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Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (1985)

Chapter:8 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Non-Pro~iferation of Nucicar Weapons INTRODUCTION There is general agreement in the United States that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states would be contrary to the secu- rity interests of the United States and the world at large. Most other states share this view. Despite this broad international consensus, the development of an effective regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons presents many difficult practical problems. This chapter dis- cusses the specific measures that presently contribute to the non-prolif- eration regime and the issues associated with them. The underlying issues associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons have both political and technical dimensions, which are dis- cussed in the first part ofthis chapter. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons reflects a state's deepest fears and ambitions. Given sufficient political incentives, most states could in time produce a nuclear weapon, if they obtain the necessary technical talent, know-how, and materials. A peaceful nuclear power program can provide many of the technical assets that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program. The technical component of the non-proliferation regime seeks either to deny critical technical assets to potential nuclear weapon states or to assure that these assets are only made available under safeguarded conditions. Technical controls alone, however, can delay but not prevent a state from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability if it judges this to be in its overriding political interest. The political component of the non- proliferation regime seeks to create both an international environment 224

NON-PROLIFERATION 225 and specifically targeted incentives and disincentives to discourage states from making this decision. At the end of World War IT the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and held most ofthe related know-how and technology. Today there are five nuclear weapon states and many states with exten- sive nuclear power capabilities. The United States acting alone obvi- ously cannot prevent nuclear proliferation, since there are now many suppliers of nuclear equipment and materials and importers with many different political, economic, and military perspectives. Efforts to estab- lish an international non-proliferation regime therefore involve a com- plex of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral undertakings. The practical problems associated with these efforts reflect the underlying issues and the priority that participating states are prepared to give to non-proliferation. The second part of this chapter briefly reviews the history of the proliferation problem and efforts to deal with it. The overlap of the technologies of peaceful nuclear power and nuclear weapons has created a potential conflict between worldwide interest in extending the benefits of nuclear power and concern over further prolif- eration of nuclear weapons. This dilemma underlies the continuing debate as to whether U.S. export policy should be based on "denial" of nuclear capabilities that might be used in a nuclear weapons program or on "constructive engagement" with other states developing nuclear power to encourage them to accept an international non-proliferation regime. The third section in this chapter reviews the development of these approaches and the rationales and issues involved with them. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which underlie the international non-proliferation regime, are efforts to catalyze and codify national decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons or assist others in doing so. The fourth part of this chapter addresses the role and future prospects of these treaties and identifies the principal issues that have arisen among the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states in defining and developing this international regime. International safeguards are the principal means of verifying compli- ance with the two major multinational non-proliferation treaties. Safe- guards are also the most common condition imposed on nuclear exports. They are therefore a particularly important tool for dealing with states that have not joined the international non-proliferation treaties. The fifth section of this chapter reviews the questions that have arisen over the application and effectiveness of these safeguards. A few states have insisted on remaining outside the international non-proliferation regime. The final section of this chapter addresses the

226 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL problems of constructively influencing these holdout states and of coor- dinating the efforts of other states that share the concerns of the United States about this problem. An examination of current approaches to non-proliferation demon- strates not only the difficulty and complexity ofthe problem but also the opportunities that do exist to slow, if not stop, the spread of nuclear weapons. Although several states appear to be seriously considering the development of nuclear weapons, a range of possible actions exists to deter this decision in each case. In 1964, when China joined the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France as the fifth nuclear weapons state, few observers would have predicted that in the next 20 years only one other state would test a nuclear device and that, after the test, India would emphasize its "peaceful" purpose and apparently discontinue an active weapons program. THE NATURE OF THE RISK The Relationship of Proliferation to U.S. and International Security and Stability There is a broadly based international consensus that worldwide security and stability would be best served by limiting the number of states with an independent nuclear explosive capability. From the per- spective of the United States, this would have several advantages. Not only would it reduce the threat of nuclear weapons being used directly against the United States and its allies, but, more significantly, it would prevent the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances that might pro- voke nuclear retaliation against the United States or in local hostilities that might escalate into a broader nuclear war threatening the United States. An increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons, particu- larly those with unstable governments or limited capabilities for tech- nical controls, would increase the probability that nuclear weapons might be used by accident or miscalculation or that nuclear weapons might come under the control of irresponsible leaders. Further prolifer- ation would also increase the probability that weapons might be seized by dissident groups or stolen by terrorist organizations. In view of the complex of potential threats, further proliferation would also greatly complicate the military planning of the United States. These concerns about nuclear proliferation are not confined to the United States or even to states that already have nuclear weapons. Indeed, all states should have an interest in preventing the creation of

NON-PROLIFERATION 227 these potential threats to their security. States directly threatened by regional hostilities should have a particular interest in keeping nuclear weapons from being introduced into these conflicts. States without nu- clear weapons generally see the danger of the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to their adversaries as outweighing the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons or even the future option to produce them. The adherence of more than 120 states to treaties designed to support non-proliferation and the willingness of these states to pay the price of forswearing the future option of acquiring nuclear explosives demon- strates the widespread recognition of the international security advan- tages of a non-proliferation regime. Significantly, these states include most of the non-nuclear weapon states that could easily develop nuclear weapons. In each case, the state independently concluded that it would be against its overall security interests to undertake such a program or even maintain an option to do so. A small minority of states have been unwilling to accept this non- proliferation regime. However, none of these states has openly pro- cIaimed that it intends to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability. While some of these states have argued that the regime is blatantly discriminatory and offensive to their concept of national sov- ereignty, they have at most only implied that they were maintaining a future option to obtain nuclear weapons. Those few states that appear to be actively developing this option are clearly weighing its consequences very carefully. These consequences include the acceleration of nuclear weapon programs by their adversaries, the possibility of preemptive attacks, and competition with their own conventional military forces for scarce technical resources. Above all, these states must decide whether nuclear weapons are relevant to their actual defense needs. They must ask whether the nuclear option would not only fait to deter their adversaries but endanger their own survival. There have been a few proponents of the concept that the general proliferation of nuclear weapons would serve a useful purpose by ex- tending the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence to potential adversar- ies other than the present nuclear weapon states. They have suggested that the possession of nuclear weapons would engender a deeper sense of responsibility among leaders ofthose states. This notion has received very little support in the United States and has not become a major official argument even among the non-nuclear weapon states that are apparently developing a nuclear weapons option. In addition to the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities to more states, there is the frightening possibility of proliferation to subna- tional groups within states. This form of proliferation would most likely

228 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL occur by the direct seizure of existing nuclear weapons, but the con- struction of crude weapons from stolen weapons-grade fissionable mate- rial and available components cannot be completely ruled out. In the present nuclear weapon states, this threat may exist if weapons are deployed or stored at poorly protected sites and are inadequately se- cured against unauthorized use or where large quantities of weapons- gracle material exist. However, it would present a particular danger in potential nuclear weapon states that are unstable and contain subna- tional groups prepared to engage in terrorism. There are differences of opinion as to the actual extent of the nuclear threat from subnational groups. The ability of a subnational group to detonate a stolen weapon would depend on the state's technical precau- tions to secure its weapons against unauthorized use, precautions that in principle can be very effective. Presumably, these precautions would be least developed in a state that had not had time to develop technical sophistication in the control of its weapons. The seizure of fissionable material or production facilities by subna- tional groups is certainly a real possibility, but the fabrication of this material into a successful explosive, while conceivable, would in prac- tice be an extremely difficult technical task for such a group. However, even the claimed existence of a primitive device in credible circum- stances could be a powerful too! for blackmail. The Technical Problem The problem of controlling nuclear proliferation is greatly compli- cated by the overlap of underlying technologies needed for developing and producing nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear power. At the outset of the nuclear age, some scientists believed that the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons were so great and the technologies so closely related that nuclear power should not be devel- oped at all. With the massive worldwide investment in nuclear power in the postwar period, the option of prohibiting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has long been dead, if in fact it ever existed. The critical and indispensable ingredient of a nuclear explosive de- vice is either highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium. Highly enriched uranium is produced by separating the fissionable isotope uranium-235 from uranium-238 in enrichment plants by a variety of different processes. Plutonium, which is produced in a reactor when uranium-238 is irradiated with neutrons, becomes available in a form suitable for weapons when it is separated in a chemical reprocessing facility from the residual uranium and fission products. The underlying

NON-PROLIFERATION 229 technical problem arises because these materials and "sensitive" facili- ties with the capability to produce them can, and do, exist in nuclear power programs devoted entirely to peaceful purposes. Most current power reactors use low-enriched uranium, which is not suitable for weapons. However, some high-enriched uranium suitable for weapons can exist in peaceful programs as fuel for certain advanced power and research reactors. In any event, facilities that produce low-enriched uranium could in general be modified to produce high- enriched uranium or be used to feed other facilities to produce a highly enriched product. Plutonium is produced in all nuclear reactors fueled with natural or low-enriched uranium. Although it is not now economically advanta- geous to do so, this spent fuel can be reprocessed as part of a peaceful power program to separate the plutonium for reuse as fuel either in present generation power reactors or future fast breeder reactors. Re- processing can also facilitate the disposal process by separating radio- active waste products into a more manageable form. Although plutonium produced in a nuclear power plant optimized for power pro- duction would be much less desirable for weapons than plutonium pro- duced expressly for that purpose, it is now clear, contrary to earlier hopes, that the reprocessed plutonium could be used in weapons. Stimulated by unrealistically low estimates of the cost of nuclear power and by inflated projections of worldwide electric power consump- tion, a massive buildup and proliferation in uranium enrichment capac- ity occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the demand for nuclear power was confidently expected to be so great that the price of uranium, which was thought to be in short supply, would quickly rise to the point where reprocessed plutonium would be competitive with en- riched uranium for use in ordinary reactors. The anticipated need for reprocessed plutonium stimulated and legitimized worldwide interest in reprocessing facilities that could be built on a more modest scale than an enrichment facility. In this economic environment, the plutonium breeder reactor, which could efficiently exploit the full energy potential of uranium, seemed the next logical technical step despite its very high capital cost. The resulting "plutonium economy" based on plutonium reprocessing and plutonium breeder reactors would have resulted in vast quantities of plutonium at power reactors, reprocessing plants, and fuel fabrication plants and in transit domestically and internationally between these facilities. For example, the plutonium fuel load for a single plutonium breeder could contain enough plutonium to make 50 nuclear weapons. With plutonium recycled in existing thermal reactors, every power re-

230 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL actor would become a potential recipient of plutonium fuels. A pluto- nium economy would increase the opportunities for theft, seizure, or diversion of plutonium and make it more difficult to achieve safeguards in which a high degree of confidence could be placed. The drastic slowdown in the growth of nuclear power in recent years has caused a glut of natural and enriched uranium on the international market, and the projected plutonium economy has receded into the future. Domestically, the changed prospects in this area are dramati- cally illustrated by the termination of the Barnwell reprocessing plant and the Clinch River breeder reactor and by the increasingly uncertain future of the large new centrifuge uranium separation plant at Ports- mouth, Ohio. Nevertheless, in the longer term the basic proliferation problems inherent in the plutonium economy will have to be faced. Moreover, despite today's unfavorable economic prospects, many states, for a variety of reasons discussed later in this chapter, are still pursuing their earlier interest in sensitive facilities. In the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study, the Carter Administration undertook a major effort to engage the inter- national nuclear community in a critical review of the problems and prospects of the nuclear fuel cycle. The goal was to develop a consensus on the advisability of deferring dangerous developments in the nuclear fuel cycle that presupposed the early attainment of an international plutonium economy. Many of the INFCE participants, confident of the basic economic viability of the plutonium fuel cycle, opposed this posi- tion and refused to consider restructuring their approaches to nuclear power. However, the continued decline in the fortunes of domestic and international nuclear power since the 1980 INFCE report has raised further questions about arguments in favor of the current need for a plutonium fuel cycle. Consequently, despite the Tong history of interna- tional opposition to such efforts, the issue of whether the nuclear fuel cycle should be limited or restructured to build a more secure non- proliferation regime will probably remain active. The current situation, in which uranium enrichment services are in ample supply at reasonable prices and the electric power industry is eager to avoid taking further risks, holds out some prospect of avoiding or at least substantially deferring a worldwide plutonium economy. Plutonium recycled in existing reactors is now clearly uneconomical, and commercial fast breeder reactors are at best a future prospect in a few highly industrialized states. This economic reality should reduce the pressure for additional commercial reprocessing facilities. How- ever, it will not necessarily eliminate interest in small reprocessing plants for the declared purpose of gaining technical experience as a

