Improving Safety Culture in Public Transportation (2015)

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53 C H A P T E R 7 Introduction This chapter presents capsule descriptions of 34 practices that transit agencies may consider for adoption to improve safety culture. These practices were initially identified dur- ing the mini–case studies on safety culture within and out- side public transportation. The 34 practices are presented in rank order as rated by the ESCP. Not all of these safety cul- ture improvement practices are expected to be appropriate for every transit agency since most require pre-establishment of certain conditions to support the practice. The capsule descriptions also include contact information at the originating transit agency and the reference documents that can be obtained from that agency. These documents define and promulgate the specific practice. Transit agencies considering adoption of a practice are encouraged to contact the originating transit agency for additional information. Role of Expert Safety Culture Panel The research team asked the transit managers on the ESCP to rate each of the safety culture improvement practices in terms of its value to a transit agency, using a five-point Likert scale, with 5 being extremely valuable and 1 being not very valuable. The combined average ratings are the basis for rank- ing the 34 practices. The participating transit agencies on the ESCP included: • Champaign-Urbana Mass Transit District (CUMTD) [100 buses], • San Mateo County Transit District (SamTrans) [300 buses], • Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) [550 buses], • King County Metro Transit Division (KCMTD) [1,500 buses and electric trolleys], • Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) [100 subway cars, 150 light-rail vehicles (LRVs), 2,200 buses], and • New Jersey Transit (NJT) [200 locomotives, 1,000 passenger rail cars, 45 LRVs, 2,030 buses]. Best Practices in Rank Order SAFE-7 Report of Unsafe Condition or Hazard and Near-Miss Program ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #1—4.67 AGENCY: LACMTA CONTACT: Executive Officer, Corporate Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION Metro’s SAFE-7 Report of Unsafe Condition or Hazard and Near-Miss Program encourages LACMTA employees to complete a report on potential safety problems such as haz- ards and near misses. The report can be submitted anony- mously. Upon receiving a completed report, department or division managers are required to analyze the reported haz- ard or near miss, identify all of the factors involved, develop recommendations for timely elimination or mitigation of the hazard or near miss, ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken within established time limits, track the status of cor- rective actions taken or planned, and maintain records of the reports. The mitigation and corrective actions may include, for example, modifications of equipment or facility design, maintenance schedules or practices, operating rules and pro- cedures, employee training, bus stop locations, rail station layout, traffic control devices, road design, traffic signs, and markings. After a report is submitted, management informs other employees of the existence of and circumstances sur- rounding the hazard or near miss by posting a summary tracking form listing all open SAFE-7 reports on the safety bulletin board. Hazards or near misses involving more than one department, which cannot be resolved by a single depart- ment, will be reported to the LACMTA corporate office to resolve by working with all departments that are involved. The responses to SAFE-7s are distributed to the individual Best Practices

54 involved and to the appropriate local safety committee (LSC), including union representatives. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This practice improves safety culture in many ways. It requires management commitment to safety and safety culture, it allows significant employee involvement in safety management, it con- tributes significantly to creation of an informed culture, and it demonstrates that LACMTA has the essential elements of an effective reporting culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS LACMTA Injury and Illness Prevention Program, Revi- sion 3, March 2010 SAFE-7 Form “Good Catch” Recognition Program ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #2—4.6 AGENCY: OCTA CONTACT: Executive Director, Human Resources and Orga- nizational Development BRIEF DESCRIPTION This program has three criteria for award: (1) A good catch can occur through intervention in an unsafe act or condition, such as: • Successfully using the stop-work authority, • Identifying an unsafe condition and proactively elimi- nating or controlling a hazard, or • Identifying and intervening in an unsafe act through assisting or coaching an employee. (2) Safety above and beyond can be demonstrated by: • Successfully managing an emergency response effort, or • Personally pursuing non-compulsory safety training to further comprehend program requirements. (3) Safety program improvement may include: • Identifying a safety program deficiency and assisting in developing an improvement, • Proposing an idea for process improvement and assist- ing OCTA in its full implementation. Awards for a “good catch” consist of immediate recognition— a $25 gift card awarded to the employee in a public forum (for example, a tailgate or pre-shift safety meeting) and a quarterly drawing in which 10% of the total number of approved “good catch” forms are randomly selected for a $100 gift card. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This practice demonstrates a strong management com- mitment to safety, encourages employee ownership of safety, drives employee involvement through action and interven- tion, and contributes to the creation of an informed and flex- ible safety culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OCTA “Good Catch” Recognition Form Confidential Close Call Reporting System ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #3 Tie—4.5 AGENCY: NJT CONTACT: Deputy GM, Rail Safety and Training BRIEF DESCRIPTION NJT participates voluntarily in FRA’s Confidential Close Call Reporting System demonstration project along with three freight railroads. The program is designed to increase hazard reporting and reduce hazardous conditions by addressing employees’ concerns about punishment or discipline related to close-call reporting. NJT implements the pilot system- wide in main tracks and yards. A contractual agreement with its unions establishes the terms of the pilot project, includ- ing a labor and management peer review team and a senior management support team. Rail workers report minor inci- dents or close calls to the federal Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) by telephone or electronically. After remov- ing information that might identify the employee, BTS passes the information to NJT management. Corrective actions are recommended independently and then jointly by the peer review team and senior management support team. The C3RS improves safety conditions by allowing for non-punitive reporting and better data collection and analysis. Its imple- mentation and evaluation across the pilot locations is allowing the FRA to refine the program before rolling it out nationwide to public and private railroads. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The use of C3RS exemplifies a reporting culture based on employee involvement through action and intervention that strives to be just and informed. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS C3RS Concept and Process Recruitment Screening Battery ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #3 Tie—4.5 AGENCY: SAS CONTACT: Head of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION SAS hires for attitude and trains for skill. There are multi- ple rounds of interviews for all positions, with the first round focusing on attitude and the second round focusing on skill.

