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Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design (1993)

Chapter: 2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats

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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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2

U.S. BANKNOTE COUNTERFEITING THREATS

There is increasing concern about a new counterfeiting threat enabled by continuing significant advancements in color non-impact printing and related technologies. Beginning in 1983, a number of studies were sponsored by the BEP and the Federal Reserve Board to examine this emerging threat (Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1986; Batelle Columbus Laboratories, 1982; NRC, 1985; Price Waterhouse, 1983; Sheldrick and Pickett, 1985; Sheldrick et al., 1983). All concluded that the increasing availability of very capable color copiers and printers, at lower and lower prices, posed a very serious threat to U.S. currency and that more effective anticounterfeiting measures would soon be required to maintain a reasonable degree of deterrence.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to update these prior threat assessments, taking into account changes that have occurred over the course of the six years since the last National Mateials Advisory Board study. Projections of the availability and accessibility of advanced non-impact color printing technology and general technical trends are presented, and the most important threats are identified. (Appendix B describes advancements in non-impact printing technologies in greater detail.) Various classes of counterfeiters are explained, along with the general types of deterrents required to neutralize them. The last two chapters of this report then provide specific recommendations and suggested strategies that respond to the threat assessments discussed in this chapter.

COUNTERFEITING TRENDS

In 1991, $17.1 million in counterfeit notes—25 percent of the counterfeits produced in the U.S.—were reported to have entered the commercial mainstream in the United States. Those that were not culled out along the way were removed by the Federal Reserve System, where they were identified using covert features and highly effective sensors. Another $87 million in counterfeit banknotes was seized by the Secret Service before entering circulation. According to the Secret Service, counterfeiting is increasing by 4–6 percent each year. The latest data for fiscal year 1993 (October 1992 through September 1993) indicate that $20 million in counterfeit banknotes entered the commercial mainstream in the United States (Brown, 1993a). In addition, during that fiscal year, $121 million in counterfeit U.S. notes was seized worldwide at the production source (i.e., before they entered circulation (Brown, 1993a).

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Currently, 90 percent of counterfeit banknotes are produced in the United States lithographic methods, and this is also true of counterfeits made outside the United States (Brown, 1992). This type of counterfeiting is usually performed by a professional, since it requires skill, as well as specialized equipment and supplies. These counterfeiters must produce large enough quantities of counterfeit notes to recover their investment in time and effort. Typically, the number of notes printed have been large enough to permit the Secret Service to trace the source and seize the bogus notes.

The total value of counterfeits produced by color copiers and printers is small now, on the order of several million dollars, but it has been doubling every year since 1989 (Brown and Einsel, 1992). The increasing counterfeiting rate plus the rapidly increasing number of color copier and printer placements over the next few years (discussed later in this chapter) are major reasons that the government is concerned about the integrity of U.S. currency and is actively engaged in a deterrence program. In 1990, $1 million in counterfeit banknotes were produced by office machine copiers. In 1991, this doubled to $2 million, and in 1992 the amount increased to $6-8 million.

The fastest growing fraction is being made by ink-jet technology (Brown, 1993b). Ink jet printers make up the largest color printer population. For the 9-month period from October 1, 1992, to June 30, 1993, the U.S. Secret Service has observed a dramatic increase in ink-jet counterfeits. Prior to this time, only a few notes were produced using ink jet copiers or printers. But during this period, the number “exploded” to 205 geographically dispersed occurrences in separate, apparently unrelated cases. They accounted for 2,283 notes, with a face value of over $66,000. The low number and value of the notes indicate that most of them can be attributed to casual counterfeiters. Table 2-1 shows the distribution of occurrences by denomination. The $20 note was the one most frequently counterfeited.

Table 2-1. Counterfeits Produced by Ink-Jet Technology, October 1992 through June 1993

Denomination

Separate Occurrencesa (Cases)

Total Number of Notes Passed

Average Number of Notes Passed Per Occurrence

$1.00

2

2

1

$5.00

8

80

10

$10.00

29

253

9

$20.00

115

1524

13

$50.00

20

157

8

$100.00

31

244

8

a An occurrence is a set of identical counterfeit notes.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of the counterfeiting instances for $20 notes. Even though the overall average is 13 notes per occurrence, it is clear that most of the cases involved the passing of only a few counterfeit notes. For example, there were 23 instances in which only a single note was passed and 18 instances in which only two notes were passed. The horizonal axis of this graph is truncated at 25 $20 notes per case. In addition, there was one case of each of the following quantities being passed: 32, 34, 45, 50, 52, 86, 137, and 432. These larger quantities are less indicative of activity by a casual counterfeiter and more indicative of a petty counterfeiter (these different classes of counterfeiters will be discussed later in the chapter).