NON-PROLIFERATION 231 hedge against another change in the economics of nuclear power. Nor will it eliminate the current risks posed by the problem states described later in this chapter, which have unsafeguarded enrichment and repro- cessing facilities already in existence or under construction. Although not an immediate problem, technological advances now under development, such as laser isotope separation, could complicate non-proliferation efforts in the future. Laser isotope separation might be used to produce highly enriched uranium in a single step, as opposed to the current multistage processes that can be more reliably dedicated to the production of only Tow-enriched uranium. It could also be used to remove the isotope plutonium-240, which has an undesirably high spon- taneous fission rate, from the plutonium in spent fuel from power reac- tors, improving the plutonium's utility for weapons purposes. If applied by non-nuclear weapon states to the accumulated spent fuel from their reactors, it could greatly enlarge the quantity and quality of weapons- usable material accessible to them. Laser isotope separation plants may also present a special monitoring problem, since they could be much smaller and less distinctive than the large gaseous diffusion plants or even production-size centrifuge plants. Once adequate quantities of enriched uranium or plutonium are available, the problem of fabricating a simple fission weapon should not prove too difficult for any state that has developed even a modest level of competence in the nuclear field. The basic design features of first gener- ation fission weapons are now widely known. A small number of scien- tists and engineers whose experience was derived from a peaceful nuclear power program could develop a workable design. The actual fabrication of a device would require a small team of fairly qualified experts in a number of fields with access to laboratory and fabrication facilities using easily obtainable equipment. Opinions vary as to how necessary a proof test would be for an initial weapon. Some argue on the basis of hindsight that such a test would not be necessary since there would be reasonably high confidence that a weapon produced by a technically competent group would give a signifi- cant yield. However, the weapon designers would probably have little confidence in the actual yield. More significantly, military or political authorities might not share the confidence of their scientists and techni- cians, particularly in a state with little history of technical sophistica- tion. Moreover, a test is the only way a state could demonstrate to others that it had actually acquired a weapons capability. In any event, the development of more advanced fission weapons, and certainly thermo- nuclear weapons, would require testing. At the same time, the ease of making a fission weapon should not be

232 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL exaggerated. It cannot be done by a clever university student in a ga- rage with tools from the local hardware store. As a practical matter, it would probably be beyond the capabilities of almost any subnational group operating outside of an organized nuclear program. Besides ob- taining an adequate supply of fissionable material, such a group would need qualified experts and technicians in a number of fields with access to equipment and considerable advanced planning to develop a design. Such a group could conceivably construct a primitive device with an uncertain yield of a few hundred tons, although it might have no yield at all. Nonetheless, a primitive device of this type could be extremely destructive in an urban area. Consequently, as noted above, even the claim of such a capability in credible circumstances could be a powerful toot for blackmail. Capabilities Versus Intentions In developing a strategy to prevent the further proliferation of nu- clear weapons, a fundamental issue has been how much weight to give to "capabilities" as compared with "intentions." This issue reflects the inevitable interaction of the technical capabilities associated with nu- clear power with the technology required to fabricate nuclear weapons. To date, non-proliferation efforts have primarily sought to build legal and political barriers against decisions to fabricate nuclear weapons. International agreements have drawn the line at the actual manufac- ture of a nuclear explosive, rather than at the acquisition of underlying technical capabilities that might make this possible. States such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany clearly have the technical capability to produce weapons on short notice. The barriers to their doing so are their conviction that it would not be in their net interest and the international legal obligations they have undertaken on the basis of this conviction. These convictions and commitments are very substantial barriers for these countries. The risk that they will override these constraints in the foreseeable future appears correspondingly small. Critics of this approach argue that intentions change and that inter- national obligations can easily be violated or abrogated. Only by limit- ing the underlying technical capabilities can proliferation be prevented in the longer term, they argue. While some half a dozen states may now intend either to build nuclear weapons or to consciously develop an option to do so quickly, probably 20 to 30 countries already have most of the technical capabilities needed to make such a decision. The acquisition of the nuclear materials and facilities needed for a

NON-PROLIFERATION 233 nuclear power program, the associated industrial support, and the re- lated infrastructure of trained nuclear scientists and technicians go a long way toward giving a state the technical capability to make weap- ons, especially if weapons-usable material or facilities for its production are available. But there is considerable difference of opinion over the extent to which the prior acquisition of these capabilities makes a nu- clear weapon decision more likely. The French and the Indians built up such capabilities some years before deciding to manufacture nuclear weapons, though at least one of their objectives in undertaking this buildup was to establish the option to make such a decision. On the other hand, Sweden built up such capabilities and seriously debated initiating a weapons program in the 1960s but finally decided that this would be counter to its security interests. Since the mid-1970s, concern over nuclear weapon capabilities has focused on the most sensitive nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium) and on enrichment and reprocess- ing facilities for their production. Some critics of the present U.S. ap- proach have essentially redefined proliferation as access to these sensi- tive materials. They have largely discounted the offsetting effect of legal and political commitments against proliferation. THE HISTORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION Shortly after World War II, while it still had an absolute monopoly on nuclear weapons, the United States offered in the Baruch Plan to work out arrangements for the international ownership and control of all nuclear materials and facilities. Pending agreement on such an arrangement with appropriate international safeguards, the United States prohibited through the MacMahon Act of 1946 the export of nuclear materials, equipment, or technology. Nevertheless, without di- rect assistance from the United States, four additional nuclear weapon states emerged in the next 18 years: the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (19641. By 1953, with the reported test of a Soviet thermonuclear device and growing interna- tional interest in peaceful nuclear power, it became apparent that the United States could not dictate a policy of denial simply by unilaterally prohibiting exports. In response to this changing situation, President Dwight Eisenhower reversed the policy of denial in December 1953 and inaugurated a policy of constructive engagement with the Atoms for Peace program. This policy was designed to promote internationally the peaceful applica- tions of nuclear energy, provided the recipient state guaranteed that

234 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL there would be no diversions to military use and agreed to accept safe- guards. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act was revised to reflect this new approach of constructive engagement, and the first of several interna- tional Atoms for Peace conferences, at which much previously classified nuclear technology was released, was held in Geneva. The U.S. efforts to implement the new policy included agreements for cooperation with over 30 states, liberal grants to facilitate the purchase of research reac- tors, training programs, and disclosures of technology. The Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, was based on this approach of open international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in return for pledges against diversion to military use and the acceptance of international safeguards. Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons intensified not only in the United States and the Soviet Union but in many non-nuclear weapon states as well. One result was the negotiation in 1963 of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Ap- pendix D), which had non-proliferation as one of its main objectives. Nearly every state having a potential capability to make nuclear weap- ons eventually joined the treaty. Another consequence was the Latin American initiative that led to the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, often referred to as the Treaty of TIateloIco. Following the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union turned their attention directly to the proliferation prob- lem, embarking on the complex four-year multinational negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Appendix G) or simply the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty, which was signed on July 1, 196S, and entered into force in 1970, has so far been joined by 124 states, including most of the advanced industrial nuclear states. Both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America were remarkable achievements. They involved commitments by sovereign states that had not yet ac- quired nuclear weapons to forswear that option and to accept interna- tional safeguards to verify their compliance with this self-denying obligation. At the same time, both treaties embodied commitments to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards. They thus reinforced the policy of construc- tive engagement. At the time the NPT was negotiated, the United States was the free worId's principal supplier of nuclear power reactors and its only exporter of enriched uranium to fuel these reactors. This situation

NON-PROLIFERATION 235 changed radically in the 1970s, when reactor vendors in other states (most notably France, Germany, and Canada) won a substantial pro- portion of new orders, several other exporters of enriched uranium emerged (EURODIF, controlled by France; URENCO, a German-Brit- ish-Dutch consortium; and the Soviet Union), and the bottom fell out of the reactor market as a result of reduced demand for electric power and a rapid rise in nuclear power costs. With the anticipated loss of the U.S. monopoly now a fact, the need for collective action by the nuclear sup- plier states on nuclear export conditions became urgent. In the mid-1970s a series of proliferation problems, including the detonation by India of a nuclear device made with materials pledged to peaceful use, the purchase of French reprocessing plants by Pakistan and South Korea, and the purchase of German uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants by Brazil, convinced many that the liberality of nuclear exports had been excessive and had created poten- tial proliferation threats that would not otherwise have existed. This led to new pressures for denial of sensitive nuclear materials and tech- nology, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and heavy water pro- duction technology. In response to a U.S. request, the principal nuclear supplier states met in 1975-76 to work out common guidelines for nuclear exports.* The resulting Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines, which do not constitute a for- mal international agreement, include a clarification of the safeguard requirements for exports to nonparties to the NET, the first multilateral attempts to deal with physical security against subnational threats, and constraints on the export of sensitive nuclear materials and facili- ties. A major accomplishment was to persuade France, which is not a party to the NPT, to require safeguards on its exports. While the guide- lines did not categorically forbid exports of sensitive materials or facili- ties, they called for restraint in such exports. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States also announced that no new commitments to export reprocessing technology or equipment would be made until further notice. In the United States, President Gerald Ford's nuclear policy state- ment- of October 2S, 1976, and President Jimmy Carter's policy state- ments of April 1977 called for a reconsideration ofplans to proceed with the commercial reprocessing of reactor fuel and the widespread use of plutonium-based fuels in existing reactors. These statements coupled *The following states have stated that their nuclear export policies follow the guidelines: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Canada, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslo- vakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Australia, and Finland.

236 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL concern over the increased risk of proliferation from these activities with serious questions about the economic basis for moving in this direction. The call by the United States for an international reexamina- tion of the technical side of these questions met considerable resistance in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation held from 1977 to 1980. Nevertheless, pressures to move in the direction of commercial reprocessing and plutonium fuel recycling have markedly decreased since then in light of the dramatic reduction in the number of nuclear power plants on order or still under construction and the greatly im- proved supply picture for uranium-basecl nuclear fuels. The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 reflected the growing concern over the spread of sensitive nuclear capabilities. The target of the act was not only the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices (the objective of the NPT) but also the proliferation of "the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices." The act was even more restrictive about the export of sensitive nuclear technology than the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines. It included provisions designed to discourage any further international transfer of reprocessing technol- ogy, the reprocessing abroad of fuel originating in the United States, and the international transfer of plutonium. The act also provided for termination of nuclear cooperation with any nation or group of nations found by the President to have entered into an agreement, after the date of enactment, for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a non-nuclear weapon state. In addition, the Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act provided for a cutoff of economic aid and military grants and credits to states that delivered or received reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment or technology. An amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act forbade that institution to give credit, guarantees, or insurance for the purchase of any liquid metal fast breeder reactor or any nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. These U.S. statutes were criticized abroad as discriminatory and in- consistent with the obligations of the United States under the NPT to help non-nuclear weapon states develop peaceful nuclear energy. The most vociferous critics of this new emphasis were major allies and trad- ing partners of the United States such as Japan, Korea, and the Western European states, all of which were parties to the NET, as well as various developing states such as India, Pakistan, and Brazil, which were not. The latter group posed a qualitatively different problem, since the risks inherent in their access to weapons-usable material were compounded by the absence of any international commitment not to use the material to make nuclear weapons.

