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Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook 117 APPENDIX A. Glossary of Terms B. Bibliography C. Literature Review D. Copy of the Transit Agency Survey E. State of the Practice (Results of Surveys, Interview, and Site Visits)
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook A-1 A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS Term Description Access Control Methods and technologies used to identify and control access to a defined area. Used in conjunction with IDS to control nuisance alarms ACS Access Control System Alarm Processing Evaluation of sensor input data to determine whether to annunciation an alarm APTA American Public Transportation Association Area Sensor Sensor used to monitor a physical surface area such as a floor, outdoor ground area, etc. Ranging from as simple as a pressure mat, to as complex as a buried field sensor. Distinction between Area and Volume sensors are sometimes limited Balance Pressure Switch An IDS sensor that alarms when subjected to a pressure differential Barrier Sensors Sensors used to monitor a physical barrier - fence, wall, roof, window, etc. BIA Business Impact Analysis Binary Sensor An IDS sensing device that has only 2 states - open or closed, which is used to annunciate alarms. Example = BMS Biometric The utilization of a personal biometric trait to identify a user to ACS and IDS systems. Examples are fingerprints, iris scans, retinal scans, hand geometry Bistatic Sensor An IDS sensor that consists of two parts: a transmitter and a receiver. Normally, interruption of the transmitted sensor energy (IR, laser, microwave, etc.) cause an IDS alarm BMS Balance Magnetic Switch - A set of contacts and magnets used to annunciate the opening / closing of door, window, or other device. Replaces magnetic position switches that are easily defeated and bypassed. Breakwire An IDS sensor that alarms an IDS when a wire or other cable is broken BCP Business Continuity Plan C2 Command & Control C3 Command, Control, & Communications C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Integration - Military term to define an integrated system for overall control and operation of a complex operation Capacitance An IDS sensor technology that measures the disturbance of a capacitive field set up to protect fixed objects CATS Consequence Assessment Tool Set CCTV Closed Circuit Television - Video camera system used to monitor defined area. Imaging includes color, black & white, and thermal sensors. COTS Off The Shelf - technologies and solutions that are readily available and do not require development research work. COTS can be configured to specific applications without development or research. Crisis Management A set of methods and procedures used to address crisis situations. CSDS Coastal Surveillance and Display System Data Fusion Methods to collect and display various IDS sensors and systems information DB Data Base - also database or dB
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook A-2 Term Description DFDCS Data Fusion, Display, and Control - applies to an extremely wide variety of systems and software applications from a diverse field of vendors or integrators that cover the complete range of data fusion, display, and control management Dual Technology IDS sensors that use two methods jointly to sense intrusions. Example is IR & Microwave Duress Alarm A binary sensor device activated covertly by personnel to annunciate to an IDS the occurrence of an alarm condition DVR Digital Video Recorder - method of recording video signals from CCTV systems by digitizing the analog video signal, compressing, and saving on computer style hard disk storage. EBS Electronic Badging System - system that saves a userâs picture and other relevant data (including, if required, biometric information) into a database. This information is used to create credentials that are used by guard force personnel and access control systems for both identification & access control. EECS Electronic Entry Control Systems - ACS EH&S Environmental Health and Safety EIBS Electronic Image Badge System Electric Eye An IDS sensor that senses to transmission of visible or invisible light EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference Environmental Alarm Alarm annunciated from environmental condition that mimics an intrusion False Alarm Alarm annunciation from no apparent cause FAR False Alarm Rate - a rate or ratio of false alarms to other alarm times Fiber Optic Cable A cable consisting of glass or plastic used to transmit light (visible or invisible). Alteration or interruption of the light is used by IDS sensors to annunciate intrusion FOV Field Of View - used for CCTV systems and defines the angle of viewing of the system (in horizontal and vertical). FOV is controlled by camera image sensor size and lens type and setting. FTA Federal Transit Administration Geophone An IDS sensor that utilizes sound and pressure to detect intrusions HASCAL Hazardous Assessment for Consequence Analysis HID High Intensity Discharge HR Human Resources ID Identification IDS Intrusion Detection System IES Illumination Engineering Society Intruder Unauthorized person, animal, or object in a restricted area. Intrusion Alarm Alarm generated by an IDS. Alarms include Intrusion, Nuisance, Environmental, and False. Also an alarm generated by an intruder entering or violating a protected area. Intrusion Detection Methods and technologies to sense and annunciate the intrusion of personnel into a defined area.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook A-3 Term Description IR Infra-Red - Optical wavelength outside normal human viewing, normally above 700 microns. Beyond Red. LED Light Emitting Diode Microwave Sensor An IDS sensor that uses the disturbance of microwave energy to annunciate an intrusion Monostatic Sensor An IDS sensor that consists of one part,with transmitter and receiver mounted in the same physical device NAR Nuisance Alarm Rate - a rate or ratio of nuisance alarms compared to other alarm types Nuisance Alarm Alarm annunciation from the detection of an intruder that is NOT an intrusion. Example is an authorized worker who enters a protected area with proper suppression of the IDS alarm. PC Personal Computer Piezoelectric An IDS sensor that uses the physical effect of voltage generation caused by the exertion of pressure on certain materials PIN Personal Identification Number - used in access control systems to prevent use of ID badges by unauthorized personnel PIR Passive Infra-Red (sensor) - system that used human IR (heat) emissions for detection purposes. Point Sensors A sensor that is used to monitor a single point such as door position (open or closed) Ported Coaxial An IDS sensor that uses a leaky (purposely designed cable with poor shield) to detect intrusion. A RF signal is injected into the cable and interference of the field produced around the ported cable causes an IDS alarm Pressure Sensor An IDS sensor that detects pressure (usually intruding personnel) and alarms when activated PTZ or P/T/Z Pan Tilt Zoom - control of camera systems - pan is side to side motion, tilt is up and down, and zoom is FOV adjustment via camera lens control RF Radio Frequency RFI Radio Frequency Interference SAIC Science Applications International Corporation SDMS Security Data Management System Security Screen An IDS sensor that utilizes a mesh of breakwires to alarm an IDS when open or broken. Sensor Processing Equipment and computer processors that receives sensor inputs and determines if an alarm condition exists. Provides binary output of processing decision TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TIS Thermal Imaging System UL Underwriters Laboratories Ultrasonic An IDS sensor system that utilizes high frequency sound for intrusion detection UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply - system used to provide back up power in the event of loss of AC line power. Usually a system of AC to DC and DC to AC converters with a battery supply source. VA Vulnerability Assessment - a study to determine potential vulnerabilities to a defined area or system
