10
Nuclear Exports and International Competition
Although U.S. reactor vendors are currently focused on successful completion of demonstration projects in the United States, many have plans to market their reactors internationally and may depend on significant international sales to justify the establishment of a manufacturing infrastructure. Expectations are that increased demand for new reactors will come from both existing and emerging nuclear power countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, a development of importance in global efforts to address climate change (Ford and Abdulla 2021; IAEA 2021). When advanced reactor deployments expand to address these worldwide energy needs, those nations who emerge as dominant in these markets will have opportunities to establish long-term interactions with host countries and will likely have influence in establishing norms that govern civilian nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in those countries. For example, in the past, U.S. prominence in the nuclear energy field made it a leader in safety, security, and nonproliferation efforts worldwide. More recently, however, other nations have developed and expanded their nuclear energy sectors, including the Russian Federation, South Korea, and China, while the U.S. nuclear sector has waned (Bowen 2022; IEA 2022a).
Some have argued that the national security of the United States relies on regaining a leadership role in the future and worldwide expansion of nuclear energy (DOE 2020; Lovering et al. 2020; Hamre 2013, 2015). In addition, and as noted in Chapter 1, the U.S. Navy relies on nuclear-quality components and services provided by a robust commercial nuclear industry (Energy Futures Initiative 2017). However, a number of potential barriers exist for U.S. vendors in global markets, such as a complicated set of rules to market and sell nuclear products internationally, increased competition among nations, and potential expansion of nuclear reactors into newcomer countries that may lack effective government, industry, and societal frameworks to support the facilities. These potential barriers (some of which U.S. vendors have little control over) include development of regulatory oversight capabilities, financing mechanisms that provide market advantages to non-U.S. vendors, management of the fuel cycle, expanded transportation networks for nuclear materials, and education and outreach to local communities that may house reactors.1 This chapter provides background on these topics and identifies opportunities and barriers to U.S. vendor expansion into international markets.
___________________
1 The IAEA has initiated an effort in which the Energy Communities Alliance is also engaged (with support from DOE’s Office of Environmental Management) on establishing global connections between local jurisdictions and cities considering expansion of or into the advanced reactor market, encouraging “interaction between less experienced and more experienced local communities and organizations, which would contribute to improving communication among authorities, regulatory bodies, and operators.” See International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023, “Technical Meeting for Municipalities with Nuclear Facilities,” https://www.iaea.org/events/evt2101964.
TABLE 10-1 International Governance Instruments for Civilian Nuclear Safeguards, Safety, and Security
| Safeguards | ||
| Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treatya | Requires non-nuclear weapons State Parties to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA | |
| United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540b | Obliges all UN Member States to account for nuclear weapons related materials in production, use, storage, and transport. | |
| Safety | ||
| The Convention on Nuclear Safetyc | ||
| The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Managementd | ||
| Security | ||
| The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) | Establishes legal obligations for physical protection on nuclear material during international transport under the auspices of the IAEA | |
| Amendment, A/CPPNM 2005e | Establishes broader legal obligations for physical protection on nuclear facilities and material under the auspices of the IAEA, not just during transport | |
| Review of implementation of the 2005 Amendment | ||
a United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt, accessed January 13, 2023.
b UNODA, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),” https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540, accessed January 13, 2023.
c International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Convention on Nuclear Safety,” https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-nuclear-safety, accessed January 13, 2023.
d IAEA, “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,” https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/joint-convention-safety-spent-fuel-management-and-safety-radioactive-waste, accessed January 13, 2023.
e IAEA, “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and Its Amendment,” https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material-and-its-amendment, accessed January 13, 2023.
In addition to international safeguards requirements discussed in the previous chapter, there are a series of U.S. laws, international agreements, and export control mechanisms designed to limit proliferation of nuclear weapon technologies that affect U.S. vendors’ ability to sell their nuclear technology internationally. The U.S. requirements differ by country and export controls may change rapidly in response to geopolitical events, adding complexity, legal implications, and unforeseen barriers to international sales.
Consideration of safety, security and safeguards during the design process outlined in Chapter 9 will not change the fact that vendors will also need to operate within existing global governance frameworks. As of 2022, international governance instruments for civilian nuclear safeguards, safety and security do not distinguish between existing and advanced nuclear reactor types (see Table 10-1).2 Negotiating new or renegotiating existing international legal instruments, either binding or non-binding, typically takes many years of effort with no guarantee of successful conclusion. Opportunities for crafting new global governance instruments for advanced reactors could arise, from the work by the IAEA3 or out of necessity in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (see Box 10-1).
Nuclear liability has its own set of international governance instruments including the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Protocol to amend it, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of
___________________
2 SMRs may require a separate Code for Safety and Security based on the differences outlined in Chapter 2.
3 See International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023, “Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 2022,” https://www.iaea.org/events/acppnm2022.
the Vienna Convention,4 the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,5 the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.6 (See also Nuclear Liability and Post-Fukushima Developments [McIntosh 2022].) Most countries with existing nuclear power facilities have already included the principles and norms of these instruments in their national legal regimes. In addition, the IAEA’s International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability plays an important role in examining issues related to the application of the international nuclear liability instruments and exploring developments in the nuclear industry that may affect the liability regime. In 2022, the group began discussing liability issues for SMRs, such as adjusting liability limits and financial security of operators owing to potential reduced exposure risks from an incident of some SMRs. Notably, the liability conventions apply to existing nuclear research reactors, which like some SMR designs use smaller amounts of radioactive materials, suggesting that some SMRs will not create new issues for the nuclear liability regime. However, an increase in countries with nuclear power reactors will argue for more universal adherence to the existing international nuclear liability instruments to ensure an orderly settlement of disputes in case of a nuclear incident.
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) and nuclear export controls provide the legal and practical foundations for U.S. nuclear trade and other forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the nuclear field (see Appendix E). The chapter begins with a review of the landscape of U.S. and global nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) and nuclear export controls and the implications for the development and deployment of new and advanced reactors. This chapter also discusses international competition within the advanced reactor market and the implications to safety, security, and safeguards goals/norms. The chapter ends with a discussion of several U.S. government and IAEA initiatives to address these issues before concluding with findings and recommendations.
