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1 1 Summary of Workshop Discussions The Marine Salvage Response CapabilityCommittee of the Marine Board within theTransportation Research Board held this work- shop on August 5â6, 2003, in Washington, D.C. The workshop agenda is shown in Appendix A, page 32. The workshop included three plenary sessions inter- spersed with two breakout sessions to allow a full and open discussion of the issues by all attendees as well as to focus attention of both federal agency and industry representatives on the readiness to respond to terror- ist attacks on U.S. maritime facilities and how to improve the nationâs response capabilities. In the opening plenary session, the purpose and goals of the workshop were presented and two hypothetical ter- rorist attack scenarios were described. Next, two pan- els (one of federal agency representatives and one of marine salvage industry representatives) responded to prepared questions about response capabilities. During the federal agency panel discussion, panel members described their respective agencyâs roles and responsibilities. During the industry panel discussion, panelists described the industryâs probable salvage response actions following the scenarios presented to the group. Each panel member was then asked to respond to several questions regarding how their agency or industry would probably respond and whether adequate capabilities are available. The ques- tions that were posed to each set of panelists can be found in the Introduction, on page 7. At the end of the panel presentations, a general question-and-answer period was held. The plenary sessions were intended to inform participants about federal agency and industry roles, responsibilities, and resources and to set the stage for more detailed discussions in the four breakout groups. Workshop attendees participated in one of four breakout groups: ⢠Physical Salvage and Harbor Clearance Issues; ⢠Financial, Economic, and Political Issues; ⢠Legal, Forensic, and Human Casualty Issues; and ⢠Environmental Issues. Using the information presented in plenary sessions, each group discussed the scenario results, responses, and likely impacts from the perspective of each group theme. The moderator of each group summarized the results of the group discussions and presented them to the full workshop during the second plenary session. Using feedback from the full session, each group then prepared a final summary of discussions, including use- ful next steps. The breakout group summaries, which are presented in the following sections, represent the key results of the workshop and the observations by the workshop participants about how federal agencies and the salvage industry would likely respond to terrorist attacks of the nature presented in the two scenarios as well as the response capabilities that are available and the response capabilities that are needed to attain an adequate readiness posture.
PHYSICAL SALVAGE AND HARBOR CLEARANCE ISSUES The physical salvage and harbor clearance group reviewed and discussed the most critical such issues fac- ing the salvage industry, including the physical resources available, the time frames most likely for a response (e.g., would it be within months or years in the situation presented?), questions about where the sal- vage community fits in the Department of Homeland Security of the Transportation Security Administration (DHS-TSA) structure in responding to terrorist events, and the level of resource capabilities that might be available if the nation were faced with multiple events. In considering a proper marine salvage response, decision makers must assess the situation, including the circumstances surrounding it. For example, in the event of a fire, extinguishing it immediately may be inappro- priate because salvors may not have all the needed data about the burning materials and how they might react with water or other agents used to fight the fire. Salvors must also give adequate consideration to an evolving situation that may have multiple needs and require- ments. Because salvage is a dynamic situation, the sal- vage plan may change a number of times, perhaps abruptly, during the course of a typical operation. One key factor to consider is that there will be pres- sure after a serious event to reopen the waterway quickly if it is closed by the incident. For instance, par- ticipants estimated that about one weekâs crude oil sup- ply is usually available to the refineries above the Houston incident site, and pressure to resume crude oil deliveries to these refineries will be great. One method that might be used to expedite reopening a waterway is open-water dredging of a new channel (without concern for disposal).1 This operation might be possible in some waterways and may be the fastest means for opening a channel to shipping. Clearing a channel by salvaging a wreck might take much longer. The group then discussed the physical salvage resources that would be needed and their availability given the scenarios presented. Most of the commercial salvors at the workshop believed that they currently have sufficient salvage equipment to effectively carry out the needed salvage response even though they did not have specific details about all components and their locations. However, concern was expressed about the future because current needs for salvage do not justify training of new people or acquisition of additional assets, and thus salvage capabilities may diminish with time. For example, today there are few young salvage masters, and for most salvage companies, salvage is now a small part of their overall business (industry par- ticipants estimated 10 to 25 percent). In addition, there is an issue regarding provision