Marine Salvage Capabilities: Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports — Actions to Improve Readiness (2004)

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7Introduction The United States is a world trade leader with aneconomy increasingly dependent on oceantransportation and the vitality of the nation’s ports and waterways. U.S. ports and waterways, how- ever, are remarkably diverse in terms of the vessel traf- fic served, the types of services provided, geography, and environmental conditions. Because ports must be able to provide efficient, rapid turnaround capabilities to accommodate not only expanding trade but also the increasing size and speed of ocean-going ships, it is critical that ports and waterways be kept open to pro- vide these services on a continuous, uninterrupted basis. If a terrorist-related or other incident results in the blockage of a harbor or waterway, emergency tow- ing vessels, salvage vessels, dredging equipment, and salvage personnel must be available to respond. Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has been the federal agency that maintains the ability to respond to mar- itime incidents requiring professional marine salvage services. Within the Navy, the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) was established to meet military needs for maritime salvage and underwater search operations, and that remains its primary mission. To meet its responsibilities, SupSalv augments the Navy’s internal resources through competitive, long-term support con- tracts with commercial salvors to provide additional assets, personnel, and cutting-edge technology as needed. Because of its unique capabilities and recog- nized expertise in the field, SupSalv also has the discre- tionary authority, under the Salvage Facilities Act (P.L. 80-513, 10 U.S.C. Sections 7361–7364), to provide and promote domestic marine salvage facilities and capabil- ities for private-sector as well as public-sector vessels. The Navy’s ability to exercise that authority with respect to the private sector has been, and continues to be, constrained by budgetary considerations and shrinking internal salvage resources. Although the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has increased its emphasis in maritime homeland security to reflect its leadership role in that mission area, it also has responsi- bility for maritime safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility, and national defense. For maritime incidents such as collisions, groundings, and shipboard fires, USCG usually takes the federal lead responsibility for response. However, if salvage response is needed, USCG typically relies on the responsible party to provide commercial salvage capability. For example, USCG maintains requirements for marine salvage and firefighting resources in vessel response plans for tank vessels carrying oil. The existing requirements are cur- rently being revised to clarify what services must be identified in vessel response plans. In some instances, USCG calls upon the Navy for salvage expertise and capability. In recent years, there has been no significant increase in the number of domestic salvage vessels and no significant enhanced capability or availability of existing vessels (Volpe 2001). Although marine casu- alties in U.S. waters are at a historically low rate (NRC 2003), recent events—notably the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Yemen—suggest that issues relating to national marine salvage capabil- ity have importance not only for transportation, the

economy, and the environment but also for homeland security. Given the current variations in salvage missions of the different agencies, the restructuring of some parts of the federal government with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and resulting changes in agency missions, it is timely to discuss and consider whether there is a need to reexamine U.S. marine salvage response capability, particularly with respect to potential terrorist-related incidents that could affect commercial and military operations in U.S. harbors and waterways. BACKGROUND In 1982, the Marine Board conducted a comprehensive study of salvage needs and capabilities, the findings of which appear in the report Marine Salvage in the United States (NRC 1982). This report was followed by A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States (NRC 1994), which contains a descrip- tion of the Navy’s salvage resources and contribution to the nation’s salvage capabilities. The overall organiza- tion of the Navy’s capabilities has remained much the same since that report, but there has been a continuing decline in the number of vessels and other available resources (Volpe 2001). In addition, the 1994 report found that there was insufficient marine salvage busi- ness to support a commercial salvage industry solely dedicated to traditional salvage work. This lack of sup- port continues to be a concern today. Since the 1994 study, substantial changes have occurred in public and private salvage capabilities as well as in public expecta- tions for the nation’s ability to respond to major casu- alties at sea. In 2000, the major U.S. salvage companies formed the American Salvage Association (ASA) with the intent of agreeing to and defining joint interests of salvors for representation before federal agencies and the general public. The plans and policies of this group will be important to consider in any assessment of future salvage capabilities. Significant changes have also occurred in maritime traffic and shipping in general in major U.S. ports and waterways. The state of Washington now requires escort tugs for certain tankers operating in Puget Sound and standby tugs for areas in which emergency towing services might be needed. USCG also conducted a for- mal risk assessment as well as a regulatory assessment on the use of tugs to protect against oil spills, which