FIGURE 2-1 Cases of counterfeiting $20 notes using ink jet technology.

The counterfeiting of U.S. currency overseas is also a problem. Interpol, an international police organization composed of 169 member countries, rarely encounters counterfeit notes of currencies that have incorporated sophisticated security features. Most of the counterfeit

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

cases they are investigating deal with U.S. banknotes (87.6 percent; Kendall, 1993). In 1991, $30.7 million in counterfeit U.S. notes were reportedly detected overseas. However, these data are not comprehensive, since there is, at present, no system in place worldwide that reports all incidents of counterfeiting to the U.S. Secret Service; thus the overseas counterfeiting problem may be greater than the figures mentioned in this report indicate. While part of the overseas problem can be attributed to unfamiliarity with U.S. currency (although this is by no means proven to be true), it may be due primarily to the relative ease with which U.S. currency can be counterfeited compared with the currency of other industrialized countries, most of whom have recently redesigned their currency. Moreover, U.S. currency is widely accepted throughout the world, making it a prime target for international counterfeiters. As one measure of the problem, U.S. travelers are beginning to experience difficulty in exchanging U.S. currency overseas. For instance, many Japanese banks are very relunctant to accept $100 U.S. banknotes due to their concern about counterfeit notes (Japan Times, 1993).

Also, not all acts of counterfeiting are solely motivated by profit; state-sponsored counterfeiting can be done to embarrass or lessen the influence of another country in world affairs, or wage economic warfare (Kranister, 1988). The United States is not immune to such attacks by such counterfeiters who possess essentially unlimited resources.

ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICAL THREAT

To date, most printing and copying in the office or home has been text oriented. Since text can relay its information content in low-cost black-and-white or low-cost impact printers, non-impact color printers are not currently dominant. However, the advent of high-resolution color monitors in the office and the requirements of presentation graphics have helped create the growing demand for color printers and copiers in the office that can reproduce high-quality color images. The committee envisions that desktop color printers will become one of the fastest growing areas in the domain of reprographic technology during the next decade. In order to satisfy the emerging demand, increasingly sophisticated and capable color copiers, scanners, and printers are being developed and sold worldwide by more and more companies1. As usual, selling price varies inversely with volume and competition. Consequently, placements of systems that can scan originals and produce color reproductions are growing rapidly. They are being purchased not only for businesses but also by individuals for home use. Thus, rather powerful “counterfeiting” equipment is becoming commercially available at readily affordable prices. All indications point to a low cost desktop color system (less than $5,000) being available by 1995 and becoming cheaper and more widely placed by the turn of the century. Historically, key counterfeit-deterrent features were selected because they were difficult to

1  

Advanced, color non-impact reprographic technology has been used in niche applications, such as for proofing and final color copy by the graphics art industry, but these costly systems, on the order of $100,000, have not been widely available.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

reproduce. However, modern imaging and printing technology is making such rapid advances that many deterrent features will come under severe challenge. For instance, in the past, the art of a craftsman has been used to make fine-line engravings that are then printed using a high-pressure printing technique (intaglio printing) to provide realistic portrayals of shadow, highlight, and detail. These images could only be approximated by any other process. However, advanced reprographic equipment has sufficiently fine resolution detail and color fidelity to very closely simulate the appearance of intaglio images and many other visible security features. The proliferation of printers and scanners is making it much easier to do quick, quality reproduction in the office environment.

Equipment

Electrophotography, electrostatics, ink jet, and thermal transfer are the four technologies on which virtually all color copiers and printers are based. There are recent indications that reasonable quality color can also be produced using magnetic toners; thus, magnetic printing technology is a fifth relevant technology. At this time, most of the color copiers are based on electrophotography, because it is the only technology that permits direct optical input, that is, the use of a photoconductive image-sensing element. Computer scanners use a similar technology to digitize an image. All the other types of printers respond to electronic input directly, so there is no light-sensing component.

Ink-jet and thermal-transfer copiers are available and are attractive, because the process is less complex than electrophotography and less expensive. However, at the present time, the output quality from those types of copiers is generally not as high as from the other technologies. But the technology is advancing. For example, the new top-of-the-line thermal transfer copiers provide very good color images.