of salvage services by international salvors within U.S. waters (in the 3-mile and 12-mile limits) without specific waivers in certain U.S. laws that prohibit foreign flag operations here. There are costs involved in maintaining U.S. equipment and infrastructure, but customs can waive the U.S. flag requirement. There is concern, however, that arbitrary waiving of this requirement will diminish U.S. salvage capability. Time to mobilize assets was another issue that was raised. Even if there is no capability problem, there is concern about whether equipment can be mobilized quickly enough to respond to multiple incidents in sev- eral locations. Permission and ability to get the assets that are needed are crucial. In most cases, if an incident results in a national crisis, the question is mostly one of money and details. Oil companies own heavy lifting equipment and other assets that they ordinarily will not lease for sal- vage because of liability concerns and prior commit- ments. Although it was believed that such equipment would be made available in case of a national emer- gency, it was suggested that including a liability release in the National Response Plan would facilitate procure- ment of equipment. However, although salvors regu- larly cooperate with each other, procuring equipment previously committed to other projects could be a con- cern. Many thought that cooperation is the key, and some issues can be resolved by the terms of a contract, most of which contain a deviation clause in the event of terrorism, war, or government requisition. The partici- pants suggested that there is a need to investigate possi- ble standardized contract language that might be put into place before an event occurs. Existing U.S. Navy Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) contracts with commercial salvors were given as an example of a system that works well. In discussing a time line for salvage and wreck removal operations, the group estimated that dredging to open another channel in Houston, where barge chan- nels are already available outside the main channel, may take only 24 hours once equipment is ready. Furthermore, if a broadside collision results in vessels remaining upright in relatively shallow water and with- out extensive damage, patch-and-float operations can typically be carried out in two or three weeks. When vessels cannot be patched and floated, cutting and removal may take two to three months, possibly longer. Much information from prior salvage events is avail- able on which to base these time estimates. One key fac- tor affecting time lines in a terrorist event is the extent 1 2 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S 1 Although disposal of dredged material is always a significant envi- ronmental concern during normal operations, for this situation the workshop participants assumed that environmental impact issues could be set aside for the duration of the emergency.
of human casualties. For example, immediate issues relating to loss of human life and the rescue of sur- vivors, concerns over toxic chemicals, and treating the area as a crime scene could significantly affect salvage operations and thus extend the time required. The group also addressed organizational concerns related to salvage response. First, there is a concern that the proposed Initial National Response Plan (DHS 2003) should balance prevention and response. In addi- tion, there is a critical need to incorporate institutional salvage knowledge into the federal government side of the Unified Command System (UCS). Within any major salvage operation, communication is a key factor and is critical given the large number of parties involved.2 The mechanism used for transmitting information is impor- tant, and not just for informal communication, and there are special considerations relative to a terrorist incident. Commercial salvors believe that they would need to communicate and coordinate with someone who understands the industry. One approach might be for the National Response Plan to include a directive that the salvor be involved early in the process. A concern was also raised about the high turnover rate of key government personnel [e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and SupSalv], and it was noted that sal- vage requires experienced people. It was also noted that the Supervisor of Salvage is typically quite experienced, but many other agencies may not be aware of SupSalv resources both in house and under contract. With regard to conducting an exercise to evaluate salvage capabilities, most participants believed that it should focus on the interaction of a terrorist attack and the salvage operation and should identify where there are interferences. If DHS sponsored an exercise, it could raise awareness of problems relating to communica- tions and decision making among DHS and other key agencies. For example, many thought that it would be useful to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in an exercise scenario and include a realistic por- trayal of how the communication and interplay occurs between that agency and its counterparts. It should also involve the major salvage companies with different lev- els of capabilities and the key government agencies that would need to work together. An exercise will be most valuable if it replicates all of the actions (e.g., reaching the location of the incident, arriving at the Unified Command Center, contending with roadblocks) that will be required if a terrorist inci- dent occurs. The process is what is important. There could be 140 to 160 persons at the Unified Command Center during an event, with only a few being salvors. Salvorsâ position on the list of key decision makers should reflect the extent to