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AND NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS
The export of civilian nuclear reactors and nuclear technology between countries is allowed under the broad framework established by Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs). These agreements set the terms for future trade between two countries but do not guarantee that trade will take place.7 In the Unites States, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act defines the U.S. process and requirements for negotiating NCAs (NCAs are therefore commonly known in the United States as “123 Agreements”). Currently, the United States has 22 123 Agreements with 48 countries and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO); two additional NCAs are with EURATOM and the IAEA. The United States has yet to finalize or in some cases begin negotiations with many countries in regions that have seen increased interest in nuclear power, notably those in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and Latin America (see Figure 10-1). Efforts to expedite the establishment of NCAs with countries that are potential customers for U.S. vendors may be necessary. For additional information on NCAs, see Appendix E.
Once an NCA has been established, national export control systems define the required authorizations, licenses, and legal conditions for export of specific nuclear items between the two countries (see Figure 10-2). Many countries coordinate their export controls through their participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).8
___________________
4 International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023, “Nuclear Liability Conventions,” https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-liability-conventions.
5 The full name for the convention is “The Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004, entered into force 1 January 2022” with an unofficial consolidated text is available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_24768/unofficial-consolidated-text-of-the-paris-convention-as-amended-by-the-2004-protocol-nea/nlc/doc-2017-5/final.
6 International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023, “Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,” https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-liability-conventions/convention-supplementary-compensation-nuclear-damage.
7 For more details on the negotiation, timeline, and status of current 123 Agreements, see Appendix E.
8 See Nuclear Suppliers Group, 2022, “About the NSG,” https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en; Nuclear Suppliers Group, 2022, “What Are the NSG Guidelines,” https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/27-faq/198-what-are-the-nsg-guidelines.
A new Department of State diplomatic initiative aims to assist in the early development of strategic civil nuclear cooperation relationships, support U.S. civil nuclear industry and vendors, and advance U.S. national security and nonproliferation goals. Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (NCMOUs) provide a framework for developing cooperative relationships with the United States on civil nuclear issues. For example, NCMOUs can allow the United States to assist its potential future nuclear trading partners, especially newcomer countries, in building their nuclear infrastructure and lay the foundation for and develop future civilian nuclear cooperation,
TABLE 10-2 Summary of U.S. Governance Instruments of Relevance to Advanced Reactors Export
| Vehicle | Scope | Examples | U.S. Government Entities | Average Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Cooperation Agreements or 123 Agreements | defines terms of (future) trade | (see Figure 10-1) | DOS w/input from DOE, Commerce, DoD | 400 days |
| 10 CFR Part 810 authorizations | technical assistance | training, sharing of knowledge, expertise; training materials; blueprints or other physical documents or those in digital form including certain software | DOE w/concurrence from DOS, DoD, Commerce, NRC | 270 days (9 months) |
| 10 CFR Part 110.8(a) licenses | tangible nuclear items | nuclear equipment and materials, nuclear reactors and components of reactors, etc. | NRC w/input from DOE, Commerce, DoD | ~months to more than a yeara |
| Export Administration Regulations (EAR) licenses | dual-use items: goods, services, and technologies with primarily commercial but also with potential nuclear weapons proliferation applications | turbines, generators, switching gear, pipes, and valves; health and safety equipment (i.e., radiation detectors and monitors, fire safety, and facility safety); general infrastructure (i.e., telecommunications, tools and maintenance equipment); and materials and manufacturing equipment | Commerce consensus decision w/DOS, DOE, DoD | 90 calendar days to resolve a license application (does not include prelicense checks or negotiations for government-to-government assurances) |
a These values are rough estimates. See, for example, M. Smiszek, “United States: Nuclear Export Controls: A Brief Overview of NRC and DoE Regulations,” Mondaq, https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/export-controls-trade-investment-sanctions/1140062/nuclear-exportcontrols-a-brief-overview-of-nrc-and-doe-regulations.
such as 123 Agreements or a Part 810 authorization (described below). NCMOUs do not permit exports and they do not replace 123 Agreements.9
Since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1946 and the beginning of the nuclear age, the United States has established controls on the transfer of nuclear information and technology related to civil nuclear power and reactors, as did other then-emerging nuclear suppliers (Hamblin 2021, Ch. 1; Daniels and Krige 2022, Ch. 3). Currently, the United States has three distinct yet interconnected processes for governing the export of civil nuclear items, one led by the Department of Energy (DOE), one led by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and one led by the Department of Commerce (see Figure 10-2 and Table 10-1).10 These three agencies interact regularly when granting licenses or authorizations for nuclear or dual-use items that lay within their scope (see Table 10-2) which helps ensure that decisions are well understood by all participating agencies and that the final decisions in one process are not at cross-purposes to another.
___________________
9 Department of State, 2023, “Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (NCMOU): Fact Sheet,” https://www.state.gov/nuclear-cooperation-memoranda-of-understanding-ncmou.
10 A fourth process, led by the Department of State, exists for nuclear items under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in 22 CFR 120-130. Notably, Category XV of the Munitions List in the ITAR includes space-based nuclear reactors, their associated power conversion systems, and nuclear thermal propulsion systems designated “developmental, experimental, research, or scientific, or having a commercial, civil, or military end-use.”
DOE and Part 810
Under 10 CFR Part 810, the DOE Secretary is given the authority to authorize the export of nuclear technical assistance.11 Two types of authorizations exist: Specific Authorizations determined on a case-by-case basis, and General Authorizations deemed “non-inimical” to the interests of the United States for exports to be sent to a list of ~50 countries that generally parallels countries with which the United States has 123 Agreements.12 The DOE Secretary has the authority to issue Specific Authorizations13 under Part 810 to share nuclear assistance with countries that do not have 123 Agreements with the United States, as demonstrated most recently in March of 2019 when then-Secretary Rick Perry approved Part 810 specific authorizations for exports by U.S. companies to Saudi Arabia (CRS 2019).
The DOE Part 810 licenses cover a broad range of activities, from sharing digital blueprints to directly assisting in technical training, including the release of related commercial proprietary information.14 Some of these activities lay the groundwork for a commercial partnership or sale, so Part 810 authorizations often serve as a leading indicator for vendor interest in future NRC and Commerce licensing applications for export of physical nuclear items. DOE has already received Part 810 export authorization applications related to U.S. advanced reactor technology, both for transfers of technical information to potential customers and for “deemed” exports for foreign personnel exposure to such intangible technology inside the United States (Strangis 2021). Currently, the average time for Part 810 authorization, which is the essential first step in sales with other countries, is 9 months (down from 16 months in 2016 owing to implementation of process improvements by DOE). A swift Part 810 process is more important in capturing a sale than the other licensing processes, which can be concluded post-sale.