The front and back of a note could be scanned and recorded on floppy or rigid magnetic disks and the disks themselves circulated among counterfeiters. Converting this digital information to color copying is then simple using ink-jet or thermal-transfer printers attached to a microcomputer.

For the professional counterfeiter, two approaches to high-speed color printing appear to be gathering considerable momentum. In one, a floppy disk containing the requisite color image information is used to make lithographic printing plates (Bruno, 1993). Electrophotography, electrostatics, and other processes permit easy, rapid, inexpensive production of such plates (Bruno, 1993). In the other, the aforementioned non-impact printing processes are being modified and improved to permit printing at speeds of 300 ft/min and higher (McMillian, 1993). Such high rates have already been demonstrated in black and white with the electrophotographic, electrostatic, ink-jet, and magnetic technologies. Color electronic printers operating at even higher speeds are beginning to become available.

Thus, potential counterfeiters have a wide choice of equipment. The high-speed and most-sophisticated machines are the most expensive. However, anyone with a personal computer can now purchase a reasonably good computer scanner for a few hundred dollars and a basic ink-jet or thermal-transfer printer for $1,000 or less.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×
General Technical Trends

Perhaps the most significant technical trend is the continuing improvement in print quality. Every new product reproduces finer detail (600 dots per inch is rapidly becoming the present standard) along with more of the original color gamut (Sutherland, 1993). Tonal range, once considered to be very limited, is no longer a problem2.

Another important trend is the increased ease of use, reliability, and reproducibility of the equipment. Most new machines require virtually no skill to operate correctly, since embedded sensors linked to sophisticated control systems ensure reproducible results. The machines are also essentially maintenance free, only requiring simple replenishment of supplies.

Most color copiers are not now designed for two-sided printing. Copiers capable of printing on two-sides are beginning to appear on the market, but they are not designed for accurate front-to-back registration 3. However, there does not appear to be a technical barrier to eventual incorporation of the registration techniques used in lithography or gravure printing if the marketplace demands it.

Unit Placements and Selling Prices

When the previous National Materials Advisory Board studies were performed during the period 1985 to 1987, there was very limited market information on advanced copiers and printers. In 1985, only two companies offered color copiers (Ling, 1986). Both were based on electrophotographic technology and were very expensive, costing more than $40,000. Although color was available in many lower-cost ink-jet and thermal printers, it had not yet become popular. Within one year, two more companies introduced color copiers that were also based on electrophotographic technology; prices were somewhat below those of the first copiers. By 1987, five companies were known to be developing photographic-quality color electrophotographic printers, and three others were working on low-cost color copiers. The target selling price was $10,000-$15,000 (Ling, 1986). Projections for 1992 included much higher resolution, better print quality, and greater reliability.

In the intervening years since 1987, there have been formal studies of the non-impact-printer color market. Accordingly, there is now more accurate information about units placed,

2  

It is now possible to reproduce as many as 256 color tones in electrophotographic and electrostatic printers and 100 or more in ink-jet and thermal-transfer printers.

3  

Recently available two-sided color copiers include the Canon 550, Afga's chromapress, and Indigo; the last two copiers are electronic printers.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

average selling prices, etc., as well as with market trends. Following are averages of projections from three independent sources of market data plus information available to individuals on this committee (Hard Copy Observer 111, 1993; Prechowski, 1993; Testan, 1992).

One measure of market size and growth rate is the number of competitors. In 1992, there were 21 companies manufacturing color copiers and printers. In that same year, there were approximately 30,000 color copiers in use in the United States. Worldwide figures for color copiers and printers are about twice those cited for the United States. U.S. unit placements in 1992 were about 11,000 and are expected to have an annual growth rate of at least 26 percent through 1996. It is estimated that there could be 110,000 color copiers in use in the United States by 1966 (Testan, 1993). About 70 percent of these are forecasted to be electrophotographic. These projections are graphically depicted in Figure 2-2. The estimated number of color copies to be made in the United States in 1994 is about 2 billion, a large increase from the 500,000 copies produced in 1989.

FIGURE 2-2 Trend in color copier year placements.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

The average selling price of electrophotographic units was $36,000 in 1987. There is now a color electrophotographic copier on the market that sells for $13,500, and further price reductions can be anticipated (Gazda, 1992). A color laser printer suitable for use in small offices and homes for the output from personal computers has just been announced at a list price of $12,500. Additional manufacturers are expected to introduce similar products later in 1993 and early in 1994.

