Critical Incident Management and Clearance Practices for Rail Transit (2015)

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71 APPENDIX D Summary of Survey Results RESPONDENT INFORMATION 1. Date: 2. Contact Information Name of Respondent: Agency Name: Title of Respondent: Agency Address: Agency Size (note: this was entered after survey responses were received, based on FY 2012 NTD data) Small (<50 peak rail vehicles) 11 32.4% Medium (50–249 peak rail vehicles) 13 38.2% Large (250+ peak buses) 10 29.4% Respondent e-mail address: Respondent Telephone Number: TYPE OF RAIL SERVICE 3. What type of rail service does your agency operate? Commuter rail 55.9% 19 Light rail 58.9% 20 Rapid transit/heavy rail 29.4% 10 Commuter rail only 26.5% 9 Light rail only 26.5% 9 Heavy rail only 8.8% 3 All three modes 8.8% 3 Light rail + heavy rail 8.8% 3 Light rail + commuter rail 17.6% 6 Commuter rail + heavy rail 3.3% 1 4. How many municipalities does your agency’s rail system serve? Not summarized in report. Responses provided here. Fourteen (14). Eighty-three (83). Thirteen (13) member cities. LRT goes through to eight cities. Commuter (joint operation with another agency) through/to five cities. 1 7 Two states, nine counties, numerous local. Eleven (11). Currently only one city. The system is being expanded (under construction) to extend into another city. Approximately 22 within three counties. Commuter Rail services 12 communities with 12 stations. Light rail serves 13 stations in and between several com- munities. Another Light Rail system (more like a streetcar) has 6 stations in a 1.2 mile corridor within one city. This survey will focus on the commuter rail system from here on, for simplicity. 59 municipalities, including 38 cities, nine villages, two townships. One county. Three Fifteen (15) on the main line system between. 3 additional on peak hour only extension. One Eleven (11). Fifteen (15). Approximately 10. Over 175. Five counties plus parts of two other states. Six One Three currently. One city plus 5 counties. Eight counties. Nine 100 give or take. Six counties, 45 cities, 85 jurisdictions. Nine One city. Four cities plus four counties. Thirteen (13). 5. Does your agency’s rail service operate in more than one state? Yes 23.5% 8 No 76.5% 24 6. How would you characterize your agency’s operating environment? Mix of urban and suburban 47.1% 16 Mix of urban, suburban and rural 29.4% 10 Primarily urban 20.6% 7 Primarily suburban 2.9% 1

72 BARRIERS, OBSTACLES, AND CHALLENGES 7. Please characterize the following elements as major challenges, minor challenges, or not an issue in critical incident management and clearance practices. Major challenge Minor challenge Not a challenge Educating first responders re con- straints for rail 33% 48% 18% Response coordina- tion among multi- ple jurisdictions 11% 51% 38% Remote location of incident 30% 42% 27% Communication with passengers 21% 52% 28% Presence of uninjured passen- gers on the train 21% 36% 42% Unavoidable pro- cedural delays 19% 63% 19% Clear chain of com- mand at the scene 18% 48% 33% Electrification/ power issues 18% 30% 52% Ability to decide on/ implement alternate service 15% 48% 36% Insufficient train- ing for agency personnel 15% 30% 55% Avoidable proce- dural delays 12% 64% 24% Insufficient train- ing for non-agency personnel 12% 61% 28% Other 10% 20% 70% Other includes: (1) Re-opening main track after a fatality injured incident (major). (2) Tribal issues. (3) To be clear, we deal with many different communities and jurisdictions. In most cases, we attempt to have our own Police Department take over jurisdiction of scene if allowed. Some responders/communities have been very cooperative and helped to get service restored, others have gotten needlessly bogged down in details and irrel- evant procedures. 8. Please describe the nature of the one major challenge. Responses summarized in Table 34, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Some local agencies are more willing to assist in incidents than others; some stations and locations are in very rural areas and are hard to access for any emergency response agencies. A derailment or a crossing accident or any type of disrup- tion that will block the main line for a period of time more than 30 minutes in the peak period or more than one hour in the off peak periods During an actual emergency, all responders do focus on solving the problem. However, getting everyone to train together is an issue based on shift schedules and overtime and availability of assets. If we could train and exercise together more frequently, solving the emergency would go smoother. We have had issues where outside responders do not fully understand the rail system and the functions of our personnel to assist them—such as our Traction and Electrical System per- sonnel to take care of overhead power. We have been delayed getting to the scene due to responders not letting us through a road block, we have had responders get stuck driving on the tracks, and other issues where responders just do not under- stand our system. It is not because we do not provide training to them—they have a lot to train on and we have a very good safety record so we are not a high priority all the time for them to keep up with. None to speak of. In a situation of major flooding, mass evacuation of com- munities could be a challenge especially physically challenged individuals. It is difficult to respond to this question set because any one of these elements can present a major challenge depending on the location and magnitude of the incident. (The emergency resources in the core city are significantly different from those in outlying areas of our territory.) that being said, response coor- dination among multiple jurisdictions is always an interesting element. Prior knowledge of the different municipalities, their capabilities, personnel and communication networks can greatly streamline emergency operations. Major bridge structures located in the ocean. With multiple jurisdictions no two responders in different areas conduct investigations the same. State oversight rules require investigation of types of acci- dents: Type of Accident (1) Fatality at the scene or where an individual is confirmed dead within 30 days of a rail transit related incident; (2) Injuries requiring immediate medical atten- tion away from the scene for two or more individuals; (3) Prop- erty damage to rail transit vehicles, non-rail transit vehicles, other rail transit property or facilities, and non-transit property that exceeds $25,000; (4) An evacuation due to life safety reason; (5) All evacuations causing passengers to be in the right-of-way; (6) A collision at a grade crossing; (7) A main line derailment. A collision with an individual on the rail right of way; (8) A col- lision between a rail transit vehicle and a second rail transit vehicle or a rail transit non-revenue vehicle. This can lead to a significant delay of service (depending on location). Also, fire on train in revenue service requiring municipal fire and possibly EMS response. Coordination and communication of alternate service. Dense operation, constrained operator and vehicle resources, and sig- nificant traffic congestion make alternate service slow to set up and inefficient. Also, communicating complex and irregular substitute service requires trained staff often not available and/ or poorly coordinated. Response time variation for three different county coroner offices to process fatality scenes in a timely manner to allow reopening of the railroad Clearly, communications are a challenge in any scenario when safety and service come into play. Rapidly communicating changing information (service changes) to stake holders.

73 Electrification/power issues. We operate on a major rail line that is not serviced by our agency and power problems on that line cause delays. Being a large agency covering over 2,000 square miles, we have a need to interact with nearly 200 emergency response agencies—mostly of the volunteer variety. Arranging training and conducting drills with these agencies is a tremendous chal- lenge due to the nature of the volunteer organization. Ensuring power has been removed from the train in the event that the controller has to remotely remove power. Decision making at the scene is the most difficult constraint to restarting service or clearing an incident area. Communication with passengers in stations and on trains is a major challenge A commuter rail train struck a trespasser with an outbound evening train loaded with several hundred passengers. We understand there will be associated delays with such an event, but this situation was particularly challenging because the city police department detective dispatched to the scene treated it like a traffic accident and wanted to interview all of those on board to document what they saw. The result was a delay to the many passengers waiting to go home was much longer than needed. This demonstrates the challenge of making sure every potential person in charge of any incident understands more of the nature of train accidents, the differences with rail trans- portation, and the need to expeditiously restore service when possible. The challenge to our agency is training. Not in the sense of providing, but with logistics and work force availability. Train- ing consumes enormous resources in workforce availability, and can critically impact operations. Our transit agency serves a statewide area, and travels through multiple counties, cities, townships, villages and so forth. Reaching such a large network is very difficult. We have partnered with the FRA who conducts an open forum training to Fire and EMS agencies which helps. Getting some agencies to understand that the incident typi- cally does not need to be labeled a “crime scene,” that in the majority of cases, traffic can resume at a reduced (sometimes “walking”) speed on an adjacent track with a railroad supervisor on the scene to coordinate train movements. Everything does not need to be shut down and remain shut down until all of their “evidence” has been obtained. Our rail system is built through some heavily wooded por- tions of a very densely populated area. Response time can be steep due to heavy traffic in main and arterial routes and com- pounded by the time taken to properly locate and reach the rail equipment. Access to remote incident locations is problematic. Also, the transfer of passengers off incident trains to alternate transporta- tion is very difficult, especially during inclement weather. Continued education and coordination with multiple police and fire agencies to ensure smooth Incident Command Struc- ture and function at scenes. Commuter rail line runs 90 miles, adjacent to river and between significant elevation differences. Depending on location, access to sight can be difficult. The bulk of our system is fully-automated, driverless rail. As such we do not have staff on trains and our overall station staffing levels are significantly lower than attended systems. As such, we have limited resources readily available to respond to failures or emergencies making communications with passen- gers and passenger management a challenge. First responders understanding that there are passengers on the train who are stuck on the train until it is released. ASSESSMENT 9. Does your agency conduct a post-incident review for critical incidents? Always 67.7% 23 Usually 23.6% 8 Sometimes 9.9% 2 Rarely 2.9% 1 10. Does your agency incorporate findings of the review into revised procedures? If so, what have been the primary benefits of the review process? Please give examples. Responses summarized in Table 36, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Yes; revisions are made to applicable plans and documents as needed. Procedures are revised as easier or more efficient ways of handling situations become apparent. Occasionally, maps and other documents are created to ease the incident process for staff. Yes, pre-positioning of manpower, increase inspections of rolling stock, rail infrastructure, identify back up equipment, and increase communications to our customers Yes, we incorporate lessons learned into revised procedures. This has helped a lot as our system has grown and certain aspects of the system change and complexities are added that in all real- ity are not obvious when planning or initially operating the new parts of the system. Yes, we incorporate findings into revised procedures. The revisions have enhanced employee and customer safety. As example, we had a major incident that disabled our signal sys- tem impacting operations along 10 of our 11 branches. Fully loaded trains were left standing—some for considerable peri- ods of time. Our After Action Review of the incident resulted in changes including: how we account for trains during service disruptions (formalizing a Customer Advocate position in our movement bureau); how we communicate with our customers (both on-board the train and in stations/terminals—delivery, fre- quency and content of messaging); and resulted in water being stored on trains to ensure customer comfort and safety. Yes, part of the continuous improvement. Helps us avoid repeats. Yes, our agency always conducts periodic reviews of our procedures/SOPs and incorporates comments & findings. Yes. Our agency conducts after-action debriefings and attempts to revise plans, policies and procedures with lessons learned from critical events. The primary benefit of this review process is to recognize shortfalls and institute real change based on these lessons learned. Yes. Our agency conducted an emergency exercise drill to test evacuation procedures on an elevated structure that helped finalize the procedures for evacuation. The review process helps validate procedures based on real world experiences. This has led to reviewing and revising emergency procedures. Yes, Buses are ordered upon any conditions of track clo- sure for any incident to be ahead of the curve for response. Not

74 always are buses available; however a reach out to all providers is done early in the incident. Not always . . . Bulletins are issued following major incidents addressing identified problems and recommendations. Our agency does use post incident debriefs to identify areas for improvement, including processes, communications proto- cols with customers and the media, service recovery techniques Yes, we do in the aftermath of the incident review. Incorpo- rating “lessons learned” is key. It has allowed us to step back and look at the incident more objectively using confirmed data as opposed to early reported data. Better coordination and incident command understanding by responding agencies. Our Emergency Plans are treated as “living documents” and each time we do critical after actions or reviews, if needed we amend our procedures. Yes. In one case, a local fire department tried to extract a passenger through an emergency window that was partially obstructed by a stanchion bar. Due to feedback from the fire department, we removed the stanchion bars from that location on 112 light rail vehicles. Updating procedures. Upon review of major services disruptions, our communica- tion with the “customer service” call center has been better. Improvements in response—example, Control Center han- dling of emergency situations, revising SOPs, and training con- trollers on better situational handling led to improvements in decision making and time to return to normal service. Yes, we now have a much better response to customer needs in regards to bus bridging service levels and time frames. Yes—Better scene coordination, consistent timely response to all types of incidents by personnel and better customer communication. Yes, the review process provides an opportunity for discus- sion of areas to improve and implementation of enhanced prac- tices. In the example above, a debrief concluded the agency would benefit from having transit police be dispatched to the site of the incident where they could help inform the emergency response authorities and investigative units in charge the need for expediency for the sake of the many customers being impacted. Benefits: better on-scene coordination and safety at next inci- dent (or) changes to the infrastructure to allow better service management during similar incidents. Example: A crossover was added after rail traffic was halted/diverted due to near-fatal accident. This crossover allows trains to turn back and for better bus bridge operations during serious incident at this (known) higher-risk location. The agency performs post incident accident root cause analy- sis to determine unacceptable or undesirable hazards, risks, or concerns. We also do after action meetings and create lessons learned reports for major incidents and from drills. Yes, primary benefits are increased safety. There are almost always informal discussions after each inci- dent among the agency’s managers who typically respond on scene. Discussions about what went right and what went wrong are plentiful, and are often useful at the next incident. I don’t believe we have formally recorded this type of information, though. As a matter of policy, staff reviews every incident that results in a delay over one hour or where else may be necessary. Each time we meet we discover practices that are missed or steps we could have improved upon to speed up a resolution to the incident, one specific example being when one of our trains is disabled to the point where it begins to significantly impact the train behind it, coupling with the train approaching from behind has become a near mandatory policy. We discovered by avoid- ing the time spent trying to make such a decision, we can have both sets of equipment on their way and as an added benefit, we avoid the further impact of railroad signal delays caused by two trains in one block of track. Ensuring that our procedures are applicable, clearly written and that training has been provided to all employees that the procedures pertain too. AARs are conducted and Improvement Plans (IPs) created. Benefit is facilitation of discussions and tracking actions to improve. Yes, the findings have clearly driven the evolution of prac- tices and procedures. Real examples of sub-standard responses promote the “what if” discussions, leading to real time and obvi- ous analysis of the effects of doing things different. Operational issues/coordination issues example: we put “lift point” decals for FD on trains after a recent debrief. Occasionally. 11. What has been the most beneficial change to procedures, and why? Responses summarized in Table 37, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. The creation of certain forms and documents has been very helpful in the past, as well as modifications and creations of phone number lists. Increased communications to our customers. We have developed a central business district (CBD) shut down plan. All of our light rail lines use the same track in downtown. If something happens (and it has) where the CBD track must be shut down, we have developed a plan on where trains will be stopped and turned and where bus bridges will operate and where police and other employees are deployed to assist customers. Formalizing procedures created after incidents assists in pro- actively addressing customer and employee safety when future critical incidents occur. These procedures are memorialized in Standard Operating Procedures and rule books as well as incor- porated into the training for employees involved in train move- ment, train and engine service and customer communications; as well as the emergency responder community that serves our system. When a critical incident occurs, management, front line employees, our labor partners, and emergency responders understand what to expect—thus facilitating expedited response and recovery. SOPs have become living documents being upgraded periodically. In several recently revised plans, a beneficial change has been to reduce to writing certain additional procedures that may previ- ously have been considered to be “obvious” to more seasoned railroad personnel. We are seeing a lot of retirements and turnover and knowledge of “the basics” cannot be assumed of the reader.

