The Right to Self-Fuel (2009)

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11 trative record in its entirety, the FAA’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.66 Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a rea- sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.67 Not only must the FAA’s factual findings be supported by substantial evidence, but the agency’s nonfactual analysis, including its interpretation of any governing statute, application of that statute to the facts, and conclusion be reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious.68 In other words, there must be a ra- tional connection between the facts found and the deci- sion made by the agency.69 Individual self-fueling complainants70 also have brought direct actions against grant holders; these have included federal antitrust monopoly challenges and civil rights claims in U.S. district courts.71 Because these cases do not challenge FAA rulings or regulations, the courts have ruled in favor of the claimants against pre- liminary motions to dismiss based on claim preclusion and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.72 III. CONCLUSION The right to “self-fuel” at federally-obligated airports has been interpreted in many different ways through- out a wide variety of complex circumstances. Further, the many technical aspects that are inevitably involved with self-fueling (such as fuel storage and delivery) re- quire extensive regulation to control, as well as the need to maintain safe and efficient operations. Al- though there is no clear and concise guide to the rules and regulations that govern self-fueling, the FAA has made available a comprehensive compilation of cases involving self-fueling that provide insight into how such rules and regulations are interpreted under specific circumstances. Abstracts of cases mentioned in this report and other relevant cases are included in this re- port as Appendix D. 66 See BMI Salvage Corp. v. FAA, 272 Fed. Appx. 842, 845, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7964 (11th Cir. 2008). 67 Id. 68 Id. at 845, 846 (citations omitted). See also Boca v. FAA, 363 U.S. App. D.C. 397, 401, 389 F.3d 186, 204 U.S. App. Lexis 23883 (2004). 69 Id. at 845. See also Wilson Air v. FAA, 372 F.3d 807, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 12430 (2004). 70 The plaintiff in Scott v. Dupage, 393 F. Supp. 2d 638, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9582 (2005) was the founder and prin- cipal shareholder of Plaintiff Scott Aviation, Inc. 71 See Cedarhurst v. Waukesha County, 110 F. Supp. 2d 891, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12182 (2000); Scott Aviation v. Dupage, 393 F. Supp. 2d 638, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9582 (2005). 72 Id.