Establishing a Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports (2017)

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92 S e c t i o n 1 0 San Francisco International Airport • Accident date: July 6, 2013. • Large/medium hub airport; legislated accident; foreign air carrier; three fatalities, 187 non- fatal injuries. • The primary sources of information for this case study were documents provided by Toshia Marshall, Emergency Planning Coordinator for San Francisco International Airport. Addi- tional information was drawn from NTSB investigation docket materials for Asiana Flight 214 and from ACRP Synthesis 60 (Smith et al., 2015). Airport Information San Francisco International Airport (SFO) is located in San Mateo County, California, and is owned and operated as a department of the City and County of San Francisco and supported by a five-member commission (City and County of San Francisco, CA, 2016). The airport operates 91 gates, servicing both domestic and international flights, and plans to expand to 120 gates. The airport commission employs 1,500 people that support various aspects of the daily operations at SFO. Since 1982, SFO has responded to 26 accidents and eight incidents (National Transportation Safety Board, 2016), with Asiana Flight 214 incurring the largest number of fatalities and inju- ries. SFO coordinates crash and incident response through the airport EOC, which is organized along an ICS structure and led by an EOC manager. The airport duty manager coordinates all responses with the on-site incident commander and the airport EOC manager. Notification of an accident is coordinated by radio for first responders and an automated notification system for second-tier responders, including all air carriers, the ARC, clergy, mental health profes- sionals from San Mateo County, and all functional departments represented within the airport structure. Other organizations and NGOs are invited to assist with EOC operations based on the incident scenario. Airport Family Assistance Program SFO leadership recognized the importance of family assistance operations and included relevant information in the AEP, including the identification of facility space to be used for the management of uninjured passengers (PGA) and families and friends (FRC), sources of transportation off the airfield, and the location for a temporary morgue to be used in mass casualty events. The airport also strategically placed equipment and documentation needed to support family assistance operations at the identified locations throughout the airport. Case Studies

case Studies 93 SFO has designated multiple locations with private rooms that can function as the FRC, depending on the size and level of the event. Designated facilities are located on the non-sterile side of the terminal. Supplies and equipment (clipboards, stationery, phones, fax machines, first aid kits, megaphones, coloring books, and blankets) are pre-identified and ready for deployment when necessary. Airport police are used for security of the facilities, and TSA may be used if needed. While the airlines have the responsibility of determining where the FAC will be located, SFO is prepared to assist with secure transportation of families and friends from the FRC to the FAC at the appropriate time. SFO also has predesignated locations for the PGA. This information is communicated and coordinated with airlines and other stakeholders via the AEP and monthly airport meetings, as well as through the use of questionnaires that airlines complete on an annual basis. SFO will support the affected airline with the reunification of survivors with family members and friends. Victim tracking is addressed in the airport’s procedures and emergency organization struc- ture. Following an aviation disaster, first responders triage survivors using the enhanced method triage, treatment, and transport (EMT3) system. SFO coordinates with local hospitals as part of its emergency planning efforts and includes hospitals in airport exercises. Finally, SFO has established an emergency working group (EWG) to further enhance family assis- tance in an accident response. The EWG was formed to develop plans for mutual aid and a coordi- nated family assistance response. It includes representatives from tenant air carriers and the airport. SFO Emergency Working Group SFO leadership developed an emergency working group, the SFO EWG, as a result of lessons learned from the response to Asiana Flight 214. The group addresses airport emergency response and the provision of family assistance services. The group includes representatives from 26 air carriers. The working group has created an Airline & Airport Emergency Response Joint Work- ing Group Planning Guide and has developed mutual aid strategies to support any affected airline responding to an accident or emergency event at the airport. Since the inception of the SFO EWG, it has coordinated training for 75 people on basic family assistance operations, emergency response operations, and how to support the EOC. All trained SFO EWG members participate in regular functional exercises and drills and are ready to assist the airport upon notification of an aviation disaster. Accident Information Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a Boeing 777-200ER, crashed on landing at SFO on July 6, 2013, at approximately 11:27 a.m. PDT (see Photo 7). There were 291 passengers and 16 crew members (for a total of 307 persons) on board the aircraft. The crash resulted in three fatalities and 187 non-fatal injuries. ACRP Synthesis 60 provides the following account of the crash: After striking the seawall, the plane skidded down the runaway. A fire started in the right engine, which had separated and come to rest next to the fuselage. A flight attendant noticed the fire and initiated evacu- ation. Nearly all the passengers, 98%, successfully self-evacuated. When the fire spread to the fuselage, firefighters entered the plane and extricated five passengers, one of whom subsequently died. Six persons were ejected from the plane during the crash, two passengers who were not wearing seatbelts, and four cabin attendants thrown from the plane still strapped in their seats when the aft galley was ripped open. The two ejected passengers died of injuries from the crash. The third fatality occurred when an ejected passenger was run over by two firefighting vehicles. (Smith et al., 2015).

94 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports The airport ceased operations for approximately 4 hours following the crash, with inbound flights diverted to other West Coast airports. Airport Response to the Crash Victim Accounting In accordance with the SFO AEP, local and on-airport bus services were arranged to transport passengers and crew to designated holding areas, and injured survivors were transported by ambulances drawn from throughout the region. The San Mateo County coroner was responsible for removing the bodies of the deceased from the accident scene. Patient tracking proved to be difficult. Multiple jurisdictions responded to the crash, and three different triage systems were used. More than 20 hospitals received patients, many of whom spoke no English. As a result of these complicating factors, it was 3 days before the location and condi- tion of everyone on board the aircraft were confirmed. These challenges subsequently resulted in implementation of the EMT3 system for all jurisdictions responding to accidents at SFO. Communications Fire and police departments have dedicated airport staff who are dispatched through the airport’s communications center, which is a public safety answering point for daily routine and emergency response calls. Interoperability between mutual aid partners proved challenging; this has since been remedied. Communicating with local, state, and federal agencies was done within the EOC. The affected airline also provided representation to the airport EOC. The SFO public information campaign was effective in its quick and proactive use of social media for communicating externally, but after-action reports noted that there was room for improvement in communicating operational and public information to the airlines, passengers, tenants, contractors, and concessionaires transiting through or resident at SFO. The airport communicated through a web-based program called Passur, as well as through the EOC and face-to-face meetings. The air carrier then communicated with its passengers. Many Photo 7. Overhead view of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 post-accident at SFO. (Locations of exit doors are indicated on the photograph.) Source: NTSB Flickr.