NRC and Part 110
The NRC issues both individual and general licenses for exports of “nuclear reactors and especially designed or prepared equipment and components for nuclear reactors” under 10 CFR Part 110.8(a). The tangible nuclear items covered by Parts 110 (and 810) relate mainly to the items listed in Part 1 of the NSG Guidelines (equipment and materials15). General licenses, which are issued by force of the regulation and do not require an application, apply to reactor components to eligible countries and to small quantities or special forms to countries not embargoed.16 The general license is available for exports to about 35 countries, but the license is not available for exports to most countries in Asia, Africa, or the Middle East.17
In August 2019, the NRC formed an interagency Advanced Reactor Export Working Group (AREWG) in anticipation of applications for export licenses for advanced reactors.18 In a review of five reactor types and 14 designs the NRC believed most likely to be the basis for export license applications in the next decade, the AREWG concluded that the existing Part 110 process could license relevant materials and components with only some clarifications, such as the use of molten salt as a coolant.19 The NRC, however, intends to continue to review the regulations and practices. Moreover, the AREWG’s mandate did not specifically include a focus on safeguards
___________________
11 Nuclear technical assistance is also referred to as “intangible nuclear technology,” which can include blueprints or other physical documents or those in digital form, and includes training, sharing of knowledge, expertise, and certain software.
12 For the list of generally authorized destinations, see 10 CFR Appendix A to Part 810, available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-10/chapter-III/part-810/appendix-Appendix%20A%20to%20Part%20810, accessed July 3, 2022.
13 Specific Authorizations to countries without a 123 Agreement with the United States require detailed analysis and review by other agencies (Strangis 2021, slides 5 and 8; CRS 2019).
14 The authorization does not allow retransfers of exports, unless authorized under license or an exemption.
15 See Nuclear Suppliers Group, 2019, “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers,” http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images//2019NSG_Part_1.pdf.
16 Found in Part 110.28 and Part 110.29, respectively.
17 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, n.d., “Title 10, §110.26(b)” in Code of Federal Regulations, Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office and National Archives and Records Administration.
18 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2022, “U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Preparations for the Export of Advanced Reactors,” https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/us-nrc-prep-export-advanced-reactors.html.
19 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2022, “U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Preparations for the Export of Advanced Reactors,” https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/us-nrc-prep-export-advanced-reactors.html.
or security concerns.20 As with the Part 810 licenses, obtaining the required government-to-government nuclear assurances has a major impact on the length of the NRC export licensing process.
Commerce and Export Administration Regulations
Under the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Department of Commerce licenses the export of “dual-use” nuclear power related items such as goods, services, and technologies with primarily commercial but also with potential nuclear weapons proliferation applications. Generally, these items appear in the Commerce Control List (CCL)21 and represent the “balance of plant” such as turbines, generators, switching gear, pipes, and valves; health and safety equipment such as radiation detectors and monitors, fire safety, and facility safety; general infrastructure such as telecommunications, tools, and maintenance equipment; and materials and manufacturing equipment (Clagett 2021, slide 2). Retransfers of U.S. origin dual-use items also have licensing requirements under the EAR.22
Many dual-use exports can go to destinations without the need for a license application. If the item is classified as “EAR99,” it may be able to be shipped with a No License Required (NLR) designation. The EAR also outlines a range of license exceptions that allows exports of items on the CCL without a license. If a license it required, the EAR includes a requirement to resolve a license application within 90 calendar days. However, several important associated activities, such as conducting prelicense checks, required consultations with other governments under bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or obtaining government-to-government assurances, are excluded from the 90-day limit.23 As with the two other licensing systems, the EAR does not distinguish between non-light water or “advanced” reactors and more common light-water reactors. Although a Department of Commerce official noted that the United States is discussing items that might be unique to advanced reactors or related items not currently subject to controls on dual-use items, they see existing U.S. export controls as capable of successfully processing applications for the export of items related to new and advanced reactors (NRCRIC 2021).24
Interagency Coordination
Although each of the agencies listed above has a distinct licensing scope, formal and informal links exist among them. The Department of State coordinates the views of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Energy on obtaining assurances subject to the associated 123 Agreement and that license criteria have been met. For Part 810 authorizations, DOE needs concurrence from the Department of State along with conducting consultations with the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the NRC. Similarly, upon receipt of a license application, Commerce must share the application with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State (and, as appropriate, other bodies) for a consensus decision. For Part 110 licenses, for example, the NRC needs to obtain a view from executive branch agencies. With the 90-day limit for issuing a licensing decision from Commerce, the EAR includes an often-used process for resolving interagency differences. More informally, those working on these licenses speak and work regularly with one another.
Even when coordinated and working simultaneously across the authorizations and license required, the average times noted in Table 10-2 suggest that the export control process takes about two years at a minimum. These average process times are for current technology exports, where the regulators have considerable experience. For licensing
___________________
20 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2022, “U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Preparations for the Export of Advanced Reactors,” https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/export-import/us-nrc-prep-export-advanced-reactors.html.
21 Bureau of Industry and Security, 2020, “Commerce Control List (CCL),” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl.
22 A retransfer refers to an item that is exported (transferred) to a foreign end-user who subsequently transfers those items to another end-user in the host country or to an end-user in a third country.
23 See Code of Federal Regulations, “Title 15 CFR Part 750,” https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-750.
24 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2021, “M3 U.S. Regulatory Preparations for the Export of Advanced Reactors,” https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-symposia/ric/past/2021/docs/abstracts/sessionabstract-3.html. For the transcript of the session, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2122/ML21225A692.pdf.
new or first-of-a-kind items, regulators will need additional time to gain familiarity with the relevant technologies and associated processes. Similarly, licensing to new national markets and new end-users in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East will require additional time for regulators to evaluate the risk and make their determinations.
