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Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects (2012)

Chapter: CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs

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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
×
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
×
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Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER THREE Geotechnical Content of Agency Design-Build Policies, Procedures, and Programs." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/22793.
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18 CHAPTER THREE GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT OF AGENCY DESIGN-BUILD POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PROGRAMS INTRODUCTION This chapter reviews findings as they relate to the policies, principles, and guidelines currently being followed by state DOTs to implement DB contracts for transportation projects. This chapter will combine information collected through the direct experience of the authors, literature search, the RFQ/ RFP content analysis, and DOT survey responses. Under- standing how decisions made in the DB procurement pro- cess affect project design and construction is important to permit the final contract to allocate geotechnical risk in a fair and equitable manner. The major issue during the procurement stage of a project relates to how much geotechnical data will be provided to the proposers to allow them to submit competitive pricing without excessive contingencies to cover the risks of uncertainties. This particular issue is exacerbated because most public owners select DB project delivery to accelerate the delivery of a partic- ular project (Songer and Molenaar 1996). As a result, it is often impossible to include extensive geotechnical investigations in the preliminary engineering completed as part of the RFP development process (Beard et al. 2001). For example, federal military departments have used DB as a means to obligate con- struction funding before it expires in a given fiscal year, making development of a GBR impossible within the fund expiration time frame (Grammer 2001). For this and other reasons, the problem requires answers to the following questions: • Will the geotechnical aspects of the site be a major fac- tor in the project design process? • How much time is available for geotechnical investiga- tions and preliminary geotechnical engineering? • How uncertain are the subsurface conditions on the project site? • What are the critical geotechnical variables that must be known for the DOT to develop a preliminary design for funding and bidding purposes? • What are the critical geotechnical variables that must be known for the design-builder to complete a work- able design? • Can the geotechnical risk be shared with the design- builder to reduce project costs? • Is there flexibility in the procurement and contracting process to enable the design-builder to advance the geotechnical investigation before finalizing a price? The remainder of this chapter explores the answers to these questions as found in the literature, the RFP content analysis, and the DOT survey responses. DESIGN-BUILD PROJECT DELIVERY DECISION The predominant way that DB is procured in the public sector requires that the design-builder commit to a firm fixed price before the project’s design is complete (Mahdi and Alreshaid 2005). Thus, the risk of cost overruns for unforeseen geotech- nical site conditions is increased, since the full geotechnical investigations necessary for each project will likely be com- pleted after contract award, during the design process. Given this situation, the first question a DOT will address is whether a given project is a good candidate for DB project delivery, in light of the influence of geotechnical conditions on the preliminary design, price, and time. Table 1 is a syn- opsis of the risk profiles for DBB and DB found in Koch et al. (2010) and adapted for geotechnical risks. One can see that the major change in the risk profile is the result of the shift in design responsibility to the design-builder. The owner’s new DB risks result in many cases from the failure to relinquish the design responsibility to the design-builder. The owner’s DB scope risk for geotechnical design review comments and directives is an example. The direct and tacit approval of constructive changes to the geotechnical design during con- struction is another example. Assuming that the compression of the project’s schedule is not an issue, the owner’s ability to accurately portray the scope of work without completing the typical geotechnical investigation will provide the answer to this question. Ide- ally, the DOT’s RFP packages should provide DB propos- ers with sufficient subsurface information to permit them to generate conceptual designs for the foundation, embank- ment, and other features of work that are dependent on the geotechnical conditions of the site. If the subsurface and geologic project information is inad- equate, then the proposing design-builder has two options (Christensen and Meeker 2002). First, it can include a large contingency in the price to cover what its geotechnical designers would believe to be the worst possible case. The second is to declare the project to be too risky and choose

19 not to bid (Dwyre et al. 2010). Either option has a nega- tive impact on the owner. In the first case, the contingency could drive the price outside the available budget and make it impossible to award. In the second case, the pool of quali- fied competitors becomes shallower, possibly leaving only those that do not recognize (or have chosen not to price) the actual scope risk. This may result in an award to a DB entity that does not know it is in trouble until the geotechnical risks are quantified during the design process. It also exposes the DOT to either a major DSC claim or a design-builder that has underpriced the job and is in financial trouble—possibly to the point of default. For these reasons, it is critical that the project delivery method selection decision be made after careful consideration of the risk associated with the site’s subsurface and geological conditions. Blanchard (2007) synopsizes the Florida DOT (FDOT) DB experience by stating that projects “with low risk of unforeseen conditions… [and] low possibility for significant change during all phases of work” are good candidates for DB project delivery. FDOT also picks projects “that demand an expedited schedule and can be completed earlier.” There- fore, the issue of understanding the actual risk of unforeseen geotechnical conditions becomes more important. The DOT survey asked the respondents that did not use DB to explain their reasons. Most cited the lack of statutory authority. Two respondents indicated that they do not use DB because the lia- bility for geotechnical aspects was unfavorable for the agency. Another two cited the lack of time to complete geotechnical investigations to a point where they could reasonably quan- tify the geotechnical scope. Table 2 contains a list of project characteristics found in the literature that indicate that a given project is not a good candidate for DB project delivery. Diekmann and Nelson (1985) found that the three major causes for DBB construction claims were design errors (39%), owner-directed changes (30%), and DSCs (15%). One of the cited advantages of DB project delivery is that the owner is no longer liable for design errors and omissions (Mitchell 1999; Killen and Gibson 2005). However, that is only if the owner was not the source of the design error. If a design-builder’s design concept during the proposal process TABLE 1 DBB VERSUS DB RISK PROFILES Design-Builder Owner Geotechnical Scope Risk DBB • Warranties and Guarantees • Latent Defects—Workmanship • Competent Geotechnical Construction Personnel Available • Design Error and Omissions • Latent Defects—Design • Direct and Tacit Approval of Constructive Changes to Design DB • Design Errors and Omissions • Warranties and Guarantees • Latent Defects – Design – Workmanship • Competent Geotechnical Design Personnel Available • Clear Geotechnical Scope Definition • Direct and Tacit Approval of Constructive Changes to Geotechnical Design • Geotechnical Design Review Comments and Directives • Technical Review Capability Geotechnical Cost Risk DBB • Rework • Subcontractor Default • Market Fluctuation After Award • Redesign and Resultant Rework • Construction Contract Amount • Market Fluctuation During Design – Material – Labor DB • Rework • Redesign • Subcontractor Default • Market Fluctuation During Design – Material – Labor • Design-Build Contract Amount • Prompt Payment • Design-Builder Default Geotechnical Schedule Risk DBB • Contract Completion • Date • Liquidated Damages • Timely Design Completion • Owner Furnished Property Delivery DB • Delivery on Approved Schedule • Fast-Track Geotechnical Rework • Liquidated Damages • Unrealistic Schedule • Timely Geotechnical Design Approvals on Fast-Track Project • Owner-Furnished Property Delivery