NON-PROLIFERATION 237 Although the Reagan Administration initially asserted that its predecessors had overemphasized capabilities as opposed to motiva- tions and intentions in approaching non-proliferation, the United States has in fact continued the policy of withholding the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to states con- sidered to present a risk of proliferation. At the same time, the fortunes of nuclear power have continued to decline domestically and interna- tionally, with the plutonium economy and breeder reactors becoming increasingly less economical. These trends were underscored by the final demise in 1983 of the Barnwell reprocessing plant and the Clinch River breeder reactor. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY Denial Versus Constructive Engagement The historical record outlined above points toward the earliest and most persistent issue that has shaped nuclear export policies: the choice between "denial" and "constructive engagement." Under the first Atomic Energy Act, U.S. export policy was one of total denial. The Atoms for Peace program and the NPT shifted this policy to one of constructive engagement, with liberal international cooperation under safeguards and conditions of supply. These safeguards and supply condi- tions were tightened up somewhat after the Indian nuclear explosion. As interest in commercial reprocessing and plutonium began to emerge in the mid-1970s, the policy of constructive engagement was qualified by selective denial of the most sensitive nuclear exports. These exports included plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and facilities for sepa- rating plutonium and enriching uranium. This mix of constructive engagement and selective denial remains U.S. policy today, although the Reagan Administration has dec [area that the standards of selective denial will be less rigorously applied to the Euratom countries (Bel- gium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Trail and Tt.~lv Tll]xemhour~. the Netherlands. and the United Kingdom) ^' - 1~' ~ In ~ —~^'~ it' t7 ~ I'd— and Japan. Thus, current U.S. policy, like that of most states, accepts the general policy of constructive engagement. But there remain controversies over the nature and severity of the conditions imposed on nuclear coopera- tion and the extent to which the selective denial of sensitive nuclear exports is applied. Both issues were raised by the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines and by the U.S. legislation of the late 1970s. The controversy over supply conditions related to both the extent of

238 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL supplier control and the method by which such conditions were im- posed. The principal complaint about the Nuclear Suppliers' Guide- lines was that they unilaterally imposed new conditions without consulting the recipients. The complaints about the U.S. legislation were both that it made unilateral changes in previously agreed supply arrangements and that it went too far. For example, the legislation required prior U.S. consent for the handling of materials derived from U.S. exports and created tight new criteria for the granting of such consents. Considerable friction with Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as India, resulted from delays and uncertainties caused when these new criteria were applied to the granting of consents for the repro- cessing, or the transfer to another country for reprocessing, of spent fuel produced through the use of U.S. exports. The legislation also required a recipient country to accept full-scope safeguards on wholly indigenous activities (as the NPT requires signatory non-nuclear weapon states to do) and to refrain from transferring reprocessing technology or equip- ment. In the United States, however, and especially in Congress, the legislatior~ has been criticized as not being tight enough. Selective denial defines the effort to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from gaining direct access to weapons-usable material. It is based on the premises that these materials are the pacing items for the fabri- cation of nuclear weapons and that international safeguards would not provide "timely warning" of their diversion (safeguards are discussed later in this chapter). These premises bring into focus the basic contro- versy over the relative emphasis that should be given to capabilities versus intentions. Some believe that this policy should be more rigor- ously applied than it is at present, that exceptions should not be made for the Euratom countries and Japan, and that efforts should be re- newed to ensure that other states do not undercut the policy. Others point out that even the current policy has caused a number of unfavor- able reactions, including resentment by the nuclear industrial states over what they see as unwarranted interference with their nuclear energy programs, resistance by other states to what they characterize as a violation of their "inalienable right" to make their own policy choices, complaints about discriminatory treatment, and charges that such selective denial is incompatible with the basic intent of the NPT. Opponents of selective denial also argue that it is counterproductive in several ways. It alienates other states whose cooperation is necessary to an effective non-proliferation regime, they contend, and it could in- crease the determination of states denied access to this technology to develop independent nuclear capabilities free of international controls or stimulate a nuclear black market among the states affected.

NON-PROLIFERATION 239 A few of the most extreme critics of the present non-proliferation regime advocate a return to a policy of total denial, a cessation of all international nuclear commerce. They argue that the Atoms for Peace program was a fundamental mistake, since it created the basic stepping stones to a nuclear weapons option. They also contend that the risk of proliferation far outweighs the value of nuclear power for world devel- opment, since the economic advantages of nuclear power have now essentially vanished. Supporters of the present approach to exports argue that a policy of total denial is impractical and would be counterproductive since the United States is no longer the sole source of nuclear exports. Thus, even if the United States stopped all of its nuclear exports, the gap would be filled by other suppliers and by indigenous programs under much less rigorous non-proliferation controls than those that now exist, which are largely a result of U.S. influence. Moreover, a policy of total denial would clearly be inconsistent with Article {V of the NPT and would undermine support for that treaty, which is indispensable to an effec- tive non-proliferation regime. Finally, whatever the validity of the eco- nomic and other arguments against nuclear power, many states are not yet convinced by them and genuinely believe that their need for this added energy option outweighs other considerations. International controversy over the proper balance between denial and constructive engagement is bound to continue. It will be an impor- tant issue at the 1985 NPT review conference, and it is expected to be the central focus of the next UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which is scheduled for 1986. Uniform Versus Discriminatory Policies The Reagan Administration has declared that the policy of selective denial of sensitive nuclear exports will be applied less rigorously to Euratom countries and Japan. This decision highlights the issue of the extent to which it is desirable and feasible to establish uniform non- proliferation policies, applicable to all potential trading partners with- out discrimination. This question has arisen in legislative approaches to non-proliferation,* in attempts to coordinate the policies of nuclear *Most such legislation has included a compromise that grants the President authority to waive the application of the statutory requirements in particular cases, though Congress has attempted to reserve a right to veto such waivers. Congressional veto provisions (except those requiring a joint resolution passed by two thirds of both houses of Congress) were declared unconstitutional in 1983 by the U.S. Supreme Court in U. S. v. Chadha.

240 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL supplier states,* and in relations between supplier and recipient states." Supporters of a uniform export policy argue that it underscores the seriousness of the U.S. approach to non-proliferation and prevents the government from subordinating this objective to other policy objectives that appear to have temporary priority. By prohibiting preferential treatment of certain states, it obviates charges of "discrimination" by which problem states seek to discredit the entire non-proliferation regime. Critics of this approach point out that non-nuclear weapon states present a wide variety of very different situations. Some states (such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany) have extensive commer- cial nuclear programs, current access to substantial quantities of weap- ons-usable material, and strong national commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. Other states may lack all three of these characteris- tics. Critics assert that it does not serve national policy, or in the long run non-proliferation policy, to ignore these differences and apply ex- actly the same restrictions to all states. This would be the case if the shipment of an advanced research reactor to Japan were subject to the same restrictions as its shipment to Libya or South Africa. They assert that the principle of nondiscrimination should be construed, as it is under present domestic U.S. law, to treat as unfair only discrimination among "parties similarly situated." The Carter Administration's overall non-proliferation policy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 have been criticized as being too inflexible, since their heaviest impact was on the United States' closest allies and most substantial trading partners, who posed no near-term threat of proliferation, rather than on the states of greatest prolifera- tion concern. While these policies did cause friction with U.S. allies and trading partners, the underlying issue is whether this friction was too high a price to pay to achieve a uniform and consistent approach to the problem of nuclear export control. *For example, the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines provide that "suppliers should consult, as each deems appropriate, with other Governments concerned on specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability" and that "in considering transfers, each supplier should exercise prudence having regard to all the circu;rn- stances of each case, including any risk that technology transfers not covered by paragraph 5, or subsequent retransfers, might result in unsafeguarded nuclear materials." tFor example, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have complained that they were being treated no differently from Bangladesh, Libya, or Pakistan; the late Shah of Iran demanded a guarantee that his state would be given "most favored nation treatment" in the nuclear field; and Pakistan has complained that it was being unfairly discriminated against.

NON-PROLIFERATION 241 Some participants in the debate have gone so far as to advocate a completely ad hoc case-by-case approach to export decisions. This would allow the government to focus on the few serious potential proliferation cases without adversely affecting nuclear trade or relations with other states, they say. Critics of this approach argue that, in addition to the uncertainties that such a case-by-case approach would create for poten- tial customers, it would inevitably sacrifice non-proliferation objectives to immediate political expediency and would result in endless charges of discrimination. Relationship to NPT Obligations The Non-Proliferation Treaty places some inhibition on policies that deny nuclear exports to states that have adhered to the treaty. Article IV of the NPT recognizes "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" when in conformity with those articles of the treaty aimed at preventing proliferation. In addi- tion, Article IV provides for the fullest possible exchange among the treaty's parties of equipment, materials, and scientific and technologi- cal information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some NPT parties have complained that those provisions of the Nu- clear Suppliers' Guidelines and the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act that restrict the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of Article IV. In response to this criti- cism, it is argued that while this article was designed to ensure that the parties would not be deprived of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, it did not remove all discretion as to how this was to be accomplished consistent with the treaty's underlying objective of preventing further proliferation. The article provides for the "fullest possible" exchange, and what is possible must be judged in the light of that underlying objective and common sense. For example, even though Libya is a party to the NPT, if it applied to another party to purchase 500 kg of separated plutonium "for peaceful purposes," that party would clearly not be obli- gated to provide the plutonium since there would be a substantial risk that such a transaction would defeat the central objective of the treaty. Moreover, Article IV clearly was not intended to deprive a party of its discretion in selecting trading partners. In addition, a party is obvi- ously not obligated to export facilities or technology that it has deter- mined not to license domestically or has discontinued developing. The United States would not be expected to export commercial reprocessing facilities when its own program has been suspended.

