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44 Through the series of site visits and interviews with airline, airport, and service provider personnel, an understanding of the apron operating environment, the control of activities within that environment, and the effectiveness of the apron control/management was formed. The site visits confirmed that U.S. airports do not typically provide the same level of active management and control of the apron environment as is provided at non-U.S. airports. Instead, U.S. airports rely primarily on the tenant airlines and ground service provid- ers to safely and effectively manage the leased apron envi- ronment and to comply with operating procedures in the common-use (typically unleased) non-movement areas. The research plan defined to guide the collection and analysis of data included a focus on the compilation of quan- titative accident and incident data covering the apron area. This quantitative data was viewed as providing a means of comparing and evaluating the safety of the apron area in a regulated and an unregulated environment. Such informa- tion in a compiled and consolidated form is lacking in the industry, as documented in a report on aviation runway and ramp safety published in November 2007 by the GAO [Avia- tion Runway and Ramp Safety: Sustained Efforts to Address Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents and Incidents (GAO-08-29)]. However, through the course of the research, including the site visits and interviews, it became apparent that gathering and com- piling quantitative information detailing accidents/incidents would not produce the desired information due to consistent reluctance or refusal to provide the necessary and complete information. While airports typically have some data on apron inci- dents or accidents to report, these data are not considered to be complete since not all events that occur are captured. Through the research effort, the response rate and the vari- ability of information collected were deemed too low to draw usable conclusions or make appropriate comparisons. Contributing reasons for the limited and inconsistent apron event information submitted in response to the survey efforts included: ⢠Limited or incomplete information reported to airports by airlines and apron area service providers. ⢠Limited data routinely and consistently tracked (e.g., events causing less than a threshold amount of damage are not automatically tracked/recorded). ⢠Inconsistency in the primary and supporting information relating to specific events. ⢠Periods covered by the data were not consistent. Additional background on the challenges associated with the collection of quantitative apron accident and incident data is presented in ACRP Project 11-02, Task 12, Prelimi- nary Draft Final Report: Framework for a Database of Apron Incidents and Accidents, which is available at the proj- ect description website for that project at http://apps.trb. org/cmsfeed/TRBNetProjectDisplay.asp?ProjectID=2691. Because of the limited ability to gather information that would allow a quantitative evaluation of the occurrence and extent of apron incidents and accidents, the resulting com- parison and evaluation of the effectiveness of apron man- agement and control programs with and without regulatory oversight is qualitative in nature. The project panel was made aware of the challenges encountered in attempting to gather quantitative information. When accidents and/or incidents occur, despite the stan- dards, procedures, and other measures in place to prevent them, learning from and preventing similar accidents and incidents are of key importance on both the airline and the airport side, irrespective of whether apron activities are con- trolled or regulated. Each entity has its own tailored internal approach to apron management and how it relates to safety. This section presents the major differences in the approaches to apron management between surveyed airports in and out- side the United States. S e c t i o n 9 Comparison of Apron Management and Control
45 As described in detail in Section 1, apron control programs are defined as regulations, policies, and systems designed to provide a safe and efficient environment in the ground area surrounding the terminal where aircraft, ground support, and servicing equipment and personnel operate simultane- ously and in conjunction with each other. As expected, at the airports outside the United States, apron management and control is typically much more centralized through a specific apron control unit or department. These non-U.S. airports are typically responsible for more functions than airports in the United States, including gate allocation and assignment, ground handling, and integration with air traffic control. This is in part due to the lower prevalence of exclusive-use facility leases at non-U.S. airports. With facilities (i.e., gates) operated on a preferential or common-use basis, non-U.S. airports tend to play a more active role in the management and control of the apron areas. In the United States, the respective airports and tenant airlines share responsibility for these functions. In the cases where an airline uses a contractor for specific servicing func- tions like ground handling, catering, or fueling, the opera- tional coordination is directly between the airline and the contractor, without involvement by the airport. Airports typically do regulate the standards by which the contractor must operate in the apron area, but these are typically the same requirements and standards placed on an airline. The research team found that outside the United States, apron management and control programs have evolved away from the need to allocate resources, specifically aircraft park- ing positions/gates (as well as ticketing and baggage claim areas that are outside the scope of this research), which are structured as common-use positions where the airport assigns aircraft to specific gates on a dynamic basis based on demand and specific aircraft type/size. This differs from the exclusive-/ preferential-use model that is prevalent in the United States whereby the airlines lease specific gates and the apron areas associated with those gates and are responsible for managing the operations within that leased space. In the United States, the gate assignments for the most part are made by the leas- ing airlines, which, as noted, have access to a specific set of gates that are leased under exclusive-/preferential-use terms. In some cases, there are U.S. airports that control common- use gates or remote aircraft parking positions. In these cases, the operations department for the airports is generally respon- sible for allocating those resources, but it was not observed to be on a scale comparable to Toronto, Beijing, or Zurich. The common-use gates observed in the United States were not used on a regular basis but more typically on a contingency basis as in the event of a charter