case Studies 95 passengers spoke limited or no English, so translation and interpretation was provided through the air carrier. Family Assistance Program SFO’s Family Assistance Program, as outlined in the SFO AEP, was implemented, and air- port personnel understood their roles as outlined in the plan. The PGA was operational and, because this was an international flight, the PGA was located in the Federal Inspection Station in-transit lounge. A family reception center was opened and jointly operated by Asiana and its Star Alliance partner, United Airlines. Family members and friends that came to the airport for information were directed to the air carrier for information. A reunification center was set up initially in the SFO Reflection Room (non-sterile) but was quickly rendered unusable because it was not secure and was overrun by the media. The United Airlines Red Carpet Club was used as the alternative. The airline FAC was established at the San Francisco International Airport Crowne Plaza Hotel, approximately 3.4 miles away from SFO. Lessons Learned SFO conducted a thorough after-action review of the crash, and lessons learned have been captured in documents and shared widely in presentations.8 The airport identified the following family assistance issues in its report, Beyond Asiana 214: Moving Forward Together.9 • Make the automated notification system compatible with regional systems. The automated notification system used for Asiana Flight 214 failed to function as planned. A new system has since been acquired. • Develop a robust, compatible communication platform incorporating the use of radios and radio frequencies. There were numerous challenges in communicating with various respond- ers and agencies using differing communication systems and frequencies. • Use a standardized triage system during a multi-jurisdictional response. Since Asiana Flight 214, a new, standardized triage system is in use. • Integrate EMS into the incident command system structure for effective end-to-end patient care and disaster victim tracking. • Establish a process for coordination of resources with the various agencies responding to an accident. • Incorporate best practices in critical incident stress management. • Encourage the Bay Area healthcare community to develop procedures to support the sharing of patient information to aid in family reunification. • Enhance response plans to identify locations suitable for supporting survivors, families, and friends and for associated preparations. • Coordinate care and follow-on support with various stakeholders for unaccompanied minors (ICF International, 2013). Buffalo Niagara International Airport • Accident Date: February 12, 2009. • Large/medium hub airport; legislated accident; United States air carrier; 49 fatalities on board, one fatality on the ground. • Interviews with Lee Weitz, Deputy Director of Aviation, via telephone and email, were the pri- mary source of information for this case study. Interview information has been supplemented by documents provided by the airport and NTSB’s final accident report.

96 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Airport Information BUF is situated inside the city limits of Cheektowaga, New York, which is 11 miles from down- town Buffalo. The airport operates 24 gates, and in 2015 it saw approximately 5 million indi- viduals transit through the airport. The airport employs 176 individuals. In addition, the airport supports over 2,600 total employees, which include those of the air carriers and TSA, resulting in over 1,000 individuals potentially being on-site daily. BUF relies on three volunteer fire departments and has mutual aid agreements with Erie County (New York) EMS for crash response. The City of Buffalo has the only paid fire department in the area around the airport and handles all hazardous materials responses at the airport. The nearest hospital is located 4 miles from the airport property. The airport’s EOC is located on-site away from the main terminal building in the on-site ARFF facility. Its director of aviation has overall responsibility for directing a disaster response but may delegate the responsibility to the on-site incident commander. BUF has the following individuals/agencies as mutual aid partners, and when needed, it will activate each agency to report to the EOC for duty: • Erie County chief executive officer, • Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA) executive director, • NFTA director of public affairs, • Erie County Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP), • Health commissioner, • Erie County Department of Public Works, • NFTA police department liaison, • NFTA fire department liaison, • The ARC, and • Others deemed appropriate by the ODP administrator. Since 1983, BUF has responded to 14 accidents, with the Continental Connections Flight 3407 incurring the largest number of injuries and fatalities (National Transportation Safety Board, 2016). Family Assistance Program The airport has developed a family assistance program that is included in its AEP. The airport relies on the NFTA fire department to lead triage and to log and track accident victims. It stated it would keep crew members separate from passengers after the crew has completed its duties. The airport has identified its customs area for use as a PGA following an aviation disaster. In preparation for winter snowstorms, it has created a go-kit in this area that could be used fol- lowing an aviation crash. The kit contains nonperishable items, water, and infant formula. The airport also has an agreement with on-site concessions to provide food. It has identified the former Admirals Club, located inside of the terminal, as the on-site FRC to receive arriving families and loved ones. It will rely on the Admirals Club to provide snacks and beverages. The airport has cell phone chargers, televisions, and electrical outlets. The airport has Wi-Fi but does not have computers for those affected. The Admirals Club holds 100 individuals, and when transitioning to the FAC, airport personnel give oral directions, provide a handout with directions, and offer transport. The pre-identified FAC is located off-site at a local community center. It can be secured with local law enforcement, and comfort provisions are provided by the ARC.