included an analysis of the costs and benefits for vari- ous prevention and mitigation measures (Volpe 2001). The Puget Sound situation is illustrative of the issues in salvage and rescue tug operations that can arise when the perceived risk of accidents and oil spill pollution is high. The additional complexities associated with ter- rorist-related incidents make the need to examine these issues even more apparent. In addition, many other maritime nations have expressed an interest in emergency response to tanker accidents that might cause pollution. (A recent example is the Prestige incident off the European coast.) One scheme has been to station salvage vessels or tow vessels in strategic locations to reduce response time and pro- vide needed emergency capabilities. In Europe, the United Kingdom and France have adopted this stand-by approach as a way of protecting against future tanker spills; they have stationed emergency towing vessels at strategic locations in the English Channel and elsewhere. SupSalv has recognized the changing nature of mar- itime traffic, the need for increased port security in light of the threat of terrorist activity, the importance of keep- ing ports and channels open, and the continuing decline in U.S. salvage assets. These factors led SupSalv to seek the assistance of the Marine Board to evaluate current salvage capabilities and to investigate the U.S. salvage readiness posture including organizational issues within the responsible federal agencies. The Board agreed to convene a workshop with participation from both the commercial salvage industry and the federal agencies. APPROACH The workshop brought together professionals with expertise in U.S. marine salvage response capabilities, particularly with respect to potential terrorist incidents in U.S. ports or waterways that could disrupt or halt commercial shipping operations and affect the environ- ment or other transportation operations, as well as rep- resentatives of various stakeholder organizations. During the workshop, the role of salvage and U.S. response capabilities to the consequences of potential terrorist incidents affecting operations in U.S. ports and waterways was discussed. This discussion included orga- nizational and interagency coordination as well as response capabilities. The workshop addressed (a) phys- ical salvage and harbor clearance issues; (b) financial, economic, and political issues; (c) legal, forensic, and human casualty issues; and (d) environmental issues related to salvage. The principal goals of the workshop were (a) to share information among relevant agencies, organizations, and other interested parties concerning current salvage response capabilities, and (b) to deter- mine if there are any major gaps or concerns with respect to current capabilities and agency roles. The committee met before the workshop to discuss hypothetical terrorist scenarios and decided to use the scenario strategy to focus and direct the workshop. The initial conditions that resulted from the scenarios were presented to workshop participants for their 8 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

response and reaction. The committee also developed the workshop agenda and identified panelists who could address likely responses to the scenarios. At meetings following the workshop, the committee reviewed the information presented at the workshop and developed key findings and recommendations. These proceedings contain a summary of workshop discussions, the approach used to identify marine sal- vage capabilities and possible problems, and commit- tee recommendations highlighting important topics and issues that warrant further, more detailed inquiry by the Navy, USCG, and others. The workshop began with a brief description of the results of hypothetical terrorist scenarios in two U.S. ports. Following this description two panels were con- vened. The first comprised federal agency representa- tives from USCG, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Office of Maritime and Land Security, Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and SupSalv. The second panel con- sisted of marine salvage industry representatives. (See Appendix A, page 32, for the workshop agenda; panel participants are listed in Appendix B, page 34.) Following the panel sessions, four topical breakout ses- sions were held concurrently. Each group discussed the scenario results, responses, and likely impacts from the topical perspective of their respective breakout session. HYPOTHETICAL TERRORIST SCENARIOS At the beginning of the workshop the committee pre- sented the results of two hypothetical maritime terror- ist scenarios that were developed for the purpose of exploring and testing salvage response capabilities— one in the Port of Houston, Texas, and the other in the Port of New Orleans, Louisiana. The committee devel- oped these scenarios through a process of interviewing experts familiar with these ports and the members of the local commercial maritime industry and considering the possible vulnerabilities that exist. Assumptions were then made concerning what a terrorist group with suf- ficient assets could accomplish. The two ports selected are major, world-class commercial shipping com- plexes—both along the U.S. Gulf Coast—handling sig- nificant international and domestic waterborne commerce. The Port of Houston is the second largest in the United States by tonnage carried (about 185 million tons per year), accommodates 6,600 major ships each year, and conducts a major trade in petroleum, chemi- cals, and other hazardous materials cargoes with major refineries and petrochemical plants along the waterway. The Port of New Orleans and other ports along the southern Mississippi River handle more tonnage than any other U.S. port at about 359 million tons per year and accommodate a huge variety of large ocean-going ships, barges, tugs, and other vessels. The