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook A-4 Term Description Video Motion An IDS sensor system that analyses and compares video signal for the detection of intrusion VMS Video Monitoring System - a complete video system including cameras, lenses, camera control, camera and control power, signal transmission, video display, video switching, video control, and video recording Volume Sensors Sensor used to monitor a physical space such as a room interior, volume around a door, or volume adjacent to a fence VSOC Visual Security Operations Center
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook B-1 B. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment and Appendices, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' Security Task Force under National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-07/Task 151B, May 2002. (http://security.transportation.org/community/security/doc/guide- VA_FinalReport.pdf) 2. A Guide to Updating Highway Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist Incidents and Appendices, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' Security Task Force under National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-07/Task 151A, May 2002. (http://security.transportation.org/community/security/doc/guide-ResponsePlans.pdf) 3. Access Control & Security Systems Buyers Guide - Access Control & Security Systems Volume 45 / Number 6, 2002. 4. Access Control Units (UL 294), January 1987. 5. Bart Intrusion Detection System With Costing, December 2002. 6. Biometrics Explained, International Biometrics Group, 2001. 7. Biometrics Technology Overview, April 2002. 8. Body Check â Biometrics Defeated, c't Magazine Germany, June 2002. 9. Bridge Monitoring for Acoustic Events, Pure Technology Ltd. - Acoustic Monitoring, June 2002. 10. CCTV, Book by Vlado Damjanovski, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000. 11. Design Guidelines for Physical Security Facilities (Military Handbook 1013/1A), October 1987. 12. Design Manual 13.02, Commercial Intrusion Detection System (ID), Naval Facilities Engineering Command, September 1986. 13. Electronic Surveillance Technology on Transit Vehicles (TCRP Synthesis 38), Federal Transit Administration (FTA)/Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), 2001. (http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/tcrp/tsyn38.pdf) 14. Energy Efficient Lighting (DOE / GO 10095-056), U.S. Department of Energy, December 1995. (http:// www.eren.doe.gov/erec/factsheets/eelight.pdf) 15. Federal Specification Components for Interior Alarm Systems (W-A-450C), August 1990. 16. FPED III CD, Force Protection Equipment Demonstration III Information CD contains product pages for force protection equipment demonstrated and displayed during FPED III held at US Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, May 2001. 17. IDS GEGS 16725, Army Corp of Engineers, April 1991 18. Intruder Detection Systems, London Underground, 1993. 19. Improving Transit Security, A Synthesis of Transit Practice (TCRP Synthesis 21), Federal Transit Administration (FTA)/Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), 1997. http:// www.nas.edu/trb/publications/tcrp/tsyn21.pdf 20. Intrusion Detection Units (UL 634), July 1993. 21. Intrusion Detection & Assessment (DOE Order 5632.1C & DOE Manual 5632.1C-1), U.S. Department of Energy.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook B-2 22. Manual For Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests (DOE 5632.1C), U.S. Department of Energy Office of Security Affairs Office of Safeguards and Security, July 1994. (www.oa.doe.gov/sase/directives/m56321c-1c1.pdf) 23. Military Specifications Control Electronics (MIL-C-52913), January 1989. 24. Military Specifications Monitor Module, Status and Monitor Modules, Alarm (MIL- M-5287C), February 1986. 25. National Preparedness - Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings (GAO-01-687T), Statement of Keith A. Rhodes, April 2002. (http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d02687t.pdf) 26. Perimeter Security Handbook, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/ Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In Service Engineering - East (NISE East), 1997. (http:// www.nlectc.org/perimetr/full2.htm) 27. Physical Security (FM 3-19.30), Department of the Army, January 2001. (www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-19-30/toc.htm) 28. Physical Security Design, Design Manual (NAVFAC DM â 13.1), Naval Facilities Engineering Command U.S. Navy, 1983. 29. Physical Security Systems Inspectors Guide, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations, September 2000. (http:// www.oa.doe.gov/guidedocs/0009pssig/toc.pdf) 30. Proprietary Burglar Alarm Units and Systems (UL 1076), December 1988. 31. Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices (MTI Report 01-07), Mineta Transportation Institute, Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, September 2001. (http://transweb.sjsu.edu/publications/terrorism_final.htm) 32. Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities - Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks (IISTPS Report 97-4), Mineta Transportation Institute, Brian Michael Jenkins, December 1997. (http://transweb.sjsu.edu/publications/terrorism/Protect.htm) 33. Protecting Surface Transportation Against Terrorist and Serious Crime: An Executive Overview, Mineta Transportation Institute, Brian Michael Jenkins. (October 2001). http://transweb.sjsu.edu/publications/TerrorismExOverv.htm 34. Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide, DOT-FTA-MA-26-5019-03-01 35. Security Engineering Electronic Security Design (TM 5-853-4), Department of the Army, 1994. 36. Security: A Guide to Security Systems Design and Equipment Selection and Installation, Book by Neil Cumming, Butterworth-Heinemannm, 1992. 37. Terms, Definitions and Symbols for Security Equipment and Practices (FED-STD- 800), January 1989. 38. Transit Security Handbook, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, March 1998. (http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/security/TransitSecurityHandbook.pdf) 39. US Army Corp of Engineers Cost Estimator Electronic Security Systems â Spreadsheet with guide, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, January 2001.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook B-3 Intrusion Detection Related WEB SITES ACS www.casi-rusco.com ACS www.lenel.com ACS www.swhouse.com ANSER homeland defense page www.homelandsecurity.org/research.cfm Biometric www.handreader.com Biometrics www.biometricgroup.com Bollards/barriers â including hydraulic www.deltascientific.com Business Impact Analysis (BIA) and the Business Continuity Plan (BCP) Generator from Disaster Recovery World www.disasterrecovery.com Camera & CCTV www.panasonic.com/cctv Camera & CCTV www.pelco.com Camera Source Book www.securitysystemsnews.com Coastal Surveillance and Display System (CSDS) www.saic.com Concrete bollards/barriers www.stonewear.com Consequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) www.saic.com Control Electronic Security www.controlelectronic.com Defense Data www.dtic.mil/dtic Fencing www.riverdale.com Fencing www.cawire.com GE Lighting www.gelighting.com Glossary www.ciao.gov/ciao_document_library/glossary/F.htm Hazardous Assessment for Consequence Analysis (HASCAL) www.ornl.com Identification Systems www.datacard.com Identification Systems www.identicard.com Identification Systems www.lenel.com Identification Systems www.casi-rusco.com IDS www.optexamerica.com IDS www.senstarstellar.com IDS www.perimeterproducts.com IDS www.safeguards.com IDS www.fibersensys.com IDS www.southwestmicrowave.com IDS www.beicomm.com IDS www.rtms-by-eis.com Induced Pulse Fencing www.rutland-electric-fencing.co.uk IR Camera www.indigosystems.com IR Cameras www.diop.com
