios is limited to 2 to 10 miles in most circumstances. In some places the airwaves are overcrowed, and in others there may be no one listening to hear an emergency transmission. A New York State study found that CB radios reduced response times of emergency vehicles, but a California study did not reveal similar benefits. Alternative Technologies To determine if effective substitutes for CB radios were available, the Committee examined the operation and cost of a number of alternative mobile communications tech- nologies. None of the alternatives considered was found to be an effective substitute for CB radios. Indeed, CB radio is the only form of mobile communications that is
82 widely available today for use by the motoring public. For the relatively near future, CB radios constitute the only viable means of mobile communications for the inter- city bus industry as a whole. Although some bus com- panies (e.g., companies operating solely within an urban area) might be able to make use of alternative forms of mobile communication, most intercity carriers, including Greyhound and Trailways, have no effective substitute for CB. CONCLUSIONS The Committee was unable to find any evidence that CB radios on intercity buses would encourage excessive speeding, distract drivers, or annoy bus passengers. There may be some on-board incidents and accidents that would be ameliorated by the use of a CB radios, but it is impossible to be precise about how frequently CB radio use would influence the outcome of an accident or on-board incident. There are certainly a number of cases each year where communications would improve the outcome, but CB radios have enough technical and other limitations to make their specific contribution uncertain. POLICY OPTIONS Because there is no cost-effective alternative to CB radio at this time, the Committee agreed to focus on the simple question of whether all bus companies should be required to permit their drivers to carry CB radios on board. The Committee also discussed whether CB radios should be made mandatory, but decided that the evidence was not strong enough to warrant such a recommendation. The Committee considered two possible recommendations. The first would allow companies to continue to prohibit their drivers from using CB equipment. No rulemaking regarding CB radios on intercity buses would be proposed. The second option would be to propose that the Secretary of Transportation promulgate a rule requiring that bus companies allow drivers to bring their own CB radio sets on board. Companies could choose whether to provide electrical hookups and antenna mounts for CB radios. The Committee would further recommend that the Department of Transportation and the intercity bus
83 industry (management and labor) explore means by which in-vehicle communications can be made to serve as an even more effective device to improve highway safety. Most of the information examined by the Committee indicates that there probably are cases where CB radios would be used to summon emergency assistance. Advocates of allowing CB radios aboard buses admit that these devices are not the optimal mobile communications system, but it is the only system presently available. Proponents of CB radio use note that Greyhound and Trailways management have suggested no alternative solution to the expressed need for a communications system, and that none of the other technologies offers a "here and now" alternative. Until a better solution is found, CB radios can contribute to improving highway safety. Moreover, bus company management should be encouraged to explore, with organized labor and the appropriate federal agencies, ways and means of achieving more effective in-vehicle communications on intercity buses. Finally, proponents note that because costs of CB installation are small and would mostly be voluntarily borne by the drivers, this would seem to be a cost-effective policy. Opponents of requiring bus companies to permit CB radios object to a proposed rule on both procedural and practical grounds. They believe that a "permissive" approach to rulemaking is clearly inappropriate. If CB radios are indeed an important safety benefit to bus riders and other motorists, their installation should be mandatory. A rule that allows employees to substitute their judgment for that of management on an ad hoc basis is a departure from normal rulemaking procedures and could have important legal liability implications. Opponents further believe that the possible benefits of CB radio use on intercity buses are so minor that federal intervention would be inappropriate. Government intervention is not desirable in an area in which the safety payoff is uncertain. The government should focus its attention on areas in which the benefits are more certain and more substantial. Although the government does get involved in establish- ing safety standards that affect far fewer individuals than the bus-riding public, in these cases the need is more readily apparent and the benefit more certain. Pro- tective equipment for workers in certain industries is one example. Similarly, there are federal rules and regulations regarding other "low probability" events,
84 but in these cases the event, were it to occur, could have catastrophic consequences and the rule is more directly and more certainly related to affecting the outcome. Requiring flotation devices for airline passen- gers is a good example. Allowing drivers to bring CB radios on board intercity buses would have an uncertain, although probably a positive, impact on highway safety in relatively few incidents. Benefits are too uncertain and not great enough to warrant recommending a rule over- turning management's policy forbidding the radios. RECOMMENDATION Faced with the finding that CB radios on intercity buses would have an uncertain impact on overall highway safety, the majority of the Committee concluded that the avail- able data do not sustain the arguments for federal inter- vention. The majority of the Committee recommends that federal policy remain unchanged and that individual companies continue to determine whether to permit their drivers to use CB radios on the job. Although the majority did not favor federal rulemaking as a way to resolve this dispute, the Committee did recognize that an improved communications system for the users of our nation's highways could make an important contribution to highway safety. However, on the basis of the available evidence of the effectiveness of CB radios, a majority were unwilling to recommend that there be any changes in federal policy regarding this equipment. The decision not to endorse a.rule permit- ting bus drivers to bring CB radios aboard their buses should not be construed to mean that the Committee believed that existing mobile communications are satis- factory. It is not the existence of the problem but the appropriateness of the proposed solution that lies at the heart of the Committee's decision. Although the Committee recognized that CB radios have potential for making the nation's highways safer for travelers, the majority believed that the available evidence does not support a recommendation that the federal government require intercity bus companies to permit drivers to use CB radios. As the responsible federal agencies continue to develop policies and pro- grams governing the use of CB radios by motorists, and as communications technology continues to advance and alternative devices become more cost-effective, the changed environment may necessitate a reassessment of this question in light of such future developments.