U.S. government officials perceive the biggest challenge for U.S. export controls of new and advanced reactors as stemming from the lack of awareness of vendors of the Part 810 and EAR licensing requirements and processes (Habighorst 2019; NRCRIC 2019). Vendors, for example, often do not seem aware of the breadth of the Commerce controls, which include, for example, vendor collaborations with universities or exporting of testing equipment. Nor are they prepared for the international political complexities and the associated licensing criteria, such as the challenges in obtaining government-to-government assurances with new partner countries for new end-users. DOE, the NRC, and the Department of Commerce have done outreach individually and collectively, including interagency teams presenting to broad audiences and conducting in-house training. Although the pandemic has made on-line outreach less effective than face-to-face interactions, an apparent lack of proactive efforts by the vendor community to work directly with the licensing agencies greatly compounds the issue (NRCRIC 2019). Nonetheless, officials believe that U.S. export control licensing processes itself does not need to hamper U.S. competitiveness. However, the lead U.S. agencies have not made a coordinated outreach effort specifically designed for U.S. vendors for new and advanced reactors. For example, outreach conducted by the Bureau of Industry and Security in 2021 did not appear to include any special focus or events on new and advanced reactors.25
Findings and Recommendation
Finding 10-1: 123 Agreements provide a foundation for the eventual transfer of nuclear items from the United States to existing and emerging nuclear-capable countries. Negotiations typically take years and require the application of significant diplomatic resources. Once a 123 Agreement has entered into force, three main U.S. export control processes are used to authorize or license nuclear exports: Part 810 (Department of Energy), Part 110 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and Export Administration Regulations (Department of Commerce). Each licensing or authorization process adds additional time, from as little as 90 days to more than 9 months. Therefore, obtaining U.S. export licenses—from negotiation of a 123 Agreement through exchanges of design information (Part 810) to reactor construction—may take at least several years for the first nuclear export to a country, particularly for a first-of-a-kind reactor plant design.
Finding 10-2: The U.S. federal agencies—Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of Commerce—working on the different licensing and authorization processes regularly speak and work with one another when presented with an application. This close coordination across these lead agencies has several benefits: it may reduce the need for extensive modification to manage the export of new and advanced reactors and their technologies, and, given that the export of any individual advanced reactor by a U.S. vendor would likely involve all three licensing processes, this interaction across the agencies plays an important role in ensuring that decisions in one process do not work at cross-purposes with the two other licensing processes. There is little evidence, however, that these agencies have offered coordinated and targeted outreach efforts to U.S. vendors of new and advanced reactors.
Recommendation 10-1: Efforts should be made to shorten the timelines for putting in place 123 Agreements and review of export applications. The three lead export control agencies should increase efforts to educate U.S. nuclear vendors on the requirements, bureaucratic resources, and timelines associated with U.S. 123 Agreements and U.S. nuclear export controls. These efforts would include the creation of new specialized guidance materials, training activities, and other forms of technical assistance, especially for new vendors and in coordination with Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear and similar initiatives, in anticipation of new license applications.
___________________
25 Department of Commerce, 2021, “Annual Report to Congress,” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/pdfs/3140-annual-report-of-the-bureau-of-industry-and-security-for-fiscal-year-2021/file, pp. 31–32. See also Bureau of Industry and Security, 2020, “FY 2023 BIS Seminar Schedule,” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/compliance-a-training/current-seminar-schedule.
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND COMPETITION
The majority of present-day nuclear reactor deployments occurs in countries with well-established regulatory processes and the capability for addressing safety, security, and safeguards risks. This status quo is rapidly changing, however, due largely to two synergistic market factors. In the coming decades, the majority of increased energy demand is projected to occur in developing and nuclear newcomer countries (Ford and Abdulla 2021). On the supply side, many advanced reactor vendors are seeking to develop lower cost, mass-manufacturable nuclear reactors that would be affordable to more countries. Increasing the worldwide deployment of advanced nuclear reactors will require reinvestigating—and in some cases reimagining—global protocols for nuclear regulatory processes for limiting safety, security, and safeguards risks. The specific implications of this growth, however, depend heavily on both the number of new nuclear reactors and institutional readiness of the countries where they are being built. Growth scenarios for global nuclear energy use, projected from 2020 to 2050, range from nearly stable nuclear use to more than double (IEA 2022b; IAEA 2021).
For much of the early history of nuclear energy development, the United States was at the forefront of civilian nuclear deployment. For example, one-third of the 637 reactors listed in the IAEA’s worldwide Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database (operational + shutdown) were either built by a U.S.-based developer or in partnership with a U.S. developer.26 This leadership position in both design and deployment has declined dramatically since the early 1980s for reasons that vary from a general lack of a sustainable order book, to a perception that a U.S. or other western development company will be more expensive that competing options from Russia or China, and that the regulatory burden of dealing with western developers is too high (MIT 2003). As a result, while a few international reactors currently being deployed have their origins in U.S. companies, only ten of the 55 reactors (~4 percent) are being built using U.S. designs—two in the United States and eight reactors in China (i.e., Westinghouse’s AP1000s). This decrease of U.S. participation in the global nuclear development market is in stark contrast to the continued, aggressive marketing from competitor nations such as Russia and ongoing large-scale reactor development by China (albeit currently dominated by internal deployments) (IEA 2022a; Bowen and Dabbar 2022).
As a competitor in the international nuclear marketplace, Russia has stood out for several reasons. Prior to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine in February 2022, Russia dominated the international market with 17 units under construction in seven countries (Schneider and Froggatt 2022, p. 16). In addition, of 509 signed NCAs and 228 less formal memoranda of understandings and policy statements (post-2000), Russia has three times more agreements to supply tangible nuclear technology (physical nuclear items), such as NPPs, than the next suppliers (France and the United States) and more than twice the number of countries than the next supplier (France) (Jewell et al. 2019).27 Russia also has had at least two dozen entities working on advanced reactors, including molten salt reactor, liquid metal-cooled fast reactor, HTGR, and SMR designs, and offers other new power reactor options, such as floating NPPs (Allen and Milko 2017; World Nuclear News 2021). The Russian success in marketing arises in part from its willingness to provide very favorable financial terms, thereby advancing a foreign policy objective of having an important role in the customer country’s critical energy infrastructure for the life of the plant (as long as 100 years). In pursuit of this objective, it also offers favorable terms on fuel supply and even the take-back of spent fuel, alleviating the customer country’s obligation to develop disposal capability.28
___________________
26 Of the total, 202 (32 percent) were U.S. developed or in partnership with U.S. developers. See International Atomic Energy Agency Power Reactor Information System Database, 2022, https://pris.iaea.org/PRISTA/frmChooseReport.aspx?Menu=STANDARD+REPORTS.