75 Review of procedures by multi-disciplinary departments, because it provides an opportunity for various departments to submit comments/input to improve existing procedures. Reducing delays to service and increasing passenger and employee safety. Establish of a conference call within 15” of a reported inci- dent, pages sent to all partners to join in and the call remains open till track or tracks are open (even if a speed restriction applies). Partners include train operations, bus operator, mechanical, dis- patch, safety and security, contractors as well as agency staff and customer service employee to remain current of changing status of activities. Checklist definition and sequence of safety critical proce- dures. Latest example is how to take a door out of service and secure it, preventing accidental opening in the subway. This is a practice that has been in place for some time, but I think it is the procedure that helps us manage all incidents better. For all major/critical incidents, the agency’s contract operator opens an emergency call-in number—internal managers from all aspects of the direct operations plus our parent agency are listening in on this call as key information is exchanged and deci- sions are made. This includes our public information/media and customer service teams who can hear and receive in real-time the status of various activities to allow their communications to be more timely and accurate. Having rail operations oversight managers directly in contact with our TASI contract operator also allows us to ask follow up questions and agree upon an appropri- ate service recovery plan for the specific incident—such as single tracking around incident scenes if approved, turning back trains to create/protect service on other segments of the line, establish- ing bus bridges or mutual aid from adjacent transit providers. We are constantly reviewing procedures. Use of configu- ration management helps. But more broadly, receiving input, reviewing the governing document, achieving consensus, then making the changes in writing and training has been very benefi- cial. The key is to conduct this process ASAP after the incident takes place, while the “trail” is still fresh. No changes have been required to procedures as a result of the incident review process to date. County migrating to same type of communication sys- tem to promote inter- and intra-departmental communication capabilities. Post Hurricane Sandy—we have developed “Safe Haven” polices and location to safeguard rolling stock and equipment. The most beneficial change to procedures has been our utili- zation of the ICS and our ability to better communicate with first responders. This has allowed us to manage the incidents more effectively and communication better with first responders. Re-educate all levels of an updated procedure. Overall communication and the flow of information have improved. Our decision process is based on safety, service and schedule in that order. Improvements to procedures have improved safety for our passengers and employees, enhanced our customer ser- vice, and led to a faster/smoother return to normal operations. With the amount of time that can pass between needing a bus bridge and actually putting one into service our procedure now advises the Control Center to make this call first. This allows the bus operations center a chance to begin the bus bridge process and if not necessary can be easily canceled. Improved scene management leads to quicker resolution to incidents and better customer communication. 1) Communications—The agency has made enhancements to the communications systems based on feedback from inci- dents; an 800 MHz radio system has recently been procured in order to enhance communications with key responding entities and allow for a system that is less vulnerable to communica- tion disruptions during major events (like cell phones). 2) Bus Bridging—The agency has implemented specific procedures to the plan for interrupted service, especially involving bus bridg- ing with great benefit. To maintain loyal and satisfied ridership, every effort needs to be made in keeping the customer experi- ence as “seamless” as possible, even under adverse conditions. Using buses during periods of interrupted rail service is an area that has been developed over the years and provides a premium level of service that helps retains customers. Smoother incident management; greater confidence and interagency coordination and communication. We improve rules, procedures, and help identify measures for improvement. About 7 years ago we were successful in getting our own agency Police responders focused on restoring service as quickly as possible. Previously, they were often the biggest deterrent to getting the trains moving again. This came as a result of discussions following some fiasco type incidents, and I believe we were able to achieve a basic philosophical change on their part which has assisted us immeasurably since. It is now to our advantage to get the agency police quickly on scene, and attempt to gain jurisdiction over the remaining investigation. Timeliness but also safety. Having a less unpredictable oper- ating environment enables an increase in safety. Secondary review by non-operations personnel. This has helped ensure procedures are clearly written and that the nomenclature/ terminology remains consistent throughout the procedures. Official ICS structure within the agency to delineate clear line of command, and area of responsibility to responders (Rail, MOW, police, Safety, claims, etc). Procedures become much stronger and have less ambiguity if they are based on real-time experiences. Less interpretation results in less errors or omissions. Meeting with one particular jurisdiction’s first responders to educate them on the fact that there are riders on the train stuck until the train is released. 12. Does your agency review and incorporate findings from post-incident reviews conducted by other agencies? If so, what have been the primary benefits of the review process? Please give examples. Responses summarized in Table 38, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. N/A Yes, if the findings can be implemented in our operations we do implement them, the primary benefits are time and cost sav- ing. Having spare equipment ready in case of mechanical failures. Yes, where possible—not all post-incident reviews are shared unless specifically asked for. There is incredible cooperation between agencies if asked for—but I don’t generally share an after action report with other agencies unless they specifically ask for it. AAR contains sensitive information and I don’t want to send it in a blast email to all my contacts—even if I trust them.

76 We have used case studies in our training programs. Yes, when we become aware and the findings are appropriate to our environment. Yes. Review of procedures by multi-disciplinary depart- ments, because it provides an opportunity for various depart- ments to submit comments/input to improve existing procedures. Whenever possible, yes. Using lesson learned from other critical incidents can yield the same benefits. Yes, when is it applicable. This has allowed us to refine our preincident plans where the agency has been written into exter- nal response plans (i.e., nuclear evacuation plan) Yes, train to train bridge plates have been purchased to allow movement from one train to another train on an adjacent track (if local responders will allow a train on the adjacent track). We consistently review industry events to ensure we have adequate protocols in place. I personally review NTSB incident reports and I believe our Safety chief does too. I have not seen any systematic incorpora- tion of findings into our procedures yet. I’m not aware of any work in this area. We would if the information is made available. Yes. These are mostly reported through our regulatory repre- sentatives. Most recently another agency had an employee fatal- ity which resulted in changes to the RWP rules. This has lead to greater safety. The “hot wash” gives the responding agencies a better under- standing of our procedures and realizes our concerns with pro- tecting all responder around the transit environment Yes, most recently a train derailment elsewhere was reviewed by Rail Operations to make sure that factors involved there are not duplicated at our agency. Only if the incidents are investigated and reported nationally. That review may lead to process changes. One example is our roadway worker protection program which had been enhanced after review of other agency’s roadway worker incidents. Not directly. Lessons learned and not repeating mistakes. Most often what is incorporated are lessons learned from APTA peer reviews in which our personnel take part on other properties. On an occasional basis we will review a high profile incident that has occurred and look for lessons we can learn. Not really. Although we do pay attention to “Dear Colleague” letters or requests from our partners. The primary benefit is improved scene management which directly impacts the customers experience during the incident. No, we currently do not review the findings of other agen- cies; this would be a good idea to implement, however. No. Yes, NTSB findings and recommendations. Yes—this helps ensure that our procedures/rules are well- crafted to implement successful communication between employees and management. We always review other reports and do incorporate changes and recommendations where applicable. This results in stronger procedures based on directly relevant experiences. There are always best practices to be gleaned from others. Alternatively whether or not the experiences of others actually result in change, they can also re-confirm the viability of our existing procedures if others are doing similar things as well. In response to other major incidents we review in house pro- cedures, equipment response, and deem our methods acceptable or modify policy or procedures to better respond, or incorporate lessons learned. No. 13. If you could change ONE aspect in the process of criti- cal incident management and clearance practices, what would you change? Responses summarized in Table 39, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. I would make a mandatory attendance of all persons involved in an incident in the debriefing, including law enforcement and coroners present at the scene. The decision-making level, bring it closer to the field as possible. I would change the perception of the event. Much of what happens is not in our control, but personnel feel as if when some- thing goes wrong, someone is to blame. If someone is responsible that does need to be identified and dealt with from an adminis- trative and supervisory stand point. An AAR is to identify what procedures went well and what we need to work on—not to point fingers. Because our system is 24/7 and operates over multiple juris- dictions it is sometimes challenging to expedite the response of the local medical examiner’s office to an incident that involves a fatality. None, seems to be working. Spend more time and efforts in pre-planning and better com- munication during the incident. Employee accountability. We need to put a greater emphasis on a controlled and coordinated response by the numerous rail- road employees and other emergency services that respond in order to better control the scene. Finding the root cause of an incident and incorporating it into the procedures. Briefings at the scene to allow trains to move on adjacent tracks to permit safe movement of passengers not on the affected train involved in the incident. Just reaffirming the importance of unified command and joint decision-making and respecting each stakeholders needs. Find a way to get the recommendations to the operators better than we do now. Too much reliance on bulletins and inspectors. Not certain the operators fully understand what causes accidents/ incidents and which actions they must take to avoid them. I would like to get all three County Coroner offices to have the same level of response to critical incidents. Unfortunately this is very challenging since each is staffed a certain way, cover- ing their own unique territory and with their own levels of other calls that they must prioritize for response. We have established an excellent working relationship with one County office thru meetings, education, and long-term relationship building that has resulted in outstanding response time and cooperation to process incident scenes.

77 Difficult to identify one in particular. Eliminate critical incidents! Clear chain of command among multiple responders. Clear lines of responsibilities, “service restoration, incident investigation, incident management, information collection, and communication.” Who is responsible for what and how is that information communicated. Improve our radio system. Have the same AHJ respond to all of them. Be more consistent with assigning initial and appropriate personnel assets on the front end of the incident. Make sure emergency responders understand the nature of rail transit as opposed to highway traffic. Can’t think of anything. Getting responding agencies to agree to basic philosophical principles, such as a piece of a broken cell phone, or someone’s sneaker lying between the rails does not constitute the type of evidence that would require that track to be shut down; an under- standing on their part that however tragic the event may be, the needs of thousands of people trying to get home from work should outweigh, or at least be on a par with, the needs of a police investigation where the circumstances are usually fairly clear. Expedite the investigative process to resume revenue service sooner. Incident Command. All too often, we the boots on the ground get pushed aside by regional or governmental agencies that will not attend joint planning exercises when offered but who para- chute in and assume control with zero knowledge or experience of what our capabilities and limitations are. Results in tremen- dous amount of valuable time being directed toward educating the uninformed when more critical recovery activities should be underway. Clarify accident reconstruction methods. Vary from “mark and drive,” quick measurements to full LIDAR survey of crossings Making a top priority for all parties to handle the passengers stuck on the train. 14. What would be the most useful guidance your agency would offer to local jurisdictions? Responses summarized in Table 40, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Use the train crew to your benefit, and work with them to get the train back moving as soon as possible. Simplify the coroner process. Get basic training on our operations, but depend upon our subject matter experts in an emergency if it deals with our sys- tem. Don’ think they know the train better than we do. To take advantage of the classroom training and drills offered by our agency. Participation in education and simulations pro- vides insight into the challenges of responding to an incident on railroad property and equipment. It also enables us to “test” pro- cedures and make adjustments to ensure appropriate response in the event of an actual incident. We open communications. Participate in agency system familiarization and ongoing refresher training opportunities. Seek out training from rail operators in your jurisdiction. Ensure that you get to know and periodically touch base with your contacts to review joint procedures. Conduct joint exercises. Train movement can occur without compromising safety of responders so the train can stop within ½ the sight distance as they pass thru the area to permit traffic flow as well as continued safe conduction of the investigation. Take advantage of emergency preparedness training offered by the agency. This training can be modified to better suit your needs. This process helps build an open line of communica- tion and provides a better understanding of each organization’s structure including roles/responsibilities. Stay in communication during the incident (Incident Com- mand). We do a very good job of responding, assessing, and setting up initial response. Problems develop as the incident evolves and during the service restoration process. Single lead- ership for us and each responding agency with sustained coordi- nation throughout the incident is key. Identify all the key stakeholders for types of incidents that could occur on your system and engage them in a collaborative process to ensure that overall goals are understood, what the key needs are of the various stakeholders, establish expectations and behavioral norms for incident handling, and train key personnel to be prepared. Debrief every incident for lessons learned and try and incorporate when possible into established SOP. Be aware of overhead power lines, track conditions (tripping hazards) and train movements on adjacent tracks. After Safety First—communication is key. Understand the rail transit environment and seek training with qualified and knowledgeable people from the transit agency in order to recognize and understand the hazards inherent in the transit operating environment. Work with your local transit agency. Seek out the agency to provide information on hazards and risks that may be of a con- cern. Also make sure the local jurisdictions first responders are familiar with them and cross train with transit first responders. The incident most likely to occur is not the mass casualty event. There should be more preparation for the smaller inci- dents that lead to more soft tissue injuries. Alignment familiarization. Work with “transit” as a primary partner instead of as a sec- ondary partner. Get to know your transit emergency response counterparts as they support ESF-1 and incorporate them in your planning and training activities. How important it is to quickly reinstate service. Overcrowd- ing on the system when it’s shut down can lead to unintended problems and possibly other incidents. Clear the incidents as quickly and safely as possible and return to partial and/or full rail service. During emergencies the sooner we get back to some type of service on the rail line it directly limits the possibility of crowd management on the sur- face by local jurisdictions. Have a procedure document that has been well vetted, then update as needed and train with that document. Be uniform in your responses to rail incidents (as much as possible)