flight or unplanned mainte- nance issue requiring a parking position outside of an airlineâs exclusively or preferentially leased gates. These differing lease structures represent the single big- gest difference in how the responsibilities of apron manage- ment are approached within and outside the United States. Although the apron control units outside the United States are primarily responsible for gate allocation, they offer a single department from which all aspects of apron control can be managed. In the United States the operational and safety functions performed by those airportsâ apron control units are the same functions performed by a combination of parties: airport, airlines, and ground handling companies. After the gate lease and use differences between airports within and outside the United States, the establishment of SMSs was identified as the other significant difference in how safety is addressed in conjunction with apron management. All of the airports outside the United States for which site vis- its were conducted have implemented an SMS. The research team ascertained from the site visits that apron safety is approached as part of the overall SMS program. In these cases the safety group within the airport organization reviews acci- dent and incident data and recommends changes to operating procedures through the SMS process. Respondents outside the United States expressed the general belief that the SMS process was effective in identifying problem areas or poten- tial issues and allowed for a collaborative approach to finding solutions to those problems, ranging from revising operational procedures to facility modifications/improvements. In several cases, it was learned that changes or improvements proposed through SMSs were coordinated with the airlines, paralleling the coordination that was reported between U.S. airports and airlines. The following sections summarize the primary compo- nents of apron management and control at non-U.S. and U.S. airports. 9.1 Non-U.S. Airport Apron Management and Control Management and control of the apron environment at non-U.S. airports, based on the site visits conducted through this research project, are typically airport-administered or airport-authorityâadministered responsibilities. Similarly, the airports that were the subject of the site visits all have an SMS in place, consistent with ICAO Annex 14 requirements, which requires the development of state safety programs and an SMS. Because many non-U.S. airports operate and assign aircraft gates on a common-use basis, the apron control function typ- ically maintains responsibility for the safe and efficient assign- ment of flights to gate positions. To maximize operational flexibility in the gate area, many non-U.S. gates are sized to accommodate a significant range of aircraft sizes. Addition- ally, gates at these non-U.S. airports tend to be dimensionally
46 larger in some cases than comparable gates at U.S. airports, allowing a less congested apron operating area in the vicin- ity of each gate and accommodating the staging of GSE in advance of aircraft arrival at any gate. The staging of GSE prior to the arrival of the aircraft tends to reduce the dynamic movement of vehicles and equipment in the area surround- ing the aircraft. In general terms, these factors favor a safe operating environment. The following points summarize those factors that con- tribute to the effectiveness of apron management and control at non-U.S. airports: ⢠Airport authorities/operating entities aggressively promote safety cultures throughout the airport environment on an active and ongoing basis. The safety culture is advanced through the implementation of an SMS and the estab- lishment and enforcement of apron regulations covering operations and activities in the apron area. These regula- tions are reviewed and refined on a regular basis to reflect experiences and information collected through the SMS reporting of apron incidents and accidents. ⢠Safety in the apron environment is part of the overall air- port SMS process and is treated similarly to safety in the movement area and the interior of the terminal in terms of risk assessment, safety promotion, and monitoring of results. This holistic treatment of safety as a culture is a key feature of SMSs. ⢠The establishment and enforcement of apron regulations support a consistent and routine operating environment, particularly in light of the common-use nature of gates at non-U.S. airports. Consistency tends to foster a safe oper- ating environment since variability is reduced and both aircraft operators and ground service providers require less decision making in the active apron environment. ⢠Processes for documenting and reporting apron incident and accident information are defined and adhered to by airport management (through the SMS reporting process). Defined and consistent reporting tends to foster consistent use of terms and descriptions, consistent and repetitive investigative techniques and processes, familiarity with expected participation by involved parties, and other fac- tors that aid in the normalizing of data collected. It also minimizes the potential for duplicative or inconsistent reporting that can obscure actual trends and conclusions. ⢠Active management of the use of the gates by the airports allows the apron control units to more closely monitor activities at each gate. Because an apron accident or inci- dent would tend to affect the time that an aircraft occupies a gate by delaying departure, the apron control unit will often have an early indication of the potential occurrence of a reportable event, which enhances timely reporting and investigation. ⢠Training is a central component of apron management and control programs and SMSs. Training is both an ini- tial and ongoing requirement, but it is also a remediation measure in many cases where an adverse apron incident is reported. ⢠Airlines and airports maintain the same objective of pre- serving and promoting a safe operating environment for employees, equipment operators, and travelers. 