27 However, the United States has the most agreements or other arrangements when it comes to intangible nuclear technology cooperation, especially in the areas of safety and security. See J. Jewell, M. Vetier, and D.G. Cabrera, 2019, “The International Technological Nuclear Cooperation Landscape: A New Dataset and Network Analysis,” Energy Policy 128:838–852, https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15756/1/IR_nuclear_draft_180712.pdf.
28 Reformers have suggested that Russia has less stringent conditions in its NCAs—arguably making Russian-based reactors more competitive options (Stulberg and Dorsey 2020, p. 94 plus footnotes). While this appears to have been true in the past, a recent examination of the quality of 109 U.S. and Russian NCAs from 1990 to 2020 on safeguards requirements, transfer restrictions, limits on enrichment, limits on reprocessing of spent fuel, and controls on retransfers found that Russian agreements have tightened significantly over time, especially after the consolidation of the Russian nuclear industry within state-owned Rosatom in 2007, equaling in quality to U.S. 123 Agreements since around 2017 (Stulberg and Darsey 2020). Examining a subset of agreements between Russia and nuclear newcomers shows a similar pattern with less than a 5 percent difference in the quality scores since 2018 (Stulberg and Darsey 2020).
Of course, recent events in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions will certainly impact the recent dominance of Russia in the existing nuclear reactor market overall, although it might not have much effect on potential high-growth markets in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The recent Russian willingness to use the curtailment of natural gas to exert pressure on Western Europe could offer an opening for western developers in markets where dependence on Russia for energy needs including oil, gas, and nuclear will now be seen as a much higher risk proposition than was previously the case. These actions by Russia may also open doors to international cooperation among the G7 Nations to displace Russia’s commercial dominance (Ichord 2022).
Less information on Chinese NCAs exists, but their role in international nuclear cooperation activities continues to expand (Jewell et al. 2019). China not only has the most expansive current plans for domestic nuclear power reactor construction, but it has also made civil nuclear cooperation an integral part of its Belt & Road Initiative (Lin et al. 2020). According to one study, at least 25 countries participate in nuclear reactor cooperation under the Initiative, including HTGR projects with Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates and a Pebble Module SMR project with Jordan (Lin et al. 2020). In addition, at least 11 Chinese entities have been working on designs for molten salt reactors, liquid metal-cooled fast reactors, Pebble Bed Reactors, SMRs, Supercritical Water-cooled Reactors, and Supercritical CO2 Reactors (Allen and Milko 2017). Despite the aim of the Belt & Road Initiative to cooperate with countries without regard to their economic or government systems, this expansion has the potential to lead to less stringent NCAs, especially with nuclear newcomers. Although this is a potential risk, some analysts note that China has taken steps in recent years to increase its commitment to nuclear safety and to strengthen its controls on nuclear transfers, such as through its new export control law (State Council Information Office of China 2019).
As noted earlier, the United States and European countries were historically the dominant forces in new nuclear development but now Russia and China are playing a leading role in international nuclear development and deployment. In some cases, development and construction support are coupled with extraordinarily favorable financial terms, long-term operating contracts and fuel return, easing the necessity for a host nation to develop robust indigenous capacity to manage the technology in the near-term and creating a long-term geopolitical tie (World Nuclear News 2016). The challenge for the United States and OECD vendors is in not only developing the technologies that hold appeal in foreign markets but also developing a more holistic approach for vendor support before State-sponsored vendors have created even more challenging barriers to entry in the emerging markets for nuclear power. The diminution of U.S. and OECD vendors in the markets has decadal impacts for safety, security, and safeguards. As scholars have noted recently:
[In the] context of the growing tensions and confrontation among the major powers, the race is on to commercialize the new generation of SMRs and MNRs for civilian and military use. The United States and its European and Asian allies need to progress rapidly beyond research, development, and demonstration efforts into effective manufacturing, financing, and implementation strategies to lead this global effort and successfully confront the emerging competition from China and Russia. (Ichord 2022 [webpage])
and
Without the United States and other countries with strong accountability and governance as viable competitors, nuclear safety and security norms, standards, practices, and enforcement would likely become precarious or a secondary consideration. (Nakano 2020, p. 2)
Finding
Finding 10-3: As some growth scenarios indicate, there could be a significant increase in the number of deployed advanced reactors throughout the world by 2050. Because no single country (or no single vendor within a country) is likely to be able to support the entire international marketplace, all competitors and competitor nations should recognize that they have shared responsibility in minimizing safety, security, and safeguards risks.
National Security and International Markets
This changing landscape in international leadership in nuclear development reflects a potential shift in national security influence. Because the United States still has a major role in the application of nuclear power owing to the composition of the current international fleet of reactors, and its position as a nuclear weapons state, it retains significant influence on the worldwide system for safety, security, and safeguards. Some have voiced concern that U.S. influence will wane if the United States does not pursue nuclear power at home and is not a major participant in the international market (Hamre 2015; Ichord and Oosterveld 2019; Kerr et al. 2014). There is little doubt that U.S. influence as a provider of choice for this technology continues to decrease. As more nations consider the use of nuclear power and as U.S. nuclear developers seek to take advantage of these new market opportunities, there is a critical question that the United States and western developers and governments must address if they are to regain their status as developers of choice for nuclear technology: Will the long-term interactions established through nuclear facility deployments/agreements by Russia and China to different countries—including newcomer countries—lead to long-term influences on the countries in which the reactors are deployed? And how can the United States and its allies ensure a long-term commitment to safety, security, and safeguards (especially in light of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine)?
The answers to these questions likely center on two key factors: (1) reexamining the role of international partnerships; and (2) developing enhanced financing and government support options. The latter is most critical when considering the potential future vast need for sources of clean energy.