which salvage is important to the response. It is necessary to have experienced people on the spot to make the critical decisions. One important outcome of an exercise would be to increase awareness to other responders of the role of salvage. The exercise could highlight issues relating to salvageâteaching others what this part of the opera- tion involves and its importance. The fact that maritime commerce might be severely affected could elevate interest in this exercise among industry members involved. In many past incidents, pollution concerns have overshadowed concerns about salvage operations, but in the case of the terrorist scenarios presented, channel clearance because of its potential impact on the nationâs economy seems to be paramount. Inclusion of this issue in an exercise would allow it to be evaluated. When an exercise is proposed, industry participants believe that the American Salvage Association (ASA) should be involved in planning the exercise scenario to ensure that practical issues are addressed. For example, ASA could prepare a particular component of the exer- cise with a very complex salvage challenge. The exercise could also be of value for training personnel by high- lighting problems related to the interruption of com- merce. A two- to three-day exercise with adequate resources to support the effort appears appropriate. Questions to be addressed would include the following: What do we know? What donât we know? What do we need to know? How do we get the needed information? What decisions canât wait for all the information to be available? One other useful facet of an exercise would be to prepare a comprehensive inventory of what is available in the salvage industry and what type of assets would be needed for this type of event. ASA, through its mem- bers, could develop a list of what each member has available (pumps, compressors, equipment, etc.). SupSalv has some of this information, but a fully docu- mented and verified inventory prepared by the industry could be more comprehensive and up to date. Existing capabilities are extensive, but it would be helpful to know more detail about what capabilities the commer- cial salvage sector has, the types of ships and equipment that could be brought to bear, and what would be required to mobilize and move them. There are two components to a proper salvage responseâequipment and the people to actually run the operation. To date, an adequate gap analysisâan assess- ment of salvage needs versus available capabilities for both these componentsâhas not been done. A number of questions need to be answered: Are there any obvious gaps that can be identified today? What requires addi- 1 3S U M M A RY O F W O R K S H O P D I S C U S S I O N S 2 This same issue was discussed and similar conclusions were reached in the context of marine salvage response to air crashes at sea such as the TWA Flight 800 accident in 1996 and reported in a Marine Board Roundtable that included many of the same participants (NRC 1997).
tional analysis? Are there adequate marine firefighting skills? For example, only a handful of people in this country can extinguish fires on ships, and marine fire- fighting capability in major port cities varies consider- ably. There is a similar situation in retainers and contracts with respect to firefighting. A survey of vari- ous port cities to determine if there is a need to upgrade skills in marine firefighting might be useful. The issue of who has control also arises in this situation. In many cases, the local firefighting unit has control; however, control varies among jurisdictions. There needs to be more communication among jurisdictions. Many munic- ipal firefighting units are not prepared or allowed to go aboard a vessel. The workshop participants suggested that marine firefighting issues need more careful analy- sis to determine what might be available for response in the event of a terrorist incident. The pool of people to perform specialized salvage work is small and may be shrinkingâthe lack of quali- fied people could be the most critical gap between needs and capabilities. This group travels a great deal and thus is not always readily available. If an exercise or drill is conducted, issues related to the availability and qualifications of salvage personnel could be investi- gated in more detail. Any subsequent gap analysis must look at both people and equipment. For example, some gaps may be geographicalâassets needed and whether they are readily available in a particular areaâand should be part of the gap analysis. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) relies heavily on the commercial sector and has an extensive inventory of salvage assets including dredging equip- ment. For this reason, USACE should be a part of any gap analysis. The workshop participants noted that dredging may be the quickest means to get channels reopened to commercial traffic, and an evaluation of how to do this in an emergency situation would be of significant value. In any exercise, it is important to get the salvage com- munity at the table with high-level officials so that they can provide information on available assets. It was noted that the list of people to be called for response to an inci- dent should include the salvage community as well as the salvage leadership (including SupSalv) and must be iden- tified within any protocol for incident response. Since SupSalv is a U.S. Navy agency and, in many cases, is involved in domestic salvage events only by invitation, the agencyâs role tends to be omitted in planning docu- ments. Therefore, their role must be explicit and well- defined. In addition, by law, USACE is responsible for safety, maintenance, and clearing of channels. However, the Corps no longer