9.2 U.S. Airport Apron Management and Control Apron management and control at U.S. airports tends to be, with few exceptions, an airline-administered responsi- bility in the leased areas of the apron. While there is a lack of centralized apron management and control that is evenly administered to all airport users, the apron environment is functionally managed and controlled on an individual, leased-area basis, coupled with airport regulations guiding activities in unleased apron areas. Less common but opera- tionally equivalent, an FBO service provider may manage the apron area for a facility that does not have a predominant airline presence. The majority of U.S. airport apron areas are leased on either a preferential- or exclusive-use basis, with airlines controlling and managing the activities that occur and the operating procedures employed within these areas. Using preferentially or exclusively leased gates/apron areas typically allows airlines significant freedom to accommodate a varying aircraft fleet as long as the parked aircraft do not create a safety issue or impinge on the leased area or opera- tional flexibility of adjacent facilities/gates. The accommo- dation of a variable fleet within a leased area can mean that aircraft parking is maximized by minimizing wingtip clear- ances (subject to airline operating procedures), limiting GSE storage and staging areas, and defining segmented and com- plex gate entry and exit maneuvers. In these cases, the avail- able space for GSE maneuvering in the vicinity of the parked aircraft can be significantly constrained, reducing the margin of error available to avoid incidents or accidents in the apron environment. The following points summarize those factors that con- tribute to the effectiveness of apron management and control at U.S. airports: ⢠Airlines aggressively promote safety cultures through- out the organizations on an active and ongoing basis. The safety culture is advanced through the use of stan- dard operating procedures developed to cover operations and activities in the apron area. Standard procedures are amended, expanded, supplemented, eliminated, and oth- erwise renewed on an ongoing basis as necessary to address documented deficiencies, changes in equipment, modified
47 training, revised airport regulations, and other relevant factors. Many of the airlines interviewed through this research revealed the existence of internal SMSs. ⢠Initial and recurrent training of employees is common within airlines and ground service providers in order to maintain awareness of safety in the operating environ- ment. This training is in addition to any training required by an airport for operating vehicles and equipment in the apron or movement areas. ⢠Service providers that have contractual relationships for servicing aircraft (fueling, catering, lavatory servicing, etc.) are required to either comply with the respective air- line operating and safety procedures or submit their own operating and safety procedures for review and approval by the contracting airline. This allows an airline to ensure that appropriate, consistent, and acceptable operating and safety procedures are employed for activities in the apron area even if those activities are conducted by personnel not employed by the airline. ⢠Airline attention to and prioritization of safety in the apron area is promulgated through the airlinesâ systems and stations. In this manner, airline experiences are shared throughout the organization so that all personnel benefit from experiences at any given station (airport). Typically, airlines use the results of investigations into incidents and accidents to determine whether system-wide changes to operating procedures are warranted, and if so, those are cir- culated throughout the airlinesâ networks simultaneously. ⢠Airline prioritization of a safety culture and safe operating environment reflects the adverse financial and operational impacts that result from injuries, equipment outages, and facility damage. ⢠Airlines typically require reporting of apron incidents and accidents by employees, typically irrespective of whether there are damages, injuries, or other significant conse- quences. Objectively, the reporting allows airlines to analyze collected data to identify trends, recurring issues, and other relevant factors that may be revealed only when aggregated information is available. In response to reported incidents or accidents, airlines typically follow a defined procedure for investigating the event, focused on understanding con- tributing factors and determining whether events are dis- crete and isolated or part of a larger pattern warranting a more systemic review and potential solution. ⢠Because airlines prioritize a safety culture and are moti- vated to appropriately address documented events, there is minimal perceived benefit to sharing compiled incident data outside of the organization. Similarly, there is a per- ceived disadvantage to sharing this data because of the potential for the information to be disseminated without context or background, including to entities without an interest in the productive investigation and resolution of these events. ⢠Although unregulated in a formal sense, the majority of the airports visited fostered a safety culture by provid- ing routine meetings and other communication tools for identifying and resolving identified or potential safety issues. This culture fosters continuing communication, allows all participants to benefit from the experiences and improvements of others, and emphasizes the collective and organizational nature of maintaining a safe operating environment. ⢠Airlines and airports maintain the same objective of pre- serving and promoting a safe operating environment for employees, equipment operators, and travelers. In comparing apron management and control systems in use at non-U.S. and U.S airports, it is difficult to assess on a quantitative basis whether a material difference is real- ized in terms of the rates, severity, and costs of apron inci- dents and accidents. However, in comparing the qualitative nature and aspects of apron control in regulated (non-U.S.) and unregulated (U.S.) environments, the conclusion can be reached that the operating environments are not signifi- cantly different in terms of prioritized safety. However, the source of the safety emphasis and prioritization differs in each case. In regulated environments, apron safety is priori- tized by the regulating body (and adopted by airport users). Compliance with regulations is a motivating factor in this environment. In unregulated environments, apron safety is prioritized by the operators in an individualized man- ner. In these cases, overall safety in the apron environment is achieved through the aggregation of the safety emphasis and culture by individual operators supported by airport prioritization of safety and implementation of operating procedures and requirements for unleased non-movement areas that are not under the control of FAA ATC. Minimiza- tion of injury, damage, and operational disruption due to equipment being taken out of service are motivating factors in an unregulated apron environment. Both in and outside the United States, the safety aspects of apron management are coordinated between airport, air- lines, and ground handling providers. In the United States, as airports review and propose modifications to airport rules and regulations that apply to the apron environment, it is typically done in consultation with the tenant airlines. This helps to guide changes based on the airlinesâ collective experi- ence on the apron and to aid in implementing such changes. Outside the United States, it was reported that when changes to procedures or apron regulations were necessitated as part of the SMS process, the airlines and ground handling compa- nies were included in the process.