Partnerships
Partnerships may help streamline key support activities such as fuel supply and waste remediation while ensuring quality, safety standards, security, and safeguards controls. The Gen IV International Forum (GIF), for example, originated in 2000 to discuss international collaboration for the development of nuclear energy systems using fourth generation nuclear reactors. The GIF currently has 11 active member countries (plus EURATOM), a Senior Industry Advisory Panel, and five “external collaborators, i.e., the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the IAEA, the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, the World Nuclear Association, and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation IFNEC). Among the external collaborators, the IFNEC similarly focuses on new nuclear energy initiatives focuses on new nuclear energy initiatives, aiming to ensure that new nuclear energy initiatives meet the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards.29 The group currently includes 33 nations and 31 observer countries, and three working groups.30
While this type of interaction is potentially valuable in developing customer/client relationships, it is unclear whether these partnerships will provide a vehicle for enhanced partnering that may improve efforts by western nations to compete effectively. Some of the efforts have not born much fruit. The GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection assessment methodology Working Group, for example, last published a revised version of its methodology in 2011 (although it added a bibliography relevant to its methodology in 2022), the same year it last reported on the proliferation resistance and physical protection of the six Gen IV nuclear energy systems identified by the GIF. Similarly, U.S. government support for IFNEC has fluctuated and it is not apparent that it has led to new openings for western developers with potential customer nations.
___________________
29 For more information on the IFNEC, see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec. The U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnerships (GNEP), formed in 2006, identified key areas that should be evaluated for international teaming. Ultimately, GNEP was rebranded and transitioned into IFNEC in 2010. See also CORDEL, https://world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA/Publications/Working_Group_Reports/REPORT_Facilitating_Intl_Licensing_of_SMRs.pdf. (The CORDEL Working Group established the Small Modular Reactor Ad-Hoc Group [SMRAG] in 2013 to elaborate a path toward harmonized and well-regulated global SMR deployment.)
30 (1) The Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group (RNFSWG), which addresses nuclear fuel leasing and other considerations around comprehensive nuclear fuel supply goals, and included evaluation of back-end fuel cycle options. (2) The Infrastructure Development Working Group (IDWG), which addressed human resource development, radioactive waste management, small modular reactors, financing options, engagement with specialist organizations and identified infrastructure requirements for an international nuclear fuel services framework that may enable nuclear power deployment in many countries. (3) The Nuclear Supplier and Customer Countries Engagement Group, which focuses on nuclear safety, project development (supply chain issues in particular) and financing as well as public acceptance and accountability.
Other collaborative efforts could be focused on likely pathways for partnerships between U.S. allied nations and include shared facilities and expertise to expedite advanced reactor demonstrations (Bowen 2020).
Financing Options
To improve competition, the United States and western nations could examine additional financing structures than currently exist that will help developers compete with state-supported competitors such as China or Russia.
Most of the expected growth in electricity demand over the next several decades is expected to occur in non-OECD nations (Kahan 2020). In many cases, these nations do not have the financial resources and access to credit that allows them to independently support large-scale energy development projects required to meet the growing demand (Ford and Abdulla 2021).31 Most will require support from vendors and vendor nations in the form of low-cost export credit financing. This financing challenge significantly affects U.S. nuclear vendors because, in many cases, their foreign competitors (e.g., Russia and China) are backed by their own governments, which offer financing independent of issues such as customer nation credit worthiness (NEI 2022).
U.S. private companies must compete in this, at times, unbalanced global marketplace to win reactor plant orders. However, the U.S. government has several financial tools to support and expand the commercial technology export sector. These could include loan guarantees, and as export financing. Because resulting civil nuclear partnerships can lead to other forms of bilateral economic cooperation, it would be prudent to consider the use of these tools to counterbalance foreign government sponsorship and keep the U.S. competitive.
Financing of nuclear projects in foreign countries has taken many forms, including the following (see Chapter 3 and IAEA 2018):
Government Financing Options
Direct Government Financing: In this form of project financing, the government serves as the sole funding agency for a nuclear development project. For example, the Chinese government funds the Qinshan 1 and 2 projects.
Loan Guarantees: This is a more traditional form of international nuclear development financing, especially in government managed or tightly regulated energy markets. The U.S. government offers loan guarantees that may provide support for domestic advanced reactor development through the DOE Loan Programs Office, but not for overseas projects.
Government-to-Government Loan: In this mode of financing, the lending government usually has a stake in a state-run NPP vendor, so this financing method provides a market for its plants. In many cases, the goals of government-to-government financing include a geopolitical component and may lead to very favorable repayment terms. This type of financing is provided by China to Pakistan and offered by Russia to multiple countries including Belarus.
Commercial Financing Options
Vendor Financing: Vendor financing covers options that include corporate financing via equity or loans provided from the NPP vendor. This is only viable for very large vendors or vendor coalitions. In some cases, the vendor can also be a conduit for government financing by arranging credit from affiliated banks and export credit agencies. Vendor financing options, if properly tailored, could serve as a mechanism to compete with sovereign nation vendors. This model can take multiple forms to include partial or full ownership by the vendor as well as transfer/return of any used nuclear fuel to the vendor nation, enabling the host nation to avoid the cost and
___________________
31 The use of “large-scale” acknowledges that for some nations even a small number of SMRs would be a large-scale energy development effort when considering grid scales and capacity of their institutions.
challenge of developing a storage or disposal capability.32 In some cases, the vendor may operate for a time and then transfer to the host nation once workforce capacity has grown (“Build-Own-Operate-Transfer” or BOOT) In other cases, the vendor retains all own/operate responsibilities and is simply providing energy output to the customer (“Build-Own-Operate” or BOO).
Investor Financing: Investor financing through special project financing vehicles. This form of financing has been used in energy investment but has not been used in nuclear project development. In this case, investors make a bet on the revenues from the resulting project (versus investing in the developers). This may be more challenging for advanced reactor developers given the higher uncertainty in plant reliability (capacity factor) for these advanced reactor designs.
Export-Import Bank: In the past, a primary source for financing foreign projects by U.S. companies was the U.S. EXIM Bank, chartered by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. The Bank is backed by the U.S. government’s full faith and credit, providing support for U.S. exports to augment/supplement private sector finance and/or to counter foreign Export Credit Agency (ECA) financing (EXIM Bank 2021). In 2019, funding approvals from the Bank totaled $5.3 billion, placing the United States in the seventh position among foreign export credit agencies and dwarfed by the $33.5 billion allocated by China in that year (Akhtar 2022). Given the scale of most nuclear projects, the limited availability of ECA backing for U.S. vendors has been a significant cause of concern. Fortunately, in 2019, the Congress approved a long-term funding authority increase through 2027 capped at a level of $135 billion (total exposure) (Akhtar 2022).