Appendix A Owners of Buses Ridden Firm Headquarters Routes Airport Service,' Anaheim, Los Angeles-Anaheim Inc. California Anaheim-Costa Mesa Boise Winnemucca Boise, Idaho Boise-Banks, Idaho Stages, Inc. Eyre's Bus Line Gleneig, Baltimore-washington Service, Inc. Maryland Greyhound Lines, Phoenix, Kalamazoo-Detroit Inc. Arizona Phoenix-Wickenberg, Arizona Indian Trails Owosso, Kalamazoo-Chicago Michigan Kalamazoo-Lansing Jefferson Lines, Minneapolis, Minneapolis- Inc. Minnesota Northfield, Minnesota Las Vegas-Tonopah- Las Vegas, Phoenix-Wickenberg, Reno Stage Lines, Nevada Arizona Inc. Peerless Stages, Oakland, San Jose-Oakland Inc. California San Jose-Santa Cruz Sun Valley Bus Lines, Phoenix, Phoenix-Wickenberg, Inc. Arizona Arizona 85
Appendix B Interview Questions for Jefferson Lines, Boise Winnemucca Stages, and Peerless Stages Personnel Managers Why did your company decide to allow drivers to use CBs? Is CB use now or was it ever part of a labor contract? How long have your drivers used CBs? Can you recall any incidents or emergencies in which a CB was used? Are there company rules governing driver CB use? Does management supply CB hookups? What percentage of your drivers use CBs regularly? Do most of your drivers use earpieces? Have you ever considered installing any other form of two-way communication? Dr i ye r 5 Do you usually bring a CB on board? For what reasons do you use a CB? 86
87 Do you use an earpiece? Is operating or listening to a CB ever distracting to you? How often do you speak into your handset? How much of the time do you listen? Does the CB talk ever help you keep awake in an otherwise monotonous situation?
Appendix C Representative Motor Vehicle Injuries by Abbreviated Injury Scale Level1 AIS Injury-Severity Representative Code Level Injuries 1 Minor injury Superficial abrasion or laceration of skin; digit sprain; first-degree burn; head trauma with headache or dizziness (no other neuro- logical signs). 2 Moderate injury Major abrasion or laceration of skin; cerebral concussion. (unconscious less than 15 minutes); finger or toe crush/amputation; closed pelvic fracture with or without dislocation. 3 Serious injury Major nerve laceration; multiple rib fracture; abdominal organ contusion; hand, foot, or arm crush! amputation. 4 Severe injury Spleen rupture; leg crush; chest-wall perforation; cerebral concussion with other neurological signs (unconscious less than 24 hours). 5 Critical injury Spinal cord injury (with cord transection); exten- sive second- or third- degree burns; cerebral concussion with severe neurological signs (uncon- scious more than 24 hours). 88
89 Appendix C continued AIS Injury-Severity Representative Code Level Injuries 6 Maximum injury (cur- Decapitation; torso tran- rently untreatable, section; massively crushed immediately fatal) chest. 1 Based on Nelson S. Hartunian, Charles S. Smart, and Mark S. Thompson, The Incidence and Economiä Cost of Major Health Impairments, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1981.