20 is ultimately inadequate because it was based on the owner’s design input information—such as a boring log or specifica- tion of a particular type of foundation (e.g., spread footings instead of deep foundations)—then the question of responsi- bility is no longer clear. There is substantial legal precedent for the fact that the owner will retain these risks under a DB delivery system to the same degree as it would under a DBB delivery system (Loulakis and Shean 1996). Therefore, DB project delivery does not necessarily insulate the owner from the three most common DBB claims related to a project’s geotechnical conditions. Table 3 summarizes state DOT policies regarding the geotechnical aspects of DB projects gleaned from the sur- vey. Tables 4 and 5 furnish additional details from comments made regarding answers to survey questions. Approaches to Understanding Perceived Geotechnical Risk The North Carolina DOT (NCDOT) uses a qualitative evalu- ation of project characteristics that include “innovation, con- structability, safety, environmental permitting, right-of-way acquisition, utilities, traffic management, public perception, and risk” (Kim et al. 2009). The agency couples that with a quantitative cost and schedule risk analysis to determine whether a given project is a good candidate for DB delivery. Part of the decision-making process includes an assessment of geotechnical investigation needs as well as the potential for delay resulting from the need to obtain permits to perform subsurface investigations. If the project is selected for DB delivery, NCDOT will then perform what it calls “prelet geo- technical investigations” and include the results in the RFP (Kim et al. 2009). The agency also conducts at least two “one- on-one” meetings with each firm on the short list to identify information gaps and assess the need for further investiga- tion to reduce risk. NCDOT then conducts the supplemen- tary investigation. The California (Caltrans) and Minnesota (Mn/DOT) DOTs also use one-on-one meetings to identify the need for further information and address risks perceived by the competing design-builders but not recognized during the RFP development process (Mn/DOT 2005; Trauner Con- sulting Services 2007). VDOT also liberally uses the concept of proprietary meetings for its two-phase DB selection pro- cesses, with the expectation that proposers will identify any perceived gaps in the geotechnical data as appropriate. Geotechnical Issues to Be Addressed A 2011 Strategic Highway Research Program 2 report, which is focused on earthwork projects, provides the follow- ing detailed list of questions that may be explored to deter- mine if a given project’s geotechnical requirements make it a candidate for DB delivery: • “What type of project is being constructed? • What is the size of the project being constructed? • Are there any project constraints to be considered in selecting a possible technology? • What is the soil type that needs to be improved? • To what depth do to the unstable soils extend? • At what depth do the unstable soils start? • Is there a “crust” or “rubble fill” at the ground surface? • What is the depth to the water table? • How does the water table fluctuate? • What constraints exist? (i.e., utilities, material sources, existing adjacent structures, etc.) • What is the desired improvement? (i.e., decrease set- tlement, decrease construction time, increase bearing capacity, etc.) • What technologies does the user already have experi- ence with?” (Schaefer et al. 2011). The purpose of this checklist is to identify issues that would make the project’s geotechnical aspects unaccept- ably risky. In other words, to award a DB contract without a TABLE 2 PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS THAT INDICATE THAT A GIVEN PROJECT IS A POOR CANDIDATE FOR DB PROJECT DELIVERY Project Characteristic Source • High risk of differing site conditions • Low probability to be able to expedite design and construction schedule • High possibility of change to phases of work Blanchard (2007) • The design must be complete for accurate pricing • The design must be complete for permitting or third-party issues • The owner wants “heavy” input into the design • Project is too small to attract competition Gransberg et al. (2006) • Project scope is difficult to define • Project scope has high probability of change in permitting process • Missing “sound geotechnical and environmental data prior to the bid phase” Christensen and Meeker (2002) • “[I]nability of design-stage investigation to eliminate risks from unknown geological conditions for construction of underground works” Hoek and Palmieri (1998) • Risk-shedding is owner’s primary motivation for using alternative project delivery methods Scheepbouwer and Humphries (2011)

21 T A B L E 3 S U M M A R Y O F S T A T E P O L IC IE S F O R T H E G E O T E C H N IC A L A S P E C T S O F D E S IG N -B U IL D P R O JE C T S D O T A ut ho ri ze d P ro je ct D el iv er y M et ho ds D B G eo te ch M an ua l E st im at e G eo te ch U nc er ta in ty ? G eo te ch R is k C on tr ac t C la us es ?1 S co re G eo te ch ? P ar tn er in g R eq 'd ? D B C on tr ac t P ay m en t P ro vi si on s G eo te ch W ar ra nt y? 1 G eo te ch In ce nt iv es ? C on tr ac to r P er fo rm - an ce E va l? U se D B -S ig ni f- ic an t G eo te ch Is su es ?2 D B B C M G C D B O th er L um p su m L S G M P L S w /u ni t pr ic es A la ba m a X T ol l r oa ds - D B N o A la sk a X X X N o N o Y es X N o N o N o N o A rk an sa s X X D B p ro j > $5 0M N o N o C al if or ni a X X N o N o N o N o Y es X N o N o N o Y es C ol or ad o X X X N o Y es N o Y es Y es X X N o N o N o N o C on ne ct ic ut X N o F lo ri da X X X P 3 Y es N o Y es Y es X X X Y es N o Y es Y es Id ah o X X X N o Il li no is X N o N o In di an a X X N o Y es Y es Y es Y es X N o N o Y es N o Io w a X N o K an sa s X A + B N o K en tu ck y X X N o N o X N o N o N o N o L ou is ia na X X N o N o N o Y es Y es X N o N o N o Y es M ai ne X X N o N o N o Y es Y es X Y es N o N o Y es M ar yl an d X X N o N o N o Y es Y es X N o N o N o Y es M as sa ch us et ts X X N o Y es M ic hi ga n X X X Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es X N o N o Y es Y es M in ne so ta X X N o Y es N o Y es N o X Y es Y es N o Y es M is si ss ip pi X X N o N o N o Y es Y es X N o N o N o N o M is so ur i X X N o Y es X N o N o N o N o M on ta na X X N o Y es N o Y es N o X N o N o N o Y es N eb ra sk a X X Y es N o N ev ad a X X N o Y es Y es Y es Y es N o N o N o Y es N ew J er se y X X N o N o X N o N o N ew M ex ic o X X N o Y es Y es Y es Y es X N o Y es Y es N ew H am ps hi re X X Y es N o N or th C ar ol in a X X P 3 N o Y es N o Y es Y es X Y es N o N o Y es 1 S ee T ab le 4 f or d et ai le d co m m en ts . 2 S ee T ab le 5 f or d et ai le d co m m en ts . Ta bl e 3 co nt in ue d on p .2 2