78 Operational and rolling stock familiarization. Partake in all training opportunities Get involved and stay involved with our training exercises. Recognize that rail is much more than public transportation— we can easily become an ambulance service, a command post, an emergency shelter, an emergency response personnel trans- porter, etc. How does your police/fire agency identify the Incident Com- mander? The transit agency lead should know who to contact at a scene. What assistance/training do your officers need to respond to rail incidents? Communication and coordination. Know local responders before an incident if possible. Have relationship with police and fire leaders so you can call their cell phones if things are not going as planned. Trying to ascertain a good estimate of how long it will take to clear the scene so that alternative arrangements can be made if appropriate. 15. Please describe any “lessons learned” that would benefit other transit agencies. Responses summarized in Table 41, chapter four of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Emergency response agencies are constantly changing per- sonnel; offer equipment and classroom training at least annually. Be as specific as possible when it comes to procedures. Plans and policies can be broad, but the more specific proce- dures can be the better. With our CBD shut down plan, we say which switches will work, where each line will turn around, and where employees will be deployed to assist customers. These are specific and measurable during an exercise as well. We also use the incident command system for every major event which makes every major event an exercise of sorts. Filling out forms and personnel knowing their roles—it has helped our organiza- tional structure during prolonged events such as the recent ice storm. This lesson learned we have shared with many transit agencies. Establishing a foundation of standard operating procedures, conducting after action reviews, and providing training to employees and the emergency responder community facilitate the appropriate response and recovery from critical incidents. Our focus has been to be inclusive and seek out input from the community and have incorporated those findings into our procedures and training. Joint exercise drills, exercises & tabletops should be well planned and executed on regular basis. Develop partnerships with the external agencies (i.e., Fire, EMS, police). An emergency is no place to exchange business cards. Be as diplomatic as possible with local responders so as not to delay the clearing of the scene any longer than necessary. Evaluate rules and procedures on a regular basis and update accordingly. Even the best procedures may have to be revisited over time. The agency recently revised an SOP related to fire, smoke, and alarms at or between stations. In short, the pro- cedure outlines roles, responsibilities, ensures safe operations but minimizes the impact to operations. Initially, technology is used to check for signs of smoke or fire followed by on-site inspection . . . Although not always transit priorities, scene preservation and witness retention become important in the after incident investigation both for the transit agency and law enforcement. Procedures to allow service restoration priorities to work with investigative needs are needed with ongoing coordination between agencies. If your system is operating thru or adjacent to other public transit systems/modes—take time before incidents to establish a relationship and discuss possible mutual aid type needs and possible responses. Examples include accepting your fare media on their system without having to go thru a lengthy approval process (my teams are empowered at the operating control cen- ter to make these types of decisions without senior management approval), alternative service such as bus bridges/shuttles that can be activated on short notice, etc. Assign one person as in overall charge. He can delegate, indeed he must, but assign one person. Good incident command structure and communication with other stakeholders is key. The essential nature of setting up a unified incident com- mand post so that one course of direction can be relayed to all personnel in the field. Find opportunities to engage the communities where you operate. Train together for possible emergencies; develop rela- tionships prior to an event. Communicate often and effectively with these communities on issues that may impact them or their residents. Maintain open and productive dialogue with the first responder agencies and OEM. Don’t assume that everyone knows what everyone is responsible to do. 1. Communication; 2. Procedures for the following: 2a. Inci- dent management, 2b. Service restoration, 2c. Incident investiga- tion, 2d. Emergency communication, 2e. Information collection. A closed loop process with new lessons is required. You get the lesson learned, implement, check for implementation and then follow up six months or a year later to see how that implementation is going—is it still in place? Has it worked? Is it meeting agency needs? We had a homeless encampment outside of one of our tunnels that was burning trash to keep warm. The prevailing winds blew the smoke into the tunnel and caused an evacuation. When the fire department could not locate the source they wanted to walk the tunnel. It was rush hour and thousands of passengers were stuck. I knew that if 20 fire fighters started walking the tunnel it might be hours to reassemble them all. I convinced the Chief that riding in an out of service rail vehicle was a much better way to find the source. They were happy that it was suggested and that we could make it happen. They rode on the vehicle and found the source of the smoke thereby saving at least one hour or more. Establish good working partnerships with local jurisdictional emergency management agencies, police and fire departments on transit related incidents. • Instruct conductors not to grant permission for riders to cross the tracks unless specific permission is granted from the dispatcher. This practice is not the result of an issue but an effort to avoid an incident. • Station agents and security staff (that are not uniformed officers) can only tell people not to cross with the crossing arms down, but they cannot physically stop people once they start crossing. • Timely and direct communication is needed between station agents, conductors, and security. Imple-

79 mentation of the 800 MHz radio system greatly improves this internal communications. • Update Service Interruption Plans annually on a cycle that coincides with changes made in the service. • Create checklists within the Service Interruption Plan for Duty Officers to use in order to keep track of the chronology of events and key information. Our newest Rail Line first-responder training incorporated both hands-on training and train-the-trainer, recorded (DVD) trainings so fire fighters could do refresher training in their fire- houses without direct RTD trainer involvement, year-round. Our biggest “successes” are usually due to getting to the scene quickly, quickly assessing who is in charge of the investi- gation, and then try and develop a rapport with that individual to the extent that they can be convinced that trains can be brought through the area slowly and safely in a manner that does not put his personnel in danger. Hire enough staff to support critical incident response. Emergency drills and exercises are excellent to facilitate the coordination. Ongoing dialog and hands on familiariza- tion training with first responders is very beneficial. Train- ing pamphlets and videos distributed to local police enhances education. Debrief after every incident. Include all local emergency responders. Often helpful to have internal debriefing in addition. You can discuss operational issues such as passenger communi- cation and bus bridging without boring the police and fire staff. Communication with the First Responders is critical 16. Who has primary responsibility for managing a critical incident? Transit agency 21.9% 7 Local municipality 37.5% 12 Other (please specify) 40.6% 13 Other includes: (1) The Conductor is the incident com- mander until relieved by either Management or Emergency Responders on the scene. (2) There are two facets to a criti- cal incident: a. The Transit Agency manages the operational response and recovery in coordination within the National Incident Management System Framework with b. Emergency Responder (Law Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Medical Ser- vice). (3) Transit agency for small issues (i.e. service delays, passenger illness/injury) or issues that only affect the transit system (derailment). If the issue has impacts outside of the transit system, the City may activate the emergency operations center and lead the strategic response. (4) Agency certainly does, but the nature of the incident plays into this answer. For example, if HAZMAT involved, the fire department takes a large role. (5) Depends on the incident. Initially police and fire stabilize the scene and then transit agency takes over. (6) First responder from each agency takes the lead until relieved by a senior-more person. Primary oversight is dependent upon nature of incident, i.e., fire-rescue, police, transit, etc. (7) If it is a transit specific issue it would be the transit agency. If it impacts the locals it is a Unified Command with transit in the lead. (8) It depends on the incident. If municipality is involved they are responsible, if just the transit agency then transit agency is responsible. (9) The agency and the local jurisdictions have agreed to utilize NIMS unified command to manage incidents. We use a local jurisdiction representative, a transit police representative and a rail representative as the three components of our unified command. (10) Coordinated command, following NIMS model. (11) Local municipal- ity until such time as they will relinquish control to agency police. Sometimes they will do this, sometimes they won’t. (12) Depends on the incident. If on transit property, the agency but once outside the entrance, municipality. 17. How soon are local jurisdictions and others notified after a critical incident? Immediately. As soon as possible. Local jurisdictions will receive immediate notification through 911 calls generally—if not, our police dispatch will notify them and request assistance as soon as we know we need them. Immediate notification is made. Immediately. As soon as possible, but within 2 hours at the most. Immediately. Immediately. Immediately, sometimes passengers on the train call 911 before the official call from Operations or the train crew. Immediately. Five minutes. In many cases local PD may roll/arrive at a scene before our own PD or others can respond. Thru the relationships we have built, the vast majority of the time the local PD will turn the incident scene back to our Transit Police to then process with the coroner or other investigatory units. Immediately. No delay is desirable. Immediately. Within minutes of notification at the transit agency property. Immediately. Immediately. Immediately. Immediately. 911 call from Integrated Control Center (transit) Dispatcher. Someone usually calls 911 even before we know about it. Public Safety emergencies are immediate notification by the Rail Control Center and /or Police Communications. The emergency responders of local jurisdictions are notified immediately by the dispatcher when an event is known to have occurred. Also, the Rail Duty Officer will put out an email to a “Command Post” address list (contains dozens of staff that need to know) of the details as they are made known. Phone calls are made to the Customer Service, Safety, and Media staff in order to make sure key contacts are notified directly, where an email is more passive. Almost immediately. Immediately or as soon as practical. Immediately to five minutes. Immediately. Immediately.

80 Within 10 minutes. Immediately. Train operator calls to dispatch. Agency Police dispatch calls local jurisdiction or appropriate responder dispatch. Immediately. 18. Describe your agency’s role in managing a critical incident. Responses summarized in Table 6, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Dispatch is in charge of notifying emergency responders. Management is in charge of getting passengers on-board the vehicle/train in question to their destinations, either by bus or rescue train. In our properties we take the lead and in our partners proper- ties we assist them. If it is solely transit related (which probably won’t meet the general threshold for “critical”), it will be managed by our Police department such as grade crossing accidents. We can manage an incident where their multiple injuries—if it becomes a mass care incident the local jurisdiction will become involved in the scene management; otherwise our police coordinate with EMS on patient transport to hospitals. If it is more complicated than an accident or it is an incident that affects our system (such as a structure fire along our tracks), the local jurisdiction is in-charge from the beginning Under the National Incident Management System framework we work with local emergency responders who set up Incident Command and control the scene. We typically handle the initial phase of a critical incident until others arrive. It depends, transit agencies usually work under the Incident Command System (ICS). The Incident Commander is either a fire chief or police depending upon the nature of incident. Tran- sit agency becomes part of the logistic. Establish and participate in a Unified Command. Provide tech- nical and logistical support to the Unified Command as required. The agency plays a key role in moving/evacuating people from affected areas of the city to designated evacuation centers. Assure our contractors are performing appropriately by short turning trains, bus bridges are in place and passengers onboard are informed as well as make and monitor station announce- ments, web updates and phone leader messages. Maintain command until agency security/sheriff department arrives. Support emergency responders (e.g., police, fire). Control access to the operator. Re-direct riders to alternate service Coordinate investigation and reporting. Manage repairs and inspection for service restoration. Complete investigations and reports with recommendation follow up. Monitoring incident scene handling by first responders, updating customers and the media, arranging for emergency mutual aid, coordinating service recovery plans during incident and post-incident to normal operations. We will manage those processes that we control, but allow our “partners” to perform their functions without our slowing them in any way. Depends on where it occurs. In most situations first respond- ers (police and fire) stabilize the scene and then transit agency takes over. Transit personnel are first responders for the critical incident, if it is on transit property. All subsequent activities will be gov- erned by the incident commander. If the emergency is not on transit property, we are a support department and may be used to aid in the response to the incident, in any way deemed neces- sary by the Incident Commander. We follow the NIMS doctrine and are extensively trained in the Incident Command System. Agency supports emergency responders. Utilizing an incident commander to communicate with OCC and other responders. Primary responsibilities unless loss of life or destruction of property are involved. After cleared by Fire, the transit agency takes over—first safety to review the situation if it meets State Safety Oversight requirements for an investigation and report, concurrently ser- vice quality to assist the passengers to their destinations, then operations to restore service. We are the on-scene coordinators until the police or fire arrive. Then we are in a supporting role until the first responders release the scene. We use Unified Command to manage critical incidents— transit police and rail are always part of the unified command supported by other internal departments. The initial person responsible for managing the scene is usually the train conductor, who turns things over to the local jurisdictional emergency responders, who take command from there. As a Command Post is activated, participation by the agency will continue to support the scene with operational infor- mation, assistance from the Public Information Officer, etc. Depends on the nature of the incident. We are primarily a transit agency; we serve supporting/logistical support role, for the most part. Incident Command—Transit Police part of incident com- mand working with other agencies. Working directly with those in charge of scene to get trains moving as quickly as possible. Will typically authorize train movements through the area via radio at reduced speeds until police and cleanup agencies have left. Transit Police conduct police investigation and manage traf- fic around the incident. Operations is responsible for bus bridge and service restoration. Safety responsible for investigation and SSO notification. Customer service and Media for handling cus- tomer communication and service disruptions. We have our own PD and they take the lead in investigating incidents If on our property, we initiate emergency contacts, secure the scene, make the site safe for emergency responders (isolate power, apply grounds, escort responders into restricted areas, etc.), prepare and provide CCTV recordings, assist with iso- lating witnesses if applicable, crowd management, assist with investigations as required. Manages everything on or near the rail and platforms. Train, passengers, power, crossing mechanical devices and corridor. Coordinates with local jurisdiction. Manages walking speed passing trains when allowed. Local jurisdiction has fire, medi- cal, scene control, investigation and public information. Transit agency will assume last three as relinquished by local officials.

81 19. Who in your agency has primary responsibility for man- aging a critical incident? Operations Manager. Operations manager and the business resumption plan manager. For police/law enforcement incidents, the Deputy Chief for Operations. For transportation centered incidents (such as ser- vice disruption due to a structure fire), our VP for Transportation is in charge of coordinating our response. Transportation Services Department. First supervisor present on the scene, until relieved by safety or more experienced operating staff. Police services. Typically the Operations and Safety departments. Transit Control has the initial responsibility. If the incident grows beyond their capabilities, the Operations Command Cen- ter is activated. Safety and Operations directors or managers. Corporate Safety. Control Center, Metro Rail Operations Inspectors (Super- visors) and Safety Inspectors Our Transit Police unit along with our Rail Operations over- sight group and/or Deputy CEO, Operations The Incident Commander who communicates with Execu- tive Management. Director or his /her designee. The Police Department serves as the Incident Commander for Transit specific events. First manager on scene. Field ops representative. Rail Management Team and Communication Control. Safety. The on duty Rail Supervisor or Chief. Metro Transit Police and Rail Operations utilizing unified command. Typically primary responsibility for managing critical inci- dents would be with the emergency response entities. Participa- tion and responsibility for the agency interest will fall with the highest ranking agency public official present (unless otherwise delegated, AGM, Safety, Security and Facilities, and his delegates. Operational and Safety concerns. Agency Police Officers will handle the scene. A Transporta- tion Department Officer will arrange for train movements once allowed. Transit Police. PD and Rail Operations. Depending on the incident—Duty Managers are first respond- ers, may escalate to VP Operations or Duty Safety Officer. ICS for rail incident is Train Operator, Rail Supervisor, tran- sit agency police. Each assumes Incident Command until the next arrives. Rail Supervisor becomes Rail Chief, when transit agency assumes IC. Director of our Commuter Rail service 20. How would you describe ongoing coordination with local jurisdictions? Conduct joint training exercises 50% 15 Meet on a regular basis to discuss critical incident management 23% 7 Meet on an ad-hoc basis to discuss critical incident management 7% 2 Communicate in other ways 3% 1 Varies by jurisdiction (please describe below) 17% 5 Comments include: (1) We have multiple levels of interaction: Conduct joint training exercises with all jurisdictions, meet on a regular basis with the central city emergency responder commu- nity, meet on an ad-hoc basis with the suburban volunteer emer- gency responder community, communicate in other ways . . . We meet more frequently with some jurisdictions than others. While we may speak several times a week with some (e.g., central city) due to system density, we may only touch base with others during significant storms or annually to discuss training needs, etc. All of the options above. * All boxes could be checked on this question. We conduct monthly meetings with our jurisdictional part- ners, we conduct regular training and we conduct joint exercises. Also includes meetings on ad-hoc basis to discuss critical incident management. We also train and conduct exercises on a regular basis. We have many agencies we meet with. Central city includes all items listed above, smaller agencies a combination of the above items. There has been some follow up with local communities, but this is atypical. Joint training exercises. FD training for rail vehicle familiarization. We have a standing Emergency Services Committee made up of internal Operations, Maintenance and Safety personnel, plus senior representatives from all municipal fire departments, some ambulance personnel, some jurisdictional police, and our regula- tor. Meetings are held quarterly to discuss common issues and arrange joint training exercises. In addition, we try to conduct two joint table-top exercises and one full-scale joint emergency response exercise per year. Although desired, not all agencies attend regularly and no municipal or provincial emergency coor- dination staff attends. There are occasional ad-hoc meetings with municipal and state or provincial emergency coordination staff but these are typically single purpose such as to discuss earth- quake preparedness with high level reviews of response plans. Regular exercises in various areas, with monthly Fire Life Safety and Security Committee (FLSSC) meetings. 21. What are the major impediments to coordination with local jurisdictions in managing critical incidents? Responses summarized in Table 8, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here.

