The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991) / Chapter Skim
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IV. Nuclear Forces
IV. Nuclear Forces
Pages 25-39
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From page 25... ...
In the next five sections we discuss the implications for: (1) central strategic nuclear forces, (2)
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From page 26... ...
In this discussion, we turn first to the question of estimating the appropriate numbers of central strategic nuclear systems and then to sample survivable force structures. Numbers of Targets and Weapons Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States acquired strategic systems on the basis of political assessments of what was necessary to deter a nuclear war with the Soviet Union under the worst case scenarios perceived by the United States at the time.
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From page 27... ...
The current numbers of central strategic nuclear weapons have seemed excessive for some time. The START agreement will lower them by about 25 percent (see Appendix A)
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From page 28... ...
In addition, we include no targets outside the Soviet Union; deterring China or possibly other nuclear powers may be taken as a lesser, included case. We further assume that the remaining categories of targets (nuclear submarine and air bases, major conversational military bases and command and control centers, war-supporting industries)
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From page 29... ...
A Lower Level for Later At some later time, if the following circumstances apply, even greater reductions would be possible. · Continued favorable experience in U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations leads to a high degree of mutual confidence on both sides regarding each other's nuclear development and deployment capabilities.
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We note that the number of strategic nuclear weapons systems can be drastically reduced without going to a purely counter-city targeting doctrine, one consequence of which might be that nothing short of a nuclear attack on U.S. cities could be deterred.
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From page 31... ...
The two ranges presented—about 3,000-4,000 and 1,000-2,000 illustrate what might be achieved given appropriate political and technical developments. Sample Survivable Force Structures As much as the state of the art and budget strictures permit, the structure of strategic forces at these reduced force levels must be optimized for survivability, availability, and reliability.
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From page 32... ...
A well-designed multiple aimpoint system could exceed that number and maintain that advantage against a surprise attack without any tactical warning, as long as an attacker remains uncertain about the position of the actual missiles. This is not the place to evaluate the relative merits of these systems.
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From page 33... ...
U.S.-based intercontinental bombers, whether they deliver bombs or cruise missiles, could be allocated 20-30 percent of the warheads at both the contemplated levels. A comparable Soviet force optimization process might emphasize mobile ICBMs as the primary deterrent, with lesser dependence on SLBMs and aircraft.
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From page 34... ...
The eventual total will be under 1,000 weapons, and perhaps considerably less than that, given uncertainties about fiscal constraints, British political developments, possible future arms control, and intra-European cooperation agreements. France plans to increase the number of its strategic nuclear warheads to around 700 over the next decade, largely through modernization of the submariIle-based force.
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From page 35... ...
The possibility of nuclear attack by either navy on the other or on land-based targets adds little or nothing to deterrence, while the presence of nuclear weapons on potentially vulnerable surface ships detracts from stability.
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From page 36... ...
REDUCTIONS IN THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS The START agreement, which establishes ceilings on strategic systems at lower levels, is formulated in terms of limits and sublimits on both nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles (aircraft and missiles or their launchers)
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From page 37... ...
We note that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union requires continued plutonium or highly enriched uranium production to meet current weapons requirements. Reductions in the stockpile of nuclear weapons could be implemented in the following stages: · Initially all the nuclear warheads associated with delivery vehicles that are eliminated or downloaded would be either stored or destroyed in a secure monitored facility.
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From page 38... ...
BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING The contribution of a comprehensive test ban as a collateral measure in the proposed reduced role for nuclear weapons in a cooperative security regime is more difficult to assess. The importance assigned to such a ban depends on the subjective estimate of its value in supporting the regime's nonproliferation objectives, since its impact on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance at substantially reduced levels is debatable.
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From page 39... ...
How difficult this issue will actually be remains to be seen, particularly If START is in place and the United States and the Soviet Union are making demonstrable progress toward substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a cooperative security environment. In the final analysis, most countries will make their decisions about the utility of the NPT regime or their maintenance of a nuclear option on the basis of their perceptions of their own security interests, not on the actions of the United States and Soviet Union or other nuclear weapons states on testing.
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