22 T ab le 3 c on ti nu ed fr om p .2 1 D O T A ut ho ri ze d P ro je ct D el iv er y M et ho ds D B G eo te ch M an ua l E st im at e G eo te ch U nc er ta in ty ? G eo te ch R is k C on tr ac t C la us es ?1 S co re G eo te ch ? P ar tn er in g R eq 'd ? D B C on tr ac t P ay m en t P ro vi si on s G eo te ch W ar ra nt y? 1 G eo te ch In ce nt iv es ? C on tr ac to r P er fo rm - an ce E va l? U se D B -S ig ni f- ic an t G eo te ch Is su es ?2 D B B C M G C D B O th er L um p su m L S G M P L S w /u ni t pr ic es N or th D ak ot a X X Y es N o N o N o Y es X N o N o N o N o N ew Y or k X Y es Y es Y es N o N o O hi o X X Y es N o Y es X N o N o Y es O kl ah om a X A + B N o O re go n X X X A + B Y es Y es N o Y es Y es X N o N o Y es N o S ou th C ar ol in a X X N o N o N o N o Y es X Y es N o Y es Y es S ou th D ak ot a X X N o N o T en ne ss ee X X Y es N o X N o N o N o N o T ex as X X X P 3 Y es Y es N o Y es Y es X N o N o N o Y es U ta h X X X Y es Y es Y es Y es N o X Y es N o N o Y es V er m on t X X N o Y es V ir gi ni a X X P 3 Y es Y es N o Y es Y es X N o N o Y es Y es W as hi ng to n X X N o Y es Y es Y es Y es X Y es N o N o Y es W yo m in g X N eg o- ti at ed :< $1 00 K . N o 1 S ee T ab le 4 f or d et ai le d co m m en ts . 2 S ee T ab le 5 f or d et ai le d co m m en ts .

23 TABLE 4 DETAILS OF RESPONSES TO TABLE 3; RISK CLAUSES AND WARRANTIES DOT Type of Geotechnical Risk Clauses DOT Warranty Types Indiana The mitigation of secondary settlement is the owner’s responsibility. Florida Project warranty Michigan We typically pay a price set by MDOT for subgrade undercut- ting on freeway projects and consider this a shared risk item since we set the price. Maine Pavement settlement Nevada We sometime require or prohibit certain types of geotechnical related designs. For example, driven piling and lime subgrade treatments were prohibited on the I 15 North DB job due to our local knowledge of shallow caliche deposits and lime suscepti- ble soils in Las Vegas Valley. Minnesota Settlement roadways and structures New Mexico Pile driven and pile cut-offs paid separately; Rock Excavation unit price; obstruction removal for drilled shafts. North Carolina Culvert settlement limit +1-year project warranty North Carolina We use lump sum for geotechnical features. South Carolina 3-year warranty for latent defects or workmanship Utah Sometimes we make liquefaction/lateral spread mitigation an owner-ordered change order. Utah Settlement warranty criteria (2–5 years) Washington We require that all changed condition under a certain dollar amount (different amounts for different contracts) is the con- tractor’s risk. If that threshold is exceeded, then the department pays for the costs above the threshold. Washington 1-year project warranty TABLE 5 DETAILS OF RESPONSES TO TABLE 3; SPECIAL METHODS EMPLOYED ON DESIGN-BUILD PROJECTS WITH SIGNIFICANT GEOTECHNICAL ISSUES DOT Special Methods Included in DB RFQ/RFP to Address Significant Geotechnical Issues California Providing additional geotechnical report/studies as reference information for Proposers. Allow Proposers to perform additional testing prior to submittal of Proposal. Louisiana Our first DB project involved major piers in the Miss. River on the longest cable-stayed bridge in North America and the Geotechnical Aspects were not even considered in the primary scoring of the project…a minor oversight which had major impacts on the success and schedule of this project. On other projects, we have obtained geotechnical data and provided that data to the DB teams. Maine (1) A Supplemental Boring Program was conducted during the bidding where competing Proposers could request borings, lab tests; (2) Very specific geotechnical design criteria was in the RFP to control high-risk elements such as staged construction techniques, limiting driving piles to after 90% consolidation was complete; (3) Limiting foundation types and superstructure types, etc. Maryland A majority of our DB projects would be considered major projects where geotechnical aspects are considered to be significant. Our cur- rent DB Performance Specifications provided in the RFQ/RFP were written with major projects in mind. Michigan This is specific to one project under development, and traditionally we have not had DB projects with geotechnical work as complex as this project. MDOT gathered a lot of geotechnical data that will be placed in the RFP including borings, soil analysis, and artesian data. Minnesota On a recent project with large fills over soft soils, we required the DB Contractor to use extensive modern instrumentation to monitor short and long term settlement. Nevada NDOT uses project specific Geotechnical Performance Specifications for all DB projects. New Mexico 30% Geotechnical Information ($1.5 million); 4 ATCs of complicated segments were part of RFP and used to rate RFPs. North Carolina We addressed them in both RFQ and RFP; In the event of geoenvironmental concerns, the department would absorb some of that risk by removing materials and being the generator of the disposal manifest while the DB team was expected to and evaluated on their mini- mization of impacts to areas of geoenvironmental concern. In areas where a large number of borings were needed pre-bid, the depart- ment would solicit the locations from the shortlisted DB teams and then perform the investigation accordingly and provide all informa- tion to all teams. Where shallow groundwater is concerned, the department would collect piezo data and provide to teams. Ohio Red flag geotechnical report in preliminary engineering work. Oregon We have limited experience with DB, only 1 ongoing DB project, with significant geotechnical problems which leads me to say we will not do any more DB projects when there are known geotechnical problems. South Carolina A more detailed subsurface investigation and preliminary design analysis is performed to quantify hazards. Utah We have clarified RFP language for specific concern such as lateral spread design requirements. Washington Our Geotechnical Design Manual (GDM) is quite detailed, but we may add special requirements in the RFP. For example, seismic ground motion requirements, floating bridge anchor design requirements, tunnel equipment selection issues, and other issues not cov- ered in available design standards.