55 management commitment to safety and safety culture, it rep- resents major employee involvement in safety management, it contributes significantly to creation of an informed culture and provides a platform to demonstrate that OCTA has a flexible culture, and, finally, it could not work without the prevalence of mutual trust throughout the organization. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OCTA Policy # HROD-HSEC Safety Captain Committee, dated 1/26/2004 and revised 11/05/2012 Non-Disciplinary Safety Ride Check—Rail and Bus ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #6—4.42 AGENCY: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) CONTACT: Manager of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION A supervisor arrives unannounced and rides a bus or train anonymously to observe and evaluate, using a comprehensive checklist, the vehicle operator. The detailed and comprehen- sive rail and bus checklists cover the pre-trip and terminal activities, practices en route, and safety hot spots; the check- list also includes room for open-ended comments. The purpose of the non-disciplinary safety ride check is instructional and not disciplinary. The supervisor, who is a trained road instructor, provides suggestions on how to properly do certain things, trying to improve performance. After the observation, the trainer reviews the checklist with the operator. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This safety observation and feedback program demon- strates an informed and learning culture. By separating train- ing and improvement from discipline, the practice supports a just culture that enhances mutual trust. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS GCRTA Bus and Rail Safety Ride Check Forms Joint Safety Task Force ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #7—4.33 AGENCY: SamTrans CONTACT: Manager, Transit Operations Training BRIEF DESCRIPTION The SamTrans Joint Safety Task Force is chaired by the director of bus transportation and includes the deputy CEO of operations, transportation superintendents, the director of maintenance, the safety officer, the training manager, the Airplane pilots are given a very long test battery. The crew test is a shorter version of the pilot battery. SAS also uses a psycholo- gist to test flight crew candidates, to include attitudes toward safety. Ground crew candidates are also asked a series of ques- tions during their interviews to assess their attitudes toward safety. Executives and managers undergo internal interviews and are typically also interviewed by external consultants for a second opinion. There are separate processes for hiring internal and external candidates. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This recruitment selection process demonstrates the orga- nization’s commitment to maintaining a safety culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Recruitment screening tool for ground and flight crew members. Safety Captain Program ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #3 Tie—4.5 AGENCY: OCTA CONTACT: Executive Director, Human Resources and Orga- nizational Development BRIEF DESCRIPTION OCTA safety captains are union employees appointed by management to represent their fellow employees in the main- tenance and transportation departments. • Maintenance. In the maintenance department, each base manager appoints a safety captain for each shift for each of the following job titles: mechanic, service worker, parts, and facility maintainer. The base manager also appoints a safety coordinator, who is responsible for chairing the maintenance safety committee at each base. • Transportation. In the transportation department, each base manager appoints a minimum of two bus operators to the agency-wide operations safety committee. This committee is chaired on a rotating basis by a base operations trainer. Safety captains represent employees on the safety commit- tees. They address employee safety concerns, requests, and questions; recommend corrective actions for identified safety deficiencies; develop and recommend safe practices and pro- cedures for specific tasks; assist and guide fellow employees in complying with safety and health rules; and conduct safety inspections and campaigns as coordinated by the Health, Safety, and Environmental Compliance (HSEC) Department. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The safety captain program affects and contributes to numer- ous key components of safety culture at OCTA. It demonstrates

56 particular area that warrants greater scrutiny. While having an indicator “in the red” signifies a potential problem, great emphasis is also put on significant movement of indicators toward being “in the red.” The company has begun reviewing the system and consid- ering what changes might need to be made based on experi- ence thus far. SAS may need to adjust the levels of acceptability (for example, five ground incidents per month). When SAS notes indicators moving in the wrong direction, it determines whether processes need to be changed to address the trend or whether the performance indicator needs adjustment; SAS is careful not to make changes to a process just for the sake of making changes. There is a lot of thought put into the effec- tiveness of the indicators and their impact on safety culture. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The use of these leading indicators demonstrates the orga- nization’s commitment to maintaining a safety culture. It dem- onstrates a commitment to a reporting culture, an informed culture, and a learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS SAS List of Fifty-Five Leading Indicators Recruitment Screening for Safety Mind-Set ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #8 Tie—4.25 AGENCY: CSX CONTACT: Senior Vice President (VP) and Chief Adminis- trative Officer BRIEF DESCRIPTION When hiring, CSX looks for a safety mind-set. The com- pany uses a series of 10 to 20 interview questions for all poten- tial new hires directed at determining the applicant’s safety attitudes. Examples of such questions are: 1. Safety is a way of life at CSX. You have to be extremely safety conscious when working in the field for a railroad. Tell us of any common safety practices you have used (or would use) to avoid accidents. How would you influence someone who is practicing unsafe behaviors? • Follow-up probes: – Can you think of ways in which you might make your environment safer while you work? – Have you influenced others to adopt those safety practices you speak of? – What other safety practices or principles can you think of? – Have you ever been part of a safety committee or been a safety officer? – What would you do if one of your team members was violating a safety practice? route planner, the union president or secretary-treasurer, and several bus operators as members. The forum addresses route planning, time points along the routes, road hazards, equipment, and operator safety con- cerns. It is a hands-on committee that drives concrete deci- sion making and actions. The task force helps managers gain a practical perspective on the demands faced by bus opera- tors. Photos of task force members are posted at the bases so operators and mechanics know to communicate with them when safety issues arise. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The Joint Safety Task Force shows leadership, management and organizational commitment, employee involvement, and mutual trust. It reflects a reporting, informed, and learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Joint Safety Task Force Policy Statement Fifty-Five Leading Safety Indicators ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #8 Tie—4.25 AGENCY: SAS CONTACT: Head of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION SAS developed 55 leading indicators in 2009 and 2010. The list was created with input from various areas of the company: ground crews, operations personnel, flight crews, and so forth. Representatives were asked to provide their most important indicators. Included are indicators of poten- tial problems, such as “aircraft not properly configured for takeoff per 1,000 cycles,” “runway or taxiway incursions per 1,000 cycles,” “deviation of more than 300 ft from cleared alti- tude per 1,000 cycles,” and “bird strikes resulting in damage to aircraft per 1,000 cycles.” Representatives were also asked to suggest what acceptable standards might be for each indica- tor. For example, the ground department proposed that an acceptable number of ground damage incidents would be five for 22,000 departures per month. When a safety performance indicator (SPI) exceeds the acceptable standard, it is reported as being “in the red.” When selecting SPIs, SAS considers the following questions: What is measurable? What are we measuring today? What would we like to be able to measure? The indicators are not prioritized—they are seen as carrying equal weight, but they are grouped by area of responsibil- ity. SAS also averages various indicators into what it calls risk indexes. SAS has considerable baseline data because there is a signif- icant amount of recording equipment in the airline industry. Trend movements among the indicators draw attention to a

57 reduce unsafe behavior without having to resort to discipline, this practice supports a just culture and enhances mutual trust. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Observation tool used by employees. Green Card Safety Concerns Reporting Process ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #10 Tie—4.17 AGENCY: KCMTD CONTACT: Transit Safety Unit Manager BRIEF DESCRIPTION In addition to standard reporting forms and verbal report- ing, the green cards offer an alternate way to report concerns or suggestions for safety improvements. Maintenance and operations staff give the cards to their chief or safety com- mittee representative. They are asked to identify the prob- lem, explain proposed improvement, include photographs, and describe methods to achieve the desired improvement. Green cards are discussed in safety committee meetings. These cards are in use throughout the transit division, and operators are reminded to report any unsafe conditions that they observe on the road as well as in the base. A response is expected within 30 days of receipt of the suggestion. If this is not possible, the transit safety officer will update the origina- tor or safety committee representative about the status of the suggestion. After resolution, green cards are returned to the supervisors, who return them to the originator. Suggestions made anonymously are kept in the safety committee meet- ing binder. If the submitter does not accept the response, he or she can resubmit a card with more detailed information. Employees can also convey safety concerns directly to the joint safety committees monthly or bring up concerns to the union that, in turn, introduces them at a joint committee. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The green card system reflects a reporting and informed culture. The process contributes to employee involvement and organizational trust and is an indication of management commitment. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Safety Information Report (Green Cards); Safety Sugges- tion Program Management Commitment to Safety Culture Statement ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #10 Tie—4.17 AGENCY: Des Moines Area Rapid Transit (DART) CONTACT: Director of Paratransit 2. Tell us about your safety record. How do you feel about safety in the workplace and the use of safety equipment, including personal protective equipment (PPE)? Have you ever been required to wear PPE? • Follow-up probes: – What safety practices or principles can you think of? – Have you influenced others to adopt those safety practices you speak of? – What would you do if one of your team members was violating a safety practice? IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This standard operating procedure demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS CSX questionnaire used for rank-and-file employees and supervisors. The management questionnaire is proprietary. Actively Caring and Approaching Others Who Are at Risk ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #10 Tie—4.17 AGENCY: ExxonMobil CONTACT: Safety Programs Manager BRIEF DESCRIPTION In 2011, ExxonMobil adopted a philosophy that encour- ages workers to freely intervene when another worker is doing something that puts him- or herself or others at risk. Global safety efforts are oriented around this philosophy; workers are trained in how to intervene and in how to react if some- one intervenes. It is more of a philosophy that is designed to make intervention more acceptable than it is a program. The idea is “if everyone is looking out for everyone, you’re almost there.” The company conducts workshops and holds toolbox sessions where people discuss this philosophy. This philosophy is implemented using a key tool in their safety toolkit, which is the safety observation. These observations are based on an objective standard. In addition to the direct intervention, these observations are aggregated and analyzed to determine if any trends can be detected. The company cur- rently has more than two million observations collected. This program provides individual observations, which are imme- diately helpful to workers at the time, and valuable insights, which flow from analyzing data over time. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This philosophy demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety, encourages employee involvement, and supports an informed culture. By training employees to intervene and by creating this mechanism to

