6 Redirection and Erosion of Russian Brainpower
The main wealth is our people who take very good care of the genetic code.
Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, 1998
Ivan the Terrible sent 17 young men to study abroad to make Russia “rich and strong,” but none ever returned.
Russian historian, 1994
At the end of 1998, two American journalists reported widespread recruiting by Iranian officials of Russian scientists who had been involved in the Soviet biological weapons program. The investigative reporters discovered Iranian business cards at a number of former bioweapons research institutes in the Moscow region. The institute leaders acknowledged the visits but disclaimed any personal interest in contributing to development of biological weapons capabilities in Russia, Iran, or anywhere else. Two interviewees reported, however, that they knew a “half-dozen” colleagues who had traveled to Iran, adding that other Russian scientists had entered into contract arrangements with well endowed Iranian institutions. The details of the Iranian overtures were vague and uncertain, although salary offers of $5,000 per month seemed unambiguous. One Russian microbiologist reported he had been bluntly asked to return to his previous profession of developing biological weapons, but not for Russia.1
A few months later, during a visit to Tehran, I raised with several well informed Iranian acquaintances U.S. government concerns over Iran's international shopping for expertise to help develop weapons of
mass destruction. They replied that Washington suffered from paranoia on this issue and saw hidden facilities behind every rock in the Iranian desert. At the same time, Iran had the right to defend itself. Like the United States, the government was obliged to investigate modern weaponry. My contacts argued that Iran is surrounded by hostile forces and is within easy range of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. It only made sense for the country to be ready for any type of attack. They attached considerable importance to good relations with Russia although they steered clear of discussing cooperation in biotechnology or other sensitive fields.
The U.S. government is convinced that Iran is developing biological weapons. Another interpretation of developments is that the Iranian government is trying to create a biodefense program. Most likely, Iran wants a capability related to biological weapons to be used as the international situation dictates. Its leaders probably do not embrace the fine distinction made by the international community between an “offensive” capability, banned by international conventions, and a “defensive” capability, considered necessary and permissible. The details of the Iranian program undoubtedly are known to only a handful of direct participants. In any event, the account of the journalists of activities in Russia is unsettling.
At the very time the reporters were making the rounds of the Russian institutes with their questions about connections with Iran, I was visiting the same institutes and meeting with the same Russian scientists. My task was different, however. I was searching for opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation in redirecting the skills of the biological scientists and technicians to address public health problems.
Many viruses and microbes that have been considered for use in weapons occur naturally in the wild. They pose a threat to the public in some regions of the world. For example, anthrax contaminates large agricultural areas of Russia where it has infected cattle and sheep, and is a short step from reaching human populations. Anthrax is also occasionally encountered in the United States by American veterinarians, and it infests other regions of the world as well. Anthrax not only poses possibilities of tainted meat; some think bioterrorists might attempt to
disperse anthrax through postal systems or subway tunnels in the United States or elsewhere.
Russian authorities are rightly concerned that this agent be brought under control, particularly in their agricultural areas. Anthrax, when transferred to humans, can spread quickly and lead to sudden and painful death. Successful control requires research on the prevention, detection, and treatment of anthrax infections. Russian colleagues are particularly interested in novel approaches to development of anthrax vaccines that could counter infections by different anthrax strains, a development that could benefit both countries.
United States offers of collaboration in this kind of work should be an appealing alternative to employment in the Middle East for Russian scientists who want to be in the mainstream of world science. First, for centuries Russians have been wary of Moslems. Second, in recent years they have been ambivalent toward cooperation with their southern neighbors—even those in Central Asian countries that had been part of the Soviet Union. The relatively unsophisticated state of biology in most of these countries further dampens the enthusiasm of Russian scientists to travel south. That said, nations with weapons ambitions may bid high, and offers from the United States must be quite attractive, particularly in guaranteeing reliable incomes over a number of years.
At one time, thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers were engaged in biological weapons activities. The residual of that workforce is simply too large—with skill levels ranging from world class to mediocre—not to expect some orientation of bioweapons brainpower toward countries with nascent bioweapons programs. These countries may well have money to put into the hands of researchers with little documentation required.
Development of biological weapons is only one of the skills the Soviet Union left behind that is of interest to rogue states. Some regimes with hostile intentions are expanding their capabilities related to chemical weapons, nuclear devices, and missiles. Thus far, few Russian weaponeers have sold their secrets, although tens of thousands have left their laboratories to seek fortunes as traders and handymen in the cities of Russia.
Western countries are rightfully concerned about weapons expertise flowing from Russia to trouble spots of the world. Still, the mass exodus of technical talent from science and engineering to business pursuits within Russia is even more significant for the future of Russia. Highly experienced specialists from civilian institutions have joined displaced weaponeers from the downsized nuclear weapons complex to seek their fortunes in professions far removed from research laboratories.
Some Russian specialists have moved to Europe, Israel, and the United States. They have mixed experiences. A handful of internationally known researchers and their protegés enjoy scientific success. Skilled computer programmers, in particular, easily find jobs that use their talents, but many emigres consider themselves fortunate to have any type of challenging employment.
The overwhelming majority (i.e., more than 95 percent) of researchers searching for new professions remain in Russia, though often disillusioned by what they find there. Whatever professions they choose, there simply are not enough financial rewards at fulfilling assignments to go around.