82 Communication. Politics and internal policies. Knowledge of each other’s capabilities—assumptions about what each other can and can’t do. Managing through the jurisdictional coordination when mul- tiple agencies respond to one incident. No major problems. Misunderstanding of roles & responsibilities and lack of good communication. The sheer number of emergency services agencies in our ter- ritory (266). None. We all meet on a regular basis as part of the External Liaison Committee. Local responders have no concept of the delay’s impact to those on the train or other trains. Sometimes they will not even let passengers off the incident train to get on buses even if the location is safe to do so. Local jurisdictions are typically volunteer or have high turn- over rates. Difficult to ensure these employees maintain famil- iarization with agency equipment and procedures. Staffing constraints, availability to participate in frequent coordination meetings. In our case it is the sheer number of municipalities and coun- ties that the system serves. Time. Everyone is busy all of the time. None that we haven’t overcome. None, at this time. We have continual joint-training exercises often and maintain a very good working relationship with all jurisdictional entities. Some jurisdictions have more training then others in under- standing the Incident Command System. Mostly volunteer organizations and are difficult to organize. Time and coordination. Dispatching emergency equipment to the site. Local jurisdictional interest. Lack of a written agreement providing direction on who is charged with the investigation, on scene coordination/management and clearly defines incident scene release. Having multiple local jurisdictions in the service area that encompasses three states. Turnover among staff at other entities requires continual coor- dination. Busy schedules and resource constraints make it clear priorities need to be clear for ensuring adequate coordination. The vast number of jurisdictions and varying capabilities, equipment, and personnel. Reluctance on the part of the local responder to relinquish complete control of the scene including allowing train move- ments where doing so would not create any safety issues. Occasionally we deal with egos at the scene but this is man- aged by regular interaction and relationship building at senior levels in the various partner organizations. Finding adequate staff time to support local jurisdictions training needs. 1. Their lack of commitment to attend ongoing meetings and to participate in joint exercises. 2. Not knowing who the key players are, when then would get involved, how, or from which location. 3. No clear definition of boundaries, responsi- bilities or accountabilities—we serve nine cities, all with dif- ferent protocols, some municipal, some state or provincial, and some federal. Time to train, coordinate, educate, and exercise knowledge of responding jurisdiction. Rail incidents are infrequent, so responding officers/firemen are usually new to the event. Ascertaining who the lead contact is for the local jurisdiction and making contact with them. 22. What actions would be most useful in improving coor- dination with local jurisdictions in managing critical incidents? Table Top Exercises. Eliminate the politics and the internal policies. More responder training—I work with managers and upper level responders and they have knowledge but that isn’t always passed on to the responder on the street level. Maintaining good communications. Good planning, joint drills & exercises. Joint training. Joint/regional meetings and interactions. Regional planning efforts and exercises. Helping them see the number of passengers as well as conse- quences to other trains and passengers. Joint Partnership Agreements that formalize roles, responsi- bilities, and procedures for handling critical events. Address staffing and funding, increasing opportunities for training, meetings, and non-service disruptive drills. Provide adequate personnel for incident management and public service outreach. Education on the impacts of critical incidents on the public— including the system and its customers as well as the public at large. Show the impact, particularly in the peak AM and PM service hours, how the system and public are impacted by a sys- tem shutdown. Lead by example—show everyone that “minutes matter.” When this mindset is owned by all stakeholders then incident handling improves. More scheduled meetings, more structure. None that we haven’t overcome. Regular communication, exercises, and training are key. Continue to find opportunities for dialogue in advance of an incident, build up relationships that lead to trust. Train with local jurisdictions. A central point of contact within the county’s OEM that could coordinate with their local response agencies. Getting front line employees involved with local jurisdic- tions through exercises. Quarterly meeting to discuss roles and responsibilities. Working with training officers of fire and police commands. Having a written agreement outlining the above. Conduct more regional transportation specific exercises with local jurisdictions.

83 The emergency exercises are crucial in preparation for the actual incidents; it would be useful to continue to make these a high priority. Greater communication and consistency. Produce a concise guide which we could provide local juris- dictions which emphasizes the points described—that trains can be moved while they complete their investigations, and can be done without creating any safety hazards. Hire dedicated staff to coordinate and train staff from local jurisdictions. Form a mandatory participation, joint Emergency Response Counsel consisting of transit agency, emergency responder, municipal, provincial, and, federal representatives who meet at least quarterly and who have the authority to establish gener- ally accepted response principles and unified incident command structure applicable to prescribed situations or occurrences that all parties must formally agree to abide by. The transit agency does a good job at keeping communica- tion open, offering training, providing educational materials to the agencies. Periodic area wide events / planning with chiefs. Improved communication with first responders. MINIMIZING PASSENGER IMPACTS 23. What steps does your agency take with regard to unin- jured passengers? Responses summarized in Table 9, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Able-bodied persons are asked to remain calm, follow staff/ crew instructions, and in certain cases may be asked to assist staff/crew. Provide first aid and assist until proper medical attendants arrive. We take “customer care cards” that contains the passengers name and contact information. Operators are supposed to get these but passengers are not always cooperative. It depends on the length of the incident. We provide alternate transportation when appropriate. We ensure on-going commu- nication and provide water (depending on duration of incident). Not sure of the nature of this question. Arrange bus bridge to transfer uninjured passengers to their next connection point. Assist them with evacuation if necessary. Direct them to a separate area and keep out of harm’s way. If possible, assign EMS to the gathering point to address any delayed symptoms, etc. Gather names and contact information to the extent pos- sible. Provide timely information and alternate transportation as soon as practicable. We provide shuttle service around an incident when the sub- way is closed. On the train, try to keep them comfortable and calm, deter- mine if any travelers need to make connecting flights at one of the three international airports we serve. At stations inform them so they can make an informed decision on their travel options before boarding the train. Make announcements and ask if anyone is injured. Or respond to intercom calls by passengers. We interview them and provide them with claim cards. We retain video record in case they submit false claims later. We try and keep them informed as best we can regarding the status of their train, service interruption, and our progress on getting them moving again. Whenever possible we try and get an incident train moved to a location where passengers can be transferred to another train or bus bridge to get them moving towards their final destination. We try to assist in every possible way, from communicating an evacuation plan to establishing a communication link to the friends and family of passengers. Operator controls the scene and keeps them in safe location until the IC arrives and statements are taken. Dependent on the situation, the Incident Commander may have a muster tent in order to question the injured patrons and attend to them, on an as-needed basis. Risk Management may also want to collect information for further use. We try to remove them from the incident site in a safe and efficient manner and reconnect them with transportation to their final destination. We attempt to get information on those passengers before they leave the scene. Account for them and keep them safe. Collection of personal information. Gather name and address, witness statement, and see they get transported to their destination or next available station/terminal. Depending on the circumstances, witness cards are requested. Then we accommodate them by whatever means is most timely. Customer communications is paramount. Customers need to be kept informed of any service disruption. From initial notifica- tion to updates during incident so they can make decisions on transit options. We utilize train operator and station announce- ments, we put police and rail personnel on trains to keep cus- tomers informed, we use e-mail and twitter (social media) alerts using an incident communications protocol developed by media relations and the rail operations information center. Keep them informed with regular announcements of what is happening and what is known about the expected delay time. Minimal stabilization until qualified personnel arrive. Evacuation, accounting, and egress protocols. We have had some involvement with “special needs passen- gers” (one was a diabetic in need of medication). If necessary, local fire departments should be called to get passengers of this type off the train. As for the remaining passengers on the train, we try and make frequent announcements with any updates that can be given as to when trains will be able to move again. When- ever possible, other trains that are not directly involved in the incident are held at passenger stations so that passengers who elect to do so are able to get off the train and make other arrange- ments to be picked up. We request their name and address and what they witnessed. Identify with the follow up contact information. Informational cards are distributed and collected from each. Information on contacting transit agency is provided. Bus bridges provided as soon as practical. Find a bus bridge.

84 24. How do you communicate with passengers remaining on board? Responses summarized in Table 10, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Passengers are communicated to via intercom, verbally, or written for hearing-impaired individuals. Personnel and PA systems. We have on-board announcements—however, these are not always easily heard if the train is noisy. Train crew walks the consist sharing information and ensur- ing customer comfort and safety. Operator makes announcements and provides direction. Through onboard PA system. The Public Address System, if viable. Otherwise it’s direct communication moving car-to-car. PA announcements from Transit Control (subway) or the operator or other staff on scene. Onboard PA system as well as face to face by train crew and security if onboard. Announcements over a public address system on trains and stations include message boards. Operator initially, then responding inspector (supervisor). The crew is in radio contact with the Central Control Facility— which is engaged on the Emergency Call established for the incident. Key message updates are decided and passed on to the crews for transition via PA and face to face on board. In addition key messages/updates are delivered to station visual message signs and PA systems. Conductors are required to make first announcements imme- diately, next announcement within two minutes, then at least every 5 minutes. Crews are also required to walk through the train and interact with customers. Via the “Radio to PA” feature on new technology trains: train crews will activate the feature and allow supervisors in the Rail Control Center to speak to customers on the train. Usually, face to face contact. Internal communication system if operational after the event, otherwise bullhorn. Through train-line announcements from the train operator and from the Rail Traffic Control personnel relaying informa- tion to the train operator. Through the train crews, public announcements, “Transit alerts.” Intercom systems. Passenger intercom and in person. On site, via audio systems. Public address system. The operator, until a supervisor arrives. Station and train announcements, text alerts, social media. We send police and rail personnel to affected trains to commu- nicate with customers and provide stability. Mainly with train conductors making announcement using the on-board public announcement system. We also use “gov. dot” alerts, which send “live” information about the delay times that can be expected to our customers that subscribe to the email service. Onboard operator-to-passenger announcements; email blasts to subscribers to our “Rider Alerts” notification service. Face- book, Twitter, also. We find that many of our passengers are using their cell phones while on the trains. PA systems, call boxes, bullhorns, and employee direction. On board announcements. Also “service alerts” via e-mail from our website. Train Operator via internal PA and rail field supervision. Rail supervisor will communicate with all and obtain infor- mation . . . give information on service restoration. Intercom Rail Supervisor or UTA Police, as available train hosts on our Commuter Rail Transit agency. Twitter feed pro- vides information from the control room as made available. Conductors make update, email notifications. 25. What information does your agency communicate to passengers remaining on board after a critical incident? Instructions on what to do 96.8% 30 Instructions on what not to do 67.7% 21 Description of the incident 54.8% 17 Description of ongoing procedures in response to the incident 51.6% 16 Estimates of the potential delay 93.5% 29 Other 19.4% 6 Other responses include: (1) Appreciation for their patience. (2) Our descriptions of the incident are many times not specific— out of respect for the victim and need to complete the investiga- tion. (3) Common sense guidance. (4) Passengers are informed of the general nature of the incident, without much detail. Cus- tomers on board are regularly informed of any developments, even if the news is “we continue to await the release of the train by the local authorities.” (5) Incident description is limited and vague. (6) Evacuation plans and bus bridge information, when available. 26. What are the major impediments to minimizing passen- ger impacts in managing critical incidents? Responses summarized in Table 11, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. The major impediment is getting the on-scene emergency responders to release the train, so that we can begin a bus/train bridge. Keeping the passengers informed. Communication is ALWAYS the biggest challenge in any incident. With today’s expectation of immediate communica- tion and knowledge, it is not easy to do that. Also people post misinformation on social media sites that customers take as fact. The location and time of day the incident occurs. The response time for alternative transportation. Passengers self evacuation & not listening to the instructions. The magnitude of the event. Location and access to alternate modes of transportation.

85 Effective communication, as the passengers may not speak English or may be hearing impaired. The length of clearing scene by local responders to resume some train movement. Not moving train until security/sheriff arrives . . . removing injured trespasser/vehicle from right-of-way. Limited radio system. Limited public address system (not available in all stations). Constrained staff often not available to focus on public outreach during incidents. The time required to process a scene and release the train/ tracks for service. In the case of a trackside fatality due to accident or suicide, there are bio-hazard procedures that must be followed. These services are provided by specialty subcontractors that have their own response time issues—imagine a bio team being called to the middle of the system at the precise time that the freeways/ roads of the region are most congested with peak period traffic. Loss of power on the train, location of train on a bridge or in an under-river tunnel. Train radio reception. Location can sometimes limit evacuation procedures. Rerouting alternative service. Reassurance of quick activities and the ability to keep all passengers calm during needed response delays. Sometimes electrical issues require passengers to stay in place for their safety until the power issues can be resolved. Dynamic situation that changes. Time of day and location. Alternate service, establishing bus shuttles or substitutions are problematic and tend to become implemented after the incident has been cleared but if they are not established at all then the pub- lic feels that their needs of alternate service were not addressed. Some areas of the right-of-way have very limited access and pose difficulty with passenger extraction; requiring a rescue train. Good communications. Consistent and accurate messaging to our customers. The actual act of releasing the trains, and knowing when the train will be released by incident managing authorities. Lack of infrastructure (more tracks, ability to run around the problem). Occasionally, the difficulty in reaching trains with buses so passengers can be evacuated. Limited space in subway system and response times within subway. Response times on commuter rail due to distance. 1. Obviously, getting the trains moving. 2. Getting a reliable ETA of when trains will be able to move. 3. Getting this infor- mation to onboard personnel so appropriate announcements can be made. Alternate bus service resources. Communication with passengers. Self evacuation and leaving the scene. Number of passengers on a train, especially during commute hours. Finding alternative transportation. 27. What actions have been or would be most useful in mini- mizing passenger impacts in managing critical incidents? Responses summarized in Table 12, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Sending out updates to social media outlets (Facebook, Twitter, and text messages) has been very helpful in the past; keeping our passengers informed has proved to be key. Having local emergency responders familiar with our system and equip- ment is crucial. Provide alternative service. We are continually looking and improving our means of pro- viding customer information. Availability of alternate transportation and expedited response from Medical Examiner’s Office. More equipment in reserve. Early passenger communication & direction to passenger and providing prompt assistance at the incident scene. Pre-existing alternate service plans. The installation of Station Managers has proven to be very effective for managing customers during critical incidents. Allow safe train movement on adjacent track. Ensuring a quick response with a rescue train and emergency response team. Using transit fare inspectors as a ready resource to man- age crowds and communicate with riders. We are developing a passenger ambassador program for all agency employees expanding ready reserve of personnel to respond to subway disruptions. Reaching out to educate first responders, establish agreements on who will take control of incident scenes in advance, work closely with local coroners, have more than one bio-hazard con- tractor that is fully qualified and able to respond to your incidents. Establish service recovery techniques and have part of the team focused on this element of the incident so timely decisions can be made. Early notification of incident; frequent communication with train crews. We have improved our communication process . . . and that has been most helpful. Use of social media to communicate faster. On-train announcements and getting transit representatives to the scene to answer questions. Fast and accurate communications as to what is happening, how it will impact, and how soon it will be resolved. We’re able to utilize other agency assets (i.e., buses) to assist in moving passengers away from the scene. Communicating to all what is going on in terms of alternate means of service. We purchased some four wheeled carts for difficult areas for use by Transit Police in responding to incidents and evacuating passengers. Better communications with more timely options provided by us. Consistent and accurate messaging, sending adequate staff to incident scene, directly above and below the affected area, and any major transfer stations that are affected by the incident. Increasing regular communication with jurisdictions and education on the nature of rail transit.