case Studies 97 Accident Information On February 12, 2009, about 10:17 p.m., eastern standard time, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Cen- ter, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The two pilots, two flight attendants, and forty-five passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the air- plane was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). BUF reported that its upper-level airport management and director of public affairs arrived on the scene within the hour. (Photo 8 shows responder vehicles at the scene.) It provided infor- mation between the incident commander and aviation stakeholders such as the air carrier. As the crash occurred away from airport property and was not under the jurisdiction of the airport, the on-scene incident commander was not an airport person and required immediate support. ARFF and the NFTA police department worked with various stakeholders under the ICS that night, primarily with these individuals/agencies: • Town of Clarence disaster coordinator, • 13 local fire departments, • Erie County Emergency Services, • Erie County Health Department (medical examiner), • Erie County Sheriff’s Department, • NTSB, • New York State Police, and • The FBI. Additionally, on the night of the crash, the media was at the crash site and was staged 1 mile from the scene. Over time, the media transitioned to the local county media center near the FAC (see Photo 9). Following the crash, the televisions in the holding rooms and concession areas were turned off. Survivor and Family Assistance Support Following Crash The airport activated its AEP and opened the FRC to provide a private area away from the public. The US Airways Club was opened as an FRC at approximately 10:30 p.m. for those affected to gather before all affected families and loved ones were transferred to the off-site FAC “Airports need to have an area for the go-team to work with the families for a period of time.” – Airport staff member Photo 8. Response to Continental Connection Flight 3407. Courtesy of NFTA.

98 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports around 4:00 a.m. During this time, the police chaplain was present, and support provisions were coordinated (i.e., food, emotional support, first aid). As the go-teams of the affected air carrier were activated, the airport provided assistance escort- ing non-badged employees through airport property. The airport also coordinated with other on-site stakeholders, such as unaffected air carriers, concessionaires, and ground transportation providers, to assist in the immediate response. Information and Briefings The airport relied on the affected air carrier to make informational announcements about the crash. The airport released information about the FRC on its website. It worked with the affected air carrier on information sharing (i.e., ensuring families knew where the FRC was located). The airport did not use signage to identify the FRC. The television was turned off in the FRC, and no one asked to turn it on. Logistical Support The airport provided offices in the middle of the terminal to the air carrier employees and their go-team for 2 weeks to assist in supporting families who arrived for FAC services. All televisions located within the airport were changed to sports channels and away from any news stations. NFTA provided bus transportation for the loved ones as the airport and air carrier transitioned from the FRC to the off-site FAC. Debriefing All airport personnel who were involved with the event were required to attend counseling sessions conducted by the authority’s EAP. All air carrier personnel operating at the airport were required to attend a debriefing session to review the event and to discuss the effectiveness of the actions taken. Long-Term Considerations The airport participated in planning the 1-year anniversary event with the Families of 3407 group and United States Senator Charles Schumer of New York. Families observed the anniversary by walking from the crash location to the airport, symbolically completing the flight Photo 9. Media response to the Flight 3407 crash. Courtesy of NFTA. “It’s very important to have law enforce- ment near your FRC so the media cannot get near the family members.” – Airport staff member

case Studies 99 (see Photo 10). For the memorial walk from the crash site to the airport, the airport provided an area for a tent to be erected for the press conference next to the terminal and provided airport police for security. After the 1-year mark, the airport has not had many interactions with the families. Lessons Learned • Use multi-faith clergy to provide support. In the Flight 3407 aftermath, the responders relied solely on the fire chaplain, who in this case was a Catholic priest. • Medical personnel should be at the FRC and FAC to address health concerns. Following Flight 3407, airport personnel had to request two firefighters/emergency medical technicians (EMTs) to assist in the FRC to provide care; a registered nurse from the ARC arrived the next day. • Airports should communicate directly with the entity providing security at the FAC (e.g., provide a vehicle description) to anticipate the arrival of persons en route to the FAC. • Flight 3407 remains newsworthy in the Buffalo area, resulting in media crews coming to the airport to report news about the crash and the affected families’ advocacy efforts. • Make sure there is access to emergency contact information for the highest corporate levels of the airport’s air carriers. • All facts should be verified before talking to the media. There will be a rush to share informa- tion with the media, but all parties should refrain from releasing information before facts are established. • In addition to local media outlets, airport planners should expect that national and interna- tional media outlets would fly into an affected airport. Airports should watch for those who try to set up post security; they may attempt to interview passengers as they deplane. Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport • Accident date: October 29, 2015. • Large/medium hub airport; non-legislated accident; foreign air carrier; no fatalities, 23 injuries. • The primary sources for this case study were interviews with Michael Nonnemacher, Director of Operations; Lisa Forester, Airport Emergency Manager; Tawana Russell, Guest Experience Photo 10. Flight 3407 families and friends on the 1-year anniversary of the crash during their memorial walk. Photograph by Michael Procknal, Jr., and provided by the Eckhart family.