The number of young students entering Russian science and engineering faculties is on the rise after several years of decline. However, the percentage of graduates who pursue careers in their fields of study for more than a year or two is appallingly low, probably less than 20 percent. With many of the most capable young researchers changing professions, Russia's technical manpower base is aging quickly.
Russia simply cannot aspire to regaining a place among the world's technological leaders without cutting-edge brainpower to spark the effort. In the years ahead, brainpower must encompass not only technical know-how but also entrepreneurial savvy. The key to ensuring that the manpower pipeline is adequately stocked with a combination of technical and entrepreneurial expertise is to provide a university experience that convinces students that technology endeavors will pay off for them personally while at the same time benefiting their country.
New Income Streams for 60,000 Weaponeers
At the end of 1998 and during 1999, new revelations reached the West about the vulnerability of Russian aerospace institutes to aggressive recruiting tactics of countries seeking to tap Russian military know-how. For example, a Moscow institute previously involved in anti-ballistic missile programs had fallen on such hard times that the work force had plummeted from more than 10,000 employees to a mere 2,500, with even managers going unpaid for three years. The only way the institute managed to remain open was through rental of four floors of space to Chinese shuttle traders, who used the facility as a staging area for penetrating the Moscow consumer markets with leather jackets and furs. A number of physicists at this and other institutes in Moscow—people prepared to repair VCRs, tape recorders, or electronic systems of automobiles to survive—were approached by representatives of Middle Eastern countries soliciting their services to pursue more serious physics experiments for yet-to-be-revealed purposes. The physicists claimed they rebuffed the offers.2
This situation is not surprising. As discussed in Chapter 3, Iraq, India, and other countries have been eagerly seeking technology transfer arrangements with Russian aerospace institutes that have long histories of development of rocket engines.3 It is a little surprising, however, that the extreme economic conditions faced by the physicists did not inspire some level of interest in international overtures to pay for their skills.
Russian nuclear institutes have constantly been in the headlines for flirtations with visitors from other parts of the world as well. Strange sounding names like Arzamas-16, Mayak, and Krasnoyarsk-26 have become common grist for journalists looking for incidents of leakage of nuclear materials and nuclear know-how from behind guarded fences.4 There are few documented cases of violations of Russian regulations concerning protection of state secrets that reside in the heads of nuclear specialists. But Russian security services may relax stringent interpretations of regulations so as to permit transfers of sensitive information if officials in Moscow consider that the price is right.
Overall, there are tens of thousands of Russian scientists and en-
gineers with skills relevant to the development of nuclear or other dangerous weapons systems who have been and remain potential targets for expanded recruitment efforts from abroad. In the early 1990s, U.S. experts were reluctant to acknowledge that such a high number of weaponeers accurately reflected the proliferation threat. The experts argued that only a handful of Russian specialists had the wherewithal to lead a weapons program, whether it be nuclear, chemical, or biological.
Commonly accepted estimates in Washington during that time as to the number of scientists that should be of proliferation concern equalled 200 nuclear scientists, 100 chemical and biological scientists, and 200 rocket scientists.5But these estimates were grossly off the mark. While only a few Russian specialists may have the capability to lead a weapons program, most countries of concern already have their leaders. They are looking for more narrowly oriented specialists to fill in important technical details. In even greater demand for most countries with fledgling weapons programs are engineers and technicians with experience in the weaponization process, a process that in particular requires skills in electronics and mechanical engineering.6
The importance of engineering experience in solving problems associated with effective delivery of biological agents to designated targets, for example, is illustrated at a former bioweapons laboratory near Moscow now engaged in research that will benefit public health. Whatever the biological agent of choice by military commanders or terrorists, there is a problem with precisely introducing the agent on the target. The engineering group in the laboratory has constructed mechanical devices for spraying minuscule particles of dust that can serve as carriers of bacteria as the dust floats in the air. Experimenting with these devices, that permit the infection of rats and mice with bacteria-laden fine sprays, allows the engineers to better understand the reaction of the rodents to dangerous bacteria. They have designed highly effective spray nozzles, as well as small metal boxes for holding the rodents in the midst of the sprays.
A key bottleneck in the weaponization process is the capability to produce such a spray for dispersal in urban areas. The spray is supposed to carry infectious bacteria in very small breathable globules.
This is precisely the problem the engineers have solved. Fortunately, these specialists intend to globulize bacteria for use in the laboratory and not in cities.
At one time, technical facilities in Russia housed nearly one million scientists, engineers, and technicians who dedicated their careers to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to missiles and other delivery systems. Among those former Soviet weapons specialists, some 60,000 have skills that are potentially of interest to rogue states attempting to assemble and use weapons of mass destruction. About 30,000 learned their trades in the aerospace industry, 20,000 in the nuclear complex, and 10,000 in the chemical and biological sectors. Of the 60,000, perhaps one-third are still engaged in weapons work, one-third have retired or become commercial traders and other types of businessmen, and one-third are still in their laboratories trying to find civilian applications for their talents—relying in large measure on grants from abroad. All of them have honed their skills for many years throughout an extensive network of research, development, and production facilities established during the Soviet era.7
As I noted in 1996:
Almost all countries of proliferation concern have a number of well-trained scientists with skills relevant to weapons programs. Many studied in elite institutions of the United States and Europe. Therefore, most of the one million Russians with skills important, but not unique, to weaponry would not be of interest to countries with hidden agendas involving weapons. The additional insights that they could provide would not warrant the difficulties in recruiting them. But 60,000 core specialists had many years of direct hands-on experience in the laboratories and on the test ranges where components and materials for thousands of real weapons were developed and fired. Such experience is lacking in most countries.8
Few scientists and engineers still affiliated with sensitive laboratories will respond to overtures from unknown foreign sources without official permission of the Russian government authorizing participation in such international contacts. They will continue to be driven by a loyalty to Russia and to their institutes, aware of the dangers to the world should they or their colleagues transmit secrets to foreigners who could misuse them. But if economic deprivation or enticement by
criminals encourages only a few to behave otherwise, the consequences could be severe.