Non-electrophotographic copiers will be much less expensive. Present prices of color inkjet and thermal-transfer units are on the order of $9,000 to $10,000. Reductions to $5,000 to $7,000 are anticipated over the next year or two. An ink-jet printer has been announced for less that $5,000 (Testan, 1991).

One of the conclusions of the former National Materials Advisory Board studies (see Appendix A) was that color printers constituted a much greater counterfeiting threat than color copiers, because the cost is much lower, and they are part of personal computer systems that are themselves inexpensive and ubiquitous. Current information has strongly reinforced that earlier conclusion. Thirteen companies offer color printers; only three of them also manufacture color copiers. U.S. unit placements of non-impact color printers totaled 121,000 in 1991, (Testan, 1993), (compared with 953,000 impact printers; i.e., 9-pin and 24-pin dot-matrix printers). The placements of non-impact color printers are projected to increase to 644,000 in 1993 and to approach 2.5 million units by 1995. This placement trend, depicted in Figure 2-3, is indicative of an estimated annual growth rate over the next 3 to 5 years of 58 percent (Testan, 1993). The estimated 1995 cost of these printers is summarized in Table 2-2

FIGURE 2-3 Trend in non-impact color printer placements.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Table 2-2 Estimated 1995 Non-Impact Color Printer Costs

Printer Technology

Estimated 1995 Cost

Ink Jet

$1,000 or less

Thermal Transfer

$3,000

Laser

$4,000 to $5,000

(Testan, 91). Due to favorable performance and price, ink-jet printers could make up as much as 95 percent of the new printer placements by 1995 (Gazda, 1992; Testan, 1993).

Thus, by 1995, there will be on the order of 4.9 million color printers associated with personal computers (many of which will have peripheral scanning devices) in the United States, and 4 million worldwide. Such systems will be extremely capable of reproducing a banknote.

Summary of the Technical Threat

The greatest technical threat to the printed currency of the United States is the result of

  • dramatic improvements in non-impact color reprographic equipment that have enabled very good color copies to be made and that allow the machines to function with only simple periodic replenishment of supplies;

  • competitive pricing that has allowed the average user to buy equipment that only the specialist had access to before (permiting the creation, editing, communication, production, and reproduction of color images for almost any users); and

  • advances in technology that have pushed reprographic hardware resolution to limits only dreamed of a few years ago (e.g., 600 dpi in monochrome is the de facto standard in 1993, with gains to 1200 dpi in the future).

While color printing and reproduction is becoming a multibillion dollar business, it is reducing the security of printed documents, such as banknotes. Looking into the future, it does not appear that there will be an immediate push for resolutions to go beyond 600 dpi in mass market use because that level of resolution is ample for the applications. The rapid improvements in ink-jet printers, which will become even less inexpensive but more capable, will most likely lead to the ink-jet printer becoming the predominante printer employed by the casual counterfeiter using a computer. Color copiers and printers using electrophotography will have wide placements in offices and will be the preferred method at first.

The professional counterfeiter already has a wide array of non-impact printing methods to choose from and will soon join in the electronic revolution as better technology becomes widely available at lower cost.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

TYPES OF COUNTERFEITERS AND REQUIRED GENERAL DETERRENTS

Counterfeiters can be considered to fall into three classes. The first group is composed of individuals who are not normally considered hardened criminals. The second group commits crimes but has limited skills and resources (e.g., petty criminals). Finally, there are the professional counterfeiters possessing considerable skills and resources. This latest group may, at times, be aided and abetted by governments pursuing economic sabotage against, or embarrassment of, another country.

Class I: Opportunistic Counterfeiters

There appears to be convincing evidence that counterfeiting is not necessarily the sole province of hardened criminals. For example, there is related experience regarding the making of illegal reproductions of intellectual property items that are protected by copyrights (e.g., computer software, audio-recordings, etc.) when the danger of being caught is remote and the task is easy (OTA, 1986). A 1988 survey by the Office of Technology Assessment found that 40 percent of a nationally representative sample of Americans over the age of 10 had tape recorded music during the past year aided by advancements in recording technology that have made it very easy to inexpensively produce high quality copies in the home (OTA, 1986). (The increased use of digital representations for music, and video, is expected to continue this trend since nearly perfect copies can be made.) The Office of Technology Assessment estimates that there are more than 1 billion instances per year of unallowed copying of audio recordings. Most of these copies are for personal use, not for sale, so the analogy to counterfeiting is far from perfect. But, it does indicate that many people will violate the law if there is a compelling reason, the means to do it, and little chance of apprehension.