100 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Manager; Colleen Brooks, Administrative Manager; and Ashamanie Heslop, college intern. Additional information was obtained from telephone conversations, email communications, and documents provided by the airport. Airport Information Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (FLL) is a major hub airport serving the Fort Lauderdale and greater Miami area. It is owned by Broward County and operated by the Broward County Aviation Department (BCAD). The airport serves 27 million passengers annually with nonstop flights to more than 125 domestic and international destinations. The airport averages 650 commercial flights per day on 30 air carriers, as well as general aviation and military flights. Key groups involved in airport emergency response are the Aviation Operations Division, the Security Division, and Broward County Fire/Rescue Department. The airport has an EOC; the facility has been at the airport but was planned to move off-site in 2016. The role of incident commander is filled by the operations director or aviation director; there are seats in the EOC for the affected air carriers and a hospital representative. Airport Family Assistance Program FLL is an airport without the strong presence of a major carrier and has many air carriers with few or no staff. The airport recognized that in the event of an accident, there might be very little air carrier assistance available to survivors, friends, and families. To address this possibility, the airport has taken steps to create its own coordinated family assistance program. The focus of the airport’s family assistance program is on the first 6 hours post-event; the goal is to be finished in 12 hours, at which point the affected air carrier’s off-site FAC should be operational. FLL has a hospital liaison with airport security credentials assigned to the airport EOC. This position supports victim accounting following an aviation disaster. The hospital liaison is con- nected to all of the hospitals in the county and can confirm where passengers are transported, their status, and for those with minor injuries, when they will be released for return to the airport. As a part of the family assistance program preplanning, the airport predesignated the locations for both an FRC and PGA. The FRC room is equipped with tables, chairs, phones, a TV, a children’s area, note- pads, tissues, and other supplies. Catering is readily available. The PGA is designated to operate at the on-site ARFF station. Located in the mid- dle of the airfield, the station would need to be emptied of equipment to accommodate uninjured passengers. Program preplanning for the PGA includes ARFF-provided medical care, ARC support, and security. Supplies and equipment mirror those in the FRC. Air Carrier Emergency Working Group Over the previous several years, the airport had created an air carrier EWG to address family assistance planning and to act as an airport CARE team in the event of an accident. The working group consists of air carrier employees who volunteer to be trained, and all those trained in their own air carrier’s CARE team program are also considered part of the team. The intent is for small and large air carriers to work together to prepare and respond to an event. The ground handling company at FLL did not participate in the airport’s EWG. The working group held hour-long meetings every 2 weeks. The airport found that conduct- ing mini-drills was an effective way to increase air carrier engagement. One of these mini-drills Fort Lauderdale has a hospital district liaison with airport security credentials assigned to the airport EOC to support victim accounting.

case Studies 101 had been to simulate setting up and opening FRC and the PGA. Meet- ings and drills helped participants understand their role: to support the affected air carrier following an aviation disaster or accident that would require the activation of the airport’s family assistance program. Accident Information On Thursday, October 29, 2015, at 12:37 p.m., a fire erupted with no warning on the Number 1 engine aboard Dynamic International Airways Flight 405, a Boeing 767-200, en route to Caracas, Venezuela, with 90 passengers and 11 crew members on board. FLL ARFF resources responded to the accident while all occupants of the aircraft evacuated via the emergency exit slides. In total, 23 people suffered injuries as a result of the accident, primarily during the evacuation process, includ- ing one passenger who sustained critical injuries. Injured passengers were transported to hos- pitals. Local air carrier ramp personnel assisted with gathering evacuated passengers on the ramp. Photo 11 shows the aircraft, with fire damage and slides deployed, after evacuation was completed. The accident drew significant media attention. One of the airport personnel interviewed stated, “the media response by local, national, and international agencies was ferocious.” A large number of local, national, and international media representatives were present at the airport during the event and for the following 3 days. The airport PIO was inundated with calls and requests. The media attempted to speak with injured passengers as they were transported to the hospital. (Photo 12 shows reporters and camera crews gathered outside the airport terminal.) The accident resulted in the closure of the airport for 2.5 hours and disruptions to airport operations for 12 hours. Passenger and family assistance continued for 4 days, and recovery and the on-site NTSB investigation were ongoing for 5 days. Accident/Incident Notification Notification of the accident was made directly to the deputy director and director of opera- tions. The airport emergency response team was notified and activated via the airport’s mass notification system. The airport had created an air carrier EWG to address family assistance plan- ning and to act as an airport CARE team in the event of an accident. The focus of the airport’s family assistance program is on the first 6 hours post-event; the goal is to be finished in 12 hours, at which point the affected air carrier’s off-site FAC should be operational. Photo 11. Flight 405 aircraft after the accident. Courtesy of Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport.

102 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Command and Control UC was established on the airfield, and the airport opened its EOC. UC was established on the airfield with a presence from the ARFF battalion chief, BCAD operations duty supervisor, Broward County’s Sheriff’s Office lieutenant, and the TSA. UC was established on the airfield (see Photo 13), and the airport opened its EOC. The Dynamic International Airways manager initially reported to the airfield, then went to the airport EOC. The airport EOC was activated at 12:45 p.m. on October 29, 2015, and remained active until 12:15 a.m. on October 30, 2015. Photo 12. The media outside the airport terminal. Courtesy of Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport. Photo 13. UC at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport. Courtesy of Fort Lauderdale– Hollywood International Airport.

case Studies 103 Responders included: • The IC, • Logistics chief, • Planning chief, • Security liaison, • Airport deputy director, • Law enforcement captain, • ARFF chief, • The FBI, • Welfare coordinator, • BCAD information systems support, • PIO (at times), and • A representative of Dynamic International Airways. Many of the airport EOC activities were handled directly by the incident commander, who maintained direct contact with UC. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) was used to observe oper- ations in the field from the airport EOC. Social media was monitored and updates sent out. The airport EOC coordinated with the NTSB for the release of passenger personal effects and authorization to remove the aircraft from the scene. Survivor and Family Assistance Support Following Crash Friends and Relatives Center/Passenger Gathering Area Because the affected air carrier did not have a representative in the room for the first several hours, the airport recognized the need to address command, control, and communication. In response to this need, an ad hoc mini-UC was established at the FRC. One of the persons interviewed noted, “we realized we needed a core group of people to make decisions. The EOC and FRC are in two different terminals, and there was no live visual communication, just phone and radio. A mini-UC worked very well. It included airport, air carrier, ground handling crew, and law enforcement and was located in the family room.” The mini-UC coordinated directly with the airport EOC to provide information to passengers and their families. The FRC would typically be a gathering place for friends and families of those on the aircraft. In this instance, there were very few families on-site and a large number of uninjured passengers. The airport decided to use the FRC facility as the gathering area for uninjured passengers since it believed it had sufficient capacity and would be a more suitable facility. Therefore, the FRC functioned as both an FRC and a PGA. Photo 14 shows uninjured passengers gathered in the combined FRC/PGA. Photo 14. Uninjured passengers in the combined FRC/PGA. Courtesy of Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport.

