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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Aviation Screening." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2007. Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23170.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Aviation Screening." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2007. Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23170.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Aviation Screening." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2007. Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23170.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Aviation Screening." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2007. Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23170.
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Page 32
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Aviation Screening." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2007. Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23170.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix C Aviation Screening Aviation screening has been taking place at all U.S. airports for the past few decades and has been well tolerated and accepted as a necessary part of life to ensure the security of airline passengers. Since September 11, 2001, screening procedures have become more rigorous and the list of prohibited items has grown. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created to ensure the security of the nation’s transportation systems. TSA is now located within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). TSA’s primary focus has been on aviation security. Beginning in 2001, the TSA took over direct control of aviation passenger and checked baggage screening responsibility.1 Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item aboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. The four passenger screening functions are: • X-ray screening of property, • walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, • hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and • physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.2 Many airports require the removal of shoes and small metal objects such as loose change, keys, and cell phones. Passengers are asked to remove their laptops from their luggage or backpack and in some cases are asked to turn them on. They then proceed through a walk-through detection device. Passengers that set off alarms, those that are randomly selected, and other passengers may undergo a more thorough screening by wand or manual pat-down. Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft. Typically, either explosive detection systems (EDS) or explosive trace detection (ETD) systems is used. Secondary screening is performed by manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag match.3 1 Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO Report 05-457. Washington, D.C., May, 2005. 2 Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues. Committee on Commercial Aviation Security, Panel on Passenger Screening. National Materials Advisory Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. National Research Council / National Academy Press / Washington, D.C., 2006. 3 Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: First Report. National Research Council. Washington, D.C. 1999. 25

Aviation Screening Personnel4 The four key screener aviation screening personnel are: screening manager, screening supervisor, lead screener, and screener. Their roles and responsibilities are summarized below. Screening manager: (1) manages screening operations; (2) ensures quality and consistency of screening procedures; (3) schedules screening personnel to screening operations; (4) manages overall screening workforce issues; (5) manages external relationships; and (6) interprets technical aspects of TSA policies, regulations, and directives. Screening supervisor: (1) identifies, distributes, and balances workload and tasks among screeners; (2) makes necessary adjustments to accomplish the screening workload; (3) trains or arranges for the technical training of screeners; (4) monitors and reports on the status and progress of screening work; (5) maintains records of work accomplishments and administrative information; (6) represents a team of screeners for the purpose of obtaining resources, and secures needed information or decisions from the supervisor on major work problems and issues that arise; (7) serves as a coach and facilitator to a team of screeners; (8) resolves simple, informal complaints of screeners and refers formal grievances to the appropriate management official; and (9) approves leave as delegated by management. Lead screener: (1) provides frontline security protection to air travelers, airports, and airplanes; (2) wands and performs pat-down searches, operates an X-ray machine, screens baggage, and reviews tickets; (3) identifies dangerous objects on passengers or in baggage or cargo, and prevents these objects from being transported onto aircraft; and (4) uses diverse electronic detection and imaging equipment. Screener: (1) performs preboard screening of persons and their carry-on or checked baggage; (2) implements security-screening procedures that are central to TSA objectives and will serve to protect the traveling public by preventing any deadly or dangerous objects from being transported onto the aircraft; and (3) assists in monitoring the flow of passengers through the screening checkpoint. 4 Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO Report 05-457. Washington, D.C., May, 2005. 26

Screener Training5, 6 The importance of training has been acknowledged by TSA management. They have asserted that “comprehensive and frequent training is key to a screener’s ability to detect threat objects.” TSA has established a dual-function training program (passenger and checked baggage screening) for new hires and an Online Learning Center with over 550 training courses accessible to TSA screeners. One of the courses, Threat in the Spotlight, is unique in that it is continuously updated to reflect the latest threat information. In addition, the importance of Screener Supervisors to be vigilant in their responsibilities- correcting incorrect screening procedures and reinforcing excellence -- was recognized by TSA and new supervisory training courses were developed. For new hires, ATSA requires 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the- job training. For recurrent training, an average of 3 hours per week of refresher training is required by the TSA. For screeners that fail an operational test, remedial training must be completed. TSA discovered that meeting the 3-hours a week recurrent training standard was a problem since screeners at most airports were forced to work overtime in order to meet this standard. Also, there are no policies or procedures for monitoring required training completion. Screener Training Assessment7 In order to assess screener proficiency and gain a better understanding of training needs and deficiencies, recertification testing, covert testing, and TIP or threat image projection technology are being utilized. • Proficiency Review - An annual proficiency review is required of each screener. The review is performed as part of a recertification program which measures the screeners’ performance and their knowledge and skills. To determine performance, screeners are rated on their ability in “maintaining the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction with screening services”. The knowledge and skills component consists of (1) knowledge of standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical demonstration of skills. 5 Ibid. 6 Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues. Committee on Commercial Aviation Security, Panel on Passenger Screening. National Materials Advisory Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. National Research Council / National Academy Press / Washington, D.C., 2006. 7 Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO Report 05-457. Washington, D.C., May, 2005. 27

Failing any of the modules would lead to remedial training or study time for the screeners and the opportunity to undergo the test again. • Covert Testing - Covert testing is unannounced testing of screeners at both passenger screening and baggage screening checkpoints. 3,238 covert tests were conducted at 279 airports during a 2 year period between Sept 2002 and Sept 2004. The covert testing results revealed that weaknesses and vulnerabilities still existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. • TIP Technology – A threat image projection system or TIP projects various threat images during operations to test the screener’s ability to identify the threat image and follow-through in terms of having the bag searched. The TIP may be developed to address individual screener strengths and weaknesses by increasing the threat image frequency for threats that a screener has difficulty in identifying and decreasing the image frequency for threats that a screener is proficient in detecting. Widespread weaknesses in detection capability may be captured by TIP and may result in adjustments and additions to the existing training program. This valuable training and performance evaluation technology is not yet available for checked baggage screening. Performance Measures8 TSA has implemented 20 performance measures for passenger and baggage screeners. These measures include: the percentage of screeners achieving a specific score on the annual recertification testing on their first attempt, the percentage of screeners scoring above the national standard level on TIP performance, and the number of passengers screened, by category. TSA has also implemented two indices to measure the effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems. The indices measure the following three elements: the machine probability of detection and covert testing results; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger or bag screened; and customer satisfaction. TSA is in the process of finalizing targets for the two indexes which along with the specific measures assist management in evaluating and improving performance. Targets are based on a 1-5 scale. Targets for individual measures have not yet been determined. Summary9 Based on the amount of investment made in airport security and attention given to the screeners and screening process, the results demonstrate that a great deal of time, effort and resources will probably be needed by transit agencies to ensure a robust screening system especially when the system requires human intervention. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 28

The GAO report on Screener Training and Performance Measurement concludes that “overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening systems at airports of all sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and at airports with private-sector screeners”. 29

Next: Appendix D: Legal Implications of Performing Passenger Security Inspections »
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TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Web-Only Document 38--Appendixes to TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections, A Guide for Policy Decision Makers contains the detailed appendixes to TCRP Report 86 Vol. 13. TCRP Report 86 Vol. 13 suggests guidance that a public transportation agency may use when considering whether, where, when, and how to introduce a passenger security inspection program into its operations.

The TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security series assembles relevant information into single, concise volumes, each pertaining to a specific security problem and closely related issues. These volumes focus on the concerns that transit agencies are addressing when developing programs in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks that followed. Future volumes of the report will be issued as they are completed.

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