A conclusion reached by former Committees of the National Materials Advisory Board, (NRC, 1985) resulting from considerable inquiry, was that some individuals, generally not considered to be inveterate criminals, would produce counterfeit currency if:

  • the opportunity presented itself;

  • the probability of being caught was perceived to be small;

  • the need for temporary funds was great; and

  • it was viewed as a benign crime.

Two typical potential scenarios considered were

  1. A worker in a relatively sophisticated office has access to color copiers and printers. Such a person might have an sudden need for several hundred dollars. At the end of a workday, that person could be tempted to see how easily currency could be reproduced. If the result is a close duplicate of the original, that individual might try the bill in a money changing machine or attempt to pass it. If the attempt is successful, that person might become an occasional counterfeiter with no consistent pattern, making apprehension very difficult.

  2. The same type of person described above could have a home computer equipped with a scanner, a disk drive, a color monitor, and a color printer and be relatively free to experiment in privacy. By 1995, such a system might be purchased for about $2,500.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Another scenario of concern is that casual counterfeiting could become the “in thing” to do, such as around college campuses. Persons with more technical knowledge than a casual counterfeiter, but not necessarily “criminals, ” could try counterfeiting for the challenge; such a group, known as “hackers,” could present a particularly formidable law enforcement problem. Hackers, within the definition applied by the committee, are a technologically knowledgeable group motivated more by the challenge, than by pure criminal intent (which is not to suggest that they are not criminals if they break the law).

The probability of the U.S. Secret Service catching random, infrequent counterfeiters is small at the present time for a number of reasons. First, the general public and proprietors of small businesses usually accept currency without carefully inspecting it. U.S. Secret Service experience indicates that even very poor reproductions are accepted, at times, even in broad daylight. There is also a disincentive for the public to closely inspect currency, because discovery of a counterfeit note leads to a monetary loss when the bogus bill is surrendered to the Secret Service as required by law. Machines that change $10 and $20 bills for lower denomination currency present a low-risk target for counterfeiters, because they will either accept the bogus bill or unobtrusively return it to the counterfeiter.

Based on these scenarios and the behavioral assumptions, the most effective deterrents against casual or opportunistic (Class I) counterfeiters, except for hackers, would be those that result in copies that are obviously different from bona fide currency, and not passable without substantial additional effort being required to correct the errors. Such deterrents could be present in the currency itself or could be built into the scanning or copying equipment.

Class II: Petty Counterfeiters

These individuals are committed to a life of crime. They may be skilled, but they do not have access to significant resources. These semiprofessionals would be intent on counterfeiting and willing to exert considerable effort to produce generally acceptable reproductions. Available deterrents would be effective if they were not easily simulated or reproduced and if the features were targeted against the different means of copying that could be employed, including photography and offset printing. It also appears advisable to include a deterrent feature that can be readily detected by a money changing machine. Thus, multiple deterrents will enhance the probability of discouraging these types of counterfeiters and will improve the chances of apprehension by law enforcement. These deterrents would also be effective against the hackers discussed above.

Class III: Professional Counterfeiters

These individuals usually work in groups and may, in the extreme cases, have access to equipment similar to that of the BEP. This class of counterfeiters includes state-sponsored efforts in which the available resources can be considered infinite. It is assumed that such organizations, given sufficient time and resources, could detect and simulate or reproduce any and all visible deterrents. Furthermore, they can print in large quantities.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Defeating this class of criminals requires the incorporation of a suite of covert and overt deterrents. In addition, the deterrents or their combinations must be changed at intervals frequent enough to make counterfeiting a large and difficult job. At least one of the deterrents must permit its presence or absence to be sensed in money changing machines. This deterrent may have to be changed from time to time, along with the sensor.

The Principal Threat

Although the semi-professional and professional types of counterfeiters are best able to defeat counterfeit deterrents, the committee does not think that they constitute the greatest threat to U.S. currency. In general, they produce such large volumes of bogus notes, purchase such special equipment and supplies, and involve such a large number of people that the U.S. Secret Service can normally find enough leads to track them down.

The greatest threat to U.S. currency, in the committee's judgment, is the Class I counterfeiter; that is, the casual, opportunistic type. This class would leave no traceable pattern, and the sources would be so numerous and so widely distributed as to make them virtually impossible to track. Accordingly, one of the main objectives of a currency redesign effort should be to defeat the Class I counterfeiter.