86 Clear, uniform communication to passengers of the incident, estimated duration, and alternatives for them. Enhanced communication and information systems. Obtaining best (most reliable) information possible from the scene. Having extra staff to assist with passenger communications both PA/VMS and boots on the ground at the incident site or affected stations. Clearing the scene as quickly as possible. 28. What steps does your agency take to communicate with other passengers whose travel is affected by the critical incident? Responses summarized in Table 13, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. We send social media alerts, written/audible messages to the station platforms, alerts to connecting buses and shuttles, and post information on our website. The information is communicated through media, cellphones and radio news. We have various means of communicating via social media tools as well as conventional media. In addition to station announcements, we communicate through Twitter, FaceBook, etc. Operator communicates, media releases. Providing prompt information regarding bus bridge or alternate transportation arrangements. PA announcements and message boards at stations and terminals. Keep media outlets in the loop. Frequently update company website and social media. PA announcements. Public address announcements, web updates, phone leader messages about conditions and smart phone applications updates. Public announcements at stations, message boards, twitter etc. We contact all connecting transit agencies through their con- trol centers. Inspectors coordinate at transfer transit centers with other agency supervisors in the field. Updates to the media, real-time updates to our website and social media (twitter, Facebook, etc), on-board and station messages. Provide tweets, text alerts, Facebook updates, website (trip- planner) updates. Press release to media (radio and TV). Make frequent announcements (visual and audio) to stations. Again, we use the tools at our disposal to communicate the relevant information. Local media outlets, PA announcements and social media. The transit agency maintains an e-alert system in which text alerts are sent to cell phones and messages are sent out over the web, informing patrons, and potential patrons, of delays. All media opportunities are used. Twitter, Facebook, website, Ready.gov. Intercom announcements or in person by operator or supervisor. Notification of service delays and areas affected estimation of potential delay means of alternate service. Public address, updates on web, twitter, and e-mail. Mass station announcements, e-mail updates and website updates that are made as quickly as possible. Train and station announcements, Passenger Information Displays on platforms and kiosks, text alerts, e-mails, social media, press releases. Messages are sent out by Customer Service department to all that subscribe to the email alert system. Rider alerts, Facebook, Twitter, news releases. System-wide alerts through media, networking, passenger alerting systems. Website; Service alerts directly to passengers who subscribe for them. Local media (traffic radio, etc.) are notified, or call for information once they hear trains are stopped. Twitter, text messaging customers, e-mail customers, web- site, station announcements, news media. Station announcements on board train announcements social media news media. Passenger Information signs on platforms transit agency Twitter account. E-mail notifications. 29. What information does your agency communicate to pas- sengers whose travel is affected by the critical incident? Estimates of the potential delay 93.6% 29 Alternate services 96.8% 30 Other 6.5% 2 Other responses include: (1) Cross honoring information to take other modes of transportation. (2) Very brief summary of the type of incident, though this message can be very much “sanitized.” 30. How soon after the critical incident is this information communicated to passengers? As soon as updates are available. As soon as possible. As soon as possible—unfortunately, sometimes we think we can get things fixed quickly so don’t make any announce- ments and things take longer than expected—at that time we are behind the information curve. However, our procedures do call for operator announcements. Within minutes. As soon as the information is available. As soon as possible, the delayed information can cause impatience and anxiety among passenger and they will start self evacuating themselves unsafely. As soon as reliable information is available. Within 30 seconds. As soon as a game plan for service is conceptualized. Within the first three to five minutes. Twitter feed and announcements within 10 minutes, direct communication and outreach typically takes 30 minutes to 1 hour.

87 It highly depends on the nature of the incident and estimated time to resolve. In many cases we will refer customers to adja- cent transit almost immediately, noting both are prepared to accept their fare media to ride. Immediately! Hopefully, ASAP and on a continuous basis. Immediately. As soon as the first responders and transit officials make the determination of service delays and alternate transit service requirements. As soon as possible, which is in most cases immediate. As soon as possible. As soon as possible. Immediately. We try and communicate information as soon as we have an assessment of the impact on service, how long or if there will be a delay. As quickly as possible. We have customer staff in the control center during working hours to manage this. As soon as possible. (We stop, we tell.) As soon as possible. However, the reality is it can take between 10–20 minutes before they are informed of the problem. Because of the chain of the information flow, and the need to script and vet the message, this always takes longer than what would be desirable. As soon as possible. Operators are typically instructed by Control to make clear, repeated announcements. Immediately or as soon as practical. Fifteen minutes. As soon as possible. Station announcements and on board train announcements are immediately after the initial scene size up. Immediately on train by operator. As available and clarified following. Hopefully within 15 minutes. 31. What types of alternate service does your agency deploy or arrange for and recommend to passengers when a critical incident occurs? Alternate rail lines within the agency 35.5% 11 Rail lines operated by other agencies 19.4% 6 Alternate bus routes 80.7 25 Single track operation around the critical incident site 77.4% 24 Bus bridge around the critical inci- dent site 93.6% 29 Bus bridge to another transit service 29.0% 3 Other 9.7% 3 Other responses include: (1) Cross-honoring with other agen- cies; (2) Express runs, rescheduling of service intervals; (3) All of the above have been used, depending on the scene, location, and time of day. Bus bridges are typically impractical during rush hours due to the inability to get large volumes of busses already in use. If the incident occurs toward the end of one line where there are fewer passengers left aboard, the possibility of busing is greater. Some of our rail lines parallel others for a period of the route, and passengers are always encouraged to use these where they are available. 32. Does the selection of the type of alternate service depend on any of the following factors? If so, please explain. Expected duration 96.8% 30 Time of day/day of week 87.1% 27 Incident location 83.6% 29 Availability of vehicles/personnel 80.7% 25 Cause of the critical incident 51.6% 16 None of the above 3.2% 1 Other/explain 12.9% 4 Other/explain responses include: (1) Expected duration— getting alternate service set up takes time, if we think the inci- dent will be cleared before we could get alternate service set up, we don’t set it up. Time/Date—peak service times are more crit- ical (more passengers) than other times, thus more riders could possibly be affected. Location—there will be a different level of system influence if the incident is at a terminal station served every 20 minutes vs. in the CBD where trains from all lines come through every few minutes. Availability of vehicles/personnel— in incidents such as ice storms, we may not have the assets to set up alternate service. Cause—if there are suspicious factors that shut down service, we would have to determine alternate service based on the circumstance. (2) Sometimes weather (hot, sunny or rainy day) plays a role in detraining passengers from an incident train. (3) Whether alternative service is provided will depend upon the duration of the event. However the type of alter- native service will always be bus bridging. (4) Less than 10 minute duration, the focus is clearing the incident and restoring service. If available we single track around the incident. For 30 minute delays when both tracks are blocked we would establish a bus bridge 33. What are the major impediments to minimizing impacts to other passengers whose travel is affected by the criti- cal incident? Responses summarized in Table 16, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Location of the incident; severity of the incident. Customer satisfaction. Always communication—we have our sources of official com- munication but people follow unofficial information web sites that do not always give accurate (or close to accurate) informa- tion. There is no way we can ever wait until we have complete information to pass on—sometimes initial information we get from the scene is not correct or changes quickly so it may look like we are not putting out consistent messages. People expect immediate response and quick resolution of any issues, but it doesn’t work like TV or movies (one response I get from exer- cise participants all the time—it took so long for them to get here and usually during an exercise equipment is pre-staged for safety reasons). I think we have to manage customer expecta- tions through effective communication. We have done some great things with social media, but there is always more that can be done—it’s just figuring out what that is. The location of the incident train may impact other service. Equipment. Lack of planning, procedures or arrangements with fire, police, and other transit agencies in case of emergencies.

88 Loss of communications. Lack of reliable information. Regional event that affects alternate modes of transportation. Effective communication. Short turn trains back in the direction they came so part of the rail corridor can remain moving. Dependent on where it occurs most of the passenger volume may be unaffected (near one end of the rail corridor). Short notice and confusion at terminals when normal loading procedures change. Sustained communication after the beginning of an incident. The time required to get the system back into normal opera- tion. Also, sometimes in the peak of the peak, a bus system may not have the extra bus/driver resources to immediately respond to establish a bus bridge. Our system is very crowded. Often we cannot reroute trains because of lack of track capacity. We often divert customers to routes that are already crowded and have little room for addi- tional riders. Establishment of alternate transportation service, then inform- ing them of the plan. Availability of resources. This depends on the type of incident, but certainly the ability to mitigate a problem quickly matters. Location, time of day, availability of alternate service. Establishing alternate bus service. Location and severity of the incident and available resources to work around (buses for bus bridging, available drivers, etc.) Good communications. Day of week, time of day, weather, any special events on going at time of incident. Track capacity, as delays will result from the incidents, and the extent of the delays can be a function of that capacity. Com- munications is key, and being able to obtain useful information in a timely way is a continual challenge. This is especially true because people today have their own electronic devices, so they will know there is a problem much earlier than before, but their expectation for answers often exceeds the ability to develop and communicate the right answers. Traffic congestion, availability of buses, and lack of third and fourth tracks to run around the problem. Cost labor and equipment. Getting good reliable information. Staffing resources. Providing information. Providing sufficient capacity to accom- modate large crowds. Finding alternate transportation. 34. What actions have been or would be most useful in minimizing impacts to other passengers whose travel is affected by the critical incident? Trains have now been placed at northernmost location, which helps if there is an emergency at this end of the line. Fees reduction. Setting up bus bridges and getting appropriate information out. Proper planning, procedures, and arrangements with fire, police, and other transit agencies in case of emergencies. Alternate Service Plans have been developed for each station that pre-identify the shuttle locations in the event of a loss of subway service. Informing them of conditions. Having public relations/communications located in the control center. Post incident review. Having pre-established mutual aid understandings with other operators, and empowerment of the daily operations team to activate emergency protocols without having to seek prior senior management approval. Customer information is important. If customers know about an incident, they can change their travel plans before they reach our system. Once they are in our system, they need to know what is happening and what their options are. Good, forward leaning information sharing . . . via text, web- site, loud speaker, etc. Flexibility to pull other employees off their assignments to use as resources for alternative service. Transit agency maintains a very knowledgeable emergency response team which is dispatched to scenes of critical incidents to address the incident and provide oversight in restoring service and/or establishing alternative services. Again communication, fast and accurate as well as possible alternatives to utilize due to the incident at hand. Utilizing buses where possible. Have transferred passengers to Amtrak service when necessary. Communication. Early planning and effective communications within and outside the agency (to the customers). Better communications with more timely options provided by us whenever possible. Adequate staffing resources on to manage incident, consis- tent and accurate customer communication. We have begun to have media relations staff monitor “tweets” and real time social communications in order to take advantage of additional ways of reaching passengers. Manual block/single track around the problem. Bus bridge operations. Extra staffing both for customers communication and alternate bus service. LIMITING SERVICE DISRUPTIONS ON ADJACENT TRACKS 35. Does your agency operate rail on multiple tracks? Yes, as a general rule 87.5% 28 Only on specific segments 12.5% 4 No, all single-track operation 0.0% 0 36. What steps does your agency take to limit service dis- ruption on adjacent tracks? Are these actions entirely within your agency’s control?

89 Reroute some of the traffic on the adjacent track. We have shared corridor with freight rail in some areas which are not in our control and we have to ensure all of our person- nel are trained properly to operate in that corridor. We cannot control what happens on those tracks—we have had suspicious packages on adjacent tracks shut down service. We have to be able to quickly coordinate with other rail operators in any emergency. It depends on the incident scope and scene. Single tracking and all actions taken are within our agency. We coordinate with tenant rail operators (Amtrak, freight) to optimize use of remaining tracks. We clear and postpone non- essential outages to keep remaining tracks open when possible. Ask politely. No, these are not in our control Always try to isolate the scene . . . sometimes with physical barriers or backdrops. No. Limited to switchbacks, single tracking not practical in street operation and not advised in subway due to traffic volume and short headways. They are not always within our control; safety of investiga- tory personnel on the scene may require a full system shutdown. Another factor is potential debris fields and recovery of remains. The entire transit PD and first responder team is trained to look at each scene and establish as soon as possible whether single- tracking is an option and if so, how soon it could be established. This can then be applied to the subsequent decisions that will be made. We use common sense techniques, but only after evaluating the situation. No, the actions are not entirely within our control. Depends on the nature of the incident. We may single track, reverse run, use bus bridges, etc. Single track operation, if necessary and permitted. If safe, we will always look to proceed with caution on adja- cent tracks to continue service. Only where we control the tracks. Utilize watchpersons and place speed restrictions. Not entirely within agency’s control. To operate safely when using adjacent tracks, yes. This all depends on severity, but where possible, single track- ing is a preferred option to continue service with minimal delay/ disruption. No, depending on the location. Agency tries to maintain both tracks during revenue opera- tions. Emergencies on rail lines may cause single track opera- tion. Rapid and safe intervention is critical to successful outcome on any transit related incident, especially during peak ridership times. Work with local jurisdictions and the dispatcher to try and expedite the ability to operate on adjacent tracks. These actions are not within our agency’s control, and subject to the local jurisdictions judgments at the time, which vary by jurisdiction and the individual in charge. We run adjacent to freight tracks in parts of our system. If the incident threatens their operation, their dispatch is notified. In a couple of locations, we have three tracks instead of two. In those areas we have all control. Single track operation and bus bridge. Once individual in charge of scene authorizes use of adjacent track or tracks, we will immediately begin using them in the most efficient way possible. Typically during critical incidents both tracks are taken out of service to protect first responders. When the opportunity pres- ents itself, single track operations are used to supplement alter- nate bus service. Yes. Work with fire department and law enforcement to make track available to single track around incident. Often have to wait past initial triage to make sure FD/EMS vehicles are removed from track. Issue of training and coordinating with FD. Out of our control. 37. Do first responders from local jurisdictions view limit- ing service disruptions on adjacent tracks as important? Yes 26.7% 8 Yes, but it is not a high priority 20.0% 6 Depends on the jurisdiction 40.0% 12 No 13.3% 4 38. What are the major impediments to limiting service dis- ruptions on adjacent tracks in managing critical incidents? Responses summarized in Table 18, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Level of traffic on the adjacent track. Not all responders realize that different track is controlled by different companies—it is not always a “one call does it all” situation. Location of the incident and scope. Crowd control and safety of passengers and providing physi- cal barriers between incident tracks and those providing single tracking service. The magnitude of the incident determines how many tracks we get back and how quickly we get them back. Egos and lack of understanding on either side’s part (railroad or emergency responders) can hamper efforts to restore service. Local responders allowing it. Incident command and lack of information about potential alternatives. Street traffic and subway congestion. Safety of incident scene personnel, recovery of remains/ bio-hazard, location/distance between control points and track crossovers. Communications with the first responders. Safety. Speed restrictions. Scope of the incident and whether adjacent tracks can be safely utilized. Fouling of adjacent tracks and emergency personnel. Overhead catenary may need to be deenergized if equipment is being brought in that might come too close to the adjacent catenary (such as a crane). Better understanding of rail operations by first responders.