104 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports The FRC/PGA consisted of a conference room with a 75-person capacity and a small kitchen with power, data, and phone lines. The facility was equipped with Wi-Fi access, tables, and a TV. Access and egress were easily controlled. Catering was provided by concessionaires and paid for by the airport. Air carriers assisted with providing blankets and pillows. Other supplies arranged by the airport included: • Loaner laptops with Wi-Fi, which were important because passengers had left their phones and laptops on the plane and needed a way to communicate; • Phone chargers from airport lost and found, which were important because many passengers who did have phones did not have chargers and were running out of battery; and • Children’s items (e.g., clothing) and other supplies from airport lost and found. Two representatives of the media attempted to gain access to the FRC by posing as family members. Law enforcement identified them and prevented them from entering the room. Support of Uninjured Passengers Uninjured passengers had been gathered by air carrier ramp agents; some were initially taken into a nearby concourse and others to a ramp conference room. BCAD arranged for transport of uninjured passengers via the airport COBUS (the airport’s people moving bus) to the FRC/PGA. Passengers boarded the COBUS at 1:45 p.m. and were taken to the FRC/PGA facility, via both ramp-side and curbside service. The first bus of passengers arrived at the FRC/PGA over an hour after the accident occurred. Some of the passengers in the FRC/PGA experienced medical concerns and asked to go to the hospital. They did not speak English, and they did not want to go to the hospital alone. Airport and air carrier staff accompanied them. Coordination with the Broward County Health Department went well due to planning and training. The hospital liaison was connected to all the hospitals in the county and could confirm exactly which passengers were going to which hospitals, their status, and when they were com- ing back to the airport. This made patient tracking much easier and also enabled the airport to support transportation and escorts between the airport and the hospitals. Information and Briefings During the course of the day, passengers became frustrated by lack of information. Informa- tion was relayed from the airport EOC to the FRC as it became available. Language barriers were a challenge. Most of the passengers and families were native Spanish speakers and spoke little or no English. Airport and air carrier responders spoke little or no Spanish. Eventually interpreters were provided through the airport, Swissport, JetBlue, and the sheriff’s office. Having a Spanish-speaking law enforcement officer was particularly helpful and helped to maintain order in the room. Passenger Manifest The passenger manifest was not controlled, but it should have been. It was printed and distrib- uted to hospitals, FRC, EOC, and others. The airport was able to intercept the manifest before it was distributed to the media, but this was a potential concern. Personal Effects/Personal Belongings The primary concern of uninjured passengers was the return of their luggage. They did not want to leave the airport FRC/PGA until their luggage was returned. The airport has a good working relationship with the NTSB from attending trainings and because of the airport’s efforts to establish the family assistance program. This enabled the airport

case Studies 105 EOC to communicate easily with the NTSB early in the response and to coordinate on getting approval to remove passengers’ personal belongings from the aircraft before the NTSB inves- tigation began. The NTSB approved removal of belongings because the fire did not breach the fuselage of the aircraft and there were no fatalities. The passengers’ personal belongings were recovered from the aircraft at 9:45 p.m. Passenger matching took place using the airport’s baggage recheck facility, away from other passengers and the media. Overnight Accommodation and Off-Site Assistance to Uninjured Passengers and Families Arrangements for transportation to a local hotel were coordinated by the airport. BCAD staff accompanied the passengers until all passengers were checked in. This took place around 1:45 a.m. on Saturday, October 30, 2015. On-site support at the hotel was coordinated by Dynamic International Airways via a private contractor. BCAD and contract personnel from Dynamic International Airways returned to the FAC the following day; passengers were sought immediately upon return to FLL by a large number of media. Most passengers departed for their destinations on October 30; the final passengers departed on November 1. Lessons Learned In its debriefings and after-action report for the Dynamic International Airways event, FLL identified the following lessons learned. The first six items are recommendations for improve- ment; the final two are examples of what worked well. • Although the FRC at FLL is small, there are limited options for an on-airport facility. For a larger-scale event, the room would not be big enough. The airport is considering additional space or alternative locations, including nearby off-airport facilities. • BCAD should require in its lease agreements a robust plan for emergency response, including details about the air carrier’s family assistance program and contract services plan. • Airport personnel should be prepared to provide regular briefings for passengers and family members and share only confirmed information. They should also be prepared to address language issues. Local bilingual resources need to be identified. • Clergy should be represented at the FRC. • A scribe should be assigned to the FRC to account for documents and to account for a timeline of events. • When the air carrier representatives arrived at the FRC/PGA, they were not immediately integrated into the command structure. This resulted in some mixed messages to passengers, friends, and family. • BCAD had been planning for an event of this type for the previous 5 years and was equipped with the skills and knowledge to take a leadership role in the absence of an air carrier presence. • The airport had practiced assisting families in an incident with limited air carrier representation. Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport • Accident date: October 30, 2013. • Small/non-hub airport; non-legislated accident; four fatalities, five injuries. • The primary sources for this case study were interviews with Kelly Fabrizius, Assistant to the Chief, Airport Police and Fire Division, and Jason Jones, Deputy Chief, Airport Police and Fire Division, of the Wichita Airport Authority (WAA). The information was “A lot of the local airline station manag- ers were not aware of their family assis- tance responsibilities under the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 [due to] high turnover.” – Airport staff member