242 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL As one could expect, not all parties to the NPT have accepted these arguments, and the tension between Article IV and the policy of denial must be taken seriously. More broadly, it is argued that this policy, if carried too far, could undercut non-proliferation objectives by weaken- ing support for the NPT. This aspect of the problem, however, relates only to denials of exports to parties to the NPT and not to states that have chosen to remain outside the NPT. Extreme Denial Beyond the withholding of cooperation, a policy of denial might in extremis be extended to the destruction of existing nuclear facilities. Examples of such a policy were Israel's actions against an Iraqi reactor whose nuclear potential Israel considered an imminent threat even though Iraq was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a full- scope safeguards agreement. The actions initially involved sabotage of the French plant that was producing equipment for {raq's reactor and later the aerial bombing ofthe reactor shortly before it was scheduled to commence operation. The Israeli attack was strongly condemned by the international community. It was seen as damaging to the non-prolifera- tion regime since, by totally dismissing the assurances provided in the NPT and full-scope safeguards, it lessened the incentive to adhere to those measures. The international community rejected Israel's attempt to justify its attack as an act of anticipatory self-defense based on its assessment that the Iraqi program presented an imminent prolifera- tion threat. It has been argued that such preemptive actions cannot, in the Tong run, prevent a state determined to develop nuclear explosives from doing so, and that physical attacks will only increase the attacked state's determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Neverthe- less, there is no question that the Israeli attack set back the Iraqi nu- clear program by several years and that the French and other suppliers will probably be considerably more circumspect in how they replace and fuel the damaged facility. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS A major focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to secure treaty commitments from non-nuclear weapon states not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives. It is sometimes argued that such treaties are only paper promises that can always be violated or abrogated. There is a

NON-PROLIFERATION 243 strong international consensus, however, that this approach helps cata- lyze national decisions to forego nuclear weapons and erects legal and political obstacles to changing these decisions. There are appreciable costs in international relations involved in breaking a treaty commit- ment, as well as internal pressures against doing so. Above all, as long as nuclear proliferation can be held to a minimum, most states continue to believe that their security is better served by preventing their neigh- bors and adversaries from developing nuclear weapons than by under- taking a weapons program of their own. The Non-Proliferation Treaty The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Appendix G), which was originally signed on July 1, 196S, and has been in force since March 5, 1970, was designed to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. The treaty, which divided the world into nuclear weapon states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) and non-nuclear weapon states (all other countries) places on all signatories the following basic obligations: · Article I: "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under- takes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explo- sive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encour- age, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." · Article II: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manu- facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex- plosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manu- facture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." · Article Ill calls on all parties not to export nuclear materials or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state without international safeguards designed to verify that such exports are not diverted to nuclear explosive programs. Despite ominous predictions that most states would not chose to ad- here to the treaty, the NPT currently has 124 parties, including all members of NATO and the Euratom countries other than France, all members of the Warsaw Pact, and most of the other states in the world

244 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL having nuclear programs. The parties to the NPT, together with France, which has made clear that it will act as if it were a party to the treaty, account for 98 percent ofthe world's installed nuclear power capacity, 95 percent of the nuclear power capacity under construction, and all of the world's exporters of enriched uranium. This means not only that the overwhelming majority of the world's civil nuclear activities are di- rectly under the treaty's regime, but also that any nonparty seriously interested in developing nuclear power must rely at least in part on cooperation with parties to the treaty, whose exports are covered by international safeguards. Despite these impressive statistics, not all relevant states have joined the treaty. In addition to France and China, which already have nuclear weapons, the most notable holdouts are Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba. Each of these non-nuclear weapon states presents a special case (these cases are discussed in the final part of this chapter). The primary effect of the treaty for the nuclear weapon states is on their export policies. It is therefore important to note that France has voluntarily conformed its nuclear export policies to those called for by the treaty and that China has not yet become a significant nuclear exporter. To make adherence to the treaty more attractive and to minimize charges of discrimination, three significant provisions (Articles IV, V, and VI) were added during the negotiation process. Article IV declares that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting "the in- alienable right" of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It also provides that all parties should facilitate, and have a right to participate in, the fullest possible ex- change of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological infor- mation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article V guarantees the sharing of any peaceful benefits from nu- clear explosives. This was designed to prevent the nuclear weapon states from gaining special economic advantage from these develop- ments, which they alone could pursue. During the 1960s the United States had promoted the potential of nuclear explosives for a variety of peaceful purposes. This led some non-nuclear weapon states to charge that the prohibition on the development of nuclear explosives in the treaty would inhibit their economic development. This was cited as a further example of the discriminatory nature of the NPT. Although some holdout states (including India, Argentina, and Brazil) still refer to this issue, the increasingly pessimistic assessments of the prospects for such peaceful applications have greatly reduced its appeal. Article VT contains a very important provision for all parties to "pursue negoti-

NON-PROLIFERATION 245 ations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Most ofthe controversy among treaty parties has been over the imple- mentation of Articles IV and V1, which a number of the most significant parties declared to be of central importance to them when they ratified the treaty. Some parties have charged that the nuclear export policies of some supplier states, in particular the United States, have been incon- sistent with Article IV, and that the benefits they envisaged have not been realized. The lack of progress by the superpowers in curbing their own nuclear arms race, which is sometimes referred to as "vertical proliferation," has been even more heavily criticized. There have been many protests that, contrary to the obligation of Article VT, the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers have been growing in size and sophistica- tion. Many of the non-nuclear weapon states contend that the "basic bargain" consisted of a balance of obligations between the non-nuclear weapon states, who were forswearing nuclear weapons, and the under- takings of the suppliers and the superpowers under Articles IV and V1, and that the latter are not honoring their end of the bargain. The coun- terarguments are that there has been extensive cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and some progress in nuclear arms control, and that in any event the basic non-proliferation provisions of the treaty benefit the security interests of all its parties. Perceptions as to the military value of nuclear weapons obviously affect national decisions about whether to acquire them. These percep- tions are influenced by what the nuclear weapon states do and say about the role of nuclear weapons. Opinions vary as to how the willingness of the nuclear powers to accept arms control measures on their own forces influence those perceptions. Some believe this is a critical consider- ation, that the failure to establish a more effective arms control regime between the nuclear powers undercuts efforts to establish an interna- tional environment conducive to nuclear self-restraint and accentuates the double standard between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Others have discounted this argument and have suggested that any perceived weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could increase the incentive of states now covered by it to clevelop their own nuclear deterrents. Still others argue that this is not a central issue one way or the other since any state that decides to develop a nuclear option will do so for its own reasons, which will be largely unrelated to the arms control actions of the nuclear weapon states. These issues dominated the NPT five-year review conferences held in 1975 and 1980 and are likely to be even more heated at the review conference scheduled for 1985. An important question is whether these

246 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL issues will cause any withdrawals from the treaty and how seriously they may affect the prospects for extending the treaty beyond its stated expiration date of 1995. While the treaty does contain a standard provi- sion permitting withdrawal on three months' advance notice, it is sig- nificant that no party has ever seriously threatened to withdraw. Some critics of the NPT note its lack of security assurances to its parties (other than those inherent in the prevention of proliferation to fellow parties). In this regard, it should be noted that the treaty was accompanied by parallel declarations by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom that each would "seek immediate Security Council Action to provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used." Thereafter, all five nuclear weapon states entered into a treaty commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American parties to the Treaty of TIateloIco (discussed below). The United States, the Soviet Union' and the United Kingdom also declared at the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT. The formulations of these so-called negative security assurances differed in important respects, since the United States did not give up the option of first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states allied with a nuclear power (e.g., Warsaw Pact countries) engaged in an attack on the United States or its allies. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and Other Possibilities for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of TIateloIco), which entered into force before the NPT in 196S, establishes Latin America as a nuclear weapon-free zone. The Treaty of TIateloIco, which was open for signature only by Latin Ameri- can states, differs from the NPT in that it prohibits not only the acquisi- tion of nuclear weapons by its parties but also the stationing of nuclear weapons within their territory. The NPT, in contrast, does not prevent the United States from stationing its weapons in NATO states or the Soviet Union from stationing its weapons in the Warsaw Pact area. The Treaty of TIatelloIco contains a fundamental ambiguity with respect to "peaceful" nuclear explosions, since it provides for the conduct of such explosions by or for the benefit of its parties under international super- vision but also contains a definition of "nuclear weapon" that appears

NON-PROLIFERATION 247 to preclude the possession or development of peaceful nuclear explo- sives by the parties to the treaty. The NPT unambiguously bans the transfer to non-nuclear weapon states, or the acquisition by non-nu- clear weapon states, of all nuclear explosives. The verification provisions of the Treaty of TIateloIco include not only IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities of the states concerned but also inspection and investigative rights by the regional treaty organiza- tion. The treaty was accompanied by two important protocols. Protocol subjects all states outside Latin America that exercise dejure or cle facto jurisdiction over territories within that region to the obligations of the treaty. Protocol ]:T requires nuclear weapon states to respect the treaty regime, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against its Latin American parties. The treaty has been signed by all Latin American states except Cuba and ratified by all of its signatories except Argentina. In two cases, Brazil and Chile, the instrument of ratification deferred the actual entry into force of the treaty for these particular states until all other eligible parties have ratified the treaty and its protocols. Protocol ~ has been ratified by all eligible states except France, which has signed it and whose ratification is pending. Protocol IT has been ratified by all five nuclear weapon states, including China, which gives it the unique distinction of being the only nuclear arms control treaty joined by all five of these states. The treaty has been signed by several parties and signatories that have not joined the NPT (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). In defense of its failure to sign the treaty, Cuba has cited the continued existence of the Guantanamo naval base even though Protocol ~ would preclude the United States from stationing nuclear weapons there. Ar- gentina officially announced in 1978 its decision to ratify the treaty but has deferred doing so pending the resolution of a dispute with the {AEA over the terms of the safeguards agreement required to implement it. The treaty and its protocols are relevant to the current situation in Central America in several respects. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are required by Protocol IT to respect the treaty requirements that no nuclear weapons be stationed in El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, or Nicaragua and are obli- gated not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any of these states. However, the transit or transport of nuclear weapons by states other than the Latin American parties through the territorial waters or air space of these states (or through the Panama Canal) is not affected by the treaty. The negotiating history ofthe treaty makes this clear, and

248 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL the United States ratified the two protocols on the basis of this under- standing. The treaty obligations do not apply to Cuba, which has not signed or ratified the treaty. The principal dispute among signatories of the treaty is whether it precludes the acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by its parties. Most of its parties acknowledge that it has that effect unless and until a clear way of distinguishing peaceful explosives from weapons can be found, but Argentina and Brazil maintain that it does not foreclose their right to acquire such explosives. In the case of Argentina this issue has been a major stumbling block in negotiating the safeguards agree- ment with the IAEA that is required under the treaty, because the IAEA maintains that a safeguards agreement must preclude the use of safeguarded materials for any nuclear explosive, whatever its stated purpose. In addition to the importance of the treaty and its protocols to control- ling proliferation in Latin America, its use as a mode] for other regions has been much discussed. There was some interest in an African nu- clear weapon-free zone, but this has languished because of a lack of leadership and the problem of how to deal with South Africa and Israel and with the emergence in a few African states such as Nigeria of some advocacy for a nuclear option. UN resolutions calling for the negotia- tion of a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone have been supported by Egypt, Israel, and others, but political obstacles to direct negotiations with Israel, a fear that such a treaty might freeze Israel's current advan- tage, and Arab insistence that Israel join the NPT before negotiating such a treaty have contributed to the lack of progress. Pakistan has called for the creation of a South Asian nuclear weapon-free zone, but India has opposed it on the ground that to be meaningful it would have to include China, which India considers the principal nuclear threat it faces. Other such zones, some involving members of U.S. alliances, have been proposed, including the Scandinavian states, the Balkans, and the Pacific Ocean. The nuclear weapon-free zone proposed by the Palme Commission for central Europe is different from other proposals, in that this proposal is primarily concerned with disengagement by the nuclear weapon states rather than with preventing further nuclear prolifera- tion among non-nuclear weapon states. In none of the other proposed nuclear weapon-free zones is there the fortunate combination of circumstances found in Latin America: there were clearly no nuclear weapon states in the region; the regional initia- tive was originally supported by all of the region's principal states (Ar- gentina and Brazil were among the early proponents); and there was no serious impact on existing mutual security arrangements.

