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approximate l y 6-8 ft, occurred. Downstream of Stowe, flood depth s generally les s than 6 ft. were experienced. (See Figure 2 for location s of Lorad o and Stowe ,) The flows experienced in Buffalo Creek during the flood were 2 to 40 times those which would be produced by a na tur ally occurring 50-year flood. Precipitation occurring in the Buffalo Creek Val ley are a did not exceed 3.7 inches during the 72-hour period immediately preceding the flood. According to weather data, precipitation equal to or exceed- ing 3.7 inches in a 3-day period would be expected once every two years. Several agencies and people have advanced theories about the techni cal cause(s) of failure. Attempts to explain the failure seem premature. V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE The flood water descended down the narrow Buffalo Creek Valley. Towns alon g the valley from Saunders to Man were flooded with as much as 20 to 30 ft. of water. Figures 16 through 23 show damage that resulted to homes, churches, and automobiles. A total of 118 people were killed. Debris and coal silt, many times including bodies, were spread along the valley . Several railroads and highway bridges were swept from the ir foundations, as shown in Figures 24 throu gh 26. Large sections of the railroad, highway, and utilities were destroyed (Figure 27). 11
Many anim als , includin g dogs, horses and mule s , wer e drowned or left wande rin g to scave nge for food. Snakes posed a continuous threat to the clea n-up oper a tions. Shortly following th e disaster, Governor Arch Moor e of the State of West Virgini a ordered that all refuse i mpoun dments be drained . He also esta blished an Ad Hoc Commission of Inquiry to study t he di sas - t e r and its implications and to report its findings. As a direct result of the disas ter, the State Le gislature of West Vir gin i a passed a bill giving con trol of refuse piles to the Department of Nat ural Resources. This bill gav e the Department the power to enter private property to make tests an d surveys on a continuing basis and the authority to go into circ uit court to obtain an injunction against a coa l operator. In cases of imminent danger, the Department can t ake remedial act i on and recove r reasonable costs from the coal operator. Correct ive meas ur es not requirin g immediate a ttention would be re fer re d to the coal operat or for his ac tion and at his cost. The initial control of darns cons tructed with any mat er i a l still lies with th e Public Service Commissio n of West Vir gini a , but as before, the Commi ss ion cannot exe r - cise continui ng jurisdiction over such dams once constructed . At the federal le ve l, th e Committ ee on Publ i c Wor ks of the U.S. Sena te passed a r es olution cha r gin g the Sec reta ry of th e Army, acting through th e Chi ef of Engi nee rs, to s tud y and r ep ort on hazardous conditions ass oci a t ed with i mpoundment s connected with coal mining 12