24 thorough understanding of “holes” in the subsurface inves- tigation can create an intolerable level of uncertainty. This leads to the conclusion that DBB is more appropriate as the delivery method than DB on projects where the geotechnical scope risk is unacceptable. DESIGN-BUILD REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT Once the decision to use DB is made, the next step is to determine what geotechnical information will be in the RFP. NCDOT typically performs the prelet geotechnical investiga- tions. They report that they spent “0.18% to 1.15% of total con- tract price,” which is less than the typical “3% to 5% NCDOT spends on conventional contract projects” (Kim et al. 2009). The same study reports that there “appears to be a gap in the degree of conservatism or level of risk between the NCDOT in-house foundation design and the foundation design by some design–build teams.” This finding indicates that the industry was willing to work with less geotechnical information than the DOT. Thus, the one-on-one sessions between the DOT and its competing design-builders also provide an opportunity for all parties to calibrate the perceived level of geotechnical risk. The Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) and the Maine DOT issue a draft RFP to bidders on the short list and solicit comments before finalizing the RFP (Maine DOT 2003; VTrans 2010b). This approach has much the same effect as the one-on-one concept. Competing design-build- ers are able to point out areas of the RFP content that need clarification or more information before having to commit to a lump-sum price. By gaining industry input during the procurement process, the owner reaps the benefit of reduced contingencies and lower project costs. One DB contractor describes the process as follows: [Owners] can reduce costs by ‘doing their homework’ and by utilizing proper partnering, flexibility, risk allocation, and processes…. Proper ‘homework’ preparation includes developing sound geotechnical and environmental data prior to the bid phase…. included hiring the best possible geotechnical and environmental firms to provide early, pre- bid data on the project (Christensen and Meeker 2002). Agency Policies for Request for Proposal Geotechnical Content The geotechnical content of the RFP has three components: 1. The amount of geotechnical investigation that is accomplished before making the decision to use DB project delivery. 2. The amount of geotechnical investigation that is accomplished during preliminary engineering and RFP preparation. 3. The amount of geotechnical information that is required from competing design-builders in their pro- posal responses to the RFQ and RFP. The synthesis used three independent sources of informa- tion to quantify the state of the practice in the above three areas. First, the survey asked respondents to indicate their agency’s policy for the information of interest. Second, the content analysis of agency DB guidelines/policy docu- ments looked for the same information as did the solicita- tion document content analysis, which composed the third source. Thus, intersections from the three independent lines of information allow the researchers to identify trends and draw conclusions from the analysis. One word of caution is needed here. DB project delivery in transportation is an evolving field. Therefore, disconnects between the survey responses and the two content analyses are not necessarily contradictions. The survey responses are the most current source of information and may reflect an agency’s adjustment from its DB policy as expressed in the written documents resulting from lessons learned. In other words, it is possible that the documents reviewed have not been brought up to date to reflect recent practice. This word of caution is particularly important relative to the changing dynamics of public sector DB procurement. Most DOTs cur- rently use some form of price competition to select design- builders, and have not adopted DB procurement techniques that are used in other public sector industries, such as build- ings or water treatment plants. As a result, most DOTs do not have in their procurement toolboxes “progressive design- build,” where the DB firm is retained on a qualifications basis and ultimately provides a firm price after advancing the design and conducting further data collection, such as detailed geotechnical investigation centered around the detailed design. Therefore, as procurement options expand for DOTs, the conclusions expressed below on the suitability of DB for a given project may change. Geotechnical Information Needed Before Selecting DB Project Delivery The greatest risk to many DB projects may be the poten- tial for unknown subsurface conditions to adversely influ- ence DB project performance (Clark and Borst 2002). This risk is particularly acute in bridge projects, which often must be built on the weak soils found on most river- banks. Therefore, the agency project team must evaluate the risks associated with transferring the responsibil- ity for the final geotechnical investigation and resultant design to a design-builder (Kim et al. 2009). One agency described the issue as follows: “There are additional risks associated with facilities constructed underground because exactly what the ground is like and exactly how it will behave can be only assumed until it is excavated” (Clark and Borst 2002).