58 Hazard Reporting and Management Procedure ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #13 Tie—4.08 AGENCY: GCRTA CONTACT: Manager of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION This detailed operating procedure was established to create a standardized method for identifying, tracking, and resolving hazards. It covers data provided by hazard report forms; hazard hotline telephone calls; hazard reporting e-mails; hazard reporting in person; loss prevention audits conducted by agency insurance carriers; internal and exter- nal audits conducted by federal, state, and local jurisdictional authorities; vehicle defect reports; audits and inspections from safety and various other departments; audit results and suggestions of safety committees; findings and suggestions of an incident review committee; incident investigations; and root cause and effect analysis. It describes the proce- dures to be carried out through the safety committee and management process. The policy affirms that the agency will not take action against employees reporting safety condi- tions or concerns; illegal or intentionally negligent actions are not protected. It includes reporting forms, process flow- charts, and tracking forms. The policy has been extensively revised in recent years. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This detailed standard operating procedure demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety. It creates the mechanisms for a reporting and informed culture that ensures consistent safety reporting and investiga- tion for prevention. By limiting discipline related to safety reporting, the policy supports a just culture that supports mutual trust. The ongoing revision process is part of the learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Hazard Reporting & Management Procedure SOP 8.1 and Non-Punitive Reporting Policy Joint Accident Review Committee Pilot ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #13 Tie—4.08 AGENCY: SamTrans CONTACT: Manager, Transit Operations Training BRIEF DESCRIPTION The Joint Accident Review Committee grades accidents involving workers represented by the union. The commit- tee includes two union members, an instructor, the district’s safety officer, and a mutually agreed-upon neutral party. Committee members and alternates are trained in accident BRIEF DESCRIPTION A safety culture statement was developed by the leadership team, signed by the GM, and posted and distributed to all employees. It is based on safety as “the major consideration in all operations, including planning design and maintenance of our transit system.” The statement sets the guiding prin- ciples of a commitment to safety at all levels, safety as the top priority, appropriate resources and incentives, a responsible and accountable environment with free reporting of safety breaches, and analysis of actions and establishment of indi- vidual accountability. Employees were asked to sign a pledge to support the safety culture process. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE A clear statement of management commitment makes explicit management’s intention to support continuous improvement of safety culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS DART Safety Culture Statement Effective Employee Safety Communication Plan ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #13 Tie—4.08 AGENCY: SAS CONTACT: Head of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION SAS uses multiple communication networks to reach decen- tralized locations and personnel. Access to so many employees in so many classifications is a challenge. Modes of communica- tion include: • Weekly bulletins and e-mails to flight crews, • “Safety corners” on crew bases, with posted reports and computer terminals for accessing safety information, • Weekly visits from safety representatives at selected sites, • A comprehensive and professionally prepared safety maga- zine entitled Safety Feedback distributed to crew bases two times per year, and • Additional safety briefings prior to shifts given to ground crews by supervisors. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The considerable resources devoted to safety communica- tion demonstrate the organization’s commitment to main- taining a safety culture and facilitate achievement of a learning culture and an informed culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Safety Feedback, 2012 Volumes 1 and 2 and 2013 Volume 1

59 the follow-up on any safety reporting. SAS is interested in what respondents view as the biggest threats to safety within the com- pany, the effectiveness of their safety communications, and what employees view as the most positive factors related to safety. The safety survey was conducted annually to measure employees’ safety attitudes, but in 2012 SAS changed the fre- quency to every 18 months. SAS uses a commercial Internet survey service to administer the survey. During the 4-week survey period, SAS sends a direct e-mail to crew and staff on the ground that includes a link to the survey. The link is also featured on the intranet and on other staff communication tools (newsletters, lounge postings, etc.). There is an approxi- mately 40% response rate, and of respondents, 80% to 85% complete the survey. The response rate is slightly lower among flight crews and slightly higher among ground staff. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This tool demonstrates the organization’s commitment to maintaining a safety culture and demonstrates that it is a reporting culture. Results of the survey demonstrate whether employees agree that SAS has a just culture. The organiza- tion’s continued review of the tool and its application dem- onstrate a learning culture and an informed culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS SAS Employee Safety Survey Local Safety Committee Program ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #18—3.92 AGENCY: LACMTA CONTACT: Executive Officer, Corporate Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION The primary vehicle for employee participation in safety is the LSC meeting. LSCs provide the primary means of coor- dinating safety activities at the local level at LACMTA. LSCs are responsible for: • Reducing the number of injuries and incidents within a given division or department, • Verifying, through observation, the degree of compliance with established safety policies and guidelines and imple- menting appropriate corrective action, • Reducing the number of lost workdays due to injuries, and • Analyzing and mitigating hazards or near-miss incidents reported by employees. The role of chairperson of the LSC rotates every 6 months between the transportation division and maintenance divi- sion managers. Other LSC members include the transpor- tation and maintenance assistant managers; a senior safety specialist from corporate safety; division safety coordinators; investigation. After presentation by the chief safety officer, the committee votes anonymously on whether the accident was preventable. This produces a rating that is accepted by both sides in arbitration hearings. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The Joint Safety Task Force shows leadership, management and organizational commitment, employee involvement, and mutual trust. It reflects a reporting, informed, and learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Accident Review Committee Charter Reason Safety Culture Survey ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #13 Tie—4.08 AGENCY: GCRTA CONTACT: Safety Manager BRIEF DESCRIPTION GCRTA used the 20-question questionnaire developed by Dr. James Reason as a survey to assess executives’ and supervi- sors’ perceptions of their safety culture. Upper management, managers, and supervisors rate the organization most highly for the degree to which reporting is encouraged and the fre- quency with which staff attends safety meetings. Executives feel that the organization is data-driven, and managers and supervisors highlight the level of commitment. An updated survey will be distributed to employees and to management again to determine the differences between the groups and then to arrange safety improvement teams to address the gaps and needs identified. The agency has arranged for a profes- sional evaluator to carry out the survey and analysis. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Defining the current safety culture as seen from the inside is a sign of a learning and informed culture. The expanded survey process demonstrates a proactive use of indicators. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Reason Questionnaire Employee Safety Survey ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #17—4.0 AGENCY: SAS CONTACT: Head of Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION SAS gives employees a 25-question survey to gauge impres- sions of safety culture and to assess attitudes. The questions are based on a reporting culture, just culture, management attitude toward safety, employees’ attitudes toward safety, and