hypothetical scenario presented for Houston concerned a terrorist-caused collision between a cruise ship and a chemical tanker. Both vessels were sunk and blocking the Houston ship channel. The chemical tanker, loaded with 17,000 tons of mixed but unknown chemicals, exploded, resulting in mass conflagration and a spill of unknown hazardous chemicals. The pas- senger ship was carrying 2,100 passengers plus crew. It suffered fires and flooding and an unknown number of human casualties. The prevailing winds were from the collision site toward the city of Houston. In the incident for New Orleans, terrorist activity resulted in a product tanker explosion and sinking in the Mississippi River, the disabling of the Algiers locks in the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GICW), and the destruction of the State Highway 90 bridge across the Mississippi River. The product tanker was sunk across the river blocking the channel at Southwest Pass, and the Mississippi River access was blocked at New Orleans because of the disabled locks and destruction of the bridge. There was a mass conflagration on the product tanker. After presenting and discussing the major factors of these incidents, the workshop participants, organized into one government and one industry panel, addressed their assessment of key elements of a likely response— especially related to how the salvage activities would be carried out and how they would relate to the other activities anticipated during such an event. PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS The first panel included representatives of key federal agencies with authority and responsibility to respond to salvage incidents in U.S. ports and waterways. Panel members were asked to discuss the anticipated overall salvage response to the incidents presented and to iden- tify their agency’s respective role or roles in such inci- dents. They were also asked to describe the existing procedures for managing and implementing a coordi- nated response and providing the needed resources. In particular, to the extent possible, they were asked to address the following questions: • What are the specific roles and responsibilities of your agency in responding to an incident such as those pre- sented to the workshop? Are these roles and responsibilities formally established and have they been updated recently? • Has your agency developed a comprehensive plan for such a salvage response and clearly defined its rela- tionship to that of other responsible agencies as well as to the private sector? Has this plan been tested? 9I N T R O D U C T I O N

• How will the National Response Plan, currently under development, affect your roles, responsibilities, and agency relationships? • Would you anticipate any problems or shortfalls in capabilities to respond to the incidents presented based on your knowledge of both government and private equipment and resources available? • What organizational or procedural problems would you anticipate in responding to the incidents presented and how might these be addressed? • What steps would you suggest be considered in order to improve the overall readiness posture of the nation for responding to incidents such as those presented or similar threats? The second panel included representatives of the marine salvage industry. These panelists were asked to first comment on the salvage problems presented and then discuss the expected salvage response drawing on their knowledge and experience with the required type of salvage actions and any local knowledge they may have had of the Houston-Galveston and Lower Mississippi port complexes. In particular, they were asked to address the following issues: • What equipment and personnel are likely to be immediately available to respond to the scenarios presented? • What are the key steps and the major types of resources that would be required for an adequate response effort? • What would be the best estimated times for initial mobilization, first emergency response, and final channel clearing? • What shortfalls of either equipment or personnel might be expected and how might these be addressed? • What organizational or procedural problems might be expected and how might these be addressed? • What steps might be useful to consider in order to improve overall readiness posture before incidents such as these? ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT The Summary of Workshop Discussions, page 1, offers a brief description of the workshop discussions and a distillation of the key issues. The next chapter, Committee Assessment of Response Capabilities Based on Workshop Discussions, page 19, presents the committee’s assessment of existing response capabilities, as well as of the nation’s organizational capabilities (within both government and private entities) and physical capabilities (equipment and personnel). The chapter concludes with comments about whether further steps such as drills or exer- cises or additional study might help to evaluate more completely and accurately the status of capabilities. On the basis of the knowledge gained from the work- shop, Committee Recommendations to Improve Salvage Readiness, page 28, presents the committee’s suggestions regarding steps that might be taken to improve the nation’s readiness posture regarding marine salvage capabilities and identifies a sample of key action items. REFERENCES NRC National Research Council Volpe John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center NRC. 1982. Marine Salvage in the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1994. A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washing- ton, D.C. NRC. 2003. Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. Volpe. 2001. Regulatory Assessment: Salvage and Marine Firefighting Requirements (Draft). John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass. 1 0 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S