NON-PROLIFERATION Agreements Limiting Nuclear Testing 249 Agreements to limit or ban nuclear testing may contribute signifi- cantly to non-proliferation. The broader ramifications of the nuclear testing issue are discussed in Chapter 7, but it is important to appreci- ate how the different agreements and proposals limiting nuclear test- ing specifically relate to the non-proliferation problem. The existing Limited Test Ban Treaty (Appendix D), to which all states of current proliferation concern except Argentina, Pakistan, and Cuba are par- ties, contributes to the difficulty faced by non-nuclear weapon states in developing nuclear weapons. By limiting signatory states to under- ground testing, it somewhat complicates the initial test and demonstra- tion of a nuclear weapon. However, the extensive underground testing programs of the nuclear-weapon states since the treaty entered into force and India's underground test of its first nuclear explosion suggest that it is not a stringent constraint. Technically, any of the potential nuclear weapon states could conduct their first test within the con- straints of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty (Appendix E) and the ac- companying Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Appendix F) would appear to have little direct relevance to non-proliferation since the threshold is so high (150 kt) that it would not prohibit the initial testing of fission weapons. In fact, it is not even open for signature by non-nuclear weapon states. Moreover, any tests under the associated Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes could blunt the increasingly successful efforts to establish internationally that peaceful nuclear explosions are unpromising and cannot be excepted from non-proliferation constraints because they are indistinguishable from explosions of nuclear weapons. In contrast, a comprehensive test ban, which is not now being negoti- ated, is widely held to be important to non-proliferation. Without any testing, states would not be able to demonstrate a nuclear explosive capability, and their confidence that they had in fact achieved such a capability would be greatly reduced. A comprehensive test ban is specif- ically mentioned as a goal in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it has been the most persistently demanded step to demon- strate compliance with Article VI of the treaty. Proponents argue that such a ban would contribute significantly to reducing the discrimina- tory impact of the NPT by forbidding all parties to conduct nuclear tests. Its direct impact on proliferation, however, would depend in large part on whether states of proliferation concern adhere to it. Some argue that the existence of these restrictions would in many cases discourage the

250 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL initiation of a program. A ban on testing would certainly preclude the development of more advanced fission weapons and thermonuclear weapons. Proponents argue that even states that do not join a compre- hensive test ban would be inhibited from conducting tests in an interna- tional environment in which most of the states in the world, including the nuclear weapon states, did observe such a ban. However, some crit- ics of a comprehensive test ban argue that testing is not indispensable to the development of first generation nuclear weapons and that, in any event, the states of primary proliferation concern would not be likely to join such a treaty or be influenced by it. ~~ The Physical Security Convention and Related Measures Until relatively recently, the physical security of civil nuclear facili- ties as well as military nuclear facilities was considered exclusively the responsibility of the states within which they were located and not an appropriate subject for international concern. However, the rise in in- ternational terrorism has raised questions as to the adequacy of exist- ing security procedures and the international consequences of their failure. In the 1970s a number of studies were generally critical of security practices at U.S. civil nuclear facilities. These studies stimu- lated considerable debate as to the extent of the problem in the United States and in other states where security procedures were uncertain and the threat presumably greater. Following a declaration on the urgency of the problem at the 1975 NPT review conference, the {AEA published recommendations on lev- els of physical protection for nuclear materials and facilities based on their relative sensitivity. The United States and other states took steps to bring their regulatory requirements into line with these recommen- dations. The Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines included agreed standards for the levels of physical protection that were to be maintained for nuclear exports. The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 made adequate physi- cal protection a condition of nuclear export licenses and of new or amended agreements for cooperation. The act also called for the negoti- ation of an international agreement that would establish international procedures to be followed in the event of diversion, theft, or sabotage of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities. In addition, the act required that adequate physical security be established for any interna- tional shipment of significant quantities of uranium or special nuclear materials.

NON-PROLIFERATION 251 Recognizing the problem of physical security, the {AEA negotiated the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This convention now stands as the principal international instrument deal- ing with the threat of subnational proliferation. It was opened for signa- ture on March 3, 1980, and now has been signed by 37 states and Euratom and ratified by 10 states, including the United States and the Soviet Union. It will enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification or accession. The convention seeks to ensure adequate physical protection of nu- clear materials during international transport by requiring each party to assure that the levels of physical protection in the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines will be applied to any nuclear materials that it imports or exports or that move through its territory. The convention also provides for international cooperation in protecting threatened nuclear material and in ensuring the recovery and return of material that has been seized or stolen. Finally, the convention obligates its parties to enact criminal penalties for such activities as the theft of nuclear materials; unauthorized possession, use, transfer, alteration, or disposal of such materials; or the threat to use nuclear materials for purposes of blackmail. While most states would probably welcome the existence of the convention, the underlying problem is how far the security procedures for civil nuclear facilities can and should be inter- nationalized given the inherently national character of securing do- mestic activities. THE ADEQUACY AND SUFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS Essential Characteristics There appears to be general agreement that international safeguards are necessary for an effective non-proliferation regime. A wide range of views exists, however, as to whether the existing and anticipated safe- guards are sul7%cient to ensure the regime's integrity. International safeguards provide an agreed mechanism for demon- strating and verifying compliance with commitments not to divert safe- guarded material or equipment to any military or explosive use and not to transfer it to any non-nuclear weapon state without safeguards. They also provide detailed knowledge of the location, status, and use of safe- guarded material or equipment. In addition, they act as separate legal commitments to the IAEA not to engage in such diversion or transfer.

252 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL These commitments, contained in every safeguards agreement, rein- force commitments made to the supplier or contained in multilateral treaties such as the NET. In some cases they can even fill gaps in these other commitments. To illustrate the difference that safeguards make, it is useful to com- pare two existing facilities in Israel: the unsafeguarded Dimona reactor and the safeguarded research reactor at Soreq. It is not known how the Dimona reactor has been operated, how much plutonium it has pro- duced, whether the plutonium has been reprocessed, or what may have been done with the reprocessed plutonium. Israel has given no legal or political assurances not to use the plutonium from this reactor to make nuclear explosives. In the case of the safeguarded Soreq reactor, on the other hand, the IDEA has firsthand and continuing knowledge of how it has been operated, how much nuclear material has been supplied to it, and the form, location, and use of that material. Israel has a legal commitment not to divert this plutonium to any military or explosive use and to permit the TAEA to verify compliance with that commitment. In judging whether existing safeguards are sufficient to prevent pro- liferation through international nuclear commerce, it is essential to recognize the substantial contribution that safeguards can make to reduce the risk of proliferation. While it would undoubtedly be possible to improve the existing system, it is extremely unlikely that a system anywhere near as effective as the existing one would be accepted inter- nationally if it had to be negotiated from scratch at the present time. This reflects both the loss by the United States of its monopolistic position as a nuclear supplier and the increasing resistance to nuclear export controls by the developing states. In considering these problems that relate to the international charac- ter of the IAEA, it should be recognized that safeguards administered by individual states, rather than the IAEA, are in general probably no longer a practical alternative. Consider, for example, a state that im- ported reactors from the Federal Republic of Germany and Canadian uranium enriched in the United States and fabricated into fuel in Belgium. The NET requires each of those suppliers to insist that its export be covered by international safeguards, and each supplier would presumably insist on some form of safeguards even if it were not bound by the treaty. If each chose to apply bilateral safeguards, the customer state would have four sets of inspectors to deal with and four groups to whom it was obligated to furnish records and reports. Each supplier would also have to staff and fund its own complete safeguards effort. The result would probably be viewed as an unacceptable burden by the

NON-PROLIFERATION 253 recipient state and a costly and unnecessary duplication of effort by each of the supplier states. Technical Considerations Safeguards are designed with several objectives: to keep track of nuclear materials; to make sure that they continue to be used for known, nonmilitary, nonexplosive purposes; and to detect any diversion of the materials to military, explosive, or unknown purposes. In gen- eral, they are intended to deter diversion by providing a high risk of detection and timely notice of its occurrence, and to provide assurance that such diversion has not occurred. Safeguards consist of a complex of interrelated measures: a compre- hensive system of checking and cross-checking the records of relevant facilities and reports of each significant change in location of nuclear material; verification by such means as surveillance of key locations by monitoring cameras and other instrumentation; physical inspections, measurements, and sampling and observation by inspection personnel; and the use of seals and other techniques to help ensure that no unre- ported movement of materials has occurred. Approximately 5 to 10 kg of separated plutonium or 15 to 20 kg of highly enriched uranium are needed to make a nuclear explosive. The TAEA considers 25 kg of the latter the significant benchmark with regard to Tosses in the fabrication process. To account for all of the fissionable material in a large peaceful nu- clear program, safeguards must be applied to a wide range of materials and facilities. Most of the material under safeguards is not in a suitable form for use in weapons and would have to be further processed in other facilities before it could be used to make a nuclear explosive. Fission- able materials that could be diverted for use in weapons are in very different forms. This affects both their availability and the practical problems of applying safeguards. Where the fissionable material i contained in discrete, countable items such as reactor fuel rods, ac- countabiiity is relatively straightforward. Where it is in undifferenti- ate(1 bulk form, such as a liquid solution or gas flowing through a facility's pipes, the technical problem can be very complex. The largest quantity of safeguarded nuclear material is located in light-water power reactors. These are among the simplest facilities to safeguard with a high degree of confidence. The fresh fuel is slightly enriched uranium, which could not be used directly to make a weapon. While this fuel is in the operating reactor core, it is totally inaccessible.

254 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL Spent fuel, which contains significant quantities of plutonium produced during power production, is discharged from the reactor about once a year directly into a storage pool. There it remains in discrete, highly visible, countable items that are heavy, hot, and very radioactive, emit- ting a characteristic glow from the Cherenkov effect. These irradiated fuel elements can be removed from the pool only by heavy-duty remote handling techniques and must be put directly into heavy, specially de- signed shipping casks because of their high residual radioactivity. Fast breeder reactors present major additional safeguards problems. They contain a very large inventory of plutonium in their fresh fuel (typically enough for several tens of weapons and in a high enough concentration to make direct use for that purpose at least theoretically possible). Additional plutonium is also produced in blanket material around the reactor. Research reactors range from very small reactors, whose inventories and annual throughputs are insignificant in terms of the requirements for a nuclear weapon, to large reactors that use or produce significant quantities of weapons-usable material. There are a few research reac- tors fueled by highly enriched uranium or capable of producing signifi- cant quantities of plutonium. The most sensitive type of research facility is the so-called fast-critical facility, where highly enriched ura- nium or plutonium in large enough quantities for a weapon are easily accessible in metallic form. There are only a few known facilities of this type, all located in states considered "safe" from a proliferation stand- point. Facilities for the fabrication of fuel from natural or low-enriched ura- nium are the least sensitive of the bulk-handling facilities. These facili- ties contain large quantities of uranium in bulk form and in scrap, which increases the difficulty of precisely accounting for materials, but these materials are a number of steps removed from being usable in weapons. Facilities for the fabrication of fuel from highly enriched ura- nium or plutonium, where accountability problems are combined with the greater sensitivity of the materials, present much greater risks. Reprocessing facilities, where spent reactor fuel is dissolved to re- cover plutonium and enriched uranium, present the problem of large quantities of weapons-usable material coupled with a difficult problem of materials accounting. These materials are in liquid form in a complex facility where it is difficult for even the operators to know precisely how much material may be tied up within the system. Since possible discrep- ancies may amount to 1 to 2 percent of the throughput, this may be a serious problem in large facilities, where the material unaccounted for can constitute an appreciable quantity of weapons-usable material.