106 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports obtained from telephone conversations, email communications, documents provided by the WAA, and NTSB’s preliminary accident report. Airport Information The WAA of the City of Wichita, Kansas, owns all property and assets that encompass, are located on, or are used in direct support of Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT) and Col. James Jabara Airport. ICT is a commercial airport situated inside the city limits of Wichita, Kansas. The airport is located approximately 7 miles west of downtown Wichita and is surrounded by local businesses, residential communities, and agricultural fields. The nearest hospital is located 8 miles from the airport. It is the largest and busiest airport in the state of Kansas. ICT has on-site ARFF assets, including 30 commissioned police officers/firefighters and 12 noncommissioned security and administrative support personnel. The commercial terminal is approximately 270,000 ft2 and is equipped with 12 passenger gates. The WAA has 136 employ- ees and more than 80 tenants and operators employing from 9,000 to 12,000 employees on the airport campus (depending on economic conditions). Emergency Operations Center The City of Wichita and Sedgwick County have a primary EOC located in downtown Wichita, with a secondary EOC/incident command that would be mobilized at ICT in the event of a major aircraft disaster. At the secondary EOC/IC, which is used as a training room on the airport prop- erty, the airport creates its emergency control center. It places name cards with agency informa- tion throughout the room and supplies telephone and Wi-Fi connections. Responding mutual aid agencies are responsible for responding to the EOC/IC with their own command staff, pro- cedural protocols, and communications equipment, including laptop or tablet computers as necessary. Upon notification of an emergency, staff are assigned their duties and responsibilities in accordance with the airport emergency plan, including activating the secondary EOC/IC. Airline or other tenant representatives are summoned to the EOC/IC during training and real- world scenarios. The WAA involves the following mutual aid partners in emergency response planning and for its EOC/IC: • Wichita Police Department, • Wichita Fire Department, • Sedgwick County Fire Department, • Sedgwick County EMS, • Sedgwick County Coroner, • Kansas Highway Patrol, • Kansas Fire Marshal’s Office, • The FBI, • The TSA, • The Salvation Army, • The ARC, • NTSB, • Local air carriers, and • The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “If you are not prepared to deal with the friends and family of accident victims in a disaster situation, you’re overlooking a very real and critical component in your emergency response.” – Airport staff member “Even in the 2014 general aviation acci- dent, which resulted in multiple victims, I think the IFST was equally as impor- tant as the initial rescue and response; and I know they are two separate emergency response components; if we would not have mobilized the IFST, I think the relationship with the tenants on our airport, as well as the families in general, would be completely different today.” – Airport staff member

case Studies 107 Family Assistance Program The WAA developed a family assistance program in 2010 called the Incident Family Support Team (IFST). Victim Accounting The airport emergency response team, in combination and partnership with Wichita Fire Department and Sedgwick County EMS, is prepared to perform on-site triage using the START system. However, the WAA relies on the ARC for patient tracking and the sharing of informa- tion between hospitals and the WAA’s EOC. The WAA has identified two sites available to use for temporary morgue operations; however, it has not practiced this operation in its emergency exercises as the local coroner’s office has had limited availability to participate. Friends and Relatives Center/Family Assistance Center The WAA has designated a large conference room on the second floor in the airport terminal for the initial FRC location; this is in a public area that has immediate access to restroom facili- ties and food and beverage services and can be secured for privacy. Once a more suitable and private facility can be designated away from the terminal and transportation arranged, the plan is to move the FRC. This would likely be to a local hotel property suitably equipped. Friends and families of accident victims are never restricted or limited in their movements and can enter/exit through a private area to avoid onlookers and the media. The WAA anticipates the need to operate the FRC for “up to 1 to 4 hours, or until the involved air car- rier can arrive” to assume a primary/lead role with family assistance, at which time primary responsibility for the victims’ families would transfer to the involved airline or its designee, but the WAA would remain involved and provide resources as long as necessary and upon the airline’s request. PGA/Reunification Center The ICT Cargo Terminal is used for the PGA and reunification center. The WAA relies on EMS to log and track the victims in this area. Additionally, the WAA has access to and can pro- vide restrooms, interior climate control, cots/blankets, and other resources at this location if necessary. During ICT’s last full-scale exercise, it used the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) to provide mass feeding, including feeding airline and airport personnel. UMCOR brought in a large food trailer and fed over 150 individuals. Incident Family Support Team The IFST was created to support the affected families and friends of aircraft accident vic- tims. Its mission is to provide families and friends of aircraft accident victims with support and compassion until professional helps arrives (see WAA’s IFST recruitment and informational brochure, Figure 4). The IFST is composed of approximately 45 volunteers from: • WAA staff (who are not associated with other emergency duties), • Airport tenants, “Training with mutual aid agencies creates team building and better mutual understanding of one-another’s resources, procedures, and capabilities; we all know what to expect of one another.” – Airport staff member

108 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Figure 4. ICT IFST brochure.

case Studies 109 • Station personnel from commercial airlines, • The TSA, • Local area clergy, and • Private citizens. The number of volunteers fluctuates somewhat by its nature as a volunteer group. The WAA understands that the IFST is an all-volunteer group and that events happen without warning; therefore, it is comfortable having a large pool of trained volunteers on its team, knowing that not everyone would be able to respond to a given situation. It also uses the local chapter of the ARC, which provides provisions such as housing resources (local list of hotels), mental health support, translator resources, and animal care resources. The IFST conducts a formal meeting two to three times per year to review potential scenarios; complete role-playing exercises, including working with unaccompanied minors; provide training and educa- tional resources for psychological support and traumatic stress; update the volunteers’ contact information; and test its paging system. The majority of team members have received psychological first aid training. WAA staff have a go-kit, which includes forms, pens, a response per- sonnel contact list, a dry erase board, coloring books/crayons, small signs, cell phone chargers, and tables. They also have quick access to coffee and refreshments. They currently have premade lanyards for identification purposes kept in the go-kit; however, they are changing to identification cards for their volunteers to have with them at all times. This will allow team members to have identification available upon arriving to the airport or a secure area. Previous experience revealed that volunteers may have difficulty reaching the airport through police security barriers if they do not have official airport-issued credentials. The IFST participates in ICT’s full-scale disaster exercises. It has used local high school drama students to represent families/victims by providing the students scripts to act out specific sce- narios. These student actors attempt to replicate the shock, anguish, and fear that might be anticipated from the victims’ families. This gives the IFST volunteers a more realistic example of what they might expect. IFST’s activation notification call down is completed by a cell phone text paging system. Accident Information On October 30, 2014, at 9:50 a.m., during the takeoff phase of flight, a Beechcraft King Air B200 carrying one crew member impacted the Flight Safety International (FSI) building at the Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, killing the crew member and three people in the building and injuring five others (see Photo 15). The crash initially left five people unaccounted for. At the time of the crash, there were more than 100 employees and visi- tors inside the FSI building. Photo 16 shows where the aircraft impacted the FSI facility. The WAA will typically receive immediate notification from FAA air traffic control of aircraft incidents and accidents. From that moment on, the flow of information is channeled through the chain of command. The WAA’s upper-level management and administration activate the emergency response, including the IFST. In this situation, the IFST was activated once it learned families were arriving to the airport. “We never know when we may have to activate our incident family support team. Ours was developed primarily for commercial accidents, but we learned it could be used for general aviation, environmental incidents, and other situations.” – Airport staff member “Eight individuals arrived on the first day; on the second day, 16 or so individ- uals arrived [at the airport].” – Airport staff member

