Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment: State of the Practice (2013)

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1 Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment: State of the Practice This final report presents the process and findings of a project documenting the current state-of-the-practice for hazardous materials transportation risk assessment. The first phase of the project captured the status of the current practice of hazardous materials transportation risk assessment, including current uses, existing models, and available data sources. The second phase of the project focused on synthesizing the research compiled in Phase I and determining where gaps exist in available tools, techniques, and data. Phase II also included presenting a path forward for addressing these gaps and supporting better risk assessments in the future. The project included a literature review and extensive interviews with hazmat transpor- tation risk assessment stakeholders. In addition, an online survey was used to expand the collection of information to a wider group of stakeholders. The results of these information gathering steps were summarized, and the current uses of risk assessments for each stake- holder were reported according to the following categories: • Current uses, users, modes, and decision making • Models, tools, methodologies, approaches • Key sources of data • Assumptions, limitations, biases, and availability • Updates • Risk communication • Desired improvements • Implementation barriers The key risk assessment approaches involving concrete models or methodologies with sufficient documentation or available information were further characterized in a set of decision matrices. The matrices were designed to facilitate selection of a model for appli- cation to a hazmat transportation stakeholder’s particular needs. The specific decisions included in the matrix are: • Mode Choice • Route Choice • Facility Siting • Packaging Selection • Alternate Product Selection • Emergency Management Resource Planning • Operational Changes • Security Measure Identification, Prioritization Evaluation • Security Risk Situational Awareness S u m m a r y

2Each model listed in the decision matrix has been presented in greater detail in a separate matrix. The individual model matrices characterize each risk assessment approach in terms of its uses, model elements, data requirements, outputs, strengths and weaknesses, avail- ability, and potential barriers to its use. The specific models and their developers included are shown in Table S1. After characterizing each model, the project team then analyzed the information gath- ered. The general analysis included a discussion of the types of decisions different stake- holders make and the scope and timeframe for their analyses, how those decisions can be supported with different levels of quantification, and a more detailed discussion for each of the decision types listed earlier. Model Sponsor/Developer Boston Hazmat Route Evaluation City of Boston Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Guidelines: Qualitative Risk Assessment Process CCPS CCPS Guidelines: Quantitative Risk Assessment Process CCPS CCPS Guidelines: Risk Prioritization Process CCPS CCPS Guidelines: Security Risk Prioritization Process CCPS CCPS Guidelines: Security Vulnerability Assessment Process CCPS CCPS Guidelines: Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Process CCPS Chemical Manufacturer Risk Assessment Framework Large Chemical/Plastics Manufacturer Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) Fedtrak The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) at the University of Kentucky (UK) for Transportation Security Administration (TSA) GeoCTA Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Center for Transportation Analysis (CTA) Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) Safety Analysis for Risk (IMESAFR) IME Pipeline Risk Management Manual Risk Assessment Method Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) RADTRAN Department of Energy (DOE)/Sandia Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS) Railroad Research Foundation (RRF)/ Association of American Railroads (AAR) Readiness and Resiliency Assessment Framework ORNL CTA Risk-Based Preventative Radiological/Nuclear Detection Resource National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) TRACC ORNL CTA/Miss. State Univ. Transportation Routing Analysis Geographic Information System (TRAGIS) DOE/Oak Ridge Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) DHS, TSA, Office of Security Capabilities (OSC) Trucking and Hazmat Trucking Risk Assessment (THTRA) DHS, TSA Highway Motor Carrier Branch (HMC) University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) Tank Car Risk Analysis UIUC Table S1. Model risk assessments and developers.

3 The primary model components, frequency, probability, threat, vulnerability, and con- sequence, were also discussed separately, highlighting the approaches used by the different models and stakeholders along with any relevant issues, such as sources, availability, and level of detail. A discussion of the approaches used for interpreting and applying the results included a discussion on the types of output from risk assessments and the treatment of uncertainty. The project team identified gaps in the models, model data, and in the availability of these models, data, and results to stakeholders. For models, the gaps included multi-modal/ intermodal risk analyses, validation of prior assessments, comparability of model results, uncertainty, and route analysis tools. Data gaps included: inadequate highway exposure data and accident rates, conditional probability data, disparate data quality across modes, secu- rity assessment credibility and transparency, lack of public vulnerability and threat data, and validation of supporting data. Finally, for availability, the gaps included a formal risk management process; data building blocks for assessments; lack of awareness of available data, tools, and methods; and lack of public disclosure of datasets. The project team offered several recommendations for improving the state of the practice in hazmat transportation risk assessment. These recommendations included: • Recommendations for model development: development of a common risk assessment approach across all modes using a standard architecture. Highway and waterway hazmat route risk assessment tools were also recommended. • Recommendations for data development: enhancement of the available hazmat com- modity flow data to support improved accident rate information, enhancing the data to support conditional release probabilities for highway transportation, more research on commercial-scale explosives, data calibration across modes, developing a guidebook for hazmat transportation security-related elicitation from subject matter experts, and explor- ing options to increase safe sharing of security-sensitive threat and vulnerability data. • Recommendations for communication and data/model sharing: integration of common methodologies used by private and public sector entities into a common framework with specific checklists, and development of a data repository or catalog of all relevant information that would be maintained over time.