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook B-4 Intrusion Detection Related WEB SITES LED Lighting www.ledtronics.com McQ Associates âOmniSenseâ www.mcqassociates.com/IDS- Seismic,Magnetic,PassiveIR,andAcousticSensorUnits; ProcessingUnitandDisplayUnit Mesh Fence www.metlx.com Intelligent Tracking Software www.remotereality.com Razor Fencing www.binns-fencing.com RiskWatch for Physical Security from RiskWatch www.riskwatch.com Rotating fence toppings www.jncfence.com Secure Technology Inc. www.securetechnology.com Security www.dtic.mil/ndia/security Security Data Management System (SDMS) www.vistascape.com Security Links to Equipment www.intiss.com/pslinks.html Sentrol â Now part of GE Interlogix www.sentrol.com Taut Wire IDS www.govcon.com/content/ProductShowcase/product.a sp?DocID={93A50FFB-6459-11D6-A789- 00D0B7694F32} US Army Corp of Engineer Support Center www.hnd.usace.army.mil/techinfo Visual Security Operations Center (VSOC) www.vsoc.com The references in the above table are provided for information purposes only. This Handbook does not endorse any companies or products to provide intrusion detection technologies or devices.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook C-1 C. LITERATURE REVIEW The material presented in this Handbook is derived from a careful review of information compiled from commercial, state, federal, and international agencies and their personnel. The information was acquired through telephone calls, emails, a survey, and extensive online research. The objective was to identify, assess, and document the state of the practice in the use of intrusion detection systems in the transit industry. The online literature search concentrated on intrusion detection technologies such as lighting, fencing, barriers, video cameras, identification systems, access control systems, sensors, security management systems, and crisis management software. Some of the documents found include military manuals, security system inspectorâs guides, technology handbooks, government reports, and vendor technology reviews. The documents obtained are cited in the bibliography to this Handbook in the appendix. Much of the literature contained similar information with respect to specific security technologies. Many documents focused on common deficiencies, weaknesses, and potential concerns such as false alarms, improper installation, tamper protection, inadequate testing, and optimum coverage. Also mentioned are the capabilities, limitations, and integration methods of current perimeter security sensor technology. The referenced handbooks provide a compendium of sensor technologies, a general explanation of each technology, as well as integration techniques that can be used to enhance perimeter security and intrusion detection planning. The references below represent a small portion of findings from the literature search, but provided some of the more relevant background information on intrusion detection and access control systems. National Preparedness - Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings (GAO-01-687T), Statement of Keith A. Rhodes, 2002. The report discusses commercially available security technologies that provide protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Evaluations of 12 Access Control Technologies, 3 Detection Technologies, and 2 Intrusion Detection Technologies are provided. Each technology evaluation begins with a picture of the specified technology followed by a general description of how it works. Next is an assessment of the effectiveness and performance factors. The report provides discussion on user acceptance of the technology, describing issues or concerns that some organizations have experienced when implementing the particular system. Also included is a unit price range along with potential vendors of the technology. Electronic Surveillance Technology on Transit Vehicles (TCRP Synthesis 38), Federal Transit Administration (FTA)/Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), 2001. This document focuses on the state of the practice regarding on-board vehicle surveillance technologies. The synthesis begins with system design and a description of existing technology including closed circuit television, event recorders, and audio surveillance. Representative technology configurations from seven transit agencies (Philadelphia, Chicago, Ann Arbor, Milwaukee, Buffalo, St. Louis, and Portland) provide approximate system cost, reasons for use, installation summary, and more. The document also explores the benefits of surveillance technology with the assistance of statistical tables and graphs. The ending chapter addresses three issues that
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook C-2 exist with surveillance technologies on vehicles including financial, legal, and mechanical and procedural. Physical Security Systems Inspectors Guide, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security Evaluations, 2000. The guide provides security system inspectors with a set of detailed tools and references that can be used to plan, conduct, and close out an inspection. Appendix A (Intrusion-Detection Systems) of the document includes performance tests for a variety of intrusion-detection systems such as Exterior Perimeter Sensors, Interior Sensors, Perimeter CCTV, Interior CCTV, and Alarm Processing and Display Equipment. Transit Security Handbook, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center /Federal Transit Agency, 1998. The Handbook provides an overview of the rail security function such as the establishment of a rail transit police or security department, the development of a System Security Program Plan (Security Plan), the deployment of uniformed and plainclothes police and security personnel, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Situation Crime. Also included are prevention (SCP) techniques for rail facility design and operation, specifically the use and management of security technology, and techniques for crime data collection and analysis. Perimeter Security Sensor Technologies Handbook, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/ Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In Service Engineering - East (NISE East), 1997. The Handbook provides military and law enforcement security managers, and specialists with a reference of perimeter security sensor technologies, capabilities, limitations, and integration methods. Sensor technology reviews provide useful information, such as: the operating principle â a simplistic description of how the system works, sensor types/configurations â a description of those systems that have multiple âtypesâ, applications and considerations â a description of the recommended environment the specific system is designed for and conditions that may cause unreliable detection or nuisance alarms, and user acceptance of the technology - issues or concerns that some organizations have experienced when implementing the particular system. Manual For Protection And Control Of Safeguards And Security Interests (DOE 5632.1C), U.S. Department of Energy Office of Security Affairs Office of Safeguards and Security, 1994. The document is composed of 14 chapters that provide detailed requirements for protection of safeguards and security interests. Chapter 6 of the document focuses on intrusion detection and assessment systems. This chapter describes the requirements that an intrusion detection system must meet and maintain with respect to: perimeter coverage, false alarm rates, system testing, lighting, auxiliary power, and intrusion detection system protection. Each of these documents is available to the public and can be found on the Internet. A complete listing of references is provided in Appendix B of this Handbook
D. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE INTRUSION DETECTION FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES Your assistance in completing this survey questionnaire will provide valuable information for understanding the current state-of-the-art practices, equipment and resources utilized for intrusion detection for public transportation facilities. The questionnaire is intended to gather information related to intrusion detection applications for any and all public transportation facilities as well as vehicles. D-1
Vehicles should include: Intrusion Detection Applications could include: Facilities should include the following: ! Trains/Rail Vehicles ! Buses ! Video Surveillance ! Administrative Buildings ! Access Control Systems ! Sensors ! Service/Support Vehicles ! Maintenance Facilities (Bus & Rail) ! Special Purpose Vehicles ! Storage Facilities ! Alarm Systems ! Para-Transit Vehicles ! Rail Yards ! Fences ! Operational Control Centers ! Barriers ! Power Stations ! Lighting ! Train Control Areas ! Stations ! Human Resources ! Other ! Tunnels ! Bridges ! Terminals/Transfer Facilities ! Operating Right-of-Way ! Parking Lots/Structures D-2
The Survey Questionnaire has twenty-one questions with associated tables to simplify your response. Please follow the instructions related to each question and provide as much additional information as possible on specific items at the bottom of each table. Unless otherwise stated in the question, only provide responses for current intrusion detection applications on existing public transportation facilities or vehicles. Thank you for taking the time to provide responses to this survey questionnaire. Your time and commitment are appreciated. D-3
1. What type of Intrusion Detection System(s) is currently being utilized? (Please check all applicable boxes) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-4
2. Is it purely utilized for security? (Please check boxes) Is it also meeting an operating requirement? (Please add a plus sign) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-5
3. Was the application in response to a specific incident? Was it for purely preventive measures? (Mark I for incident and P for preventive) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS D-6
4. Has the application accomplished its intended purpose? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-7
5. Have you realized any secondary benefits? (Please mark Y for yes and describe below) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-8
6. Has the application functioned as originally intended? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-9
7. SU NCE ALARM SYSTEMS BARRIERS What modifications have been made since the original installation? (Please check applicable boxes and explain below) VIDEO RVEILLA ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS FENCES LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-10
8. VIDEO Was the application custom made (mark with C) or off the shelf (mark with S)? SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-11
9. Have there been any adverse effects on operations or other functions as a result of the application? (Please check for yes and explain below) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-12
9. If you had to make the same decision today, would you select the same application/product? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-13
10. What was the full capital cost of the application, including installation? (Please indicate $ amount) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. D-14
12. What are the annual costs of operating and maintaining the application? (Please report as a % of total installation cost, and if available, breakout for general maintenance, repair and vandalism) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-15
13. How reliable is the system based on failure rates and false alarm rates? (Please mark from 1 low to 5 high) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): BRIDGES D-16
14. How much maintenance is required on the system? (Please mark from 1 low to 5 high) ACCESS CONTROL VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. D-17
15. What is the life expectancy of the system(s) you currently utilize? (Please indicate the number of years) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-18
16. Are you currently planning to replace or upgrade your system(s)? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no and, if available, describe why, when and any estimated costs below) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-19
17. Do you publicize the intrusion detection system(s) you utilize? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no. If yes, explain how below) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES D-20
18. Do you currently track ongoing technology development in the area of intrusion detection? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-21
19. Are investments in this area given a high priority in your transit system? (Please mark Y for yes and N for no) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-22
20. Have you identified intrusion detection needs for which there are currently inadequate products/systems to address them? (Please check and describe below) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): BRIDGES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES D-23
21. What is the extent of detection intrusion utilized at your system? (Please provide numbers and dimensions where appropriate) VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ACCESS CONTROL SENSORS ALARM SYSTEMS FENCES BARRIERS LIGHTING HUMAN RESOURCES OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS MAINTENANCE FACILITIES STORAGE FACILITIES RAIL YARDS OPERATIONAL CONTROL CTRS. POWER STATIONS TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS STATIONS TUNNELS BRIDGES TERMINALS & TRANSFER CTRS. RIGHT OF WAY PARKING LOTS & STRUCTURES TRAINS & RAIL VEHICLES BUSES SERVICE/SUPPORT VEHICLES SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES PARA-TRANSIT VEHICLES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PLEASE SPECIFY): D-24
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-1 E. STATE OF THE PRACTICE (RESULTS OF SURVEYS, INTERVIEWS AND SITE VISITS) 1. State of the Practice - Tunnels, Bridges, and Right-Of-Way Intrusion Detection Applications There are portions of transit systems that are not intended for public access. Except in cases of station evacuation, tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way are restricted to authorized personnel only. Initially, access was controlled with the use of locked gates, fences, barriers, doors, and human resources. With the advent of technology, IDS and ACS electronic intrusion detection applications utilizing alarms, sensors, video surveillance and access control were installed in transit systems to detect and prevent access of non-authorized personnel to these restricted areas. Systems presently installed in these restricted areas are intended to enhance safety; reduce hazards, vandalism, and crime; and raise passenger perceptions about levels of safety and security within the transit system. Transit agencies currently use many different types of systems. Tunnels and bridges use camera surveillance, access control, sensors, alarm