has the in-house technical expertise to carry out these operations and generally contracts for these services. USACE is often left out even though it is the Corpsâ function to restore navigation. Because inter- agency coordination issues are often complex, it is important to bring these agencies together in planning exercises to resolve problems before an event occurs. FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ISSUES The group discussing financial, economic, and political issues began by defining the terms âfinancialâ (the actual cost of response efforts), âeconomicâ (the impacts of the incident on local and national economies), and âpoliticalâ (management of public fear, quest for information, and restoring trust and con- fidence). The scenarios as presented in the plenary ses- sion appeared to stretch existing capabilities in all of these areas. Financial Issues Several mechanisms exist to fund responses to such emergencies as natural disasters, oil and hazardous materials spills, accidents, and other maritime inci- dents. The case of a terrorist attack, however, is decid- edly different and brings new challenges. Existing funds such as those in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) can be accessed under the system when the threat of pollution exists. Under a federal disaster declaration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) can be called in. In case of a major maritime incident, the U.S. Captain of the Port can respond immediately. In the case of a terrorist incident, however, it is not clear at this time how funding would be handled. In practice, it appears that immediate emergency funding for a major disaster comes quickly, whereas funding for longer-term activities such as salvage and wreck removal could be more difficult to obtain. One impor- tant issue the group identified is how to best access var- ious existing funding mechanisms given the fact that many exist for various purposes but none fit the partic- ular situation of a terrorist attack. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorist incidents became difficult to obtain. However, enactment in late 2002 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) generally restored the availability of such insurance because TRIA provides a Federal backstop to help pay for damage to insured property caused by for- eign-sponsored terrorism. As a result, marine insurers are making terrorism coverage available. However, TRIA does not cover U.S. domestic-based or sponsored terrorism, and it generally allows insurers to exclude damage or loss caused by use of nuclear, biological or chemical devices. Consequently, private insurance may 1 4 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S
not provide a source of funding for emergency response to all terrorist incidents. The decision on whether the Federal Government will respond under TRIA involves a threshold determi- nation by the Secretary of Treasury, with concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to certify that an âact of terrorismâ has occurred. This cer- tification triggers federal payments covering 90 percent of the damage up to a maximum of $100 billion, with the insurer retaining 10 percent. (Federal payments would subsequently be recouped through surcharges on policyholders.) Therefore, unless TRIA is allowed to expire at the end of 2005, in which case insurance cov- erage for terrorism may again become difficult to obtain, marine insurance can be expected to cover at least some terrorist-caused losses. One concern related to how funding would be han- dled is who makes the decision that the incident is a ter- rorist attack, how that decision is made, and how fast it is made. It was noted that a process is needed to define a terrorist incident and that the process should lead directly to a funding mechanism to cover all aspects of a response. The process would also need to involve inves- tigative agencies so that a correct decision would result. Regarding the necessary marine salvage response, under the existing system, the needed salvage assets would be moved under the aegis of the Principal Federal Official (PFO) or Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) desig- nated by the Initial National Response Plan.3 Participants cautioned, however, that proposed new sal- vage regulations would need to be revised to allow the PFO or FOSC to activate salvage response if necessary. The existing unified command approach appears to be satisfactory, but it may be necessary to strengthen the authority of the FOSC and define more clearly the fund- ing responsibilities. The experience of the World Trade Center attack shows that initial emergency responses can be initiated quickly regardless of existing funding schemes, but funding of long-term response becomes more difficult. The National Response Plan that is under development may address some of these issues. The group also discussed whether and how the finan- cial issues could be identified and evaluated using table- top or field exercises to model incidents and responses. Within such an exercise, experts in existing funding sys- tems and new proposals could participate. Using the OSLTF as a model, it may be possible to explore other mechanisms for funding and decision making that incor- porate all aspects of a unified response. It may also be possible to use the existing National Response Plan structure by including another layer for terrorist inci- dents. Drills are useful to explore liability issues, insur- ance issues, and the extent of an ownerâs responsibilities. Participants also observed that adequate funding is needed to conduct in-depth exercises, which can be used to explore the adequacy of authorities for funding and the coordination of