90 Type of emergency and the station configuration (center platform/side platform). Educating the emergency response jurisdictions about the nature of rail incidents. Law enforcement, fire department release of the incident. This is usually dependent on the extent of matter that winds up on the adjacent track, but the decision usually rests with the person in charge of the scene, and there is a broad spectrum of thought from community to community on when this will be allowed. Distance between tracks. Scope of the incident. Local fire stations . . . often you have a fill-in captain that is not used to working around the rail. They do not have the same familiarization or comfort level to allow one track to stay open. 39. What actions have been or would be most useful in lim- iting service disruptions on adjacent tracks in managing critical incidents? Education for local emergency responders on the dangers of adjacent tracks. Organize and obtain permission from our partners to reduce or reroute some of their traffic. Coordination, planning and exercises are always useful— think things through and practice. Rapid response (especially Medical Examiner) and clean-up of any biological hazards from the scene. Providing crows control & safety of passengers between incident tracks and those providing single tracking service. Meaningful and honest participation in the Unified Command. Having railroad personnel on hand that has an emergency services background. Prior joint planning. Trust. Good negotiating. Restricted or walking speed thru the area on an adjacent track (generally we can’t get permission to operate on the adjacent track from the local responders till many hours after investiga- tion begins. Establish criteria for impacting service and ensure that decision is made at the appropriate level within the agency/jurisdiction. Exclusive rights of way on surface and additional subway crossovers making single track headways possible. We are currently looking at key sections of our system that have the longest distances between crossovers to add these to improve single tracking flexibility and reduce the length and time to run around incidents. Sharing of a realistic sense of when the problem will be rem- edied sufficiently so that service can resume. Nothing within our control. Depends on the location of the incidents and collateral damage. Coordination with investigative entities in reducing times during which the area is taken out of service. Make sure first responders have a small footprint where pos- sible to allow limited service on adjacent tracks. This is dictated by the incident itself. There are no specific rules. Having the right personnel on site to manage the situation. Tow out with track vehicle on same track as incident took place. More training and joint drills. (Maybe.) Good command and control incident scene. The emphasis will be to establish partial or full rail service as soon as possible. Frequent exercises with the jurisdictions is important, as well as meetings with key officials in authority who can inform their departments of the challenges associated with incidents. Limit total disruption, allow partial or single track operations. Communication directly with person in charge, assuring him/her that personnel involved in investigation and clean up can perform their tasks safely while trains are passing on adja- cent track. More space between main tracks. Coordination, outreach, communication with local fire/EMS. ISSUES UNIQUE TO ELECTRIFIED TERRITORY 40. Does your agency operate trains in electrified territory? Yes 87.5% 28 No 12.5% 4 41. Who has primary responsibility for the decision to shut down power so that first responders have safe access to the train? Transit agency 51.9% 14 Local municipality (city or county) 7.4% 2 Other (please specify) 40.7% 11 Other responses include: (1) Emergency Response agency works with movement bureau. (2) Incident dependent. Can be train crew, rail traffic controllers, first responders, etc. (3) The FD and PD have the authority to require power be removed where they feel it is necessary for the safety of customers and their staff, however there is dialog between the agency, Rail Con- trol Center Desk Supt, who actually is responsible for initiat- ing removal of power and then to discuss options other than power removal. (4) Incident Commander which could be transit agency or local jurisdiction depending on incident and loca- tion. (5) The transit agency controls the power and therefore the responsibility however local jurisdictions can request a power shutdown and Transit will always comply. (6) It depends on the incident. It could be the transit agency or municipality (7) Uni- fied Command makes power management decision. Power is normally taken down during an emergency on the affected track prior to FD arrival. (8) This survey covers commuter rail, where power is not an issue. Will follow-up with another for power issues. (9) We’ve trained them, so they don’t ask us to de-energize very often. We will de-energize whenever there is a threat to life. (10) Emergency fire or medical responders. (11) Amtrak. 42. Who in your agency has primary responsibility to shut down power? Operations manager. Track and Electrical Services technicians—train control can cut the power, however, most responders require verification by TES before working by the wire. Engineering systems operations desk in our Movement Bureau. OCC, systems maintenance. On-scene coordinator.

91 The Power Department (Power Control Center). The Incident Commander notifies Power Control. Rail Operations Control/Traction Power. Power Control. The Rail Control Center (RCC) under the control of RTO is the primary decision maker, but power is removed by the System Operator in the Power Command Center. Our line and signal foreman or EIC. Way Power and Signal personnel. Division of Rail Services. Trainmaster. Any person can request power out when necessary. The Power Dispatcher will remotely place power in reserve. Controller, remotely. Or the OCS department. Rail Operation Communication Control Center—Rail Controller. Power and Way Manager. Any on-duty manager or on-scene personnel. Rail Operations Control Center. Control Center, typically in coordination with MOW management. Engineering and Maintenance—Power Department. Rail Control Center. Train control. Maintenance of Way. 43. Who has primary responsibility for the decision to restore power? Transit agency 61.5% 16 Local municipality (city or county) 7.7% 2 Other (please specify) 30.8% 8 Other responses include: (1) Emergency Response agency works with movement bureau. (2) Depends on the magnitude of the incident and in whose name the power was originally removed. (3) Whoever requested power be removed must be the one to request power be restored, unless they have passed that responsibility on to someone else. However, all power restora- tion requests go through the Desk Supt in the RCC. (4) Inci- dent Commander. (5) It depends on the incident. It could be the transit agency or municipality. (6) Whoever has hold on power. (7) Unified Command. (8) Amtrak. 44. Who in your agency has primary responsibility to restore power? Catenary maintenance manager. TES. ESO. Systems maintenance. On-scene coordinator. Power Department. The Incident Commander notifies Power Control. Rail Operations Control/Traction Power. Power Control. The RCC manages all incidents and has the final responsibil- ity to insure that all outside agencies and transit agency person- nel have cleared the tracks and no longer require power to be removed, and then makes the final call for power to be restored. Power is restored through the system operator in the Power Con- trol Center. Our Chief Engineer, with assistance from his staff. Incident Commander. Division of Rail Services, in coordination with the Office of Safety and Security. Trainmaster. The person that ordered it off. IC. Rail Operation Controller. Power and Way Manager. Control Center through the Traction power group. Rail Operations Control Center. MOW, in coordination with Control Center. Engineering and Maintenance—Power Department. Rail Control Center. Train control. MOW. 45. Are there other issues unique to critical incidents in elec- trified territory? Electrical protection for the intervention teams. The electricity is the critical issue for responders. Ensuring that the electrical hazards are identified and miti- gated during response and recovery. No. Power shut down procedures, Red-tag and applying ground straps. Residual energy in de-energized, but not physically grounded, catenary lines was an issue in a derailment in May 2013. Caution must be taken when cutting power that other trains do not become trapped in the tunnel due to power off situations. Trapped trains will need to be evacuated after 20 minutes in the tunnel, leading to passenger and staff safety issues. Local jurisdictions or emergency responders do not always understand how traction power systems work—the area that will be shut down/affected . . . and how shutting down power, in some instances, may create additional challenges. Network connectivity makes segment isolation on the sur- face time-consuming. Subway does not have this problem (lin- ear and more easily managed). The rail system has Emergency Alarm boxes which provide someone on site the ability to remove power from a section of track. The EA box removes power from a very large segment of track, and should only be used where there is an imminent threat of serious injury or death. Because of the large segment

92 of track that is controlled by the EA box, the removal of power through this can impact other trains operating in the area that are not involved in the incident, which can then further complicate the incident and/or place customers on other train in danger. We train extensively with the FD and PD to request power removal from the specific incident location and to not use the EA box unless it is absolutely necessary. Beyond the obvious concerns regarding voltage, the location of wires, weather, ponds (water sources) are all of concern in this context. Safety. Personnel are trained to treat everything as “live” until TA power personnel have removed power, grounded it and tested it. Safety. Yes, ensuring when power is restored that everyone on site is safe and clear Downed catenary wires, downed wires on catenary, but oth- erwise, no. No. Yes, procedural requirements can make power removal and restoration a challenge. Supervisory power outages are quick and efficient. Red tag power outages a lengthy process in making the work area safe. Can add 20 minutes to either end of incident. TPSS. Training EMS, law enforcement and fire agencies. The uncertainty of first responders who are unfamiliar with LRT. 46. What actions have been or would be most useful in addressing issues surrounding electrification at the criti- cal incident? Provide proper training. We have TES personnel available for the incident com- mander to address issues with—have the experts on-scene. Training of FLS personnel. Strictly following the procedures established under power shut down procedures, Red-tag and applying ground straps. Too many to list. The most critical is a clear understanding of the system by first responders (training) and a clear communica- tions pathway and protocol for requesting AND CONFIRMING de-energization. The 3rd rail is always treated as live, even when the power has been cut. Training and full scale simulations. Integration of Power Control into OCC (Control Center) Automation of complex network segment isolation on surface operations. Training with the outside agencies to understand the opera- tion of the system with respect to power removal. The transit agency initiated a program where FD and PD liaisons are uti- lized in the RCC to communicate with their respective field personnel and the RCC Managers to understand the best use of power removal and restoration for an incident. The transit agency also dispatches an Emergency Response Officer to all major incidents to report to the Incident Command post and rep- resent the agency. Awareness of the issues by all parties. Well trained responders are key. During training activities, the issue of electrified third-rail is ALWAYS a main topic of conversation and explanation with all first responders. Keep untrained personnel and people out of the affected area, designate a safety officer immediately. Explain to responders that remote removal of power should not be accepted solely. Power appurtances should always be tested. Communication. Following established safe work practices for high voltage electrical hazards—NFPA 70E. Better understanding of when it’s actually needed. Good command and control at the scene and having the ade- quate power crews available to rack out and place back in the breakers at the associated Traction Power or Tie breaker facili- ties to reduce time for power management activities. SCADA control. Clear understanding (and rules) that make every employee responsible for reporting anything out of the ordinary that they observe. Providing training and alert testing equipment. Continued training of first responders. SAFETY OF NON-RAILROAD/NON-AGENCY PERSONNEL 47. Is safety training a part of ongoing coordination with local jurisdictions and first responders? Yes, they receive the same training as agency personnel 23.3% 7 Yes, they receive an abbreviated version of agency training focused on their par- ticular tasks 70.0% 21 No 6.7% 2 48. Does participation in safety training vary by jurisdiction? Yes 65.5% 19 No, required of all first responders 31.0% 9 Don’t know 3.5% 1 49. What steps does your agency take with regard to the safety of non-railroad/non-transit personnel? Responses summarized in Table 23, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Railroad safety training is offered at least once a year to every police and fire department, corridor-wide. We do provide basic safety training to all personnel. We offer training to any one that asks for it. We also set up regular and scheduled training for local responders. A safety representative responds to the scene to ensure site safety during response and recovery. Ongoing track access certification and work coordination meetings.

93 We provide safety training to outside agencies such as fire & police and those personnel who are required to work within fouling distances of our rail system. We have a dedicated position that is responsible for, among others things, being the primary liaison to emergency services agencies for the purposes of training and other needs. The Safety Department maintains and delivers a Passenger Train Emergency Response Procedures curriculum to emergency responders. The program has both classroom and “hands-on” components. We are the subject matter experts and deliver the training to external partners and first responders. Safety training and familiarization of RR operations before any are allowed on the property. Outreach to local jurisdictions/emergency responders. And we require individuals to attend rail safety training before they can access the right-of-way. On-track protection training/certification required. Otherwise active escort for those not trained. The incident/scene employee in charge ensures that the public cannot gain access (using tape, extra officers to secure a perim- eter). Access to the scene is limited to those with appropriate ID and authority. The transit agency conducts interagency emergency prepared- ness exercise during which safety is observed and then discussed during hot wash. The agency provides training assistance to agen- cies in their development of transit familiarization training for their respective personnel and has provided resources to help the build their own transit training facilities. We also have strict right-of-way rules, postings, safety related signage, informational campaigns, informational videos on the transit agency website for the public. Periodic drills are performed that include a frank discussion of everything we feel the first responder should know as they approach a railroad accident . . . on our railroad. Safety is our number one priority and we have safety personnel who respond to every critical incident. We offer contractor safety training to all personnel who are working adjacent to our structures. All contractors who work on transit agency property must have safety training and be escorted by agency personnel. We advertise safety training, make it available. Have an annual rail safety and security conference for all first responders. Non-railroad/non-transit personnel are not permitted in the track area without representatives of the transit agency respon- sible for their safety. RAIL SAFETY TRAINING Contract requirements for access to right-of-way, access con- trol committee responsible for approval of right-of-way permits and power outage requests. They all must complete on-track training before accessing the ROW. We provide roadway worker protection training and support staff on incidents. Emergency drills for the purpose of training sharing of train- ing materials signage on equipment. Anyone working or accessing our ROW must receive on- track-safety training; access permits for anyone entering the ROW. All work is protected by flagging and train orders, other procedures. Operational and equipment familiarization. Responding transportation officers typically assess the scene, and once allowed, bring trains through the area in a slow, con- trolled manner that would allow them to stop short of someone fouling the track. Continued opportunities for first responders to have hands on experience. We also provide train the trainer videos for agency that request training. Handout material/pamphlets. Training videos. 50. Who in your agency is responsible for safety-related train- ing of non-transit personnel? Safety Coordinator. Safety Officer. Emergency Preparedness specialist normally conducts train- ing for non-police personnel with the assistance of our safety department and fleet services. Police training department usu- ally conducts police related response training although the Emergency Preparedness Sgt. has conducted some training for police. The Corporate Safety and Training Department. Safety and operations. Safety Department & Light Rail Department. The Safety Department. The Safety & Environment Department in partnership with Rail Operations. Director and manager of Safety. Instruction Department. Safety group. Our Chief of Protective Services has been the lead in coor- dinating outreach and training of local area potential first responders. Director, Track and Track Safety of our Office of System Safety determines required training for contractors, vendors or non-transit personnel who will work or visit the system. Our Manager of Safety, Rules and Training. System safety. The Office of Safety and Security and the Division of Training. Rail Safety. Safety & Training departments. Safety & Security Department. Training Department. Our training department. Transit Police/Office of Emergency Management for first responder jurisdictional personnel. Responsibility lies with the Director of the Safety Department.