systems, fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources. Transit agencies use fences, barriers, lighting, human resources, sensors, access control, and alarm systems to safeguard right-of-way. All of the systems used are designed for safety and security, but some serve multiple purposes. IDS in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way also serve an operating purpose, including the prevention of service delays that occur when an intruder or unauthorized personnel are present. Different types of sensors can also be used to detect hazards in the right-of-way that can be corrected without disruptions and delays in service. Other systems such as lighting, fencing, human resources, alarms, and communication systems, also contribute to a safe and efficient operation. Many systems are used for preventive purposes, but some were installed in response to a specific incident. Depending on the factors that determine the type and mix of systems used, technology devices are frequently augmented with fences, barriers, or human resources. Transit System Experiences Based on survey results, the intrusion detection systems presently used in transit system tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way are generally functioning as intended and are viewed as having satisfied their original design purpose of reducing trespassing incidents. The exceptions occurred where access control systems did not prevent unauthorized access and vandalism within tunnels and right-of-way. Although transit systems are generally satisfied with the performance of the intrusion detection systems, they have cited problems with false and nuisance alarms and camera reliability. Responding to intrusions is costly in terms of personnel and passenger inconvenience due to service delays. Improvements to fences and barriers alone do not discourage vandals from entering tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way, so electronic sensors and video surveillance are the applications usually considered in this area. Regardless of the problems experienced, most systems indicate that they would select the same application or product with technology upgrades that incorporate increased and improved functionality.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-2 Failure rates for the intrusion detection systems utilized by transit agencies in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way are fairly low, and most systems are considered to be quite reliable. Maintenance required for fences and barriers is quite low. Access control, alarm systems, and human resources require a moderate amount of maintenance, and video surveillance, sensors, and lighting require a higher amount of maintenance. In addition to serving their initial purpose, a few secondary benefits of IDS have been achieved by transit systems. Secondary benefits have been noted through the use of access control, fences, barriers, and lighting at tunnels and through the use of human resources at tunnels and right-of-way. For example, human resources located at right-of-way may provide passengers with transit information as well as additional comfort and feelings of security. The intrusion detection systems generally have not resulted in adverse effects on operations. The only adverse effects noted for these facilities are created by sensors and alarm systems in tunnels. These sensors occasional report false alarms that can result in service delays and employee time needed to respond to and verify alarms. Transit agencies are using both customized and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for intrusion detection systems in tunnels, and primarily COTS products for bridges. Agencies generally choose more customized products for right-of-way. Frequently, a COTS product or application may be used with minor modifications to operate to the agencyâs standards and requirements. This reduces the higher cost typically associated with purely customized applications. Life expectancy for IDS in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way varies based on the system and application selected. The life expectancy for video surveillance in both tunnels and bridges is 5 to 10 years. The life expectancy for access control systems, alarm systems, fences, barriers, and lighting when used in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way is about 20 years. The life expectancy for tunnel sensors is 5 years. As technology changes and evolves (particularly with video surveillance, electronic sensors, and access control), improvements are being made to systems for tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way. Following the review of security protocol after September 11, transit agencies have generally determined that the existing intrusion detection measures in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way are adequate with some selected modifications to tunnel security components. While intrusions cannot be completely eliminated, additional protection can be provided. Security in tunnels has been supplemented with additional sensors, cameras, barriers, and human resources. Fencing and lighting have been repaired and enhanced where needed to diminish vandalism, and access control has been updated. It is important to note that intrusion detection systems in tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way are usually not publicized by transit agencies, with the exception of signs advising of video surveillance.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-3 Future Needs Technology development of the intrusion detection systems for tunnels, bridges, and right-of-way utilizing video surveillance, access control, sensors, and alarm systems are being closely tracked by transit agencies. Other applications do not require such careful tracking due to slower change cycles for products. The investments for intrusion detection systems for tunnels, bridges and right-of-way are given high priority by transit professionals. These are crucial components of infrastructure, and protecting them is considered very important. While receiving fairly high marks for reliability and service, the intrusion detection systems have certain limitations. For example, standard video surveillance does not operate well in dusty, poorly lit environments like tunnels. Improved technology should be investigated to deal with these circumstances. 2. State of the Practice - Stations, Terminals/Transfer Facilities, and Parking Lots/Structures Intrusion Detection Applications Stations, terminals (or transfer centers), and parking lots (or parking structures) are important customer and operating facilities for a successful transit system. These facilities provide the interface for passengers to connect with the transit system. By their very nature they must be open and accessible so the connection to buses or trains is seamless and convenient. While these facilities need to be open and easily accessible, they also require effective access control that accommodates fare collection and a safe movement of large numbers of people interacting with trains and buses. The open nature of these facilities poses unique challenges for protecting them from intruders. Currently, transit systems use a mix of the following intrusion detection systems: video surveillance, access control, sensors, alarm systems, fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources are all designed to work together to provide intrusion detection and access control in transit system stations. Terminals/transfer facilities utilize low-technology applications such as fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources to keep intruders out of areas designed for authorized personnel. As technology has evolved, these facilities have been equipped with video surveillance, access control, and alarm systems to improve detection and minimize the need for human resources. Parking lots and structures are also protected with walls, fences, barriers, lighting, human resources, employee ID cards, and visitor passes. Technological advances added video surveillance, access control, and alarm systems. Most of the IDS installed in transit stations were installed for preventive purposes, but video surveillance, alarm systems, and barriers in particular were positioned in response to a specific incident. Additional barriers were placed at terminals/transfer centers in response to an incident. Transit systems added alarm systems and barriers to their parking lots/structures in response to incidents.