25 Table 6 shows the responses received from the survey of DOTs when asked to indicate the level of geotechnical infor- mation that was needed before the agency could decide to select DB project delivery. Responses range from no geotech- nical investigation to a preliminary geotechnical design report before selecting a project delivery method. One respondent stated, “Geotechnical aspects of projects are not a primary consideration when deciding which project will be designed and constructed using a DB delivery method.” If this comment is coupled with the FDOT policy that DB is used only on proj- ects with a “low risk of unforeseen conditions” that “require an expedited schedule” (Blanchard 2007), one can infer that projects with a higher than normal level of geotechnical uncer- tainty may not be good candidates for DB project delivery. Given this potential constraint on selecting DB, the amount of geotechnical information necessary to select DB delivery will reflect the local knowledge already available to the DOT from its previous records and the preliminary investigations nec- essary to obtain environmental permits on the given project. This corresponds to the responses of “none,” “reconnaissance report,” and “geotechnical data report” in Table 6. TABLE 6 PRELIMINARY GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE SELECTING DESIGN-BUILD PROJECT DELIVERY Report DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects % of 28 Total Responses None 7% 11% Reconnaissance Report 0% 14% Geotechnical Data Report 7% 18% Geotechnical Summary Report 11% 11% Preliminary Geotechnical Design Report 4% 18% Geotechnical Design Report 0% 0% Geotechnical Baseline Report 0% 0% As noted in chapter two, strong benefits are derived from a DOT conducting an early assessment on overall project risks and how its choice of project delivery, procurement, contracting, and execution can mitigate such risks. This is particularly true in the case of geotechnical risk, where an early determination of the influence of variations in geotech- nical conditions on price and schedule can help the DOT determine the scope of pre-RFP geotechnical study. This does not mean that a project with significant geotechnical issues cannot be delivered using DB; it does mean that the owner must be able to put the geotechnical risks in perspec- tive and determine the best means to mitigate those risks by sharing them with the design-builder or retaining them and allocating a contingency to cover the risks if they are real- ized (WSDOT 2004). Ideally, requiring more detail helps to quantify the level of risk geotechnical uncertainty poses to the project. Although it is impossible to tell from the survey output, these risks may apply to projects where known geotechni- cal uncertainty is higher than typical. The table also shows the breakout between those DOTs with experience of more than five DB projects and those with experience of fewer. With one exception (California), experienced DOTs used more than one type of geotechnical report, which indicates an awareness of the need to match the pre-decision level of information with an individual project’s level of uncertainty. Experienced DOTs demonstrated that determining the appropriate level of geotechnical investigation before select- ing DB is a function of formal risk analysis (see Table 7). Respondents with fewer than five DB projects did not engage in formal risk analysis before selecting DB project delivery. The two “other” responses indicated that the project team considered the geotechnical conditions risk but not in a formal manner. Twelve of the experienced DOTs had com- pleted more than 10 DB projects. One can reasonably con- clude that these agencies must be achieving success with DB project delivery, or they would not perpetuate the process. This leads to the conclusion that the emphasis on formal risk analysis before selecting DB project delivery differentiates the DOTs with multiproject DB experience from those new to the delivery method. TABLE 7 RISK ANALYSES BEFORE SELECTING DESIGN-BUILD PROJECT DELIVERY Risk DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects % of 28 Total Responses Scope 0% 38% Schedule 0% 14% Cost 0% 21% Contracting 0% 17% Other 7% 3% Table 7 also shows that scope risk in a DB project is the primary concern of experienced DOTs. Given the geo- technical focus of the survey, it can be inferred that the respondents were specifically referring to the impact of geotechnical scope uncertainty. Tables 6 and 7 show that experienced DOTs formally evaluate geotechnical scope risk and then vary the amount of pre-project delivery deci- sion investigation to that required to make an informed decision. This leads to the conclusion that an experienced DOT will tailor the level of pre-DB decision investigation and risk analysis to the specific requirements of a given project. Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for selecting a project delivery method based on its geotechni- cal requirements.

26 designating types and locations for tests and making the resultant information available to all competitors. This may include allowing each competitor to conduct individual testing at its own expense if desired. 3. The DOT institutes specific constraints on the types of acceptable design solutions for high-risk features of work. This may include generating ATCs that may be used in the design-builders’ proposals. Geotechnical Information Contained in the DB RFP A successful DB project depends on a well-written, unam- biguous RFP that contains the necessary information for competing design-builders to prepare responsive propos- als that equitably price the value of the DB project’s scope of work and the risk associated with completing that work (USACE 2009). One author describes the issue as follows: Experienced design-builders can provide firm prices with a great deal of accuracy for sufficiently defined projects The survey also asked the DOTs whether or not they would use DB project delivery on a project with “signifi- cant geotechnical issues.” The population was evenly split between those that answered yes and those that answered no. Again, when the experienced DOTs were separated from the inexperienced ones, 15 of the 19 that answered yes had completed more than five DB projects. The question also asked them to elaborate on any “special methods” used to deal with the heightened geotechnical risk. Table 8 is a syn- opsis of the answers and the states that provided them (see Appendix A for details). The responses can be grouped into three categories: 1. The DOT conducts a more robust preliminary inves- tigation and furnishes the results to the competing design-builders as part of the RFP. This may include specific testing to better characterize high-risk areas. 2. The DOT allows the competing design-builders to par- ticipate in the pre-bid geotechnical investigations by TABLE 8 SELECTED RESPONSES FROM DOTS THAT USE DESIGN-BUILD TO DELIVER PROJECTS WITH SIGNIFICANT GEOTECHNICAL ISSUES State(s) No. of DB Projects Method California None— 5 RFPs under development Providing additional geotechnical report/studies as reference information for Proposers. Allow Proposers to perform additional testing prior to submittal of Proposal.* Louisiana 3–5 Our first DB project involved major piers in the Miss. River on the longest cable-stayed bridge in North Amer- ica and the Geotechnical Aspects were not even considered in the primary scoring of the project…a minor over- sight which had major impacts on the success and schedule of this project. On other projects, we have obtained geotechnical data and provided that data to the DB teams. Maine 6–10 (1) A Supplemental Boring Program was conducted during the bidding stage during which competing Propos- ers could request borings, lab tests; (2) Very specific geotechnical design criteria was included in the RFP to control high-risk elements, such as requirements for staged construction techniques, limiting driving piles to after 90% consolidation was complete; (3) Limiting foundation types and superstructure types, etc. Michigan >10 This is specific to one project under development, and traditionally we have not had DB projects with geotech work as complex as this project. MDOT gathered a lot of geotechnical data that will be placed in the RFP, including borings, soil analysis, and artesian data. Minnesota >10 On a recent project with large fills over soft soils, we required the DB Contractor to use extensive modern instrumentation to monitor short- and long-term settlement. New Mexico 3–5 30% Geotechnical Information (1.5 million dollars worth); 4 ATC's of complicated segments were part of RFP and used to rate RFPs. North Carolina >10 We addressed them in both RFQ and RFP; In the event of geoenvironmental concerns, the department would absorb some of that risk by removing materials and being the generator of the disposal manifest. We evaluated on their minimization of impacts to areas of geoenvironmental concern. In areas where a large number of borings were needed pre-bid, the department would solicit the locations from the shortlisted DB teams and then perform the investigation accordingly and provide all information to all teams. Where shallow groundwater is concerned, the department would collect piezo data and provide to teams. Utah >10 We've clarified RFP language for specific concern such as lateral spread design requirements. Washington 6–10 Our Geotechnical Design Manual (GDM) is quite detailed, but we may add special requirements in the RFP. For example, seismic ground motion requirements, floating bridge anchor design requirements, tunnel equip- ment selection issues and other issues not covered in available design standards. * Note: Italics added.