94 Rail Safety division. Operations and Safety. Safety Department. Safety (Rail Safety Section). Chief Safety Officer/Rail GMs. 51. What are the major impediments to ensuring the safety of non-transit personnel in managing critical incidents? New hires, reluctance to take training, man-power, overtime. To reach all the involved personnel. They may have been trained but did not retain the training— personnel need to regularly attend training. Unfortunately, they have a lot of unique aspects in their jurisdictions—we are not the only thing they need training on. Training time is in high demand from several sources and there isn’t always time to do all the training that needs to be done. We are very flexible in our training schedules and conduct training during various shifts to accommodate shift workers. Level of awareness of hazards inherent in a railroad operating environment including walking on surfaces, moving equipment, and electrical hazards. None. Lack of participation from non-transit personnel. Lack of training. Lack of on-scene coordination and control. Gaining track level access. They don’t take it seriously. Keeping everyone informed and patient, while attending to the incident. None. Major problem is the improper use of the EA box during inci- dents where it is not appropriate to use, resulting in power resto- ration from a much larger area. This occurs occasionally and in most cases power had already been removed and notification to the agencies dispatch center initiated. Awareness of who is doing what and where. Human nature. Not familiar with the dangers of the rail environment. Misunderstanding of the transit environment. Communicating with various other responders. Staffing. Understanding the system. Number of emergency responders in the region and their vary- ing commitment or availability for training. Education about the nature of railroads and the nature of train traffic. Vast network of municipalities. Not having enough staff to support properly support the incident. Training. Personnel wanting to see/participate in what is going on Scene Control. 52. What actions have been or would be most useful in ensur- ing the safety of non-transit personnel in managing criti- cal incidents? On-scene lookout. Developing a learning course for all our personnel and suppliers Make sure there is an agency liaison with the incident commander. Limiting access to scene to only necessary personnel. None. Involving non-transit agency personnel in the importance of getting education & training in rail safety. Providing early notification and information to local agen- cies. Getting knowledgeable railroad personnel into the Com- mand Post and participating in the Unified Command. The new track level training program has been very effective in providing critical information to first responders. Training requiring a test to confirm level of absorption. Training, SOPs, and simulations. On-track safety training and certification protocol. Periodic emergency responder safety training and drills. The use of agency liaisons and training!!! Awareness. Job briefings . . . to the extent they can be performed. Good communication. Explaining, in detail, the transit environment, the vehicles and the processes by which we, as an agency, respond to critical incidents. Training. Remove power and stop train service during the incident. Establishing communication parameters. Increase the number of available trainers. Ensure a better understanding the system. Conduct more outreach-based safety training. Take the train- ing on the “road” to the students. More training exercises, table top drills, and meetings to review policies, procedures, and safety methods already developed. Limited fire, law enforcement authority to shut down system for longer than is necessary. Hire enough staff and train with first responders—Drill— Drill—Drill. 53. What would be the most useful guidance your agency would offer to local jurisdictions in terms of safety of non-transit personnel? Responses summarized in Table 24, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. All non-transit personnel must have basic training in safety. Make sure they have a liaison from the agency with the inci- dent commander and don’t make assumptions about the system— otherwise follow basic safety practices around railroad tracks that we were taught as we grew up.

95 Assist in ensuring access to scene is limited to essential personnel. Training and communications. Involving non-transit agency personnel in safety training at the beginning of new rail projects. Regular training and joint planning and exercises. There is no such thing as too much training. I think the question is what does the local jurisdiction need from the agency to permit a safe operation concurrent with the investigation requirements. Communication about injuries and locations of the injured/ disabled prior to arrival. Help them prepare for response. Awareness of safety hazards specific to transit and require- ment to coordinate with OCC. Engage with the local transit agency to establish training that includes system orientation, safety around a live rail system, how critical incidents are processed. Establish annual drills/simulations of an actual emergency incident, use that process to provide updated training each year, and then conduct the event and debrief afterwards. Develop a strong working relationship between the emergency response personnel and transit agency personnel. Conduct exer- cise and provide familiarization training. Beware of coming into contact with downed wire and be always alert to train movement. Regular training and education are key. Be cognizant of the operating environment and request specific training from the transit agency for all of your first responders. Stay off of the rail infrastructure, wait for trained personnel. Always make sure with the transit agency before entering the rail environment to make sure it is safe. Utilize the subject-matter experts of the TA to assist in under- standing the environment. When in doubt communicate with transit personnel. Start early in the year and coordinate with the various train- ing commands—try to fit into their training schedules. Get to know them and keep them engaged. Participate in train the trainer programs, establish minimum training requirements and commit to meeting them. Extensive safety training of personnel is essential in provid- ing the safe environment we all desire. Reach out to the transit agency for hands-on training. ACCELERATED CLEAN-UP OPERATION AND KEEPING A TRAIN IN SERVICE 54. What steps does your agency take to accelerate clean-up operation after a critical incident? Responses summarized in Table 25, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Gentle reminders to on-scene emergency responders to get train traffic released. We have qualified suppliers on contract. We have officers trained in accident investigation and we know what has to be taken and done before a train can be released—we ensure those are done as quickly as possible. We have an on-call clean-up contractor. Training. Provide assistance whenever possible. Planning for multiple operational periods. Having agree- ments and contracts in place with cleanup contractors, wreck and re-rerailing operators, etc. Set up MOUs with police and the Coroner and bring in extra crews. We have an outside contractor handle clean-up including hazardous materials on-site or at shops. Inspect vehicles, track, overhead wires, signals, facilities. Clear debris and biohazards. Run sweep trains to verify restored track. Inform public of restored service. Implement service management to restore schedule/headways. We have more than one bio-hazard subcontractor and use the one that can respond the quickest given the time/location and their call backlog. The use of liaisons in the RCC and Emergency Response Officers working with the incident commanders at the scene. We use contractors and engage our own forces ASAP. Additional personnel. All personnel are on stand-by at the site to perform critical PMs, walk-throughs, etc., in order to move any/all equipment safely to an area that will afford the agency to reinstitute service. A running electronic log is also kept of the incident to afford all division to notes activities taken throughout the period. Adequate staff and contract with environmental resources if needed. We don’t “accelerate” clean-up. Clean-up occurs after all injured are attended to and an investigation has been completed. Ensure That Appropriate Personnel Are Dispatched to the Incident. If necessary, the use of outside contractors for clean-up. We have clean-up staff on site ready prior to releasing of the scene. Good command and control of scene, staging of appropriate assets at scene for recovery operations. Dispatch agency personnel to an incident to be available in assisting Incident Commanders and attend to ad hoc needs. MOW staff responds with appropriate spill/clean up equip- ment. Our on-site Incident (Transportation)) Supervisor com- municates with PD or Fire Incident Commander to make sure clearance is given; we have procedures and responsibilities for clearing infrastructure and vehicles before movement or “clear- ing” of incident scene. Track, Signal and Operation response crews. When possible, train will continue to operate in its normal cycle to tie up point, where cleanup crew will meet and perform necessary cleaning. In some instances, equipment is cleaned at the site. This is discouraged unless absolutely necessary since it will keep operations impacted longer.

96 Communication with the incident scene. Unified Command (ICS). 55. At what point in the critical incident management does your agency take back control of the site? Who decides this? Responses summarized in Table 26, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Control of the site is not taken until it is given by the incident commander. Operations manager as soon as the track is clear. When the incident is clear of local responders, we will do a safety check of the tracks to ensure they are safe to operate and take control. Once the emergency responders have finished their investi- gation and the Medical Examiner has transported the body from the scene. Post-incident debriefing. When the critical incident scene is cleared or released by the Incident Commander to our on-scene coordinator. Incident-dependent. The Incident Commander and/or Unified Command eventually returns the site to the rail operator. When the emergency has subsided and we are in the recovery stage. This is decided jointly with the emergency services and the transit IC. When they relinquish it. If there is a fatality it would be after the coroner makes his/ her determination. If trespassers strike, Fire Dept. would treat person away from tracks and handover control. When law enforcement and/or fire have completed their operations The Incident Commander decides. When the local incident employee releases the tracks for full revenue service with no restrictions. The EIC and Ops team on the ground decide and then communicate this to all affected personnel. When the lead agency has completed its operations it informs the ERO at the ICP and its own dispatch center. When the RCC hears from the lead agency dispatch center and then all other agencies that were operating at the incident the control of the incident turns over to the transit agency. That varies by case. Ultimately, the first responders make it clear that their work is done. ASAP. Police and Fire make this determination. This “take-back” is given from the Incident Commander of the scene. It may be Fire Rescue or Police. That information is relayed to the transit representative at the Incident Command Post and instructions on resumption of service are given through that designee. The Agency would never give up control of the site and the Incident Commander operating under the Unified Command with all first responders would determine this. The IC makes that determination when it is safe to do so. When loss of life and major damage to property are no longer an issue. Right after the Fire Department releases control—Fire Depart- ment turns over command to Safety Department, or, if there is a crime, the local Police turn over to Transit Police. Varies depending on the scene and incident. We utilize Unified Command so we are part of all ongoing decision making. Decision is made by Unified Command. The Incident Commander will decide when the agency takes back control; this is after their initial on-site scene investigation is complete. When investigation is concluded and is communicated offi- cially to our on-site Incident Supervisor, we then take our inter- nal steps to assure track, OCS, switches, vehicle, etc. are each checked and cleared by specified members of responding team. Once all the “boxes are checked,” the scene is released to Con- trol so trains may be ordered to move and service restoration may begin. When released by local authority, or Transit Police. Depends on incident. We follow NIMS and have the communication with the Inci- dent Commander. When injured are removed, police investigation is concluded, safety has final say to release the railroad. 56. Are there any particular strategies your agency uses to allow a train to remain in service? Responses summarized in Table 27, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. This is entirely up to mechanical and management personnel on the scene. Yes we run train on the sections of our track that is not affected by the disruption. No—but we only stop trains when necessary. SOPs. Depending on the incident, certain steps are taken to ensure safe resumption of service. Any train involved in an incident will go back to the shop for inspection before returning to service. Just the mechanical inspection performed at the scene. All trains are dispatched to the yard for inspection. Trains are inspected and returned accordingly unless a hold is placed. Station bypass on adjacent track once perimeter established. By applying agency and FRA regulations we come to that determination . . . but a thorough physical inspection is essential. Common sense—safety first, the vehicle involved in the critical incident is impounded until investigation is completed. All vehicles that are involved in incidents are properly inspected by transit officials before being returned to normal passenger service. It depends on the type of incident. If train has not been directly involved. No. We meet with the on scene AHJ as quickly as possible to offer any assistance necessary.

97 For most major incidents, the incident train is taken out of service to the rail yard for incident investigation and inspection and repair. Loss of one train does not significantly impact our system. If a train retains passengers and is not disabled, it will com- plete its run, regardless of how late it is, as long as the agency was unable to transload passengers to a more expeditious com- pletion of the commute. Depends on the severity of the incident/accident. We will sometimes relieve the Operator of the incident train and have him/her remain on the scene while another qualified employee proceeds with the incident train. This way, the Operator does not leave the scene and the police can conclude their interviews as trains move. Yes, single track operations. If train is operational mechanically, we try to use it. Some- times passengers are transferred to other trains that have been released while the train involved in the incident is being held (we often use the ADA lifts of one train to connect the vestibules of trains on adjacent tracks). If passengers have been transferred, original equipment can usually proceed directly to tie up yard. The cleanup contractor that we typically use is paid by the hour, so they are often not in a big hurry to finish up. Transportation Officer on scene needs to assess situation and be firm to insure that cleaning process does not drag on longer than necessary. Onsite inspection. 57. What are the major impediments to accelerating clean- up operation and allowing a train to remain in service after a critical incident? Damage to the equipment. Coroner and police authorities. I think we have got clean-up and quick restoration down pretty good if we are handling the scene—when local juris- dictions are involved they do not have the sense of urgency to restore service as we do. Location and time of incident. SOPs. Manpower & resources are the major impediments. Damage to rolling stock that cannot be accessed or repaired in the field. Testing of power, signal, and track components to ensure that all aspects of the system are safe and ready for ser- vice restoration. Delay in crews getting to the scene as subway service is suspended. Local responders allowing an inspection of the equipment. Outside investigations involving local jurisdictions. Oversight agency investigations. Law enforcement investi- gative holds. The biggest is the need to deal with bio-hazard issues. Fre- quently a train is perfectly safe to operate to the end of the line, but the bio-hazard issues will not allow it to remain in revenue service. Track occupancy . . . on adjacent tracks and employee fatigue. Vehicle goes into impound. Vehicular damages, being held for further inspection by jurisdictional investigative officials. The physical work necessary based on the factors involved. “Acceleration” is not the goal. Safety first; then complete investigation; then service restoration. Personnel on the site and clearing the site of emergency equipment. Funding and procurement process requirements, equipment availability, and manpower availability. AHJ not understanding the importance of service restoration. Type of incident, investigation, and infrastructure damage. Timing. It seems that the local jurisdictions have a different perspective than transit agencies, and are often not inclined to accelerate clean-up, but let their process run its course on its time. We have excellent recovery strategies, and utilize well trained crews and equipment to assist. See above. Lack of staff. Rapid clearance requires training and coordination internal and external. 58. What actions have been or would be most useful in accelerating clean-up operation and allowing a train to remain in service after a critical incident? One agency used cones to identify where body parts were, to ease the work of the coroner when she showed up on the scene. Meet and inform the authorities on the importance on clear- ing the track. Awareness of the purpose of public transportation and impor- tance of scheduled service—acknowledging our need to restore service for our customers and stakeholders—respecting our priori- ties (after ensuring the safety of our employees and passengers— getting service going again is a top priority). On-call contractor. SOPs. Having better planning and necessary MOU with various agencies to accelerate clean-up operation and prompt resump- tion of service. Allowing transit response personnel to have emergency lights to move through traffic. Access. Established agreements with local jurisdictions for less severe incidents. Education and agreements allowing immediate photography/ video/measurements to release incident trains. Just close attention to individual and departmental responsi- bility . . . who is to do what and where. Don’t impound rail vehicles. Collaborative working relationships with jurisdictional investigative personnel (this is an on-going process). “Acceleration” is not the goal. Safety first; then complete investigation; then service restoration. Depends on the situation; there is no pat answer. Assistance by the Fire Department with cleanup. Good understanding and a good working relationship.