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-4 Transit System Experiences The IDS presently in use in transit system stations, terminals, and parking lots are generally functioning as intended and are viewed as having satisfied their originally designed purpose. Occasional vandalism still occurs at stations despite access control measures and video surveillance. Also, barriers and human resources are unable to prevent occasional thefts within parking lots and structures. Failure rates for the intrusion detection systems utilized by transit agencies in terminals and parking facilities are fairly low, and most systems are considered to be quite reliable. The reliability of video surveillance can be low to moderate, but it may depend on the particular system used. Maintenance required for fences and barriers in stations is low. Access control, alarm systems, and human resources require a moderate amount of maintenance, and video surveillance, sensors, and lighting require a high amount of maintenance. As with stations, maintenance required for fences, barriers, and lighting. Access control, alarm systems, and human resources require a moderate amount of maintenance, and video surveillance, and human resources may require a high amount of maintenance. Transit agencies indicate that they would usually select the same application or product if installing intrusion detection in stations again. On the contrary, transit agencies will not always select the same application or product when installing additional intrusion detection devices in terminals and parking facilities. In addition to serving their initial purpose, a few secondary benefits have been achieved with IDS in stations, terminals and parking facilities. IDS at stations can be used for crowd monitoring and control, as well as reducing criminal activity. Human resources at stations, terminals, and parking lots can be a deterrent to criminal activity and provide customers with a higher sense of security. Additionally, human resources provide a resource for customer information on headways, routes, schedules, transfer points, landmarks, and fare media, thereby reducing the number of staff the transit agency must assign to each station. The IDS generally have not resulted in adverse effects on operations. There have been occasional false and nuisance alarms at stations that can result in service delays and employee time devoted to responding to the problem. No adverse effects directly related to the intrusion detection systems were found in terminals and parking facilities. Transit agencies use both customized and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for their IDS. Fences, barriers, lighting, and alarm systems at stations are usually COTS, while video surveillance, access control, sensors, and human resources are composed of a mix of customized and COTS components. Agencies generally choose COTS products for lighting, employee IDsand visitor passes at terminals and parking lots. The life expectancy for IDS applications in stations, terminals, and parking facilities generally conform to the ranges previously described, depending on the type and complexity of the system and the environmental installation conditions. To reiterate, fences, barriers and lighting have a life expectancy of 20+ years. Access control systems and simple alarm systems can expect to last for 10 to 15 years. Advanced sensors and video systems typically have a life expectancy of 5 to 7 years.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-5 Replacements and upgrades planned for intrusion detection systems for stations and terminals will occur mostly with video surveillance and access control. These may not be upgraded at parking lots in the near future, however. Some transit agencies may also choose to update their human resources and lighting within stations as well. Modifications have been made to the intrusion detection systems in stations to address the communications between incidents and response. Based on the type of incident, the first responder could be supervisors, police, emergency medical services or fire department personnel. Most systems within stations have been modified since inception. Modifications have been made to video surveillance, access control, lighting, and human resources in terminals. Modifications in parking facilities include video surveillance, access control, alarm systems, fences, barriers, lighting, human resources, and employee ID cards, and visitor passes. IDS in stations, terminals, and parking facilities are not usually publicized by transit agencies. Exceptions occur for video surveillance in stations and parking facilities that provide the public with a degree of comfort in the event of an emergency and are physically noticeable by riders. Future Needs Technology development of the systems utilizing video surveillance, access control, sensors, and alarm systems for stations, terminals, and parking lots are being closely tracked by transit agencies. Other applications do not require such careful tracking due to slower change cycles for products. Emerging technologies may help to address current limitations of systems, such as that of video surveillance in conditions found in terminals and parking lots. The investments for intrusion detection devices are given high priority by transit professionals, though sensors in both terminals and parking facilities are not considered a high priority. Sensors and alarm systems in stations may also be given a slightly lower priority than other IDS due to the high rate of false and nuisance alarms. 3. State of the Practice - Maintenance Facilities, Storage Facilities, and Rail Yards Intrusion Detection Applications Maintenance facilities, storage facilities, and rail yards are critical for the safe, efficient and successful operation of a transit system. Transit personnel staff these facilities and typically only employees and authorized visitors are granted access. Maintenance, storage, and rail yards are equipped with most of the systems studied. They use video surveillance, access control, sensors, alarm systems, fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources. Additionally, maintenance facilities and rail yards use employee ID cards and visitor passes for additional security measures. All of the IDS applications also serve an operating requirement in these facilities. While most systems were installed for prevention, alarm systems, video surveillance, barriers, and new access control