NON-PROLIFERA~ION 255 Most uranium enrichment facilities are in practice operated to pro- duce Tow-enriched uranium, but many could be operated or modified to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons. Most operating enrichment plants use either the gaseous diffusion process or the centri- fuge process. Both processes present the problem of an unusually com- plex facility with large inventories of material, particularly in the case of gaseous diffusion, tied up in the system. The problem of safeguarding these facilities is further compounded by concern that intrusive proce- dures might disclose details of the technology that could help other states build or improve their own enrichment facilities. Effective ways of dealing with these facilities have been studied, but this remains on the frontier of safeguards development. Timely Warning One objective of safeguards is to provide "timely warning" of the diversion of nuclear materials to military, explosive, or unknown uses. Timely warning means that the monitoring organization is alerted in time to allow other interested parties to prevent the offending state from converting the diverted material to weapons. How much weight should be given to this objective in judging the efficacy of safeguards has been perhaps the most hotly debated safeguards issue in the United States in recent years. The proponents of a strict interpretation of the timely warning test argue that it cannot be satisfied in situations where critical quantities of weapons-grade fissionable material are readily available to a state that has already acquired the other capabilities and made the necessary preparations to manufacture a nuclear explosive. This argument sim- ply underscores the fact that access to critical quantities of weapons- usable material by a non-nuclear weapon state could be the final step in its acquisition of the technical capability to make a nuclear weapon. In light of this potential risk, proponents of a strict interpretation of the timely warning test believe that weapons-usable materials should not be available to any non-nuclear weapon state. Those who disagree with this viewpoint do not deny the theoretical risk but believe that considerable weight should also be given to other factors, such as whether the state in question already has access to substantial quantities of weapons-usable material and whether there is any evidence that it might have decided to develop nuclear explosives. Thus, they question whether this argument should be used to prevent the acquisition of additional quantities of weapons-usable material by Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany, each of which already has

256 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL substantial quantities of such material. In neither case is there any evidence of interest in violating or abrogating the present safeguards agreements, and both states have substantial political disincentives to their taking such actions. The 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act deals with this issue by re- quiring a formal judgment before the United States consents to the reprocessing abroad of nuclear materials originating in the United States or to international transfers of plutonium that the risk of prolif- eration would not significantly increase. "Foremost consideration" must be given to whether the reprocessing or retransfer would take place "under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device." This legislative compromise did not dispose of the underlying issue as to what mix of capabilities and intentions constitutes prolifera- tion. Coverage A set of important but complicated issues relates to what activities safeguards must cover to achieve the intent of the safeguards regime. Safeguards on Exports Versus Full-Scope Safeguards. The non-nu- clear weapon state parties to the NPT are required to accept safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities, a provision defined as "full scope" safeguards. In contrast, the export provisions of the NPT only require safeguards on the nuclear material or equipment actually ex- ported by any of its parties to a non-nuclear weapon state and on any special nuclear material produced with these exports. In other words, the state receiving these exports is not required to have full-scope safe- guards on all of its own nuclear activities unless it also is a party to the NPr. Historically, the reason for this formulation was that the United States was not sure when the treaty was being negotiated that all of its European allies and major trading partners would join the treaty. In these circumstances the United States did not want to create a treaty commitment that might require it to violate its existing nuclear supply agreements. This reason no longer carries much weight, since most U.S. allies that are non-nuclear weapon states and with which the United States has nuclear cooperation agreements (including all of those in NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) have joined the treaty. This arrangement provides assurance that the exporter is not adding to the stock of fissionable material that the recipient could le-

NON-PROLIFERATION 257 gaily use for nuclear explosives. However, the recipient state can use safeguarded nuclear imports to build a peaceful nuclear power program and technical base while maintaining separate unsafeguarded facili- ties to make nuclear explosives. Short of amending the NET, exporters can make it a unilateral condi- tion of export that importers accept full-scope safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The importer then has to choose between obtaining the benefits of nuclear imports from any supplier having this requirement or foregoing these benefits to escape international non- proliferation controls on all of its nuclear activities. For at least the next decade (and probably considerably longer), it will be virtually impos- sible for any non-nuclear weapon state other than the major suppliers themselves to develop a nuclear power industry without importing ma- jor components or materials. Thus, if all major nuclear supplier coun- tries required full-scope safeguards as a condition for exports, it would exert powerful leverage on most states with a serious interest in nuclear power. U.S. law now requires full-scope safeguards as a condition of most nuclear exports. This has not solved the problem but has made it a triangular issue among the United States (together with Canada, Aus- traTia, and Sweden, which have comparable policies), supplier countries (such as France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which have re- sisted this export condition), and importing non-nuclear weapon states without full-scope safeguards. Even in the United States, debate con- tinues as to whether the full-scope safeguards condition should be ex- tended to cover exports of nonnuclear components of nuclear facilities and related materials such as heavy water. In fact, pending congres- sional legislation that is opposed by the Reagan Administration pro- poses such an extension. The stated French argument against a full-scope safeguards require- ment rests on the doctrinal point that it is improper to use supply condi- tions to deprive a recipient country of its "sovereign right" to decide what it does with domestic materials and equipment that are not sup- plied by others. In response, the United States has maintained that the effectiveness of the safeguards on exports is affected by whether or not the recipient country has safeguards on its other nuclear facilities. The United States has also pointed out that the requirement does not in fact deprive a country of its sovereign right of decision. It simply makes the country face a harder decision, since it could still go ahead with its internal program if it were prepared to forego foreign imports. Some members of the nuclear industry have argued against the full-scope safeguards requirement on the grounds that it is unrealistic to hope

258 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL that it will be made universal. Consequently, they contend, those sup- plier states that ignore the requirement will quickly capture the mar- ket. Some supporters of a strong non-proliferation policy have also argued against the full-scope safeguards requirement, saying that it encourages independent nuclear programs and nuclear trade among the states interested in resisting international controls. While this con- sideration is relevant for countries without a serious interest in peace- fu] nuclear power, it does not apply to countries that are deeply involved in nuclear technology, since they will have to depend at least in part on imports from the major supplier countries for some time to come. De Cure Versus De Facto Ful7~-Scope Safeguards. The NPT includes a commitment by its non-nuclear weapon parties to accept IAEA safe- guards on all of their present and future peaceful nuclear activities. These are known as de jure full-scope safeguards. The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 introduced a variant known as de facto full- scope safeguards. The act makes it a condition of supply that, at the time of export, the recipient must have all of its peaceful nuclear activities under international safeguards. However, the act does not require a legal commitment to place all future peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards. This provision was included to make the full-scope safe- guards condition more acceptable to non-NPT states. The principal lev- erage behind a full-scope safeguards requirement is the disadvantage of being cut off from nuclear imports. A de facto full-scope safeguards requirement preserves this leverage in practice, but at the same time leaves open the future option of developing nuclear weapons if the state should decide that this objective is sufficiently important to justify fore- going further nuclear imports. The de facto approach clearly provides less protection against future proliferation than cle jure full-scope safeguards. De facto safeguards would enable a state to acquire a substantial nuclear power program through imports and then, when its dependence on further imports decreased, to decide to build an unsafeguarded fuel cycle for weapons purposes without breaking any international agreement. In reality, the state would probably continue to need spare parts for existing reactors, as well as new reactors, for which further imports from the major sup- plier states would be necessary. The United States is the only exporter to have adopted the de facto variant offull-scope safeguards. The other chiefproponents offull-scope safeguards (Canada, Sweden, and AustraTia) have criticized this ap- proach as an undesirable compromise.

NON-PROLIFERATION 259 The Retroactivity of Full-Scope Safeguards. The Nuclear Non-Prolif- eration Act of 1978 required the cutoff of exports under existing contrac- tual arrangements if a recipient non-nuclear weapon state did not, within two years of its enactment, meet the condition of de facto full- scope safeguards. Thus, the law was retroactive in the sense that it required a unilateral modification of previously agreed terms after a two-year grace period. The proponents of this provision argued that the new requirement was essential to achieve comprehensive de facto full-scope safeguards. Moreover, they pointed out that this modification fell within a provision in the existing contracts that exports be subject to the laws, regulations, and licensing requirements of the United States. However, it can be questioned whether that clause was originally intended to cover laws that fundamentally changed the conditions ofthe sale. In any event, the unilateral imposition of this new condition drew substantial interna- tional criticism. The practical policy issue resulting from the new requirement was dramatically illustrated by the case of fuel shipments to India's Tarapur reactors. The agreement for cooperation with India signed in 1963 pro- vided that the United States would furnish all of the fuel for the Tarapur reactors until 1993 and that the Indians would use no other fuel in the reactors. The safeguards requirements and other non-proliferation con- trols (such as the need for U.S. consent to the reprocessing of the spent fuel in Indian facilities) were tied to this guaranteed fuel supply, as was the clarification obtained by the United States in 1974 that India would not use this fuel in any nuclear explosive, even if labeled "peaceful." When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act forced the United States to terminate fuel deliveries to India, India took the position that since this was a material breach of the agreement, India was relieved of its recip- rocal obligations. Among other things, this jeopardized the safeguards on the substantial quantities of spent fuel that had accumulated at the reactor site. More broadly, it reduced U.S. influence on Indian nuclear policy and adversely affected relations between India and the United States in general. A compromise settlement was finally worked out in which the United States waived the Indian obligation to buy the fuel for the reactors exclusively from the United States, and France agreed to supply fuel under the existing limited safeguards arrangements. While this settlement failed to institute the ale facto full-scope safeguards on the Indian program, proponents of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act argued that failing to apply the legislation to India would have been widely viewed as a lack of determination to enforce its full-scope safe-

260 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL guards requirement. Furthermore, they noted that it would have com- plicated efforts to obtain safeguards over Pakistan's enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Efforts by the United States to persuade other countries to adopt full-scope safeguards as a condition of their nuclear exports have attempted to avoid this retroactivity problem and the issue of breach of existing agreements by suggesting that this require- ment be applied only as a condition of future supply commitments. Safeguarding Transfers of Technology. The NPT requires safe- guards on transfers of nuclear materials and equipment. It does not require safeguards as a condition of the transfer of information about nuclear technology. The problem this can create was illustrated by the Indian construction of an unsafeguarded power reactor on the basis of the designs and know-how India acquired from Canada in connection with the construction of a safeguarded Canadian reactor. To deal with problems arising from technology transfer, the Federal Republic of Germany (as part of its agreement to sell safeguarded repro- cessing and enrichment facilities to Brazil) and France (as part of its agreement to sell a safeguarded reprocessing plant to Pakistan) re- quired that any plants of the same general type built by the recipient in the next 20 years would have to be put under IAEA safeguards since they would be presumed to have benefited from the transferred technol- ogy. The Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines of 1977 reflected this tightening of safeguards, but only with respect to sensitive nuclear technology, i.e., technology relating to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water pro- duction plants. The tighter safeguards would not have covered the Toop- hole exploited by India when it constructed an unsafeguarded power reactor based on the design of the safeguarded Canadian reactor. This problem does not arise where the recipient has a clejure full-scope safe- guards commitment, since all of its future nuclear facilities automati- cally come under IAEA safeguards. Consequently, this loophole is an issue only with non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT. Safeguards on Exports to NucIcar Weapon States. The NPT does not obligate a nuclear weapon state to safeguard its own nuclear programs or to require safeguards on nuclear exports to other nuclear weapon states. The rationale was that since these states were allowed to pro- duce nuclear weapons, it did nothing for non-proliferation to demon- strate that certain other parts of their nuclear programs were peaceful. Moreover, this requirement would have diverted scarce IAEA resources from the task of verifying that the fundamental purpose of the NPT was being fulfilled.