27 in the … early design phases. Of course, it is not possible to develop accurate cost information through conceptual estimating unless the project scope has been sufficiently defined. This underscores the need for owners in design- build projects to have detailed and complete RFP’s that identify all of the relevant project criteria (Friedlander 2003, italics added). The WSDOT Guidebook for Design-Build Highway Proj- ect Development (2004) maintains that the DOT is “respon- sible for establishing the scope, project definition, design criteria, performance measurements, and existing condi- tions of the site (initial geotechnical investigation, subsurface conditions).” The responsibilities listed in this passage form a foundation for determining what specific data should be included in the DB RFP. This agency elaborates that “it is nec- essary for WSDOT to establish a baseline for design-builders to develop their technical and price proposals” and that “pre- liminary geotechnical investigations will be conducted by WSDOT with data provided to Proposers” (Carpenter 2010). WSDOT is consciously creating an environment of open communication regarding geotechnical uncertainty and the allocating of differing site conditions risk. In fact, the docu- ment states, “Ultimately, WSDOT will own responsibility for Changed and Differing Site conditions” (WSDOT 2004). The Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Depart- ment (ASHTD) Design-Build Guidelines and Procedures (2006) also directly elaborates the geotechnical content of its DB RFPs. It requires that the geotechnical conditions for a given DB project be coordinated with the ASHTD Materi- als Division in the early stages of project development. This is expected to lead to the following information that will be reflected in the RFP: • “Assessment of geotechnical risks, • planning the appropriate preliminary investigations, • gathering data, • appropriately allocating the risks, • preliminary geotechnical engineering analyses neces- sary to address feasibility issues and to define project design criteria such as foundation type constraints, • risk management plans, • establish design parameters, • set the basis for determination of changed conditions, and • establish preliminary project cost estimates” (ASHTD 2006). ASHTD also develops a utility locations database that is included in the RFP. The stated aim of the process is to define “significant unknown issues” and develop contract provisions to reflect the findings of the preliminary investi- gations and allocate project risks accordingly. Tables 9 and 10 illustrate the results of the RFP content analysis and the responses from the DOT survey. There is a marked difference between the survey responses and the actual DB RFPs. To put the two tables in perspective, the content analysis includes 46 solicitation documents, and nine states had multiple RFPs. The same issue shown in Table 7 is relevant for Table 9, where several respondents marked more than one level of geotechnical content depending on the type of project. As a result, the disconnect between the survey and the RFPs is not as stark as the numbers suggest, but there is still a conflict between the number of RFPs that contained no reference to geotechnical information and the survey responses, all of which indicated that at least some amount of geotechnical information is apparent. TABLE 9 RFP CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS REGARDING GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT Equivalent Report Information in RFP No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects None 11 4 7 Reconnaissance Report 4 1 3 Geotechnical Data Report 14 4 10 Geotechnical Summary Report 8 3 5 Preliminary Geotechni- cal Design Report 9 1 8 Geotechnical Design Report 2 2 0 Geotechnical Baseline Report 1 0 1 TABLE 10 DOT SURVEY RESPONSE RESULTS REGARDING RFP GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT Report Information in RFP No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects None 0 0 0 Reconnaissance Report 3 0 3 Geotechnical Data Report 13 3 10 Geotechnical Summary Report 7 2 5 Preliminary Geotechni- cal Design Report 9 4 5 Geotechnical Design Report 7 2 5 Geotechnical Baseline Report 6 1 5 Although it is impossible to authoritatively verify from the available information, there are three possible explana- tions for the RFPs with no geotechnical information. First,

28 methods to articulate the standards for geotechnical features of work in DB projects. Mn/DOT is one of those experienced DOTs, and the following list is an example of the DB geo- technical criteria from the Hastings Bridge project in Min- nesota (presented in a case study in chapter seven) Roadway embankments constructed under this contract on TH 61 between Stations 197+50 and 213+00 shall meet the following performance criteria: • Engineering analysis shall show that total settlement at any point on constructed embankment will not exceed one inch during the period ranging from Substantial Completion to 25 years after Substantial Completion. • Global Stability calculations shall use a minimum Safety Factor of 1.5. • Lateral Squeeze calculations shall use a minimum Safety Factor of 2.0. • Ground Improvement Techniques (and/or lightweight fill material) may be used to improve the underlying poor foundations soils. Any Ground Improvement Techniques used in design or construction shall fol- low the guidelines presented in the most recent FHWA publication on Ground Improvement. • The Contractor shall monitor settlement of underlying foundation soils prior to any fill being placed, through construction and through the warranty period. • Roadway shall not be paved until settlement data shows less than 0.125 in. of incremental vertical defor- mation occurring for 6 consecutive weeks with settle- ment readings taken on a weekly basis. Readings taken during cold weather months (November through April) will not be allowed to count for this settlement period. • Settlement data shall be presented to Mn/DOT in tabu- lar and graphical format (settlement in inches plotted on the y-axis and time in days plotted on the x-axis). • Contractor shall provide, install, and monitor geo- technical instrumentation to measure total settlement of constructed embankments during the contract and warranty period. Settlement plates (flat plates with pipe extensions) shall not be used for measuring settlement. • Within 1 week after Substantial Completion of the roadway, Contractor shall measure and submit as- built profiles of the roadway for northbound center- line, northbound 12 ft left of centerline, northbound 12 ft right of centerline, southbound centerline, south- bound 12 ft left of centerline, southbound 12 ft right of centerline. The profiles shall be developed accord- ing to the State’s Surveying and Mapping Manual. The Contractor shall measure these same profiles at the conclusion of the Warranty period. • If settlement exceeds 1 in. at any point along the pro- files, the contractor shall submit a settlement correc- tion plan to Mn/DOT for approval. This correction plan will consist of major reconstruction efforts to cor- rect the ongoing settlement problem. the project may have had no significant geotechnical issues. Checking the RFPs, five had a significant vertical construc- tion component. For example, one RFP from Virginia was for the construction of a welcome center, and another from Florida was for a bridge deck replacement and widening. Second, the need to meet an aggressive schedule may have led the agency to make a business decision to accept the cost risk of awarding the DB contract without geotechnical scope definition. Finally, the geotechnical information may have been provided separately through an addendum, and as such was not mentioned in the solicitation document. Geotechnical Performance Criteria The use of performance criteria rather than prescriptive specifications is one method for ensuring that design liabil- ity is transferred to the design-builder (Beard et al. 2002; Koch et al. 2010). The survey asked respondents to indi- cate whether geotechnical performance criteria were used in their DB projects and whether geotechnical performance verification was employed. About half (46%) answered that they used performance criteria, and the same proportion used performance verification methods. Table 11 contains selected comments regarding the types of criteria and verifi- cation methods the respondents specified. TABLE 11 SELECTED RESPONSES FROM DOTS THAT USE GEOTECHNICAL PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND VERIFICATION METHODS State No. of DB Projects Geotechnical Perfor- mance Criteria Type Geotechnical Verifi- cation Method Type Indiana >10 Deformation criteria Instrumentation and testing Louisiana >10 Load test criteria Deformation Minnesota >10 Settlement Instrumentation Nevada 1–2 Tolerable max and differential settle- ments, instrumenta- tion, etc Load tests, CSL tests, settlement monitoring, etc. New Mexico 3–4 AASHTO standards Settlement; PDA testing; CSL testing Ohio >10 Settlement Settlement monitoring Utah >10 Settlement Settlement monitoring Washington >10 Deflection criteria for floating bridge anchors, settlement due to tunneling or excavations. Inclinometers, vibra- tion measurements and deformation measurements CSL = cross hole logging; PDA = pile driving analyzer. Table 11 shows that DOTs with more than 10 DB projects’ worth of experience tend to depend on geotechnical perfor- mance criteria backed up with performance verification