Corralling the large numbers of scientists, engineers, and technicians with important weapons-relevant skills who have already left their institutes offers a special challenge. For example, there are reports that Chinese aerospace enterprises and research institutions have recruited retired weaponeers living in the Urals. This is not surprising, given the massive budget shortfalls in that region and the need for grandparents still capable of earning money to contribute to the financial well being of their extended families.9
Turning back the clock, in 1993 I discovered in Russia a leaflet intended for circulation in many regions of the world. It was a recruitment advertisement of the Sun Shine Industrial Company. This Hong Kong firm had a long history of arranging arms shipments to China and apparently had developed access to former Soviet weaponeers. In part, the advertisement said:
We have detailed files of hundreds of former Soviet Union experts in the fields of rocket, missile, and nuclear weapons. These weapon experts are willing to work in a country which needs their skills and can offer reasonable pay.10
Were recruitment efforts successful? Six years later we did not know. Perhaps the Chinese firms recruiting in the Urals received leads from Hong Kong. We may never know. Or we may wake up some day to incidents of mass casualties that are traced back to Soviet know-how. What we do know for sure is that Russia's economic slump is only heightening the proliferation pressures on former and current weaponeers.
Growing Pressure on Weaponeers
Despite press predictions in 1992 of a mass exodus of weapons specialists from Russia, none occurred. Salaries for senior scientists had declined to less than $50 per month, and all of the foregoing proliferation concerns were at the center of international concern. Transfers of information seemed most likely, not through emigration, but during short-term, officially sanctioned trips by Russian specialists
abroad. Reports of Russian missile technology being transferred to Algeria, electronics specialists being hired in Syria, nuclear contracts being negotiated with Iran, and even scientific exchanges taking place with Libya had heightened western apprehensions.11
There was a significant difference between the Russian environment at that time and in 1999. In earlier years, almost all government officials from both Russia and the West, as well as the weaponeers themselves, were convinced that the economic crisis would last but a few years. Then budgets of federal ministries would be restored, Russian industry would be searching for new technologies, and research and development institutes would again be in a growth mode. In short, officials and weaponeers alike thought they could see some light at the end of a dark tunnel.
The emphasis of nonproliferation programs financed from abroad was on short-term measures to stem the outflow of brainpower from military-oriented enterprises and institutes. If only support could be provided for a few years, permanent and productive jobs would be found for former weaponeers in a prospering economy. This was the conventional wisdom.
Thus, work by former weaponeers on civilian projects supported by the United States and other western governments was based on one-and two-year projects. Russian specialists would draw steady salaries for a short time, while also contributing either to international science or more directly to Russian economic development. Keep them busy so they will not have time to look to rogue states for support; this was the doctrine. Cynics described these efforts as a form of bribery of scientists that could not be maintained in the long term.
In the end, the cynics proved correct in predicting that many projects would not be renewed when initial grants and contracts came to an end. While international programs have been remarkably successful in engaging tens of thousands of former weaponeers in civilian activities, most individual projects have been too oriented toward basic research to be of priority economic interest. The Russian government simply does not have financial resources to support science for the sake of science, while the private sector wants reasonable assurance of near-term returns from their investments.
FIGURE 6.1 Foreign countries where Russian researchers work on temporary assignments, 1996. Note: Total of 4084 researchers. SOURCE: E.F. Nekipelova, Emigration and Professional Activities of Russian Scientists Abroad. Center for Science Research and Statistics: Moscow. 1998, p. 37.
By 1999, both Russian and foreign governments realized that economic turmoil was well ingrained in the landscape. Hesitations of Russian institutions over the source of funds to support projects—whether it be a state of questionable reliability or a western country—were receding. Indeed, despair was turning into desperation. Figure 6.1 reflects the increase already apparent by 1996 in the number of Russian scientists and engineers working abroad on contracts extending more than three months. Unfortunately the number who traveled to countries engaged in activities of concern to the West is masked under the general heading of “other countries.” Several hundred probably fell into that category.
Meanwhile, the Russian government's commitment to pick up,
within a reasonable period of time, costs of programs started with foreign support has not materialized. From the geopolitical viewpoint, Russia should be concerned if the countries to its south obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or missiles that can hit targets in Russia or the territory of its friends. In practice, such thinking does not drive Russian efforts to limit the outflow of technical skills and technical information.
Russia does have regulations to curtail sales of hardware that are prohibited by international agreements. Also, Russian security services prevent leakages of state secrets unless pressured by government officials to reclassify information to accommodate new financial opportunities. However, the Russian government has left to the West the task of providing cash for supplementing meager salaries of scientists and engineers who might otherwise establish contacts in countries with malevolent intentions.