NON-PROLIFERATION 261 Initially, non-nuclear weapon states often complained that the result- ing discrimination could adversely affect their civil nuclear programs by revealing commercial secrets. The United States and the United Kingdom attempted to mollify those complaints by voluntarily placing some of their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. France subsequently took a similar, though more limited, action. In 1982 the Soviet Union also made a similar offer and is currently negoti- ating an agreement with the IAEA to implement it. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act also does not require--full-scope safeguards as a condition of exports to nuclear weapon states, but it does call for "safeguards as required in the agreement for cooperation." U.S. commercial nuclear exports to the United Kingdom and France are covered by international safeguards agreements. Current efforts to en- ter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation with China have re- opened the issue. The question has been asked whether the require- ments of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act would be met if such an agreement included no safeguards. It has been argued that safeguards are necessary to verify compliance with the basic statutory require- ment that materials and equipment exported for civil uses not be di- verted to any military use. These are significant questions, since China is not a member of the NPT and has in the past denounced the non- proliferation regime as discriminatory against the Third World. Adequacy of Safeguards Agreements Another set of issues relates to the adequacy of the safeguards agree- ments negotiated with the IAEA. Prohibition on All Nuclear Explosives. The NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines both require safeguards against diversion to any nuclear explosive device, regardless of its intended use. This is to avoid a loophole by which a nation might develop nuclear explosives for pur- poses asserted to be "peaceful." There is general agreement that a nuclear explosive device suitable for peaceful applications, such as nuclear excavation or the stimulation of oil or gas wells, would be usable as a weapon and could not be devel- oped without acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, some earlier safeguards agreements, including that with India, simply required guarantees of "peaceful" use and safeguards against use "to further any military purpose." India asserted that its 1974 nuclear detonation, which did not use safeguarded material, was compatible with its assurances of peaceful use, since it was part of a program di-

262 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL rected at peaceful applications. Disagreeing with this interpretation, the United States sought clarifications from all nonparties to the NPT with which it had similar earlier agreements that they would not inter- pret the safeguards on U.S. nuclear exports in the same way. The IAEA took the position that any nuclear explosive device inher- ently furthers a military purpose. It has insisted in all safeguards agreements since the Indian explosion on language explicitly preclud- ing any military or explosive use, while maintaining that this was the meaning of the earlier language. Some of the principal holdouts from the NPT, notably India, Pakistan, Argentina, and Brazil, are still con- testing this position. They assert that this concept stems from the NPT, to which they have not agreed, and that their option to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes should not be restricted. Duration. In connection with the purchase of a reactor from the Fed- eral Republic of Germany in the early 1970s, Argentina negotiated a safeguards agreement having an initial duration of only five years, extendable by agreement of the parties. In view of the expected 40-year life of the reactor, the duration of the agreement was obviously inade- quate. Consequently, the IAEA established a policy that the duration of a safeguards agreement should be reasonably related to the life of the facility and that, once applied, safeguards should continue as long as the safeguarded facility or material could be misused for explosive pur- poses, regardless of the duration of the agreement under which they were initiated. This policy was embodied in the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines in 1977 and in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. It has also been reflected in all safeguards agreements subsequently negotiated by the {AEA with nonparties to the NPT. Limitation of Safeguards to Declared Facilities. {AEA safeguarding activities are carried out only at declared facilities, and the IAEA does not have the right to Took for undeclared facilities. However, safeguards agreements negotiated under the NPT obligate the state to declare all existing peaceful nuclear activities and to notify the {AEA of any future acquisitions of nuclear materials or equipment. Therefore, failure to declare a facility or nuclear import would in itself be a material breach of the safeguards agreement. In this connection, national intelligence resources have considerable capability to discover not only undeclared facilities but illegal imports as well. As will be apparent in the discussions of problem states in the final part of this chapter, national intelligence has been very successful in providing "timely warning" of the existence of activities outside the

NON-PROLIFERATION 263 safeguards regime. While some of the details of these programs and the ultimate intention of the governments may not be well known, the ability to identify the existence of undeclared activities, which is all that is necessary to verify compliance with the NPT obligation to de- cIare all facilities, demonstrates the power of national intelligence to reinforce IAEA safeguards on declared facilities. National intelligence presumably has obtained, and is capable of obtaining, considerably more information on foreign nuclear programs than has been macle public. The extent of this undisclosed information and the unpredict- able nature of future intelligence capabilities further deter states under the safeguards regime from undertaking clandestine activities contrary to their obligations under the NPT or other international commitments. Inspection Rights The IAEA Statute, to which all states (including China) with serious nuclear activities are now parties, provides that IAEA safeguards in- spectors shall have broad access to facilities and persons concerned with nuclear activities. Specifically, it provides that inspectors shall have "access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment or facilities which are required . . . to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source or special nuclear materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose . . . and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned." It also declares that {AEA inspectors shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the state concerned, if that state so requests, "provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions." Most safeguards agreements actually negotiated under this provision limit the frequency of routine inspections, depending on the quantity of sensitive material present at the facility. They also limit the access of normal inspection to certain agreed "strategic points" at the facility. This access is often limited even further by confidential "sub- sidiary arrangements," in which the IAEA and the state agree on how inspection will normally be implemented in practice. But the IAEA has the right to make special inspections, where the circumstances war- rant, without regard to these limitations. The IAEA has the theoretical right to make surprise inspections, but in practice arrangements must be made for visas and travel except

264 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL where there is resident inspection. Consequently, advance notice is al- most always given before an inspection takes place. The agreements also entitle the host state to reject particular inspectors as Tong as such rejection does not impede the exercise of the IAEA's responsibilities. There have been instances of abuse of this right, such as Iraq's refusal during an earlier period to accept any inspectors that were not nationals of the Warsaw Pact countries. Potential Loopholes. Critics point out that there are a number of potential loopholes in the safeguards regime. Since the NPT only re- quires a commitment not to make nuclear explosives, NPT safeguards permit a state to withdraw materials from safeguards if it declares that those materials are to be used for a nonexplosive military purpose such as submarine propulsion. This apparently glaring loophole, which was included in the NPT in response to earlier desires of certain NATO allies to retain an option to develop nuclear-powered submarines and war- ships, has in fact never been exercised by any party to the NPr. The principal protection against abuse ofthis right is to provide by separate agreements (as the United States does in all of its agreements for civil cooperation) that special nuclear materials derived from commercial exports may not be used for any military purpose. Safeguards are designed to ensure that nuclear materials are ac- counted for and that they are not being used in a nuclear explosive program. They do not require any authorization for specific uses short of those prohibited. Thus, if safeguards inspectors found declared and safeguarded highly enriched uranium or plutonium fabricated into shapes suitable for nuclear explosives, they would have no authority to object so Tong as the material remained accounted for and was not actu- ally made into a weapon, although they would presumably report the finding. The proposed international plutonium storage system under discussion in the IAEA could partially remedy this defect. Implementation of Existing Safeguards Whatever the theoretical effectiveness of the existing safeguards re- gime, a general question remains as to how effectively the IAEA uses its existing safeguards rights. Opinions on this issue differ considerably and reflect a complex of practical political and bureaucratic problems involved in operating the safeguards system. The IAEA has limited funds to carry out its safeguard functions. These funds are restricted both by the total resources provided by member states and by the de- mands of a majority of the member states that the IAEA devote a

NON-PROLIFERATION 265 greater proportion of its resources to assist the development of nuclear energy than to safeguards. For example, in 1984 the total budget of the IAEA was $130 million, of which $32.5 million was for safeguards. Moreover, in view of demands for nondiscriminatory treatment, the IAEA cannot necessarily allocate its limited safeguards resources on a priority basis to the states that are the most serious proliferation risks. The {AEA also has a continuing problem of finding and retaining technically qualified safeguards personnel, who must be selected with regard to "geographical balance." More serious is the inherent question of the willingness of international civil servants to take the politically difficult or even dangerous actions involved in charging that safe- guards have been materially violated. Finally, the Board of Governors of the IAEA is a very broadly based political body, representing 34 countries. This raises the question ofthe board's willingness to fulfill its function in finding that a material violation has occurred and to call for implementation of the sanctions contemplated by the IAEA Statute. At the same time, it can be argued that, if the safeguards system discov- ered a serious violation, it would soon be widely known and the interna- tional community would be fully informed about the problem. HOLDOUTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME The most immediate and challenging problem in the field of non- proliferation is how to deal with the small number of states that have deliberately avoided international commitments and controls in order to preserve a nuclear weapons option that some of them appear to be pursuing. These states must be persuaded that the acquisition of nu- clear weapons would not be in their net interest. This is a formidable diplomatic task. The circumstances are so varied that each country requires separate analysis, and even this must be adjusted to account for changes of lead- ership and local conditions. For example, in the case of Israel the United States has considerable potential leverage, but its use is subject to se- vere domestic political constraints. In the cases of Korea and Taiwan the United States has great leverage and has used it effectively. In the case of Pakistan, competing security and foreign policy objectives have af- fected the United States' willingness to use its available leverage. With others, such as Libya, the United States has little or no direct influence and must rely on other concerned states. In every case the relative priority to be given to non-proliferation is an issue. The most effective diplomatic efforts in this area are usually bilateral, but it is obviously

266 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL important that other countries not undercut these efforts and, if possi- ble, that they be reinforced through other direct diplomatic approaches. The Countries of Greatest Near-Term Concern The six countries generally considered to present the greatest near- term risks of proliferation are India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. Each of them has avoided formal commitments to the international non-proliferation regime. None is a party to the NPT; none has accepted full-scope safeguards; neither Argentina nor Brazil has brought the Treaty of TIateloIco into effect; and Argentina and Pakistan have not ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Ind is The only one of this group that is known to have demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability is India, which in 1974 carried out an underground fission explosion that it insisted was for "peaceful" pur- poses. India has a large cadre of trained nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. Its unsafeguarded facilities include a large research reactor at Trombay that produced the plutonium for the 1974 explosion, a reprocessing plant at Trombay that reprocessed the plutonium, and a reprocessing plant at Tarapur that will be under safeguards only while reprocessing fuel from safeguarded reactors. It has a number of other unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under construction, including several power reactors and an experimental fast breeder reactor. A change of administration in India in 1977 led to the apparent sus- pension of its nuclear explosive program. But Indira Gandhi, who origi- nally authorized the 1974 explosion, returned to power in 1980 and there have been recurrent concerns that the program may be revived. While India has repeatedly disclaimed any intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons, it has cited China's nuclear weapons capability as a major reason against forswearing a future option to do so. India is also obviously concerned about Pakistan's nuclear developments, which were in turn spurred on by the 1974 Indian detonation. The principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to India are to head off the resumption of its nuclear explosive program and to per- suade it to continue to maintain a prudent export policy that minimizes the risk of India's becoming a source of further proliferation. Since it is no longer possible to deprive India of the capability to manufacture some nuclear weapons, the practical problem is to persuade it that nuclear weapons are not in its overall interest and that it should refrain from further developments in this direction. Failure to contain Paki- stan's nuclear weapon developments would make this task extremely difficult if not impossible.