98 Ensuring that appropriate assets are staged with proper equip- ment needed for recovery operations. Education of local jurisdictions on the nature of public transit and the benefits of accelerating clean-up. Transportation Officer on scene needs to assess situation and be firm to insure that cleaning process does not drag on longer than necessary. Cross training field supervisor to inspect trains and track for anomalies post-incident. 59. What would be the most useful guidance your agency would offer to local jurisdictions in terms of accelerating clean-up operation? Responses summarized in Table 28, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Work together with the train crew and any other on-scene personnel to cover up any exposed body parts, so that passen- gers inside the train do not have to see them. Communications with them. Let us be the technical advisor for what is necessary—we have the contacts and have procedures down on how to clear a scene quickly and efficiently. Follow SOPs. Have better planning and MOUs. Plan for the next operational period. Have agreements/ contracts in place with (or at least contact information for) cleanup contractors, wreck and re-rerailing operators, etc. Make the MOU’s with the partner agencies common knowl- edge throughout the entire organization (i.e.. police). Offer to do all they will let you do without getting in their way during their investigation. Have agreements in place with vendors to expedite clean-up. Establish agreements with other agencies/railroads for equip- ment. Move investigation to yard if appropriate. Require an on- scene coordinator to coordinate with local jurisdictions on scene. And have procedures to ensure decisions that impact service are made at the appropriate levels. Make room available for local jurisdiction equipment (e.g., coroner’s equipment) throughout system (e.g., stations). Cooperative education with outside agencies and consistent preservation of evidence required for their investigations. Difficult to pinpoint an answer to this question. Maintain safety at scene, have proper training for bio-clean-up and disposal. If possible, allowing single-track operations during the period of investigation in order to maintain more seamless continuity of transportation until regular service is restored. Cooperate with the experts under the NIMS system to deal with any situation. Cleanup cannot occur until the incident is over. Clear lines of authority. Plan ahead. Get to know them. Local jurisdictions recognizing the importance of regional transportation issues during emergencies on the rail line. The quicker we can restore service, the less of an impact to the local jurisdictions. Have representatives on the scene to answer questions, assist the, investigation, and make the case for acceleration of the process. Replication of an accident is counterproductive. We will take the train to the yard and isolate it until they conclude their non-critical vehicle assessment/investigation. The police need to understand the limits of their jurisdiction under their state’s laws. Traffic cops (or at least some of them) should take a Rail Accident Investigation class so they know what they are doing. Use common sense, particularly if scene is in a rural or non- populated area. Site, depending on location, often does not need to be completely spotless. Train your employees and work closely with local first responders. PROCEDURES TO HANDLE ACCIDENT EVIDENCE/DATA COLLECTION 60. What procedures does your agency follow to handle accident evidence and data collection for a critical incident? Responses summarized in Table 29, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Formal investigation on the site, evidence gathering and analyzing by experts. Staff/crew is instructed to not handle any evidence. The only exception is to cover body parts to prevent on-board or nearby persons from seeing them. We follow state legal procedures and agency procedures approved by the SSO. Our Safety and Claims divisions work with our agency Police Department to conduct an investigation as required. Safety department. We have written SOPs to handle accident evidence & data collection. Evidence is controlled and processed by law enforcement in conjunction with NTSB. The Supervisors complete initial reports. Chain of custody form. The procedures are part of our system safety program plan. All evidence is processed through the sheriff’s department to ensure chain of custody and preserve evidence. Law enforcement handles evidence on scene and measure- ments. Transit agency handles video, audio, and photography. Claims and Safety handle passenger interviews. Operations handles operator interviews. Normally fatality scenes are investigated by the local PD and coroner, so they “own” the data and reports. We receive copies. We have on board outward facing cameras, so we capture these potential images from hard drives and provide to the investigatory units, retaining a copy for our files. The following statement is applicable to all questions per- taining to the evidence collection/data collection; in any inci- dent that would be considered to be criminal in nature, the City Police Department would be responsible for collecting/

99 securing the evidence. If the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were to assume control of the incident investiga- tion, then they would dictate how they want the evidence col- lected/secured. Typically most incidents that are investigated at the transit agency may result in disciplinary action, not criminal charges. Data collected from devices such as event recorders are captured and retained by the Operating Department that owns the equipment; i.e., Division of Signals, Division of Car Equip- ment, and copies of the downloads are provided to the Office of System Safety along with an analysis and interpretation of the data by a qualified individual. In other instances, such as an employee fatality, physical evidence such as employee’s Per- sonal Protective Equipment will be collected at the scene by OSS investigators and stored with the case files, which are kept in a locked room, within a locked cabinet that is accessible to Rail Investigation staff members. We follow FRA and other appropriate standards as they apply. We have a SOP that covers this. The incident scene is maintained to allow only those person- nel with investigative intentions to access the scene in order to preserve and collect evidence and incident measurements. All support and operational division are required to submit infor- mational reports which will become part of the main accident investigation. The Agency has a sworn police department who would fol- low law enforcement protocols for evidence retrieval. The System Safety Department is the Investigator-In-Charge at critical incidents. OCC SOPs. Safety and Security Transportation. The transit agency has an Accident Investigation Admin- istrative Procedure that applies to all accidents including rail- related—AP002. We use our transit police. Criminal incidents the police are the lead, accidental inci- dents not involving death, the office of safety is the lead. State law, chain of custody of information, and procedures regarding the downloading of event recorder information. We have a chain-of-custody protocol for onboard videos so cops get theirs. We offer to impound a vehicle for further inves- tigation. Accident reports are filed by all concerned. Transit Police secures evidence. Operations examines track, signals, vehicles and rules compliance, and reports accordingly. Transit Police are capable of handling everything necessary. Our PD handles all evidence. Police investigation secures evidence (transit police). 61. Does your agency “own” the accident evidence or is it the responsibility of another agency? Responses summarized in Table 30, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. Yes we do as the operator but we also have the Transportation Safety Board and the Federal and also State/provincial entities. It is the responsibility of the coroner. If we work the accident, we own the evidence. Depends. Collectively collected, but the agency is responsible. It depends, for critical items it’s the responsibility of another agency, but for minor perishable items our agency can also han- dle the evidence. Transit Police Department. The transit agency will take their own samples/collect their own evidence and keep their own records. External partners (i.e. police) will do the same. Generally once issued to the responders it is the responders. Our agency owns the evidence. Physical evidence remains with law enforcement, if not crime or enforcement related then rail maintenance preserves evidence. As stated above, usually the final report is the responsibility of the county coroner. In our operating environment, where we have an exclusive Right of Way, our incidents are very much self-contained; there- fore, evidence produced in the event is generally owned by the agency. As stated earlier, if some external influence (vandalism for example) were identified, it would be brought to the attention of the City PD and they would take possession of the evidence. Best I know, we own it. Depends on the location and type of incident. Usually it is the policing agency. The agency owns the information and may provide to inves- tigative officials. The Transit Agency would be responsible for evidence preservation. Yes, unless the municipality takes possession. Unless the police take it. Yes. The transit agency owns the accident evidence and reports findings to the State/Provincial Safety Oversight. Depends on the incident. Depends on the incident; if a fatality is involved the police may take the lead and then turn the incident over to safety. The agency will own data associated with event recorders and camera footage, though these are freely shared with need to know jurisdictions investigating the incidents. The City police “own” the video. We make our copies. Yes. Depends on who is ultimately in charge of scene. Yes. Agency controlled and “owned.” Local agency is primary. Transit agency conducts its own investigation. We share reports, photos, and videos as requested by the agency. 62. What are the major impediments to handling accident evidence and data collection after a critical incident? Responses summarized in Table 31, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. It’s providing the information to all the agencies involved in the investigation.

100 Ensuring all evidence is gathered correctly and vehicle is quarantined as necessary if further evidence may be gathered from it—if an incident is on a train, the train can be moved to the rail yard to collect evidence and does not have to stay on the service tracks and impede service. None. It requires proper procedures & trained personnel to do the job. Lack of access control at the accident site. Proper documentation and storage. Access, knowledge, working computer for video and event recorder downloads. The protocols associated with third party evidence review. Passengers refusing to stay/be interviewed. Responders con- taminating evidence. Trains/cars being moved before data is collected. Failure to preserve video sequences on DVRs before they are overwritten. The evidence can be disturbed by external personnel such as first responders (Police, Fire, and EMS); however, obviously, the preservation of life takes precedent over evidence collec- tion. Additionally, in extremely rare cases, employees may tam- per with the scene in an attempt to evade discipline or in other instances, overzealous employees may tamper with equipment, while trying to determine what led to the incident. In order to combat employees tampering with evidence at the scene of an incident, the transit agency periodically issues a bulletin that prohibits this activity. The bulletin in its current form is titled, Subways Bulletin 10-27, “TAMPERING WITH EQUIPMENT RELATING TO EMERGENCY INCIDENTS PROHIBITED.” Focus on collecting the information. Accident scenes are always beehives of nervousness . . . to the point where some folks lose focus of their mission. Storage. Quantity and weather conditions. “Accelerating” service restoration. None. None. Having clear established guidelines for the particular emer- gency/incident. Transfer of command at the incident scene can be challenging at times. Having the key people with knowledge of information access available to support the information requests, in order to expe- dite response to requests. None at this time. Protocols have been established and are understood. Training and management. Local agencies who insist on waiting for coroner or special investigation teams. Chain of custody. Chain of control. 63. What actions have been or would be most useful in han- dling accident evidence and data collection in the future after a critical incident? Responses summarized in Table 32, chapter three of report. Verbatim responses are provided here. We need to develop a centralized system to gather all the information. Presently we do everything by hand. As mentioned above, if ON a train, we can collect evidence from the vehicle at the rail yard and not leave it on the tracks— know what has to be collected leaving everything where it is and what can be collected elsewhere. Coordination between Safety, Claims and Transit Police. SOPs. Developed proper procedures and acquired trained personnel to do the job. Control access to the site. Get the word out to all personnel that area is a potential crime scene and that nothing is to be dis- turbed unless necessary to preserve life and/or safety. Investigation training is key to the process. Review of both the video and event recorder data at the scene with emergency responders. Perhaps a timeline for evidence linked to minor incidents. Protocols regarding release of passengers from incident scenes. Early securing and control of accident scenes. Prompt review and preservation of video evidence The transit agency issued Policy Instruction 10.28.1, “Acci- dent Investigation Policy Program Manual,” which defines each Division’s roles and responsibilities during an incident, includ- ing preserving evidence to maximum extent feasible consistent with the needs of the investigation. In addition, upon the OSS Rail Investigation Division being notified of an incident by the Rail Control Center (RCC), our staff informs the RCC person- nel of our intent to respond to the scene and requests that the RCC inform all personnel on the scene not to move or tamper with any equipment. In addition, the RCC is informed by field personnel of actions that were taken to secure the equipment, such as the application of handbrakes, the removal of the third rail power, etc., which the RCC documents in their incident report. Communications and assignment of responsibility. Let police do their job. Well trained personnel with the proper equipment. Designate one internal department as the custodian of record. Proper training, proper coordination in the field and in the shop (sidelining equipment for inspection). Use your police if you have your own force. Command and control is key. Staging of appropriate assets between internal and external partners is crucial to a successful outcome of an incident. Thorough procedures and training in those by a sufficiently broad number of staff who can respond to requests. For us, putting transit police in charge can often expedite the process. Sometimes, however, if the local accident investigation group is already there, having them handle it can be faster. Training 64. What would be the most useful guidance your agency would offer to local jurisdictions in terms of accident evidence and data collection? We need to work together as a team in order to identify the root cause and the proper solutions to correct the problem.

101 Establish procedures and protocols. Communicate and share information to minimize duplication of effort and ensure consistency. Follow SOPs. Develop proper procedures and acquire trained personnel to do the job. Have the Unified Command clarify and communicate the evidence collection policy and procedures to all stakeholders at inter-agency meetings. Depending on the nature of the investigation, ensure your personnel are properly trained before collecting any evidence. Let us help them get their job done. Educate local jurisdictions on rail accident investigation authority and procedures. Ensure the local jurisdiction under- stands the jurisdiction for rail incidents. Protocols regarding release of passengers from incident scenes. Early securing and control of accident scenes. Prompt review and preservation of video evidence Whatever entity is deemed to be the investigative body in an incident and ensure that this information is communicated to the appropriate personnel. The policy should address evidence pres- ervation and the agency should periodically issue bulletins to reinforce the prohibition of employees tampering with evidence during an incident. In addition, adopting technologies such as the use of onboard cameras, and cameras throughout the system is extremely helpful for accident reconstruction. Protocols must also be developed for the retention/acquisition of this data. Also have clear Memorandum’s of Understandings (MOUs) with the fire, police, and EMS departments to ensure that they are familiar with agency’s operating environment. This can also be strengthened through periodic table top and field simulations of high profile incidents. Only that we are very much into collecting appropriate speci- mens and objects, and are prepared to share a list and inspection results as soon as practicable. Have CCTV everywhere! Training. Designate one internal department as the custodian of record and educate other TA personnel of that fact. Have a written and SSO approved accident investigation pro- cedure in place. Agreement to use transit police would be best. Coordination, coordination, and coordination. Be sure to develop thorough procedures and implement ade- quate periodic checking in those by a sufficiently broad number of staff who can respond to requests. Reach understanding with local cops, your transit cops, your SSO, and (perhaps) FTA locals (brief them but don’t include them). Stress need to get railroad moving. Get agreement on utiliz- ing the faster means for obtaining what evidence is needed. 65. Would you be willing to participate further as a case study, involving a telephone interview going into further detail on your agency’s experience, if selected by the TCRP panel for this project? Yes 87.1% 27 No 12.9% 4 66. Is there another transit system that you suggest we con- tact for this synthesis project? If you know of a contact at that system, please list the name also. Various responses.

Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications: A4A Airlines for America AAAE American Association of Airport Executives AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program ADA Americans with Disabilities Act APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA American Trucking Associations CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program DHS Department of Homeland Security DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005) TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998) TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration U.S.DOT United States Department of Transportation