In Russia, the enterprises and institutes give ever-increasing weight to the financial dimension of proposed international projects. Even when the United States or other western countries threaten to cut off assistance funds in retaliation for Russian transfers of high-tech know-how to blacklisted countries, Russian organizations are not intimidated. They carefully weigh the cash flow aspects of dealing with all foreign partners in deciding on their responses.
Given these conditions, what is the near-term future for former Soviet weaponeers? Will there be an exodus of a few specialists who accept weapons-related work abroad? Will contracts with governments with hostile international intentions penetrate Russian institutions more deeply? Or will under-employed weaponeers simply be content to pass idle time as best they can at their country dachas? All of these scenarios seem likely.
Even if western efforts continue, Russian weaponeers will remain a proliferation concern during the next decade and probably longer. We must accept the reality that some will sell their dual-use technology skills for application at home and abroad, with concerns over misuse of these technologies taking a back seat to immediate economic needs. We urgently need strategies to reduce the demand for high-tech know-how from Russia and from other countries—including our close al-
lies—by parties with grievances against their neighbors and the United States.
To this end, effective engagement of scientists and engineers in rogue countries by western specialists through cooperative projects in these outcast nations could be an important complement to efforts to contain dangerous technologies at their sources in Russia and other industrialized countries. Such engagement, initially through private channels, should be possible if we pay the bill, and might well record successes in encouraging previously isolated scientists and engineers to work on civilian activities that enhance the standard of living of their people. Engagement in rogue states, even on a limited scale, would improve western understanding of developments in these countries of concern. Clearly it is preferable to create the opportunities for a realistic assessment of evolving capabilities than to sit on the sidelines and predict the worst possible scenarios.
An Aging Manpower Base for Space Exploration
Proliferation of Soviet and Russian military know-how will continue to be an international security threat that attracts western attention, but replenishing Russia's scientific and technological expertise is critical to the future of the country in many spheres. An example of the need to upgrade existing capabilities arose in September 1997, when The Christian Science Monitor asked for my stand on whether the U.S. government should entrust the life of yet another American astronaut, David Wolf, to a flight on the rickety space station, Mir. Mir's computer systems had already crashed on three occasions, a small flash fire had erupted in the cabin, and mechanical failures had become commonplace. Still, Mir was providing useful experience for both Russian and American astronauts as an important stepping stone to launching the International Space Station (ISS).
The technical issues were clouded with conflicting information. My view on the immediate problems aboard Mir would have been little more than uninformed speculation. Opinions on the safety of the Russian vehicle were better left to three expert panels assembled by
NASA to recommend whether Wolf should participate in this shaky Russian adventure. And he did, successfully.
However, no one in Washington had addressed the related issue of the long-term importance of Russia replenishing its cutting edge technological skills as a prerequisite to remaining a reliable partner in manned space flight. The leading nations of the world have banded together in a 13-year program to launch the ISS. Russia, with a decade of unique experience in operating Mir, is scheduled to provide key components for the station. To meet this commitment over many years, an infusion of new technical blood into the Russian space program must begin immediately. There are too many space research and production facilities in Russia with tired faces and aging skills to think otherwise.
My specific suggestion to NASA was to invest $100 million over a period of five years, or longer, in support of the education and early research efforts of a new cadre of young Russian scientists and engineers. This investment, if focused on specific critical skills, would help ensure a secure technical footing for Russian participation in providing components, services, and manpower for the ISS. Five hundred up-and-coming specialists, committed to aerospace technology and current on worldwide developments in the field, could make a significant difference in key institutes and enterprises among the Moscow region and several other industrial areas.12
Such an expenditure would be less than 0.3 percent of the U.S. investment in the ISS. Russian participation has been repeatedly justified to the U.S. Congress as saving the United States $3 billion. If Russia does not perform as intended, those costs—and probably much more—will eventually flow back to the United States. Without new talent to maintain competency in high technology, the likelihood of failures of Russian equipment or operational procedures that will affect the investments of more than a dozen countries is unacceptably high.13
Three years have passed and NASA has not responded to these concerns. A few, but not enough, bright Russian students are still attracted by the lure of space exploration. But by 2005 or sooner, Russia may not be able to hold up its end of this technological bargain. The
hardware will be only as good as the designers and construction personnel and the operations only as good as the launch and flight crews.
Widespread Decline of the Research and Development Workforce
The problem of tired blood is not unique to the aerospace industry. Prominent Russian leaders say they cannot prevent the loss in many scientific disciplines of an entire generation of talent lured from science by higher-paying jobs elsewhere. In 1997, the Minister for Science and Technology was vigorously pressing for a commitment of sustained government support for the 10,000 leading Russian scientists to preserve and expand world-class achievements in their disciplines, called “schools of science.” He subsequently reduced his goal to 1,000 scientists, assuming that they could each share a portion of their support with other members of their research teams. But even that modest goal seems out of reach for a government committed to cutting expenditures on every front.14
During the early 1990s the exodus of young scientists and engineers from research and development institutions was dramatic. Those who stayed in the institutes experienced nothing but boredom, with little useful activity and little or no pay in most Russian laboratories. After the economic collapse of 1998, many who had switched to the private sector were suddenly out of jobs and saw the security of the old-line institutes in a new light. In fact, some who lost private sector jobs, playing on old friendships with institute directors, were able to rejoin their former institutes. By now, elation over minimal pay is fast disappearing; and increasing numbers see emigration as their only hope.