funding systems. In summary, although existing funding mechanisms are designed for other purposes (e.g., OSLTF), most participants thought that they provide useful models on which to build a new terrorist response fund. In addi- tion, the need was cited for a process to declare that an incident is caused by a terrorist attack in which (a) key decision makers would be identified, (b) the agency with authority would be specified, (c) direction would be given to response funding, and (d) access would be provided to salvage resources. Economic Issues Economic issues related to the given terrorist scenarios were discussed including (a) the direct and immediate local effects of a port shutdown, (b) the impact on the national economy caused by a prolonged port closure, (c) the effects on other ports caused by the need to han- dle diverted cargo and to meet new security measures that would naturally follow the attack, and (d) the rip- ple effect on all transportation modes, especially those that move waterborne cargo to and from the ports. Many participants believed that total economic con- sequences are incalculable at this time but that a thor- ough detailed analysis that provides some estimates of specific impacts would be instructive. This analysis, however, could be a very complex undertaking. It could include impacts on all port facilities and terminals; refineries and chemical facilities; rail, truck, and barge operations; local populations; and nearby industry. One unique impact related to the New Orleans region is the possibility of catastrophic flooding caused by damage to the locks on the Mississippi River and the shutdown of all coastwise barge traffic along the Gulf Coast using the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. A key question related to reducing the economic impacts is how much time would be needed for a full salvage and wreck-removal operation. In addition, the level of effort that would be needed to reduce the total response time significantly is unknown. If the economic impacts were large enough, it might be cost-effective to spend much more to clear channels faster in order to resume the flow of commerce. A trade-off analysis would provide good guidance for decisions on this approach. It might also be helpful to consider the use of 1 5S U M M A RY O F W O R K S H O P D I S C U S S I O N S 3 Workshop participants noted that an interim plan for terrorist inci- dents has been published and will be in effect until a final plan is developed. The interim plan calls for a PFO, whereas other emer- gency response plans in effect (such as one for oil spills) have desig- nated an FOSC. Details of these plans and how salvage issues are incorporated will need to be addressed in the future.
government (military or other) assets within the response plan in order to respond more quickly or bring in needed equipment faster. Political Issues Several aspects of political issues were discussed that would be critical to an adequate emergency and salvage response to the hypothetical incidents. One political issue relates to legal and regulatory systems that are in place or are needed. The existing National Contingency Plan for pollution incidents establishes a process for assuming no specific liability and a vesselâs insurance covers emergency funding but calls for a responsible party to recover costs later. With a terrorist incident, the responsible party will only be identified through law enforcement actions, and no response funds are usually available. Although vessel owners are required to have a response plan, in the case of a terrorist event there appears to be a need for a clear definition of liability for the plan to be adequate. Another political aspect is whether the public is satis- fied with how a response is being conducted, how to address questions about what happened and what is being done, how to respond to pressures for action, when and how to handle public fears and the restoration of confidence, and how to conduct and manage relations with the media. These questions and others can be iden- tified through advance planning, and the adopted response plan needs to incorporate all of these aspects.4 The subject of restoring public confidence was also cited as a most important consideration in addressing a series of economic impacts. With regard to salvage response, an overriding question is how soon an all- clear signal can be given so that it will be safe to enter the site and begin salvage operationsâhow responders are equipped and trained to identify risks and work in areas with hazardous chemical spills. USCG is develop- ing a new CERCLA response manual that will be useful to train responders in terrorist or chemical incidents. It includes considerations about trade-offs between victim rescues and responder safety. Currently, only a limited number of certified responders are readily available, and it may be necessary to evaluate these capabilities and determine what improvements might be needed. Both improved training and field exercises might be useful to consider. It was noted that proper training for hazardous materials responders, a key consideration in any readiness improvement program, could be very expensive. LEGAL, FORENSIC, AND HUMAN CASUALTY ISSUES The legal, forensic, and human casualty issues group began its discussions with reference to existing legisla- tion and possible legislative solutions to problems iden- tified. When faced with an emergency response, equipment owners might need protection from contrac- tual or consequential damages with respect to equip- ment and personnel assets moved by government order. In such cases, it might be useful to provide legislative protection. Some participants were also concerned about liability issues and