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30 C H A P T E R 5 The information in Chapter 3 came from research con- ducted through HMCRP Project 15. The research had three parts: (1) cataloging the current federal and state regulations governing pipelines, (2) examining NTSB investigations of pipeline incidents, and (3) writing this guide for improving communications during pipeline incidents. Chapter 3 provides the information about decisions and roles obtained from two workshops with representatives from public safety agencies (fire and police departments), pipeline operators (both utilities and large-scale operators), and fed- eral agencies (the U.S. EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). The workshops used a method called a SAIRA. Workshop participants helped the project team define the roles, decisions, and information required for pipeline emergencies. The SAIRA uses a goal hierarchy approach that reveals the relationships among roles, goals, decisions, and information requirements. For every role, there are goals to pursue, and for every goal, there are action- able decisions to make to respond appropriately to a pipeline incident. Also, for every decision, there are types of informa- tion required by the decision maker. Figure 5-1 displays the logic of the analysis. The SAIRA method clarifies the specific types of information needed to make the key actionable deci- sions associated with each role. It also clarifies who needs each type of information and why that information is needed. Effec- tive communication is often difficult during emergencies, and the SAIRA reveals both (1) what information people need to request to fulfill their roles and (2) what information people should be prepared to provide, in an accurate and timely manner, to other individuals in roles other than their own. The various responding public agencies and pipeline oper- ators should plan for how to obtain each type of required information once they determine the situation awareness information requirements. This âinformation flowâ analysis simply involves figuring out who has the information, who needs the information, and how to convey it early enough in an incident to improve the likely outcome. Tabletop exercises are well suited to conducting information flow analyses. Another part of the research examined the types of com- munication problems that can occur during pipeline emer- gencies. The method used for this part of the study was a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), a method often used by systems safety engineers. The method examines the various ways that a systemâs components can fail (i.e., the fail- ure modes), along with the likelihood that such failure modes will occur and the effects on the systemâs ability to fulfill its functions when components do fail. The âsystemâ examined in the FMEA was derived from the SAIRA. The system is a generic pipeline emergency commu- nications system. In this context âgenericâ means that the sys- tem is general enough to apply to communications during all types of pipeline emergencies. The components of the system were the types of information required to make key action- able decisions, as identified in the SAIRA. Data for the FMEA were collected using a panel of 15 technical specialists. The panel rated (1) the likelihood that failure modes would pre- vent each type of information from reaching the people who need it and (2) the consequences for recipients being able to make decisions if the information is not received. Table 5-1 displays the failure modes the panel used. About the Project
31 Figure 5-1. Situation Awareness Information Requirements Analysis. Failure mode Definition Information not collected The information does not exist, or the potential source of the information does not collect, assemble, or observe the needed information. Recipient unknown The original source of the information, or whoever is supposed to forward the information, does not know to whom the information should be sent. Source unknown Whoever needs the information does not know from whom to request it. Request poorly communicated The request from the recipient is unclear; the expectations of the requesting party are not clear to the source. Information not sent or poorly expressed The source does not convey the information to the user/requesting party in a clear manner, only part of the information is transmitted, the information is inaccurate, equipment or communication issues may distort the message. Value of information unclear The recipient does not understand the importance or value of the information, the source of the information is unclear, the source of the information is not trusted. Information sent too late The source does not collect and send the information soon enough to be useful in making the decision. Technology unavailable or fails Information cannot be sent because the source or the recipient does not have the available technology, the equipment lacks interoperability, or the means of transmitting the information is unreliable. Table 5-1. Failure modes and effects analysis.