Russian statistics, while often uncertain, nevertheless help describe technical manpower developments. About one million scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel were engaged in research and development activities in 1998. About 500,000 were classified as researchers, with two-thirds engaged in engineering research. One decade earlier the workforce was double this size. My estimate is that only one-fifth, or 100,000 of the researchers, were active researchers in
1999, spending at least 50 percent of their time carrying out specific projects. The remainder were on the rolls of research and development institutes to retain social contacts and partake in health and retirement benefit plans, however modest. They only rarely engaged in serious scientific endeavors in lighted offices or laboratories (see Figure 6.2).15
The mix of employees of the institutes is also changing. According to 1996 statistics, 38 percent of the personnel leaving the facilities were researchers while 50 percent were support personnel other than technicians. An estimated 26 percent of new hires were researchers and 66 percent were support personnel. In short, the research and development facilities are becoming more heavily populated with administrative staff.16
External Brain Drain
External brain drain from Russia encompasses two traditional categories: emigration for permanent residence abroad, and long-term (more than three months) employment abroad that sometimes leads to emigration. After the exodus of large numbers of Jewish specialists at the beginning of the 1990s, fewer than 1 percent of the remaining researchers have emigrated (as indicated in Figure 6.2). In mid-1999, there was a brief upswing of computer programmers leaving the country under a special visa quota for computer specialists to accept employment in the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the three U.S. consulates were issuing about 60 visas per week to Russians headed for long-term employment in the United States, primarily at computer software firms. The embassy estimated that about 50 percent of these long-term workers will remain in the United States permanently.17 On a broader basis, Figure 6.3 characterizes the overseas employment of about 4,000 Russian scientists and engineers in 1996. Again, about one-half of these specialists probably stay abroad for permanent residence.
But external brain drain should also include employment of research and development specialists by foreign firms that claim intel-
FIGURE 6.3 4084 Russian researchers working abroad in 1996. SOURCE. E.F. Nekipelova, Emigration and Professional Activities of Russian Scientists Abroad. Center for Science Research and Statistics: Moscow. 1998, p. 34.
lectual property rights and do not publish the resulting findings. In addition, publication of Russian research and development results only in foreign journals not widely available in Russia is a form of information emigration.18 These two types of activities, even though
some science policy analysts are reluctant to call them brain drain, reflect the loss of intellectual prowess when researchers cast their lot with foreign institutions.
Also of concern to some officials in Moscow has been loss of technology through Russian specialists working on defense-oriented contracts sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy. One seemingly accurate estimate is that, in the mid-1990s, 8,000 Russian researchers were working on these contracts. The annual cost to Russia was several hundred million dollars, since the Russian institutes shared expenses of almost all projects. Many projects were of little interest in Russia other than as income sources for the participants, so this activity too should be considered a form of brain drain.19
The majority of researchers who went abroad and found relevant career opportunities in the early 1990s were well known Russian leaders of science and talented young researchers with ties to these leaders. The loss of leading researchers, even if limited in number, can devastate specific fields, as has been the case in theoretical physics and mathematics. But this development is not evident in engineering.20
Recent science and engineering emigrants have been primarily undergraduates, graduate students, and young researchers under the age of 35. Some have succeeded without the benefit of support from eminent Russian mentors.21 The recent example of 462 researchers emigrating from the Physical Technical Institute near Moscow, one of the country's premier research universities, shows the youth of recent departees: 51 percent were under 30 and 22 percent were between 30 and 35. In all age groups most of the emigrants went to the United States, although a significant portion of the youngest and oldest emigrants went to Israel.22
Before concluding that Russia's scientific loss equates to the West's scientific gain, it is important to realize that many researchers seeking immigrant status abroad have little interest in continuing to work in science. They simply want a new way of life. They now know that jobs are not easy to find, and many rely primarily on their language skills and their willingness to work in other fields to find appropriate employment niches.
An interesting development has been the movement abroad of Russian research groups that at the same time retain a foothold in Russia. The Institute of Microbiology of the Russian Academy of Sciences has established a laboratory of 10-15 researchers from Moscow at Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, for example. Their work is supported by a large grant from the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. They use sophisticated equipment in designing impregnated microchips that detect biological agents of possible use to terrorists. At the same time, the Russian researchers retain tight links with their home base, probably uncertain as to how many more years the financial support for research in the United States will continue. A second arrangement is the outpost in Paris of the Landau Institute of Physics, where a dozen Russian researchers press the limits of mathematical physics. The French government provides support to “twin” laboratories in Russia with counterparts in France.23
Do foreign grants encourage Russian recipients to remain in science or engineering in Russia in the long term or do they simply whet appetites to seek a better life abroad? Such grants certainly are welcomed by recipients, and some researchers are building their careers on grants. As an extreme case, in November 1998, a young Moscow biologist informed me she was working simultaneously on six grants from U.S. and European organizations. Still, availability of grants is probably not a pivotal factor in the determinations of most researchers as to whether they should continue to pursue scientific careers in Russia. 24
Other factors influence individual decisions whether to remain in science and engineering, whether to seek emigration to other countries offering work in these fields, or whether simply to abandon any hope of using years of specialized training. The long-term outlook is important to many who had been accustomed to commanding respect in their communities. Now at the top of the list of respected professionals in Russia are businessmen, bankers, and politicians and at the bottom of the list are soldiers, scientists, and engineers.25 Working conditions have become difficult and often impossible as equipment breaks down and supplies run out. Finally, housing difficulties almost always pre-
vent young researchers from accepting positions at facilities distant from their residences.