60 safety, passenger and public safety, loss prevention, system change management, and internal assessment. The plan is supported by a detailed annual statement of initiatives, goals, and practices. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This detailed and comprehensive plan, and the ongoing initiatives undertaken to support it, demonstrate commit- ment to safety on the part of leadership, management, and the organization overall. It describes an informed, reporting, and flexible culture that uses incident data and other indica- tors to improve the safety environment. The dedication to system change management and assessment contributes to a learning culture, involving safety planning with operations and procurement. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS System Safety Program Plan 2011 Rail Safety Program 2012 Chief Safety Officer Reports Directly to General Manager ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #20 Tie—3.83 AGENCY: Utah Transit Authority (UTA) CONTACT: Chief Safety Officer BRIEF DESCRIPTION The chief safety officer is one of seven executives in the orga- nization reporting directly to the GM (along with planning, capital, communications, technology, operations, and finance). The recently established office was designed to improve safety coordination throughout the organization, enhance the safety culture, and comply with regulatory requirements. The office now includes the construction safety element (previously in capital development), the UTA police department, and emer- gency management. This consolidated many of the safety, security, and emergency responsibilities of the organization into one reporting structure. The reorganization has gained affirmation from the state safety oversight and FTA head- quarters and region staff. It has also facilitated the audits and reviews conducted in the activation of several new rail lines. The reorganization anticipated changes that agencies might need to make under MAP-21 (Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century). IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Direct report to the GM demonstrates strong leadership and management and organizational commitment. It reflects the high priority accorded to safety. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS UTA System Safety Program Plan 2013 employees representing the bargaining units of the United Transportation Union (UTU), ATU, and the American Feder- ation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSME); the subcommittee chairpersons; the return-to-work coor- dinator; a sheriff ’s representative; and other local staff as needed. Non-division departments, such as rail wayside sys- tems, have an equivalent membership structure. LSCs and their subcommittees normally meet once per month to review the status of local safety performance and safety programs and activities at a regularly scheduled date, time, and place. Meeting minutes are e-mailed to LSC members and posted on division bulletin boards to inform employees of LSC activities. LSCs use data analysis to: • Review reported hazards/near misses and accident and occupational injury data, and implement strategies and programs to reduce workplace incidents, • Ensure that the subcommittees are analyzing all appropri- ate data/metrics and key performance indicators, and • Review subcommittees programs and recommendations for improvements. The three standing subcommittees are the Injury/Accident Reduction Sub-Committee, the Hazard Identification & Cor- rection Sub-Committee, and the Program Activities & Rec- ognition Sub-Committee. Subcommittee chairpersons are normally assistant managers. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This practice affects and contributes to numerous key components of safety culture. It could not have been created without management commitment to safety and safety cul- ture, it represents significant employee involvement in safety management, and it contributes significantly to creation of an informed culture and provides a platform to demonstrate that LACMTA has a flexible culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Local Safety Committee Charter 2-10-11 Rail System Safety Program Plan ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #19—3.9 AGENCY: NJT CONTACT: Deputy GM—Rail Safety and Training BRIEF DESCRIPTION The rail division has established a comprehensive safety program plan addressing the hazard management process, accident investigation and analysis, inspections and main- tenance, training and certification, emergency planning and response, environmental management, security, workplace

61 are doing to advance safety and brainstorm as to what would help consortium members keep pool costs down and improve safety conditions at each agency. A current task is to find solu- tions to onboard passenger accidents. Participation is voluntary. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Sharing data among colleagues at other agencies dem- onstrates a strong commitment to an informed culture. It is also a sign of a flexible and learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS None; there is no formal policy governing this practice. Tailoring Training and Policy for Improved Pedestrian Safety in a Campus Setting ESCP RANKING—CORE: #20 Tie—3.83 AGENCY: CUMTD CONTACT: Safety and Training Director BRIEF DESCRIPTION Because of the challenges of a dense pedestrian environ- ment on campus, the agency commissioned an in-depth study of the problems with pedestrian and bicycle traffic, and initi- ated changes to improve communications, traffic planning, and operations. The agency’s Smith system defensive driving program was expanded beyond new-hire training to an exten- sive summer review program for all operators, and included a safety-focused roadeo. Data analysis had shown that accident or incident risk is highest at 6 months following employment and overall during the first year. New drivers are restricted from driving campus routes in their first 6 months. A men- toring program for first-year operators consists of a minimum of six safety ride evaluations and follow-up if necessary. The director also conducts random safety ride evaluations on an ongoing basis. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Responding to a hazardous environment by providing spe- cific training and tailoring policy to address those hazards is a sign of an informed and learning culture and an organiza- tional commitment to safety. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Training qualifications class.xls; mentoring program.pdf; 6-month review Ri2 Safety Reporting Program ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #24—3.8 AGENCY: OCTA CONTACT: Executive Director, Human Resources and Orga- nizational Development Collaborative Design and Procurement Process ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #20 Tie—3.83 AGENCY: KCMTD CONTACT: Manager, Transit Safety Unit BRIEF DESCRIPTION A collaborative design process links ergonomics and safety needs with procurement procedures to identify, design, buy, install, and improve on equipment and systems, not just rely on what is currently available. The Transit Fleet Contract Man- agement Group and Bus Procurement Team rely on wide and deep involvement across all key internal stakeholders, includ- ing operations, maintenance, safety, paratransit, and customer service and sales. One tool for facilitating this is the vehicle component change request process and form. The on-site ergonomics process has led to many improvements, includ- ing enhanced bus seat and mirror designs, improved repair procedures to accommodate mechanics of different sizes and strength levels, and the efficient reallocation of funds away from pedestrian safety devices that did not address the observed cause of accidents and fatalities to more effective solutions. Hourly workers in maintenance, trades, and operations, along with safety and operations supervisors and managers, have contributed. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The informal ergonomics process relies on proactive use of safety data, effective safety communication, and an informed culture. By procuring equipment that suits local needs, based on employee involvement through action and intervention, the agency demonstrates a flexible and learning culture. The process contributes to organizational trust and is an indica- tion of management commitment. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Transit Fleet Contract Management Group and Bus Procure- ment Team; Vehicle Component Change Request Trolley 2012 Regional Sharing of Safety Information and Expertise ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #20 Tie—3.83 AGENCY: CUMTD CONTACT: Safety and Training Director BRIEF DESCRIPTION The agency is part of an insurance consortium with other regional properties. To control costs and reduce risk, the broker organizes meetings for safety personnel from all involved agen- cies to meet twice a year, in person or virtually, to discuss safety concerns. Topics include driver selection, drug testing, training, and loss analysis. Consortium participants describe what they

62 10. Community awareness and emergency preparedness; and 11. Operations integrity assessment and improvement. Each of these elements contains an underlying principle and a set of expectations, which are the same for all employ- ees regardless of their positions in the organization. Business segments are responsible for supplementing the OIMS frame- work by establishing and maintaining guidelines relevant to their specific activities. Local management systems provide additional guidance, including processes and procedures, responsible and accountable parties, resources, and feedback mechanisms for continuous improvement. As part of enhanced leadership training, ExxonMobil is piloting a series of new OIMS leadership academies. ExxonMobil also employs Lloyd’s Register Quality Assur- ance, Inc. (LRQA) to conduct an annual third-party valida- tion audit of OIMS. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This standard operating procedure demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety. It creates the mechanisms for a reporting and informed cul- ture that ensures consistent safety reporting and investigation for prevention. The ongoing revision process, supported by approximately 50 to 70 assessments annually, LRQA audits, and leadership academies, is part of the learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OIMS Framework Brochure Extension of 10-Hour Rest Guideline to All Operators ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #26—3.7 AGENCY: GCRTA CONTACT: GM/Operations BRIEF DESCRIPTION APTA’s “Standard for Train Operator Hours of Service Requirements” calls on rapid transit systems to limit the hours of service for train operators to no more than 16 per shift, with no more than 14 hours active time (allowing for swing), and to include at least 10 hours in between scheduled shifts. In 2011, GCRTA extended the 10-hour rest guideline to bus and paratransit operators as well as rail operators. The absolute length of the day is restricted by the collec- tive bargaining agreement, which states that regular 5-day runs must be completed within 13 hours of platform time and that 4-day runs at 10 hours per day must be completed within 14 hours of platform time. A minimum of 10 hours between work assignments within a 24-hour period was implemented for rail and bus operators effective with the summer 2011 service change. The 10-hour rest rule came BRIEF DESCRIPTION Ri2 (route input two) is a computer-based communication system directly linking OCTA coach operators with parties responsible for resolving issues relating to schedules, bus stops, transit security, operations supervision, maintenance, and health and safety problems. Operators enter their input using drop-down boxes in which they summarize the issue or issues of concern. Ri2 was originally developed to improve communication between coach operators and schedule ana- lysts when the original paper-based input process was found to be unreliable. Since inception in 2005, the program has been expanded to include links to the other entities described earlier in this paragraph. All issues entered into the system receive formal answers and are available in the system to all operators, and a Ri2 report containing all issues and answers for that month is posted in the operators’ room. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This system significantly enhances the maintenance and continuation of an informed culture among OCTA operators. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OCTA Quick Tips for Using Ri2 Operations Integrity Management System (OIMS) ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #25—3.75 AGENCY: ExxonMobil CONTACT: Safety Programs Manager BRIEF DESCRIPTION After the Valdez oil spill in 1989, ExxonMobil committed itself to conducting business in a manner compatible with the environmental and economic needs of the communities in which the corporation operates and in a way that protects the safety, security, and health of its employees, its customers, and the public. Its commitments are documented in its safety, secu- rity, health, environmental, and product safety policies. These policies in turn are put into practice through a disciplined management framework called OIMS. This framework, which influences every operational decision, consists of 11 elements. These elements are: 1. Management leadership, commitment, and accountability; 2. Risk assessment and management; 3. Facilities design and construction; 4. Information/documentation; 5. Personnel and training; 6. Operations and maintenance; 7. Management of change; 8. Third-party services; 9. Incident investigation and analysis;