110 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Photo 15. Smoke from the post- crash fire rises from the Flight Safety International building. Courtesy of ICT. Photo 16. The damaged FSI facility. More than 100 employees and visitors were inside at the time of the crash. Three people in the building were killed; five were injured. Courtesy of ICT.

case Studies 111 Airlines delayed their scheduled departures because all the streets in and surrounding the airport were temporarily closed. The WAA reported congestion of the traffic flow in and around the airport due to the one-way traffic pattern surrounding the airport grounds. It used social media to quickly disseminate information to the public on the airport’s status. ICT resumed normal commercial landside and airside operations within about an hour and a half of the accident, but wreckage and victim recovery operations lasted for over 15 days. Survivor and Family Assistance Support Following Crash Friends and Relative Center/Family Assistance Center Upon the WAA’s awareness that families were beginning to arrive at the airport following the accident, an off-site FAC was opened. Standard planning for an air carrier–related accident calls for the use of a conference room within the airport terminal building for the FRC. Due to the accident occurring at a local tenant building on the ICT campus and affecting its employees as well as those on board the aircraft, arriving families went to an adjacent FSI building and not the terminal. Therefore, a decision was made to activate the FRC at that location. The FRC and airport-based FAC were staffed by individuals from the WAA’s IFST response team, the ARC, and clergy. On the first day (the day of the accident), responders remained in the FAC an average of 2 to 6 hours per individual. As the need for services decreased, staffing was scaled back accordingly. On the second day, the IFST team leader, the ARC, and clergy were the only support individuals needed. Information and Briefings The airport’s police and fire department worked in conjunction with the NTSB and FSI to interact and communicate with the family members who were present as well as families who were off-site. Victim Accounting Following the accident, the WAA was in contact with the local coroner’s office. The local coroner arrived at the accident site several hours after the accident due to the conditions at the scene. FSI internal employee and client records assisted in the victim accounting process through identification of its employees and clients. Lessons Learned • The airport reported that it was beneficial to have managers of the building (company/FSI) in the EOC to provide information, such as who was in the building at the time of the accident. • As the IFST is composed of volunteers, the airport was encouraged that they arrived promptly even with the change of FAC location. • In the accident’s aftermath, the airport realized that IFST members needed identification in advance to gain access to airport grounds; it is creating identification cards for volunteers to have accessible at all times. • For responders who do not have time to manage social media, a pre- identified individual with experience needs to be assigned that role. The WAA recommends having a PIO in the emergency response “We knew the first hours were critical; that’s what we were preparing for. This specific team had not prepared for a GA aircraft accident. The original plan was to meet in the terminal building, which caused confusion with not having a backup building preplanned.” – Airport staff member

112 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports plans. The WAA also recommends and has implemented a preplanned and organized social media communications method. The WAA uses a free Twitter alert messaging system, and a subscription service with the RAVE Mobile Alert Messaging System is available free to those who enroll. • The WAA recommends having toll-free hotline number ready to activate following an acci- dent or incident since communication was challenging, especially getting a hotline established. • The WAA reported some company radio and frequency difficulty. Cell phones became the greatest asset and most reliable form of communication. • The WAA used a parking lot for media to gather while reporting the accident. It brought in portable toilets and electricity and had law enforcement on-site. • The WAA could not control the photographs being taken from a distance and posted on social media. Some local stations chartered a helicopter to gain better photo angles. Since this occurred within Class C airspace, the FAA air traffic control tower was instrumental in keeping helicopters, and therefore photographers, at a safe distance. Many of the photographs circulated came from individuals on aircraft taking off from the ICT. • A responder personally knew one of the affected families, creating a challenging situation. The WAA recommends speaking about personal boundaries in training and responses. • The WAA and responders had to overcome obstacles relating to families’ and friends’ dynam- ics and discord during the initial response, which added another element that had not been foreseen (e.g., who is a friend of a victim and who is not; who determines this; and does this justify asking a purported friend to leave on the family’s request?) • FSI had a fence put around the crash site; flowers were placed on the fence for a common family memorial. • The airport reported assisting individuals in ways that it had not considered. One example was having duplicate keys made from an automobile dealership for a victim’s car so the family was able to take their loved one’s car home from the airport. • Families requested a site visit, which the airport accommodated, escorting families on multiple occasions. • The WAA reviewed safety concerns of concealed weapons being left in cars; therefore, it sought out families’ and victims’ vehicles to ensure that none were visible. • EMS and airport personnel returned into the FSI building to retrieve personal belongings, including passports that were left inside. • The WAA discovered it needed to purchase cell phone chargers to keep in its go-kits. • It also welcomed and used local law enforcement chaplains for support, when needed. • CISM was voluntary following this accident. It was offered to the law enforcement officers, airport staff, and IFST volunteers, all of which declined. • FSI was the company operating in the building where the accident occurred. Following the accident, it flew in its top management to speak with employees. Emotional support was offered to employees following the accident. • On the 1-year anniversary, a memorial luncheon was held for the family members of the victims, employees of FSI, and some of the responders. The WAA reported how emotionally moving it was to have the family members of the victims speak during their time together. Owatonna Degner Regional Airport • Accident date: July 31, 2008. • Local/basic airport; non-legislated accident; eight fatalities, no survivors. • The primary source for this case study was Airport Manager Dave Beaver. “It [the accident and working on it] affected me more than what I thought; you are trained on how to work with the families, but what about yourself?” – Airport staff member