Under these conditions, a “prosperous” researcher in the academic city near Novosibirsk has been described by a Russian sociologist as follows:
He is a doctor of science, rather young, with fairly good housing conditions. He receives a comparatively large salary at his institute and teaches at a higher educational institution. He has close connections with domestic as well as foreign scientific funds and business partners. He successfully combines the energy of youth and a high level of scientific training, and he is in demand on the market.26
A poverty-stricken scientist is described as follows:
He is either relatively young or a man of many years, usually without an advanced scientific degree. He has poor housing conditions. His basic source of income remains the institute salary, which is paltry, and he is forced to spend most of his time working in his garden plot.27
Education, drive, and connections—particularly international connections—still pay off. Such connections are often important in encouraging Russian researchers to remain in the laboratory. But these connections must be sustained or their impact will quickly vanish.
Role of Russian Technical Universities
Given the internal and external brain drain, universities are on center stage in efforts to replenish the pipeline with young specialists who have both technical talent and entrepreneurial zeal and skill. The universities are now aware of the need not only to train students but also to expand efforts to place them in jobs, since the state is no longer a matchmaker. At the same time, the universities are seeking new income streams through contracts and grants with domestic and international funders and through adoption of tuition systems for students.
The 50 or so leading technical universities of the Soviet Union and now Russia have long provided the core cadre for industry, relying on work-study programs, guest lecturers from industry, and industrial research projects to stimulate student interest. A few universities were tightly linked to Soviet military programs, and they developed dual-
use technologies they currently are attempting to market to all comers. Their industrial links belie assertions by some western scholars who view Russian universities as isolated from both research and industry.
Also, when the economic shocks of the early 1990s shredded the federal budget for higher education, almost all Russian universities took several important steps to help cushion the impacts. They changed their policies of providing tuition-free education for all students. They instituted two-track systems whereby a portion of new enrollees, perhaps one-half and purportedly chosen on the basis of merit, receive tuition scholarships. The remainder are required to pay substantial tuition, usually several thousand dollars per year. Thus, rich Russians are generally assured places for their children, since competition for the second tier is not intense. Other Russians have difficulty finding resources to enroll children who fall below the tuition-free cutoff. Many universities have expanded recruitment programs for foreign students, who are now expected to pay full tuition for education previously provided free of charge to students from countries where Soviet influence was important. Overall, competition for enrollment at the country's leading technical universities is on the rise after a sharp dip in the early 1990s. Part of the increase is explained by the fact that student status provides a lawful way to avoid the military draft—a more important factor than previously, due to the war in Chechnya and the overall poor conditions that currently exist in the Russian military services.28
To strengthen their budgets, universities have turned to their alumni for help—almost always through informal contacts. Organized fund raising targeting wealthy graduates remains an unknown art, but some alumni respond to more informal requests. They arrange for their universities to obtain contracts with government agencies or industry. Once in a while they even arrange cash donations for scholarship funds.
Despite these efforts to maintain viable education and research programs, in 1999 the overall situation was very poor—deterioration of facilities, low and uncertain pay for faculty, and a slow decline in the quality of instruction as the faculty ages and loses enthusiasm for working for very small salaries. There were some bright spots. Researchers from technology-oriented research institutes, in search of income supplements, spent more time as adjunct faculty. Also, the universities
have paid more attention to the responsiveness of their curricula to employment opportunities within the economy.
While enrollment is up, less than 50 percent of science and engineering graduates enter the technical workplace. At some universities fewer than 25 percent pursue technical careers and, for those that do, one-half or more drop out within a year or two. The perceived payoff from private business dealings is simply too much of a draw, even for physicists and engineers. 29 Meanwhile, the number of enrollees in graduate engineering courses is on the rise, probably representing a significant return to the classroom by older engineers with time on their hands (see Table 6.1).
One realistic Russian researcher believes that a “successful” university should be shoring up its teaching staff and not recruiting more
TABLE 6.1 Growth in Graduate Students in Engineering
|
Seeking Kandidat (Ph.D.) Degree |
||||
|
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
|
|
Enrollment |
12,560 |
15,183 |
18,980 |
22,537 |
|
Entrants |
4,840 |
6,400 |
7,918 |
8,729 |
|
Graduates |
2,642 |
2,423 |
2,548 |
3,185 |
|
Seeking Doctor of Science Degree |
||||
|
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
|
|
Enrollment |
531 |
634 |
742 |
887 |
|
Entrants |
221 |
257 |
316 |
354 |
|
Graduates |
97 |
124 |
163 |
197 |
|
SOURCE: Research and development in the Russian higher education sector. Center for Science Research and Statistics, Moscow. 1998, pp. 32-33, 40-41. |
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researchers. This researcher notes the increasing need to customize student programs and the decreasing amount of research funds. Not more than 50 percent of the university's income should come from federal funds, and the university should be content to rely on its own equipment to the fullest extent possible. She adds that foreign grants and contracts can be helpful but are not essential.30 Several examples of recent developments in a few technical universities generally support these conclusions but, at the same time, show how individual universities must take advantage of their special capabilities and historical strengths.