Study Committee Biographical Information B.J. CAMPBELL, Chairman, is a psychologist who special- izes in vehicle, road, and human factors in crashes and crash injuries. He is Director of the Highway Safety Re- search Center and Professor of Psychology at the Uni- versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from Texas Christian University and a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina. Dr. Campbell served as head, Accident Research Bureau, Cornell Aero- nautics Laboratory, Buffalo, New York, 1962-1966; Chair- man, National Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1975-1977; and Chairman, Advisory Panel on Automotive Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1976-1977. He was the recipient of an Award for Research on Accident Prevention, 1971; Distinguished Service Award, North Carolina Public Health Association, 1972; and the Lauer Award, Human Factors Society, 1976. DON M. BENSON is a physician who received his B.S. from Wheeling College and his M.D. from Georgetown University. He is currently Educational Coordinator, Resident Program, and Attending Staff Anesthesiologist, Aultman Hospital, Canton, Ohio; Associate Professor of Anesthesiology, Northeast Ohio University, College of Medicine; Clinical Instructor in Anesthesiology, Resuscitology and Critical Care Medicine, Emergency Medicine Residency Program, Akron, Ohio, City Hospital; Clinical Associate Professsor of Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine, School of Medicine, University of Pittsburgh; and Director, Stark County, Ohio, Paramedic Program. Dr. Benson was President of the Ohio Association of Critical Care Medicine, 1981, and a member of the Committee on Emergency Medical Services of the Assembly of Life Sciences, National Research Council, 1974-1978. 90
91 ROBERT BRANDWEIN, a consulting economist, is President of Policy and Management Associates, Inc. A specialist in public policy in transportation, environmental plan- ning,and communications, Mr. Brandwein received his B.A. from Cornell University and his M.A. from Brooklyn College. He served as Vice President, Harbridge House, 1968-1977; Associate, United Research, Inc., 1966-1968; and Economist, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963-1966. Mr. Brandwein is a member of the American Economic Association and the Board of Overseers to Visit Harvard Medical School. DONALD L. DEAN is a registered Professional (civil) Engineer. He has been Chief, Intercity Bus Branch, California Department of Transportation, since 1980. Previously he was a transportation planner and assistant project engineer for the California Department of Trans- portation and Post Engineer with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Mr. Dean had a B.S. from the University of California, Berkeley; a Master of Engineering from Iowa State University; and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Davis. He is a member of the TRB Committee on Intercity Bus Transportation. RONALD L. EYRE is President, Eyre Tour and Travel, Ltd., and Vice President, Eyre Bus Service. He is President of the Maryland Bus Association and a member of the Board of Directors of the Maryland Travel Council. Mr. Eyre received his B.A. from the University of Baltimore. ROBERT J. FORt-IAN is a bus operations executive. He has been Vice President, Safety/Security, Trailways, Inc., since 1979. He served as Vice President, Safety, Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1964-1979, and as District Director (New England States), National Safety Council, 1963-1964. Mr. Forman is a past Vice Presiden'of the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee and past President of the Arizona Safety Association. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the National Safety Council and of the Health and Safety Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers. He received his B.S. from Michigan State University.
92 ROBERT L. HESS is Professor of Applied Mechanical Engineering at the Universitiy of Michigan. He also served as Associate Director, Institute of Science and Technology; Director, Highway Safety Research Institute; and consultant, U.S. Army Science Advisory Board. Dr. Hess received B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Michigan. He specializes in computer modeling of automobile braking, vehicle handling, and crash reconstruction; design of magnetrons and transis- tors; stress analysis; and glass structure and electron tube envelopes. JOHN R. L0PRESTO has been involved in police work since 1961. He is currently Police Captain and Commanding Officer, Port Authority Bus Terminal, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Mr. LoPresto holds a B.S. from Adeiphi University and is a member of the New York State Conference of Police Chiefs and the International Con- ference of Police Associations. ROBERT R. MACKIE is a psychologist and human factors analyst. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. Dr. Mackie is Vice President of the Essex Corporation. Previously he was Director of Research, 1952-1957, and President, 1957-1982, Human Factors Research, Inc. He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Psychological Association and is past President of the Division of Military Psychology of the latter. JAMES A McKNIGHT is a psychologist who specializes in instructional technology, highway safety, and occupa- tional safety and health. He received a B.A. degree from Brown University and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Minnesota. Since 1973 he has been Director, National Public Services Research Institute. He was previously associated in various capacities with the Human Resources Research Organization, 1957-1973. Dr. McKnight has been a member of the Driver Simulation Committee and the Driver Education Committee of TRB. He is currently a member of the Transportation Safety Committee and Chairman of the Motorcycles and Mopeds Committee.
93 ROBERT A. MOLOFSKY has been Legislative Director of the Amalgamated Transit Union dince 1981. He received his B.A. from Cornell University and his J.D. from American University. He served as a Field Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 1977-1981, and with the U.S. Department of Labor, 1973-1977. ELIZABETH A. PINKSTON has been a Senior Economist with the U.S. Office of Management and Budget since 1981. She received her B.A. from Swarthmore College and her Ph.D from Yale University. Dr. Pinkston has also served the U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability and been consultant with Policy and Management Associates, Inc., 1977-1978, and Harbridge House, 1976. JOHNJ. RENNER is President of'Advanced Technology Systems, Inc. Previously he was a consulting engineer with Jansky and Bailey, 1947-1968. Mr. Renner was International Chairman, Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers, Professional Group on Vehicular Technology, 1968. Mr. Renner holds a B.S. frà m the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.. He is a member of the TRB Committee on Communications and of the Radio Club of America.
The Transportation Research Board is a unit of the National Research Council, which serves the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The Board's purpose is to stimulate research concerning the nature and performance of transportation systems, to disseminate the information produced by the research, and to encourage the application of appropriate research findings. The Board's program is carried out by more than 270 committees, task forces, and panels composed of more than 3,300 administrators, engineers, social scientists, attorneys, educators, and others concerned with transportation; they serve without compensation. The program is sup- ported by state transportation and highway departments, the modal administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Association of American Railroads, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and other organizations and individuals interested in the development of transportation. The National Research Council was established by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and of advising the federal government. The Council operates in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy under the authority of its Congressional charter, which establishes the Academy as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation. The Council is the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engi- neering in the conduct of their services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. It is administeied jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by Act of Congress as a private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation for the furtherance of science and technology, required to advise the federal government upon request within its fields of competence. Under its corporate charter, the Academy established the National Research Council in 1916, the National Academy of Engineering in 1964, and the Institute of Medicine in 1970. -
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