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-6 systems were installed in response to an incident. In most cases the incident was not specific to the transit agency; but was rather in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Transit System Experiences The intrusion detection systems presently used for these facilities function as originally intended, with a few exceptions. Access control has not been able to stop internal thefts at maintenance facilities and fences and lighting has not deterred occasional vandalism at maintenance facilities and rail yards. Video surveillance and access control do not always accomplish their intended purposes. Failure rates for the intrusion detection systems utilized by transit agencies at maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities are typically fairly low, and most systems are considered to be quite reliable. A few exceptions occur with video surveillance and access control. Moderate reliability was found with alarm systems, barriers, and human resources. Low levels of maintenance are required on most IDS for these facilities. Sensors and alarm systems require moderate levels of maintenance, while lighting and video surveillance sometimes require a higher level of maintenance. If transit agencies were in the position of choosing systems for maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities today, they would not necessarily choose the same product as they did initially. Access control, sensors, alarm systems, video surveillance and lighting products have changed and improved with new technology development. Secondary benefits have been realized with most of the IDS at maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities. These secondary benefits were not typically realized with the use of barriers, employee ID cards, and visitor passes at the facilities. The IDS at these facilities generally have not had adverse effects on operations. While sensors and alarm systems designed for other components of a transit system have experienced false alarms, the only IDS that adversely affected these facilities were access control at maintenance facilities and alarm systems at rail yards. Maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities mainly use commercial off- the-shelf (COTS) products for their IDS. These are sometimes modified to provide customized products used for access control, fences, barriers, video surveillance, lighting, and human resources. The life expectancy for the IDS at maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities are again similar to what has been previously described. Fences, barriers and lighting have a life expectancy of 20+ years. Access control systems and simple alarm systems can expect to last for 10 to 15 years. Advanced sensors and video systems typically have a life expectancy of 5 to 7 years. Transit agencies must plan for upgrades and replacement of all systems, particularly those high technology systems with shorter life expectancy. Replacements and upgrades for IDS at these facilities are expected for some places in all categories. These decisions are based on the age and condition of the IDS that are currently operating. The only systems publicized by transit agencies at maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities are access control at maintenance facilities, employee ID cards, and visitor passes. All other systems are not publicized.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-7 Future Needs All of the systems for maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities are tracked for ongoing technology development by some transit agencies. Some transit agencies do not consider investments in sensors, alarm systems, fences, and lighting a high priority at these three facilities. They do consider video surveillance, access control, barriers, human resources, employee ID cards, and visitor passes high priority investments. Several of the systems used at maintenance, storage, and rail yard facilities do not address all current needs. These systems include video surveillance, access control, sensors, and alarm systems. Transit agencies must consider these needs with upcoming plans for replacement and upgrades of current IDS/ACS. 4. State of the Practice - Power Stations, Train Control Areas, and Operational Control Centers Intrusion Detection Applications Power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers are highly technical facilities required for the effective operation of a transit system. They are usually located separately from other transit functions, and require fewer employees per square foot of space. Operational control centers serve to monitor, coordinate and direct the operations of both trains and buses consistent with schedules and the operating and safety standards of the transit agency. Power stations and train control areas are associated with electrified rail transit operations. Power stations regulate the electricity necessary to operate rail vehicles and train control areas house the sophisticated equipment that operates the computerized signal, automated train control and communications systems for the entire rail system. All of these facilities are restricted to authorized personnel only. Unwanted intrusion into any of these facilities jeopardizes the very heart of the transit operation. As a result, special efforts for intrusion detection and strict access control exist at each of these facilities. These facilities are commonly equipped with systems including access control, alarm systems, fences, lighting, video surveillance, sensors, barriers and human resources. Of these devices, access control installed in operational control centers and train control systems serve an operating requirement in addition to security functions. This is also the case for sensors and alarm systems at power stations and train control areas, lighting at operational control centers and power stations, and human resources at operational control centers and train control systems. While these have been primarily installed for prevention, barriers are often added at operational control centers and power stations in response to a specific incident. Transit System Experiences Typically the IDS presently used function as originally intended, with the exception of video surveillance at operational control centers. Other IDS devices at power stations and train control systems operate to design. Failure rates for the IDS utilized by transit agencies at power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers are fairly low, and most systems are considered to be quite reliable. Maintenance varies based on the type of intrusion detection device. Some video surveillance products used in power stations, train control centers, and operational control centers
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-8 require very little maintenance while other products require a high amount of maintenance. Unreliable cameras (failure rates up to 75 percent) are being replaced slowly. Access control, alarm systems, fences, and barriers require a moderate amount of maintenance, and lighting varies on the amount needed for full performance Transit agencies would not necessarily select the same products if making the same decision again for power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers. Video surveillance, access control, alarm system, and lighting are the areas in which new technology has been developed and transit agencies indicated they would choose the newer, more technologically advanced product, if making the decision today. Secondary benefits have been achieved at all three facilities through the use of access control, alarm systems, fences, and lighting. Additionally, secondary benefits have been noted at operational control centers with video surveillance, barriers, and human resources. If an employee has been terminated, the access control system provides a method to immediately remove the former employeeâs ability to access the building (and potentially to the operations controls center of the transit system). IDS systems generally have not had adverse effects on operations at power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers. Occasionally false and nuisance alarms are reported at train control areas, but the other IDS