The Gubkin Oil and Gas Academy in Moscow has long been proud of its role in providing the bulk of the specialists that built the Soviet gas and oil industry. The academy established affiliates in the country 's oil and gas producing regions that have now become independent universities. Many faculty members in Moscow and in the affiliates moonlight as consultants to the gas and oil companies. At the beginning of 1999, two-thirds of the students in Moscow were being sponsored by future employers—a remarkable record. At the same time, the research program of the academy has not kept pace with worldwide developments in the industry, and researchers are slowly falling behind in their knowledge of many advanced developments. The Russian energy companies, recognizing the rapid technological progress abroad, are turning to western consultants to gradually replace faculty members as advisers, a development that does not bode well for the academy.
The Moscow Institute of Technology (Bauman), often called the MIT of Russia, has recently made considerable effort to market technologies developed over many years. But, because these technologies were often the result of military contracts, adaptation to civilian markets has not been easy. To further this effort, the institute has established seven industrial research centers intended to link the faculty and associated researchers with industrial organizations. Many prominent Russian captains of industry are graduates of the institute and have interests in the centers, but success of these new efforts is still to be demonstrated.
The Moscow State Institute of Electronic Technology provides an umbrella framework not only for students but also for a major state scientific institute and an innovation center that supports small electronics firms. Across the street are the two leading electronics firms in the city of Zelenograd, and the integration of research, education, and production in this city has repeatedly been touted by Russian officials as a model to emulate. To visitors from Silicon Valley, the Russian research efforts seem primitive, but the excellent educational experiences of Russian students cannot be denied. And the small firms are finding domestic niche markets (e.g., electronic switches, connectors, sensors, integrators) that are not totally dominated by imports from the United States, Europe, and Asia.
A visit to Russia's oldest technical university, the St. Petersburg State Mining Institute, is an uplifting experience. Beginning with the courtyard where Catherine the Great selected her night-time companions from among cadets assembled at attention, this institute has been a cornerstone of the nation 's technological efforts for several centuries. While providing specialists for the oil, gas, metallurgy, and coal industries, the institute has pioneered ways to supplement its income streams. Hallways of new classrooms are bedecked with plaques commemorating generous donors. Honorary degrees are accorded for both technical achievements and for support of the institute. Research contracts with foreign partners reflect the international interest in gaining access to the lucrative natural resources industries of Russia.
These technical universities, like Russian research institutes, are scrambling for money from foreign as well as domestic sources. All the while, the U.S. government is watching to detect any efforts to transfer technologies to the Middle East through Russian faculty members traveling abroad or through visiting foreign students. In early 1999, the U.S. government decided that faculty members of the Mendeleyev Institute for Chemical Technology and the Moscow Aviation Institute crossed the line of acceptable technology transfer in their dealings with Iran, and therefore declared the institutions ineligible for receiving U.S. government funds. This is a rather unusual position, since hundreds of Iranian students were in residence at American universities in 1998,
including students studying aerospace and other high-tech subjects. A number of Iranian students were identified by the FBI as extreme Shiite Muslims considered to be terrorist threats.31
For their part, Russians continue to cherish education even though less than 1 percent believe it will be a decisive factor in enhancing the country's stature in the near term.32Only 2 percent pin their hopes on science, believing science will contribute to economic development. 33Nevertheless, the majority of the population has an intrinsic belief that education has been and will continue to be a pathway to success.
In 1998, the son of good Russian friends was accepted at the Bauman Institute on the tuition-free track. Neither the father nor mother had received paychecks for six months, and they couldn't even pay their utility and telephone bills. They remained confident that they would not lose these services. If they did, they would move to the countryside while their son became a successful Russian engineer with skills of the highest order. Two years later, little has changed. My friends remain in their apartment with sporadic income and unpaid debts, and their son is doing well at the Bauman Institute.
Bill Gates gave an unexpected boost to the spirits of all university students engrossed in science and engineering courses. Widely heralded throughout Russia as the world's richest person, his presence in Moscow in 1998 signaled that technical careers can be rewarding. He stirred the hopes of the Russian population by boldly pronouncing that within a decade all Russians would have Internet connections in their homes.
The universities will be an important key to unlocking Russia's capability to become an industrial force. Russians will continue to invest in their children no matter the financial hardships. Many students will carry on the traditions of science and engineering that date to the time of Peter the Great, but most are increasingly oriented to emulating Bill Gates and other contemporary technology entrepreneurs.34
Meanwhile, a few forward-looking Russian science and education leaders are doing their best to support the current generation of young researchers. For example, each year the Moscow Institute of Power Engineering of the Ministry of Atomic Energy recruits 25 new university graduates, guarantees them steady paychecks and interesting work
for three years, and helps them find long-term financial support so they will remain at the institute. This commitment to the future of Russia is striking.35
Future of the Russian Manpower Base
The international community—particularly the United States—is steering large numbers of former Soviet weaponeers in nonthreatening directions through financial support for international projects. Even if projects are of only marginal technical interest to the United States, the costs of employing highly talented manpower will continue to be incredibly low—probably on the order of $5,000 per workyear. The commitment by the United States and other western countries to supporting such bargains is of considerable national security importance. At the same time, these programs can be of greater importance for Russia if the Russian government adopts policies that improve the marketplace prospects for deriving profit from innovation. For their part, western partners should emphasize support of applied research projects with commercialization potential.