29 • If settlement is between 0.25 in. and 1 in. at any point along the profiles, the Contractor shall submit a settle- ment correction plan to Mn/DOT for approval. • If maximum settlement is less than 0.25 in. at all points along the profiles, no corrective action is necessary (Mn/DOT 2010). Geotechnical Content of Competing Design-Builder’s Proposals The technical portion of the DB contract is the sum of the technical requirements articulated in the RFP and the pro- posed solution for those requirements demonstrated in the winning proposal (Koch et al. 2010). Therefore, it is impor- tant to understand the extent of the geotechnical design that owners expect competing design-builders to perform to sub- mit responsive proposals. Tables 12 and 13 show the output from the survey and the DB RFP content analysis. Reconciling the two sources has the same problems as discussed for the previous set of tables. However, once again the DOTs with the most DB experience require more geo- technical information in the competing proposals. The com- parison is marked for projects with significant geotechnical issues to be addressed in design and construction. This con- clusion agrees with the previous conclusion that the geotech- nical content of the RFP must be tailored for each project and reinforces the idea that there is no single appropriate level of information in this area that will satisfy all require- ments. The other important lesson from Table 12 is the will- ingness to allow a certain amount of interactivity between the DOT and the design-builders during proposal prepara- tion by soliciting design-builder requested geotechnical exploration/testing and by permitting pre-bid investigations by design-builders. Both techniques foster an environment of open sharing of geotechnical information and allow the agency to gauge the industry’s perception of the geotechni- cal risk inherent in a given DB project. TABLE 13 RFP CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR DESIGN-BUILD PROPOSAL GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT Geotechnical Information Required in a Responsive Proposal No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects None 22 7 15 Geotechnical Design Assumptions 4 1 3 Design-Builder Requested Testing 0 0 0 Pre-bid Investigation by Design-Builder 0 0 0 Geotechnical Design Values 11 1 10 Preliminary Geotechnical Design 11 1 10 Mitigation Approach Narrative 6 1 5 Geotechnical ATCs 13 5 8 Interactivity During Proposal Preparation The notion of agency-design-builder interactivity during proposal preparation deserves specific attention. Geotech- nical uncertainty in DB projects is impossible to eliminate (Clark and Borst 2002). Hoek and Palmieri (1998) describe it this way: Changes in project scope during implementation can have a significant impact on the project cost and schedules. Such changes can arise, for example, from the inability of design-stage investigation to eliminate risks from unknown geological conditions for construction of underground works. Design-builders must make assumptions based on the best information at hand at the time the proposal is prepared. In previous discussions, the focus was on how the owner dealt with the geotechnical uncertainty in the procurement TABLE 12 SURVEY RESPONSES FOR DESIGN-BUILD PROPOSAL GEOTECHNICAL CONTENT Geotechnical Information Required in a Responsive Proposal Typical DB Project DB Project with Significant Geotechnical Issues No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects None 4 1 3 3 1 2 Geotechnical Design Assumptions 10 3 7 8 2 6 Design-Builder Requested Testing 8 1 7 7 1 6 Pre-bid Investigation by Design-Builder 4 1 3 4 1 3 Geotechnical Design Values 7 2 5 9 2 7 Preliminary Geotechnical Design 6 1 5 9 0 9 Mitigation Approach Narrative 12 1 11 13 1 12 Geotechnical ATCs 11 0 11 12 1 11