63 scheduling and report route problems, including safety haz- ards. It provides for recording, tracking, and evaluating issues that operators see on the road and that may affect schedule demands and vehicle, passenger, or operator safety. It must be processed within 10 days. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE The service change request shows leadership, management, and organizational commitment to safety, employee involve- ment, and mutual trust. It is a flexible culture tool and also reflects a reporting, informed, and learning culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Service Change Request SOP T-43 Safety Resolution Process ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #29—3.5 AGENCY: KCMTD CONTACT: ATU Local 587 Safety Committee BRIEF DESCRIPTION The safety resolution process is defined by a joint safety committee clause in the collective bargaining agreement and by Washington State code. Metro employees attempt to solve disagreements about work safety rules at the lowest level pos- sible, initially through the section safety committee. If that fails, the problem is forwarded to the joint safety committee for resolution. KCMTD also has a policy delegating accident and incident investigation by the GM to the safety depart- ment. Recommendations made as a result of these inves- tigations must be discussed and reviewed with the section supervisor. If there is disagreement, the recommendations are then forwarded to the deputy general manager for resolution. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This practice ensures employee involvement, indicates management commitment, and represents both an informed and a flexible culture. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Section 8: ATU Local 587 and King County Metro Labor Contract and State of Washington Administrative Code 296-800-130 Life-Changing Index ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #30—3.4 AGENCY: CSX CONTACT: VP, Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION Beginning June 1, 2012, after having five employees seri- ously injured in 2011, an additional safety measurement was into effect for paratransit operators with the January 2012 service change. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Voluntarily extending a safety policy from rail to bus at additional operating expense in order to support improved operator health and system safety demonstrates a strong management and organizational commitment to safety. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 2011 Operations Division Initiatives/Projects: Year End Status January 10, 2011 Board Involvement in Safety and Safety Culture ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #27 Tie—3.58 AGENCY: LACMTA CONTACT: Executive Officer, Corporate Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION On October 27, 2011, the LACMTA board of directors affirmed the board’s oversight responsibility for safety culture and system and organizational safety by approving a motion regarding various elements to promote and sustain safety at the highest levels of the organization. This motion called for: • “Reviewing thoroughly the safety culture of our orga- nization,” • “Clarifying our organizational values to support safety as our primary value,” • “Reorganizing our committee structure to highlight and centralize the Board’s fundamental responsibility to over- see safety,” and • “Developing frequent and comprehensive reports and agenda items regarding system safety for Board discussion and action.” IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This practice directly and thoroughly demonstrates the requirement of management commitment. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS LACMTA Board of Directors Minutes: Antonovich Motion, October 27, 2011 Service Change Request ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #27 Tie—3.58 AGENCY: SamTrans CONTACT: Manager, Transit Operations Training BRIEF DESCRIPTION The electronic service change request allows an opera- tor to provide data and request a service change to improve

64 that ensures consistent safety reporting and investigation for prevention. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS CSX Life-Changing Index Standard Operating Procedure Peer Bus Operator Training ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #31—3.33 AGENCY: Des Moines Area Rapid Transit CONTACT: Training Manager BRIEF DESCRIPTION Behind-the-wheel trainers are experienced working oper- ators with exemplary records who have applied for these positions and have been interviewed, selected, and trained. These trainers receive a pay differential while training and wear distinctive uniform badges so other drivers will know who they are and reach out to them for support. They meet in quarterly roundtables. These meetings facilitate mainte- nance of a shared vision. A standard training manual is used. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE Relying on experienced employees to train new drivers is an excellent example of employee involvement. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Behind the Wheel Trainers Performance Standards and Interview Questions Railroad Educational Development Institute (REDI) ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #32 Tie—3.3 AGENCY: CSX CONTACT: VP, Safety and Field Career Development BRIEF DESCRIPTION CSX personnel are trained at the REDI center for approxi- mately 6 weeks when they join the company. Employees are randomly selected for retraining. Alternatively, employees identified as needing support are rotated through programs that address the supervisors’ concerns. Since its opening in 2005, more than 12,000 students have gained professional training as conductors, locomotive engi- neers, management trainees, yardmasters, communications and signal workers, track workers, and more. Courses are avail- able for customers, subsidiaries, vendors, short-line partners, and other rail-based companies. The curriculum is tailored to meet the specific needs of those attending the institute, but each program includes a thorough course in rail safety. Train- ing opportunities include: • Ethics training, • Annual rules certification, introduced at CSX. The life-changing index is a measure of potential incident severity. The life-changing index is a pre- dictive model to gauge safety performance based on what might have happened or the potential severity of the event— for example, a track worker is brushed on the shoulder by a locomotive. This has the potential to lead to great injury/ fatality, so it gets a high score on the life-changing index, whereas it would not register on the OSHA scale because the outcome was not fatal and did not result in a serious injury. The life-changing index provides a numerical value for the incident’s potential for injury and for the risk to which it may expose the public. The measures that are currently used rely simply on numbers of injuries and fatalities. The new mea- sure allows managers to refine and tailor preventive actions that target behaviors. Key Points: • All injuries are measured on a scale from 0 to 2. • Only FRA reportable and non-reportable incidents are reviewed. Severity levels are important: Levels: • Level 0—A non-reportable injury with no severity impli- cations to the employee—for example, an insect bite. • Level 0.5—An injury with minor severity implications to the employee. For example: a strain/sprain while dis- mounting equipment or minor auto accident. • Level 1—An injury with moderate implications—for example, struck by a sliver of metal. • Level 1.5—An injury with potentially severe injury impli- cations—for example, a fall from a stationary railcar. • Level 2—An injury with potentially catastrophic or fatal implications—for example, a fall from a moving railcar or a head-on collision in a motor vehicle. Evaluation: • The total amount of each injury’s weighted value is defined as the weighted severity value. • The safety department is responsible for the ranking of incidents. The weighted severity value is then plugged into the FRA frequency index equation: weighted severity value * (200,000) = injury severity index actual man-hours. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This standard operating procedure demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety. It creates the mechanisms for a reporting and informed culture

65 Improved Rule Format ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #33—3.0 AGENCY: CSX CONTACT: VP Safety BRIEF DESCRIPTION CSX followed the military and airline industry in adopting a checklist format rather than the traditional narrative-style rule description. This format makes employees more likely to review the information and also more likely to retain it. For example, Rule 104-C formerly read: “104-C. Employees lining switches must ascertain that: 1. No conflicting movement is approaching, 2. The route is lined for the movement, 3. The switch points fit properly, 4. The lever is secured, and 5. Target if so equipped corresponds with switches. A switch that provides access to a controlled track must not be opened unless authorized by the train dispatcher. This may only be authorized by signal indication or by permis- sion of the train dispatcher. A switch must not be lined for a diverging movement of an approaching train until the employee attending the switch has contacted the crew of the train affected to ensure the movement is to use the turnout or crossover, understanding the switch will be lined for their movement, and movement will approach the switch location under control to prevent operating through an improperly lined switch. When kicking cars, a switch must not be lined for a following car going to another track, until it is known that the proceeding car will clear the route.” In checklist format, the rule reads as follows: “104.1 A switch or derail that provides access to a controlled track must not be unlocked or operated unless authorized by: a. Verbal authority from the train dispatcher, or b. Signal indication. 104.2 A switch must not be lined for a diverging movement for another train until the employee operating the switch con- tacts the approaching train and confirms: 1. Train intends to make a diverging movement, 2. Crew understands the switch will be lined for the diverg- ing movement, and 3. Train will approach the switch prepared to stop. 104.3 Before lining a switch or derail, the employee must ensure: 1. There are no conflicting movements, 2. Any preceding movement has passed the clearance point, • Safety training, • Safety training for non-operating employees, • CPR, • Diversity training, • Management trainee program, • SkillPort eLearning, • Associate development program, • Annual management training workshops, and • Leadership excellence training. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This standard operating procedure demonstrates strong management and organizational commitment to safety. Training programs demonstrate a learning culture through employee engagement. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Department of Transportation (DOT) Training, Customer Rail Safety Guidebook, Customer Rail Safety Guidebook— Car Handling Safety, Training Playbook, Sample Personal Injury Report Safety Job Briefing Reference Card ESCP RANKING—SCORE: #32 Tie—3.3 AGENCY: NJT CONTACT: Deputy General Manager, Rail Safety and Train- ing Department BRIEF DESCRIPTION The safety job briefing reference card was developed by the labor and management peer review team in response to concerns about safety and reporting that arose during the confidential close-call reporting process. The card, dis- tributed to all train and engine employees, defines what points must be discussed during every safety job briefing. It covers train movement, safety issues, employee responsi- bilities, and passenger issues, and it provides critical close- call rules and important phone numbers. This job aid enhances the safety job briefing process and promotes a safer workplace. IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This portable information source and reminder supports the agency’s strong reporting culture. Its development in direct response to concerns identified through the confidential close- call reporting process indicate a learning and flexible culture that calls on employee involvement. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS T&E Safety Job Briefing

66 Conclusions There are many practices that promote safety and safety cul- ture within and outside the public transportation industry. The research team has identified 34 such practices from a relatively small group of companies and transit agencies. It is important that readers understand that not all of these practices are appro- priate for all transit agencies. In many cases, a practice will not work in a given transit agency unless the necessary foundation exists to support it. For example, OCTA’s safety captain program will not work in a transit agency if management does not trust the hourly employees designated as safety captains to use the power delegated to them responsibly or those hourly employees do not trust their managers to accept and value their input. Transit agencies should consider the list of practices in this chapter as a menu from which to choose a few practices that appear appropriate for them—practices that would remedy a deficiency in safety operations and help improve safety cul- ture. Before a practice is implemented, it should be discussed with all stakeholders within the transit agency and imple- mented on a trial basis. After the trial period, the efficacy of each practice should be evaluated, and a decision should be made whether to retain, revise, or discard the practice. 3. The device is not locked, clamped, spiked, or tagged out of service, and 4. No obstructions will interfere with normal movement of the switch points or the handle. 104.4 After operating a switch or derail, the employee must make certain the: 1. Device is properly lined, 2. Switch points fit properly, 3. Target, if equipped, corresponds to the position of the device, 4. Lever is secure, and 5. Device is locked, if equipped with a lock.” IMPACT ON SAFETY CULTURE This standard operating procedure demonstrates an empha- sis on achieving higher levels of an informed culture at CSX. It also indicates a strong management and organizational com- mitment to safety. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS None available.