The commercialization challenge should not be underestimated. Perhaps 15 percent of current projects among the best Russian researchers have a chance of raising interests in international business circles. Another 15 percent might have marketing potential in Russia.36But, at present, most projects have little commercial value.
The other options for productive work are limited. A few Russian specialists may be able to conduct contract research for western governments, such as developing devices for detecting nuclear smuggling at international airports or flight testing new components for spacecraft. Also, particularly talented Russian research teams should be able to compete successfully for international funds to advance the frontiers of science. But such possibilities will engage only a few specialists of proliferation concern.
As time passes, former weaponeers will become rustier. Their interests in weapons will decline. Thus, they will become less of a national security problem. But for the next few years the problems of unemployed weaponeers cannot be dismissed lightly. They simply want
to have jobs, and they are less and less particular as to where they work.
With delayed paychecks for faculty members, out-of-date laboratories for students and faculty, and unpleasant dormitories for life away from home, higher education institutions are not very inviting for young, ambitious Russians. But, in contrast to many other institutions in the country, the universities are making a slow recovery. Some are expanding work-study programs, providing new opportunities for student experiments in laboratories of the Academy of Sciences, and helping students line up employment months and even years in advance of graduation. Overall, the universities will not be the brakes that hold back economic progress in the short term. But in the long term their success in inspiring youth to pursue technical careers will be extremely important.
Western programs to support outstanding faculty and young students can help maintain local competence but in some cases may simply open new emigration pathways. Longer term contracts and grants (e.g., five years) with less rather than more international travel for Russian recipients should increasingly characterize these programs. Western institutions can be most effective by stressing cooperative programs that relate student interests to the near-term needs of the country and to technology-oriented businesses with a future.
Most important, both students and specialists need work, not welfare.
Notes
1. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, “Bioweapons in Mind, Iranians Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists,” The New York Times, December 8, 1998, p. A1.
2. David Hoffman, “Idle Arms Experts in Russia Pose Threat,” The Washington Post, December 28, 1998, P. A1.
3. Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ, p. 130.
4. See, for example, Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole C. Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Plenum Press, 1998), chapter 2.
5. This topic was frequently debated within and outside government in Washington, D.C., in 1991 and 1992. While there was no formal consensus on the number of weaponeers of proliferation concern, the discussions were dominated
by a narrow vision as to ways in which technical specialists might be used by rogue states.
6. Hoffman, “Idle Arms Experts in Russia Pose Threat.” This article gives a good perspective of the range of skills within one speciality that have been of interest.
7. My estimates were developed in consultation with Russian specialists who were familiar with personnel in the nuclear, aerospace, chemical, and biological communities of Russia. We reviewed both national statistics on the size of the manpower base and then considered each of the key institutes where most of the specialists were located.
8. Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ, p. 103.
9. Discussions in Moscow with Russian weapons specialists from the Urals, November 1998.
10. Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ, p. 35. This quotation was subsequently used in U.S. Congressional hearings by senate staff members who stated they had confirmed the activities of the company with intelligence community experts.
11. S.I. Simanovskiy and M.P. Strepetova, “Role of International Cooperation in Turning Around the Brain Drain from Russia,” The World of Science and Technology and Education (Moscow: International Engineering Academy, 1994), p. 11.
12. Glenn E. Schweitzer, “Aging Mir Isn't So Worrisome as Russia's Long-Term Technological Decay,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 26, 1997, p. 18.
13. Ibid.
14. Meetings in Moscow with Russian Minister for Science and Technology, March 1996 and October 1998.
15. Russian Science and Technology at a Glance, 1997, Center for Science Research and Statistics, Moscow, 1998.
16. Irina Malakha and Igor Ushkalov, “Drainage of Intellectual Potential,” NG-Nauka, April 1, 1998.
17. Discussions in Moscow at the U.S. Embassy, June 1999.
18. Irina Dezhina, “Adjustments of Russian Science and Brain Drain,” unpublished paper, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997.
19. Malakha and Ushkalov, “Drainage of Intellectual Potential.”
20. Ibid.
21. Dezhina, “Adjustments of Russian Science and Brain Drain.”
22. Ibid.
23. Discussions in Moscow with Russian scientists involved in these programs, November 1998.
24. L.M. Gokhberg and O.R. Shuvalova, Public Opinion about Science, Center for Research and Statistics on Science, Moscow, 1997.
25. Ibid., p. 28.
26. Anatoli Ablazhey, “What is Siberian Science Living On? Wages of Scientists at Academic City Today Lower than Average for Novosibirsk,” Vecherniy Novosibirsk, August 1996, p.4.
27. Ibid.
28. Discussions at six Russian universities during the fall of 1998.
29. Ibid.
30. Dezhina, “Adjustments of Russian Science and Brain Drain.”
31. Schweitzer and Dorsch, Superterrorism, p. 137.
32. Gokhberg and Shuvalova, Public Opinion about Science, p. 46.
33. Ibid., pp. 31, 46.
34. Discussions in Moscow with a number of Russian acquaintances during the 1998 Bill Gates visit.
35. Discussions in Moscow at the Institute of Power Engineering, June 1999.
36. Comments by Boris Milner of the Institute of Economics in Moscow during a meeting at the National Research Council in Washington, D.C., November 1999.