30 process. This is an inherently one-sided process. One author categorized the current approach to shedding geotechnical risk as a “preoccupation with exculpatory language by geo- practitioners” (Smith 2008). It is important for owners to understand the perception of the designers and builders on the DB team with regard to risk of differing subsurface con- ditions; permitting some form of agency-proposer interac- tion during the proposal preparation period is one way to gain this knowledge. The Sound Transit Link Light Rail Project in Seattle found that the owner’s initial assessment of underground risk was different than that of the proposers on the short list. This project had a mechanism to furnish interactivity through design-builder requests for information termed “risk state- ments” in this contract. The agency found the following: …there were more risk statements that required answers than most of us anticipated originally. As the agency staff, [its consultants] and our Technical Oversight Panel looked for more risk issues, more risks were recognized. During the evaluation process, a tremendous amount of effort was put forth by all involved with reviewing and evaluating the answers to the risk statements (Clark and Borst 2002, italics added). The key words in this quote are “risk statements that required answers.” The remainder of the paper showed that this specific feature of the procurement process was a key factor in identifying the risks associated with the delivery of a project that included a 4.5-mile (7.2-km) bored tunnel through an urban area. The Naval Facility Engineering Command (NAVFAC) recently updated its DB policies to permit the competing proposers’ geotechnical engineer to be on site during NAV- FAC’s preliminary site investigation and testing (Crofford 2010). This practice was instituted with the caveat that the winning design-builder “must depend on its own Geotech- nical investigation and data for design.” The WSDOT DB guide (2004) allows the agency to include a “supplemen- tary” geotechnical investigation program that is conducted during proposal preparation based on requested supplemen- tal information from competing design-builders. The Maine DOT recognized the need for interactivity during proposal preparation to mitigate geotechnical risk in the DB delivery of the Bath–Woolwich Bridge, the longest precast balanced cantilever concrete segmental bridge in the United States (Phipps 2000). The agency recognized that to ensure that design-builders had the maximum latitude for their proposed designs, they needed to be able to set their own pier locations. Since the DOT could not predict the pier locations, it could not develop a preliminary boring program that would correspond to the proposers need for site-specific boring logs. As a result, the Maine DOT provided a “sup- plemental geotechnical program to minimize uncertain- ties. Each team was allowed to request up to 10 additional borings and associated laboratory tests. Results were pro- vided to the proposers in sufficient time to be incorporated into their designs” (Phipps 2000). The Utah DOT (UDOT) encouraged design-builders to conduct their own pre-bid investigations on its Legacy Parkway project. The winning team “elected to conduct a test embankment fill and a test pile-driving operation in the vicinity of the project align- ment, along with exploratory borings performed at the two test sites” (Higbee 2004). Table 12 contains two possible responses that indicate interactivity during proposal preparation: “Design-Builder Requested Testing” and “Pre-bid Investigation by Design- Builder.” With one exception, the DOTs that employ this technique use it on both typical projects and projects with significant geotechnical issues. Additionally, DOTs with more DB experience are the ones most likely to engage in this form of risk identification and mitigation. Combining that finding with the information found in the literature leads to the conclusion that permitting some level of interactiv- ity regarding geotechnical uncertainty during DB proposal preparation appears to be an effective geotechnical risk management practice. LIABILITY FOR GEOTECHNICAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL Many owners have major concerns over their liability for the accuracy of geotechnical information furnished in the RFP. As discussed in chapter two, this is one of the central issues as to whether a contractor can be afforded relief under the DSC clause, as owner-furnished information is generally the baseline for assessing whether or not there is a differing site condition. Table 14 shows the results of the survey, in which respondents were asked about their use of a DSC clause and what geotechnical documents they provided during the RFP process that could support a DSC claim. Table 14 shows eight negative responses to the use of a DSC clause for geotechnical conditions. This is coun- terintuitive. Only one of the respondents, North Carolina, elaborated on its answer, and it stated that NCDOT did “not allow differing geotechnical site conditions.” This agen- cy’s approach is to conduct the “subsurface investigation and provide the information to the design–build teams” and “NCDOT prelet subsurface investigation appears to have provided the short-listed teams with a reasonable amount of subsurface information to prepare the contract proposals” (Kim et al. 2009). The remaining seven nega- tive responses also checked “agency standard differing site conditions clause” in the next question, so it would be logi- cal to interpret the negative response to mean that there is no special geotechnical DSC clause rather than no clause at all.

31 TABLE 14 SURVEY DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS OUTPUT Does DB Contract Include a DSC Clause for Geotechnical Conditions? No. of Responses DOTs with Fewer Than 5 DB Projects DOTs with More Than 5 DB Projects Yes 19 9 10 No 8 2 6 What document(s) is used to define a differing geotechnical site condition?* Geotechnical Informa- tion Provided in the RFP 8 2 6 Geotechnical Baseline Report 2 0 2 Design-builder’s Post- award Geotechnical Design Report 2 1 1 Agency Standard DSC Clause 16 9 7 None 1 0 1 *Note: Respondents were allowed to select more than one answer. Once again, the experienced DOTs are willing to use a greater variety of methods to deal with the geotechnical risk of DSCs. The major point in Table 14 is that the experienced DOTs recognize and accept that the geotechnical informa- tion provided in the RFP in conjunction with the standard boilerplate clause defines the parameters around which a DSC claim will be decided. CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE When asked to identify the greatest geotechnical chal- lenges during procurement, 10 of 11 contractors stated that most projects faced agency distrust of the design-builder’s design team. This was coupled with 100% agreement that exculpatory language in the RFP created an environment that further bred distrust. Six interviewees stated that they rarely submitted proposals based on the DB team’s preferred practice, though all interviewees supported the idea of con- fidential pre-bid meetings to discuss ATCs and clarify RFP design intent and ambiguities. One design-builder echoed the sentiment expressed by Christensen and Meeker (2002) about the owner’s ability to reduce geotechnical uncertainty by “doing their homework” before advertising the project, and added that the correct amount of geotechnical informa- tion in the RFP was “everything the DOT has” at the point of initiating competition. Two interviewees indicated that they had bid on DB projects where they were allowed to collect their own pre-bid geotechnical data, and confirmed the idea that this type of interactivity was reflected in the level of project contingency in their price proposals. CONCLUSIONS The above analysis arrived at the following conclusions. • DOTs with DB experience evaluate the risk and impact of unforeseen geotechnical conditions before selecting DB project delivery, and the emphasis on formal risk analysis differentiates the DOTs with multiproject DB experience and those new to the delivery method. • Experienced DOTs tailor the amount of geotechnical information included in the DB RFP to the specific requirements of a given project. • Permitting interactivity during the proposal preparation period allows the agency to understand how competing design-builders perceive the geotechnical risk and pro- vides an opportunity to adjust the procurement plan to accommodate a need for supplemental information. The following effective practices were documented. • The Minnesota, North Carolina, and California DOTs use one-on-one meetings with each proposer before pro- posal submission to identify any need for further geo- technical investigation and to clarify RFP risk issues. • The Vermont Agency of Transportation, the North Carolina DOT, and the Maine DOT issue a draft DB RFP and ask for comments from the competing design- builders on the short list as a means to identify the geo- technical aspects of the project that need clarification before a proposal is due. • The Washington State, North Carolina, and Maine DOTs allow proposers to request supplementary bor- ings during proposal preparation to better align the geotechnical information with a given design-builder’s proposed design. • UDOT encourages competing design-builders to con- duct their own pre-bid geotechnical investigations before developing their proposals. • NAVFAC permits competing design-builders to have their geotechnical designer-of-record be onsite and witness the owner’s preliminary geotechnical investigation.

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TRB’s National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects addresses how states use geotechnical information in solicitation documents and contracts for design-build highway projects.

The report examines current practices regarding the allocation of geotechnical risk and the level of geotechnical information provided with bid documents, the scope of geotechnical information required after contract award, geotechnical-related performance testing during construction, and contract provisions related to geotechnical design and construction.

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