Of almost equal importance is the need to make counterfeiting extraordinarily difficult for the petty criminal (Class II) and the hacker, who are willing to exert considerable effort (but with limited resources and equipment) to make reasonable reproductions of U.S. currency.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

REFERENCES

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Batelle Columbus Laboratories. 1982. Assessment of the Timing and Nature of the Threat to Counterfeiting U.S. Currency. Final Report to the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve System, Contract 3975. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Columbus Laboratories.

Brown, J.1992. Personal communication from Special Agent James Brown, U.S. Secret Service. June 15, 1992.

Brown, J.1993a. Personal communication from Special Agent James Brown, U.S. Secret Service. October 8, 1993.

Brown, J.1993b. Personal communication from Special Agent James Brown, U.S. Secret Service. September 1993.

Brown, J., and C. Einsel. 1992. Comments by Special Agent James Brown and Special Agent Craig Einsel, U.S. Secret Service, to the Committee on Next-Generation Currency Design. June 15–16, 1992, and October 21–22,1992.

Bruno, M. H.1993. The printers new role in digital printing. The IS&T Reporter 7(3):1–4.

Gazda, T.1992. Presentation by T. Gazda, Arthur D. Little, Inc., to the Committee on Next-Generation Currency Design. September 1992.

Hard Copy Observer III. 1993. QHS beats rivals to punch with first office color laser. C. Le Cohpte, Ed., No. 6 (June): Pg. 30-34.

Japan Times. 1993. Bogus Bills, Strong Yen Lead to Limits on Exchanges. Business Notes. October 8, 1993. 11.

Kendall, R. E.1993. Letter from R. E. Kendall, Secretary General, Interpol, to the Committee on Next-Generation Currency Design. April 5, 1993.

Kranister, W.1988. Governments as Counterfeiters. Pp. 62–64 in The Moneymakers International. Cambridge, England: Black Bear Publishing.

Ling, G.1986. Verbal presentation on review of xerographic color copying and printing as a preview of future requirements. Conference on Color Hard Copy. Monterey, California, June 15–17, 1986. Boston, Mass: Institute for Graphic Communications. .

McMillian, T.1993. (Verbal Communication) The promise of portable color. Computer graphics world. September 1993. p. 30.

National Research Council (NRC). 1985. Advanced Reprographic Systems: Counterfeiting Threat Assessment and Deterrent Measures(U). National Materials Advisory Board. Wash.: D.C.: National Academy Press.

Piechowski, R., ed. Print Business Register. No 8 (April 19): Pp.1-4. Vol. 8. News Item p.4.

Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×

Price Waterhouse. 1983. Implications of Increased Counterfeiting. Final Report to the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Contract No. TEP-85-80. Washington, D.C.: Price Waterhouse.

Sheldrick, J. E., and G. E. Pickett. 1985. Summary of Battelle Research Related to Counterfeit Deterrence for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Presented to the U.S. Currency Study Committee, National Academy of Sciences, January 3, 1985.

Sheldrick, J.E., J. D. Robbins, R. Cooper, G. E. Pickett, and J. H. Lindhold1983. The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Counterfeiting U.S. Currency. Final Report to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Contract 3975. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Columbus Laboratories.

Sutherland, D.1993. Kodak tackles the color calibration curve. Computer Graphics World. Vol. 8(April) 84.

Testan, P.1992. Overview of Color Non-Impact Printer Market. Proceedings of Eighth International Congress on Advances in Non-Impact Printing Technologies. Pg 1-3.Springfield, Va.: Society for Imaging Science and Technology, .

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Testan, P.1993. Personal communication October.

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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
×
Page 27
Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Page 28
Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Page 29
Suggested Citation:"2 U.S. Banknote Counterfeiting Threats." National Research Council. 1993. Counterfeit Deterrent Features for the Next-Generation Currency Design. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2267.
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Next: 3 Assessment Methodology for Counterfeit-Deterrence »
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Traditionally, counterfeit deterrent features restricted counterfeiting to only the dedicated craftsman. With the advent of highly sophisticated reprographic systems, this is no longer true. Redesign of U.S. banknotes is necessary in order to incorporate additional features aimed at discouraging counterfeiting using advanced copiers-scanners-printers. This volume evaluates a large number of such features while recommending a comprehensive national strategy for anticipating and responding to counterfeiting threats.

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