NON-PROLIFERATION 267 Pakistan. Pakistan has been constructing a large, unsafeguarded centrifuge enrichment plant using plans stolen from the URENCO enrichment facility in the Netherlands and parts and components procured from various Western sources. Pakistan also has an un- safeguarded fuel fabrication facility and is constructing an unsafe- guarded reprocessing facility. The only known indigenous source of plutonium for the reprocessing facility is the safeguarded power reactor at Kanupp. While the TAEA earlier acknowledged some deficiencies in its safeguards arrangements at that reactor, these problems have re- portedly been remedied. Over the years considerable evidence has accu- mulated indicating that Pakistan was headed toward a nuclear explosive capability. At the same time, there are important disincentives to a Pakistani decision to carry its nuclear weapons option all the way to a nuclear explosion. This event would almost certainly lead to the resumption of the Indian nuclear weapons program. It would probably also result in a cutoffof U.S. economic and military aid under the present five-year $3.2 billion program, since the authorizing legislation calls for such a cutoff if the recipient detonates a nuclear explosive device or transfers such a device to a non-nuclear weapon state. The transfer provision was in- cluded in view of the concern, which Pakistan claims is unfounded, that it might be persuaded to help other Muslim states acquire a nuclear explosive capability. Pakistan is also reportedly interested in acquiring an additional power reactor from Western sources, although it is not clear how it would pay for it. The United States has attempted to per- suade potential European suppliers that they should insist on a full- scope safeguards commitment from Pakistan as a condition of such a sale. The principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to Pakistan are to head off a test of a nuclear device; to inhibit the completion of its unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing facilities; to obtain full- scope safeguards coverage and, if possible, an explicit dedication of the enrichment facility to low enrichment; and to persuade Pakistan to maintain a prudent nuclear export policy that minimizes the risk of its becoming a source of further proliferation. Israel. The declared policy of Israel has Tong been that it would not tee the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Neverthe- less, Israel is generally believed to have the capability to manufacture a nuclear weapon on very short notice if it has not already done so. As Tong ago as 1976, a senior CIA official stated that Israel was estimated to have a stockpile of 10 to 20 weapons or their necessary components. Israel has a strong base of highly trained nuclear scientists, engi-

268 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL neers, and technicians. It has an unsafeguarded research reactor capa- ble of producing enough plutonium for at least one bomb a year and an unsafeguarded reprocessing facility. In addition, it may have acquired enough highly enriched uranium for a number of nuclear weapons from a U.S. facility that could not account for the Toss of the material under . . . . . ncr~m~na sing circumstances. Israel has been careful to maintain a studied ambiguity between its declared nuclear policy and its nuclear capabilities. Apparently, it wishes to maintain an implicit nuclear deterrent while avoiding an open confrontation on the nuclear issue with its neighbors. The principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to Israel are to head off a nuclear detonation, to discourage the deployment of any weapons that might exist, and to persuade Israel that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not in its net interest. Above all, Israel should be dissuaded from shifting to an openly declared military policy based on a nuclear deterrent. In pursuing these objectives, the United States has much more potential leverage than in the case of any other high-risk country if it is prepared to use it. South Africa The principal focus of proliferation concern in South Africa is its unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant, which is proba- bly capable of producing highly enriched uranium from ample supplies of indigenous uranium. In 1977 a Soviet satellite reconnaissance dis- covered apparent preparations for an underground nuclear weapon test in the Kalahari Desert, which were privately called to the attention of the U.S. government. As a result of strong diplomatic approaches by the United States and others, plans for the test were apparently discontin- ued. In 1979 a U.S. satellite recorded a signal that many initially thought to be from a nuclear detonation over the ocean between South Africa and Antarctica. A prestigious group of scientists appointed by President Carter concluded that the signal was most likely caused by a micrometeor triggering the detection device and not by a nuclear explo- sion; nevertheless, an element of suspicion has remained. Attempts to persuade South Africa to join the NET and to subject its enrichment facility to safeguards have proved unavailing. While a nu- clear weapon capability would single it out from its potential African adversaries, the military relevance of nuclear weapons to South Africa's security problems is not obvious. The principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to South Africa, in addition to persuading it that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not in its best interest, are to head off a nuclear detonation; to persuade it to accept safeguards on its enrichment facility and, if

NON-PROLIFERATION 269 possible, on all of its nuclear activities; to dedicate its enrichment plant to the production of Tow-enriched uranium; and to persuade it to con- tinue to maintain a prudent nuclear export policy that will minimize the risk of its becoming a source of further proliferation. The South Afri- can government has recently announced that it will accept safeguards on its projected commercial enrichment plant (but not on its operating pilot plant) and will require safeguards on all of its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states. Argentina The proliferation concern in Argentina, which has indig- enous uranium resources and is acquiring a large heavy water produc- tion plant, focuses on an unsafeguarded reprocessing plant, a large unsafeguarded research reactor that has Tong been planned, and a re- cently announced unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility that is under construction. There appears to be no evidence of a definitive decision by Argentina to acquire nuclear explosives or undertake a program with that end. There are differences of view as to whether the Falkland crisis in- creased the likelihood that the Argentines might move in this direction. The recent change of government in Argentina appears to present a new opportunity to pursue the principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to the country: to persuade it on economic grounds not to proceed with the enrichment plant or, if it does, to subject the plant to safeguards and dedicate it to Tow enrichment; to proceed with ratification of the Treaty of TIateloIco and the negotiation of a full-scope safeguards agree- ment with the IAEA; and to exercise prudence in its nuclear exports so as to minimize the risk of its becoming a source of further proliferation. The last of these objectives is important because of Argentina's past aspirations to become a nuclear supplier to Third World countries. Brazil. The focus of proliferation concern in Brazil has been its 1975 agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to acquire a uranium enrichment facility and a reprocessing plant. Under the agreement, both facilities would be placed under IAEA safeguards, as would any of their output and any facilities of the same type built by Brazil in the next 20 years. Although the agreement was concluded in 1975, none of the facilities is yet in operation, and there has been a major cutback in the scope of the Brazilian nuclear power program. There have been reports, however, that Brazil is conducting research on advanced iso- tope separation techniques, which would not be covered by the safe- guards provision of the German agreement. While Brazil now has a number of minor unsafeguarded facilities,

270 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL there is some prospect that it may soon be covered by cle facto full-scope safeguards. Brazil has not yet carried out its commitment in the Treaty of TIateloIco to negotiate a full-scope safeguards agreement. After rati- fying the treaty, Brazil made its entry into force contingent on all Lati In American countries joining the treaty and all eligible countries joining its protocols. This requires Argentina and Cuba to adhere to the treaty (although Brazil might waive the latter requirement) and completion of the pending French ratification of Protocol I. Thus, non-proliferation objectives in Brazil are to achieve full-scope safeguards coverage, to complete the preconditions so that the Treaty of TIateloico will come into force for Brazil, to persuade Brazil that a nuclear explosive program would not be in its security or economic interests, and to persuade Brazil to exercise prudence in its nuclear exports so as to minimize the risk of its becoming a source of further proliferation. Other Holdouts. Cuba's limited technical capabilities make its threat of proliferation less severe than for that of any of the six countries listed above, but it is acquiring a safeguarded research reactor and a safeguarded power reactor from the Soviet Union. Although there is a question in this case whether the Soviet Union will follow its usual practice of requiring the return of the spent fuel, Cuba will probably continue to have de facto full-scope safeguards. Moreover, the Soviet Union is committed by the NPT not to help or encourage Cuba to ac- quire a nuclear explosive capability, and it seems most unlikely that it would tolerate independent Cuban efforts in that direction. Future pro- liferation concerns about Cuba would be greatly reduced if Cuba signed and ratified the Treaty of TIateloIco, an action that the Soviet Union should be in a position to encourage. As discussed above, Cuba's signing and ratifying the treaty would put great pressure on Argentina to ratify, which would bring the treaty into force for all Latin American coun- tries. ~ Notwithstanding their acceptance of full-scope safeguards and other obligations of the NPT, there has been some concern about the actual intentions of a few parties to the NPT. The most notable of these is Libya, whose leader has reportedly made a number of unsuccessful efforts to acquire nuclear weapons directly from other states. These actions, coupled with his open support for terrorist organizations and activities, justify greater proliferation concerns about Libya than its immediate technical capabilities would indicate. Libya has little capa- bility to produce nuclear weapons indigenously, even though it is ac- quiring a safeguarded research reactor and plans to acquire a safe-

NON-PROLIFERATION 271 guarded power reactor from the Soviet Union. This situation would be substantially improved if the Soviet Union required the return of the spent fuel, as it has previously done in similar situations. The Middle Eastern parties to the NPT that have aroused some prolif- eration concern are Iraq and Iran. The former was building a safe- guarded nuclear research center, which may have presented some proliferation risks, but this was destroyed in 1981 by Israeli bombing. Reconstruction of the facility has not yet begun. Tran's extremely ambi- tious civil nuclear program under the Shah was suspended by the Kho- meini government, but there are reports that Iran is now negotiating with Western European countries for the completion of one or more of the power reactors involved. All potential suppliers are bound by the NPr to require safeguards on any such reactor and its fuel. But the international irresponsibility displayed by Iran provides serious grounds for concern about Tonger-term proliferation problems in this country. In the Far East, two NPT parties whose potential interest in develop- ing a nuclear weapons capability was of considerable concern in the past are Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. A major disincentive in both cases was the damage that such development would have done to their security relations with the United States and with their ability to con- tinue to obtain vital supplies for their civil nuclear power plants, which provide a substantial portion of their electric power. The United States made use of its special relations with these two countries to convince them that the development of an independent nuclear capability would be ill advised. These two countries do not now appear to constitute serious proliferation risks. While this completes the list of countries generally thought to be of near-term proliferation concern, it must be recognized that if the inter- national security environment changed dramatically if, for example, the current non-proliferation regime or certain alliance relationships disintegrated some of the major industrial states, which clearly have the capabilities to make nuclear weapons on a large scale relatively quickly, might decide to do so. This would obviously have extremely serious implications for international security. The Problem of Coordination with Other Concerned Countries Improved controls on nuclear exports are an important, but clearly not sufficient, toot in seeking to achieve the non-proliferation objectives for the problem countries considered above. The United States can no longer effectively impose these export controls alone but must seek

272 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL coordination among all significant potential suppliers. These suppliers remain relatively few in number and share some commitment to non- proliferation. A question for the future is how to keep new suppliers who may not share that commitment from undercutting these efforts. This could be a particular problem in the case of China, whose government has in the past opposed non-proliferation on doctrinal grounds. The non- proliferation export regime will be tightened if the Chinese government adheres to its recently announced policy of requiring safeguards on Chinese nuclear exports. The existing non-proliferation regime provides an indispensable framework for coordinating the safeguards on all nuclear exports re- quired by the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines among the present suppliers. However, differences remain among these suppliers on several important issues. The most fundamental difference is the relative priority to be accorded to non-proliferation compared with other foreign policy objectives. Many of the major supplier countries, while willing to endorse non-proliferation as a goal, do not consider it a major concern from the point of view of their national security. NATO allies have frequently reacted defensively to U.S. non-proliferation ini- tiatives. Accordingly, they have given it relatively low priority in cases where it conflicted with other foreign policy interests, as the United States has also done on occasion. Some of the supplier countries also disagree with the emphasis that has sometimes been placed on capabili- ties rather than intentions. This is understandable, since they also have the requisite capabilities for a nuclear weapons program and therefore wish to emphasize the importance of legal and political commitments to non-proliferation. The ambivalence between a policy of constructive engagement and denial that has characterized U.S. policy is shared by other suppliers. The Federal Republic of Germany has argued that the safeguards and other commitments it obtained from Brazil in connection with the agreement to sell enrichment and reprocessing technology were a posi- tive contribution to non-proliferation. While France did not complete its sale of a reprocessing facility to Pakistan, some French leaders have questioned whether the completion of that sale, which would at least have resulted in safeguards on the facility, would not have been prefera- ble to the present situation where there is an unsafeguarded reprocess- ing facility. The Swiss have argued that the expanded safeguards coverage obtained through the sale of a heavy water production facility to Argentina offsets any proliferation risk involved. The various attitudes toward these basic issues also affect the pros- pects for concerted action in using nonmilitary leverage to head off or

NON-PROLIFERATION 273 respond to actions that clearly portend further nuclear proliferation. Such concerted action is limited by the special relationships of certain of the participants to the problem countries, such as that of the United States to Israel or that of France and Italy to Iraq (from whom those countries obtain substantial supplies of oil). Conflicting foreign policy goals, such as U.S. interest in supporting Pakistani resistance to the Soviet threat in South Asia, encouraging the new Argentine govern- ment, and not precipitating default on international loans by Argen- tina or Brazil, also limit such action. Finally, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to make progress in nuclear arms control, and the continued emphasis of the nuclear weapon states on the need for and utility of nuclear weapons in an ever-broadening military context, greatly complicate the task of persuading the problem countries not to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

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This nontechnical overview of developments in nuclear arms control describes how the United States and the Soviet Union arrived at their present positions—and where they might go from here. According to Foreign Affairs, "This book is proof that the complexities of arms control can be successfully explained in a nontechnical, and even more importantly, nonpartisan manner....It presents the key issues in a clear, thorough, and remarkably up-to-date way....Strongly recommended as a primary source for classroom and public discussions."

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