case Studies 113 Airport Information Owatonna Degner Regional Airport (OWA) is a general aviation airport in Minnesota, about 65 miles (a 1-hour drive) south of Min- neapolis. It does not have air traffic control or commercial service. It is city-owned and has two employees: a full-time airport manager and a part-time assistant. The airport has a 5,400-ft runway with an instru- ment landing system; its 20,000 annual operations include corporate and business flights, flight instruction, and aircraft rentals. Emergency Response and Family Assistance Program The airport manager was trained as a firefighter, trained in the NIMS, and worked with the local fire chief on emergency preparedness. This preparation gave him response capability and familiarity with unified command. The airport was also able to leverage this relationship to tap responders’ resources for training: the airport could recommend specific training topics and participate in responders’ classes. Although it was not required for the airport, at the time of the accident, Owatonna Degner had an emergency response plan and had practiced an emergency scenario and preservation of wreckage. The plan was not compliant with NIMS or FAA AC 150/5200-31C; it has subsequently been revised and is now compliant. The airport knew that family members and the media might show up after a fatal accident and anticipated that possibility, but there was no formalized family assistance program in place. Accident Information On July 31, 2008, at about 9:45 a.m. central daylight time, a Hawker 800 airplane—a chartered business jet with two pilots and six passengers—crashed while attempting to land at OWA, com- ing to rest approximately one-half mile past the end of the runway (see Photo 17). The airplane was destroyed and all eight people on board were killed. “There was no way to answer all the calls coming to my cell phone on the day of the accident. Families left messages that I listened to days later.” – Airport manager Photo 17. OWA Airport Terminal and facilities. Courtesy of OWA.

114 establishing a coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports Initial Notification and Emergency Response The chief deputy of the Steele County Sheriff’s Office was notified about the accident by the 911 dispatch operator at about 9:50 a.m. He arrived on the scene about 10 minutes later and became the incident commander. Two Owatonna Fire Department (OFD) commanders were also notified about the accident by the 911 dispatch operator and arrived on the scene with about 16 additional OFD personnel. The Owatonna Police Department, Sheriff’s Office, and local emergency medical services personnel also responded to the scene. Command and Control UC was established at the accident site, and an on-scene EOC was set up. The airport manager reported to the on-scene EOC as an airport liaison; he also served as a resource to the EOC to familiarize it with aviation accident response issues and procedures. In the words of the airport manager, “when you have state, federal, and local responders on scene, it gets chaotic. To under- stand your response and recovery role is important.” Survivor and Family Assistance Support Following Crash Friends and Relatives Center Activation. Families came to the airport for information and in order to gain access to the accident site. Two or three family members showed up on the first day; others came over a period of time because they had to travel from out of state. An intern working at the airport was assigned to meet and direct people arriving at the terminal. Facility. The airport conference room was designated as the FRC (see Photo 18). Staffing. The airport’s intern provided assistance to families in the conference room. Local police sent help, and the state EMA ultimately sent a representative. Photo 18. The OWA terminal conference room functioned as the FRC for families seeking information about loved ones on board the aircraft. Courtesy of OWA.

case Studies 115 Information and Briefings. The airport intern and the police directed families as best they could and tried to keep them informed. Regular press briefings were held with the NTSB, airport manager, and local elected officials. When family members were present at the air- port, they were briefed prior to the media. Victim Accounting Because the accident occurred without any advance alert, the airport did not have a manifest. Responders were initially unsure of how many occupants were on board the airplane; they did not know if there were survivors that had not been found. (Note: One passenger survived the accident but died at the hospital within 2 hours.) The airport worked with the FAA to contact the company that owned the aircraft; the num- ber of crew members and passengers was verified at about 2:00 p.m. One-Year Anniversary The airport anticipated—correctly—that family members might visit the crash site at the 1-year anniversary, and it prepared for this by placing flowers at the site. Based on advice from other airports that had experienced accidents, the airport wanted to “set flowers out so that [the site] wasn’t just a cold piece of ground, but that it was clear that someone locally cared about that spot” (D. Beaver, personal communication, 2016). Lessons Learned • “Have a place for [families] and have some basic idea of how you’re going to provide for their needs. An accident could happen a mile away and they’ll still come to the airport.” • “Families wanted to go to the accident site, see the aircraft, reconstruct events in their minds. It was important to work through incident command procedures and NIMS, and in coopera- tion with the NTSB, to figure out how to meet these requests.” • Anticipate that families will call the airport for information and have a plan to redirect them or deal with the volume of calls. “There was no way to answer all the calls coming to my cell phone on the day of the accident. Families left messages that I listened to days later.” • “There was an understanding that it was a possibility that we would have to deal with families. We were somewhat ready for that. We handled it properly at the time of the accident because we had some training on it. But we also improved [our program] through lessons learned, incorporating [family assistance] into our training and written emergency plan” (D. Beaver, personal communication, 2016). • Finally, partner closely with the fire department for training and drills and help ensure that they are familiar with airport facilities, including the FRC. “For a GA airport, it’s important to understand it’s a distinct possibility you may have an accident and families may show up. How will you handle it? Look at your facility. If families show up, where can you direct them to keep them separate from responders, the media, and the accident site.” – Airport manager