Findings and Recommendation
Finding 10-4: For U.S. vendors to better compete with state-owned or state-financed vendors in the dynamic international energy market, a technically and economically viable product must be established that could then be supported by a robust and reliable source of export credit financing. Non-U.S. vendors have more options for financing the export and deployment of advanced reactors than U.S. vendors. This imbalance will eventually reduce the competitiveness of the U.S. advanced reactors in the international marketplace, which could limit the opportunities to build successful partnerships that the United States has used effectively to promote U.S. national security and global nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Exploring non-standard financial mechanisms and ownership models, such as Build Own Operate (BOO) or Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT), could be useful in non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) markets.
Finding 10-5: Most U.S. advanced reactor vendors will not be ready for international commercial deployment until after successful demonstrations in the United States and thus will be unlikely to tap export-import bank financing before a new authorization cycle is necessary. Given the political challenges that occurred from 2015 to 2019, vendors may not view this as a reliable source absent action by Congress to stabilize and expand funding further.
Recommendation 10-2: International nuclear projects by U.S. exporters are likely to require a financing package that reflects a blending of federal grants, loans, and loan guarantees along with various forms of private equity and debt financing. The Executive Branch should work with the private sector to build an effective and competitive financing package for U.S. exporters.
U.S. GOVERNMENT AND IAEA INITIATIVES
In line with the increased legal and financial support by the U.S. government for expanding the U.S. new and advanced reactor industry over the past decade, the U.S. government has created a number of programs to support U.S. vendors in marketing of their products internationally.
___________________
32 Given the difficulty the United States has encountered in developing storage or disposal facilities for even domestic fuel, it is not likely that a U.S. vendor could offer the takeback for fuel from foreign reactors.
DOS Initiatives
The Department of State’s Nuclear Future’s Package aims to coordinate and intensify U.S. efforts to prepare the international market for U.S. reactor vendors and associated industry stakeholders. The Nuclear Future’s Package contains three separate efforts: the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program, the Countering Insecure Floating Nuclear Power Plant Deployments (FNPP) program, and a pilot Countering the Strategic Deployment of Nuclear Energy-Related Disinformation program.
The FIRST program seeks to manage a partnership among U.S. government entities, the national laboratories, universities, industry, and other non-government organizations, primarily aimed at supporting the development of effective nuclear governance in potential nuclear newcomers. It contains a ten-module program for partners, including modules on nuclear security and safeguards (FIRST Program n.d.). The capacity-building activities and most high-level dialogues reportedly will focus exclusively on supporting the deployment of SMRs, with at least 17 countries as prospective partners. The FIRST program explicitly aims to support the IAEA Nuclear Infrastructure Milestones Approach (see below). The Department of State has established partnerships with Kenya, Indonesia, and Latvia through the FIRST program.33,34 The $25 million budget builds on the $5.3 million originally committed to the FIRST program announced earlier in 2021 (Office of the Spokesperson 2021a).
FFNPs have considerable potential for making an important contribution to the production of nuclear energy, including in developing markets. The Countering Insecure of FNPP Deployments project begins with the premise that some of the countries developing FNPPs, notably Russia, have rushed them to market without international agreement on a range of safeguards and other issues.35 Similarly, the pilot project on disinformation aims to oppose misrepresentation of the cost of doing business with U.S. suppliers of nuclear technology. These latter two projects address concerns about the international competitiveness of U.S. new and advanced reactors and the possible erosion of international safeguards and security standards as a consequence of market expansion for some countries.
DOE Initiatives
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration has initiated three programs:
- Civil Nuclear Security Project (CNSP): This effort seeks to build relationships with U.S. nuclear energy industry vendors to support three main objectives: (1) improve security of future U.S. exports; (2) support nuclear security infrastructure development in newcomer countries; and (3) uphold the global nuclear security regime through IAEA collaboration.
- Nuclear Technology and Assistance Regulation (10 CFR Part 810): NNSA supports regular vendor engagement and works to ensure familiarization with DOE statutory responsibilities for authorizing the transfer of unclassified nuclear technology and assistance to foreign atomic energy activities within the United States or abroad. These responsibilities and constraints are spelled out in 10 CFR Part 810.
- Proliferation Resistance Optimization (Pro-X): NNSA supports collaborative efforts with operators, designers, and other stakeholders to improve proliferation resistance and optimization strategies for individual facility designs.
___________________
33 Department of State, 2022, “Joint Statement on the New Clean Energy and Nuclear Security Collaboration Under the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) Initiative,” https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-new-clean-energy-and-nuclear-security-collaboration-under-the-foundational-infrastructure-for-responsible-use-of-small-modular-reactor-technology-first-initiative.
34 Partnership for Global Security, 2023, “An Unconventional Strategy for Effective Nuclear Export,” https://partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/an-unconventional-strategy-for-effective-nuclear-export.
35 For more on the considerable legal issues posed by FNPPs, see A. Popov, 2022, “Russian Vision of the Problems and Prospects of the International Legal Framework in the Context of Small Modular Reactors and Transportable Nuclear Power Units,” Nuclear Law, The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-495-2_3.
IAEA Initiatives
For newcomer countries, the IAEA has developed a “Milestones Approach” methodology of elements needed in the 10–15 years of preparatory work in establishing a new nuclear power program (or for expanding existing programs) and the even longer commitment required for the program itself. The three-phase approach covers 19 nuclear infrastructure issues that Member States must address, which includes nuclear security and safeguards, and provides the basis for the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) service. The approach emphasizes, moreover, that “[t]he use of nuclear material requires constant and strict attention to nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards [italics in text]” (IAEA 2015, p. 2). The Milestones guidance document elaborates the safeguards and security milestones in different phases in developing a new nuclear power program (IAEA 2015, sec. 3.6 and 3.15, respectively; INSAG 2012). The Milestones Approach does not single out programs that would use more traditional reactor types or new and advanced reactors, but the IAEA has identified the Milestones Approach as the framework for Member States seeking new nuclear programs, including the deployment of SMRs (Kovachev 2019).