for these three facility types have caused no adverse effects. Operational control centers are somewhat unique facilities with regard to the origin of their IDS products. IDS found at operational control centers are usually commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Modifications have been made to video surveillance and access control products to configure the resource to the particular needs and requirements of the transit agency. The products utilized at power stations and train control systems are also usually COTS products, with custom configuration of access control at both facilities, alarm systems at train control systems, and fences and barriers at power stations. Life expectancy for intrusion detection systems at power stations, train control systems, and operational control centers is consistent with that of IDS for other facilities. Fences, barriers and lighting have a life expectancy of 20+ years. Access control systems and simple alarm systems can expect to last for 10 to 15 years. Advanced sensors and video systems typically have a life expectancy of 5 to 7 years. Upgrades planned for these facilities will utilize rapidly changing technology in the areas of video surveillance, access control, and alarm systems. Upgrades to existing sensor technology at train control systems is expected, as well as upgrades to fences at power stations and operational control centers and barriers at power stations. Since the systems were installed at power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers, several modifications have been made. These modifications have occurred with access control, alarm systems, fences, and barriers. Additionally, operational control centers have experienced modifications to video surveillance and human resources, while train control areas have upgraded sensors. Visitor procedures have also been reviewed and revamped. Access control is the only systems publicized by transit agencies at operational control centers. All other IDS (including all IDS at power stations and train control areas) are not publicized.
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-9 Future Needs In addition to the standard technology development monitoring of video surveillance, access control, sensors, and alarm systems, fences and lighting are also being monitored with respect to technology changes and how they can improve systems at power stations, train control areas, and operational control centers. Transit agencies tend to consider investments in video surveillance, access control, alarm systems, sensors, fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources a high priority. Although intrusion detection systems typically have limitations, there are only two IDS applications that seem to need improvement. These are video surveillance at operational control centers and alarm systems at power stations. 5. State of the Practice - Administrative Facilities Intrusion Detection Applications Administrative buildings house many employees of a transit agency, and in many instances are located close to (and in some cases integral to) a transit stop, terminal, or station. These buildings usually house the senior executives of the agency and most of the administrative support staff. Administrative buildings also experience a large volume of visitors. Customers, visitors, suppliers, job applicants, media and the general public can seek access to administrative buildings on any given day. Sensitive information is often located in such buildings, and agencies have an obligation to protect the building, its contents and employees from unauthorized intruders. Currently, several systems applications are used at most administrative buildings. These include video surveillance, access control, sensors, alarm systems, fences, barriers, lighting, and human resources. While they all enhance security, access control, alarm systems, lighting, and human resources also meet an operating requirement for some transit agencies. In many instances barriers and improved access control systems were added to administrative building security in response to a specific incident. Additional IDS were installed for preventive purposes. Transit System Experiences The IDS used by transit systems in administrative facilities are typically functioning as originally intended and accomplishing intended purposes. Exceptions occur with video surveillance and access control systems. Contributing to the success of the IDS is the reliability of the systems chosen. Most of the components used for administrative facilities are quite reliable, although higher failure rates may be found with the technology devices - video surveillance systems, access control systems, sensing devices, and alarm systems. Maintenance on administrative building systems varies greatly depending on the product chosen. Video surveillance, sensors, alarm systems, and lighting usually require a high amount of maintenance, while access control, fences, and barriers usually require very little. Exceptions of course occur, with some transit agencies reporting that their video surveillance, sensors, and alarm
Intrusion Detection for Public Transportation Facilities Handbook E-10 systems require very little maintenance. The particular product chosen usually determines the reliability and maintenance required. Transit systems would typically choose the same product again, despite some problems with maintenance and reliability. The IDS transit agencies might not choose again typically involve varying technological products. Transit systems indicated that secondary benefits have been achieved through the IDS selected for their administrative facilities. These benefits were of the types discussed in the introduction. Adverse effects on transit operations have occurred with access control and sensor systems at administrative facilities. These occurrences have included false alarms and additional personnel to monitor alarms. Transit systems are using a combination of customized and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for all the systems used at administrative buildings. Customized systems occur more frequently in applications using video surveillance, access control, sensors and alarms. As described in the introduction, life expectancy of IDS applications at administrative buildings depends on the component chosen. Fences, barriers, and lighting have the standard life expectancy of more than 25 years. Transit systems reported that their access control systems and simple alarm systems have a life expectancy of 10 to 20 years, while more complex alarm systems, video surveillance systems, and sensors have a life expectancy of only about 5 to 10 years. Upgrades are planned for video surveillance, access control, sensors, and barrier systems at some administrative buildings. Modifications have been made to nearly all IDS at administrative buildings since their initial installation. In most instances the modifications involved upgrades of the technological components. General strengthening of the systems components have occurred since the security protocol review following September 11, 2001. As mentioned in the Introduction, information on costs was collected from vendor and manufacturer sources. That information is provided in other sections of this report. The only intrusion detection application publicized at administrative buildings is access control. Future Needs Technology development is tracked by some transit agencies for all of the IDS used at administrative buildings. Typically, investments in all the areas of IDS and ACS used at administrative facilities are given a high priority. The needs that are not currently being met at administrative buildings occur with the IDS of video surveillance, sensors, and alarm systems.