In March 2022, the IAEA announced its Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI), which unlike the Milestones Approach more narrowly aims at “bringing together policy makers, regulators, designers, vendors and operators to develop common regulatory and industrial approaches to SMRs” (IAEA 2022; World Nuclear News 2022). The NHSI already has garnered approval from Canada and China among suppliers of nuclear technology (IAEA 2022; World Nuclear News 2022).
Finding and Recommendation
Finding 10-6: Increasing harmonization in developing and interpreting international nuclear export control guidelines as they apply to advanced reactors by nuclear suppliers will help equalize regulatory requirements facing U.S. and non-U.S. vendors.
Recommendation 10-3: The three lead U.S. export control agencies (Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Commerce) should continue to support initiatives within the International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Suppliers Group (e.g., technical exchanges, guidance reviews, and regular meetings) to monitor and promote harmonized implementation and interpretation of export control, safety, security, and safeguards guidelines. Increased commitment of U.S. resources to the three lead export control agencies will be needed to support the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group on new and advanced reactors, including resources for and leadership in a review of new materials and technologies in conjunction with an internal U.S. review of these items.
REFERENCES
Bowen, M., and P. Dabbar. 2022. “Reducing Russian Involvement in Western Nuclear Power Markets.” Commentary. New York: Columbia SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/commentary/reducing-russian-involvement-western-nuclear-power-markets.
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. n.d. “Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (NCMOU).” United States Department of State (blog). https://www.state.gov/nuclear-cooperation-memoranda-of-understanding-ncmou.
Clagett, S. 2021. “Commerce Controls and the Nuclear Power Industry,” Presented to the committee on October 4. https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/10-04-2021/laying-the-foundation-for-new-and-advanced-nuclear-reactors-in-the-united-states-meeting-8#sectionEventMaterials. Available by request through PARO@nas.edu.
CRS (Congressional Research Service). 2019. “Nuclear Cooperation: Part 810 Authorizations.” April 18. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. In Focus No. IF11183. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11183.
Daniels, M., and J. Krige. 2022. “Chapter 3: The Cold War National Security State and the Export Control Regime.” In Knowledge Regulation and National Security in Postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
DOE (Department of Energy). 2020. Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Energy Advantage. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/04/f74/Restoring%20America%27s%20Competitive%20Nuclear%20Advantage-Blue%20version%5B1%5D.pdf.
Donovan, J., and P.C. Vives. 2022. “Accelerating SMR Deployment: New IAEA Initiative on Regulatory and Industrial Harmonization.” International Atomic Energy Agency, April 1. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/accelerating-smr-deployment-new-iaea-initiative-on-regulatory-and-industrial-harmonization.
Energy Futures Initiative. 2017. The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler. Washington, DC. https://energyfuturesinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/02/The-U.S.-Nuclear-Energy-Enterprise_A-Key-National-Security-Enabler_Report_August-2017.pdf.
Ford, M.J., and A. Abdulla. 2021. “New Methods for Evaluating Energy Infrastructure Development Risks.” Risk Analysis 43:624–640. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13727.
Habighorst, P. 2021. “NRC Preparations for Advanced Reactor Exports.” Presented to the committee, October 4. https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/10-04-2021/laying-the-foundation-for-new-and-advanced-nuclear-reactors-in-the-united-states-meeting-8#sectionEventMaterials. Available by request through PARO@nas.edu.
Hamblin, J.D. 2021. “Chapter 1: The Have-Nots.” In The Wretched Atom: America’s Global Gamble with Peaceful Nuclear Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamre, J.J. 2013. Restoring U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Energy: A National Security Imperative. A Report of the CSIS Nuclear Energy Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Hamre, J.J. 2015. Sustaining American Leadership in the Nuclear Industry. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2019. Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Certain Member States’ Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 2. Vienna, Austria.
IAEA. 2021. Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period Up to 2050, Reference Data Series No. 1. Vienna, Austria.
Ichord, R.F. 2022. “Nuclear Energy and Global Energy Security in the New Tripolar World Order.” Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/nuclear-energy-and-global-energy-security-in-the-new-tripolar-world-order.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2022a. Nuclear Power and Secure Energy Transitions. Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/nuclear-power-and-secure-energy-transitions.
IEA. 2022b. World Energy Outlook 2022. Paris. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf.
INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group). 2012. Licensing the First Nuclear Power Plant. INSAG-26. Vienna, Austria.
Kerr, P.K., M.B.D. Nikitin, and M. Holt. 2014. Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress. U.S. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R41910.pdf.
Lovering, J.R., A. Abdulla, and G. Morgan. 2020. “Expert Assessments of Strategies to Enhance Global Nuclear Security.” Energy Policy 139:111306.
McIntosh, S. 2022. “Nuclear Liability and Post-Fukushima Developments.” Pp. 249–269 in Nuclear Law. The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-495-2_12.
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 2003. The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study. Boston MA.
NRCRIC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Information Conference). 2021. M3 U.S. Regulatory Preparations for the Export of Advanced Reactors. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2122/ML21225A692.pdf.
Popov, A. 2022. “Russian Vision of the Problems and Prospects of the International Legal Framework in the Context of Small Modular Reactors and Transportable Nuclear Power Units.” Pp. 45–54 in Nuclear Law. The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Schneider, M., and A. Froggatt. 2022. The World Nuclear Industry: Status Report 2022. Paris: World Nuclear Industry Status Report. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2022-HTML.html.
Strangis, K. 2021. “Overview of 10 CFR Part 810 Program.” Presented to the committee, October 5. https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/10-04-2021/laying-the-foundation-for-new-and-advanced-nuclear-reactors-in-the-united-states-meeting-8. Available by request through PARO@nas.edu.
Stulberg, A., and J. Darsey. 2020. “Turning Rivals into Frenemies: Shifting U.S.–Russian Trajectories at the Nexus of Global Nuclear Commerce and Nonproliferation.” PONARS Eurasia. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/turning-rivals-into-frenemies-shifting-u-s-russian-trajectories-at-the-nexus-of-global-nuclear-commerce-and-nonproliferation.
World Nuclear News. 2022. “IAEA Initiative to Accelerate Deployment of SMRs.” World Nuclear News, July 6. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-initiative-to-accelerate-deployment-of-SMRs.