believed that responding to a terrorist incident could lead to situations in which cer- tain existing laws might conflict with a need to act quickly and decisively. Therefore, under some circum- stances there may be a need to provide some form of responder immunity for salvors similar to that available under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). On the subject of preparation for salvage response, many believed that it is necessary to provide affordable terrorism risk insurance rates for salvors and for work- ersâ compensation coverage and third-party liability. Another issue of concern was immunity for provision of information to government investigators in the absence of criminal intent and possibly class-action immunity for responders. Finally, salvors might need antitrust immunity for collective action in a crisis. The group also discussed issues related to govern- ment policies that affect responders and their ability to meet the challenges presented by the scenario effec- tively. Many thought that field exercises or tabletop drills involving both industry and government would be a useful way to prepare for terrorism incidents. In these drills, it would be important to include coordination of family assistance and forensic recovery, to include forensic plans within salvage plans in coordination with the FBI, and to consider these in ranking recovery tasks by priority. It was noted that the exercises should also include complete after-action reports. With respect to improving readiness posture, many participants believed that basic ordering agreements should be used as the contractual instrument for salvors since they provide advantages such as prompt pay- ments, which are necessary to ensure that work moves ahead expeditiously in emergency situations. Importance was also given to defining the responsibili- ties and roles of key agencies and private industry when a national transportation emergency is declared. These definitions could logically be addressed in the National Response Plan. The group also suggested that a salvage advisory committee of salvage industry representatives (includ- ing the U.S. Navy) be established to serve as a liaison to DHS. In addition, such a salvage advisory committee 1 6 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S 4 For a similar discussion of public response and confidence issues, see the Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of Air Crashes at Sea (NRC 1997).
could be useful to coordinate with state emergency management officials in a local-level exercise. The group discussed the responsibilities and roles of vessel owners and operators when the Secretary of Homeland Security declares a national transportation emergency. Many participants thought that these roles and responsibilities should be clarified so that responses are efficient and effective. In addition, some suggested that a forensics plan should be prepared by the FBI and be a required part of a salvage plan. Such a plan would include ⢠Awareness at the time of the incident, ⢠Plan at the time of salvage, and ⢠Domestic emergency support plans. The salvor needs basic awareness of document con- trol and the chain of custody through preplanning with trade associations. The plan must recognize that life- saving efforts take precedence over preservation of evi- dence and that there are many difficulties in victim recovery, such as dealing with hazardous chemicals and including families of victims in decisions and plans. For example, although it is usually both essential and diffi- cult to address the needs of victimsâ families, this process may also complicate actual salvage operations. Another value in conducting a field exercise is to evaluate how to address local-level participation. Local drills with salvors and local briefs to and from salvors should be part of the overall response plan. In past inci- dents, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has assumed the lead until it has been deter- mined that a crime has been committed.5 However, many issues related to investigation of a crime scene must be considered, including whether a retrieval pro- tocol is needed and how is it assigned; how to ensure that evidence that can be easily lost is secured as soon as possible, whether and how to move the scene when needed, and how to provide secure communications and vessel traffic services. Finally, some key issues for the industry include how to ensure adequate effort by the salvage community in a declared national emergency without fear of antitrust violations, how to provide responder immunity for salvors (both civil and criminal), and whether and how to provide immunity for master, crew, and owners to assist in salvage. Perhaps a key to improving readiness is to address the issue of realistic insurance coverage premiums for terrorist acts that could perhaps be provided by the government or through subsidies. It was also noted that it is important to address worker protection and third- party coverage in the event that a salvorâs equipment and personnel are attacked. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The environmental issues group discussed environmen- tal aspects of salvage response from the standpoint of both impacts from the incident itself and those from sal- vage operations. The group also addressed human health issues because of the potential for health impacts as a consequence of environmental effects. Some of the potential environmental issues arising from maritime terrorist incidents such as the ones under consideration by the workshop include the need for containment and cleanup of hazardous materials in the course of the salvage operations, the potential need to jettison cargo to achieve vessel stability and limit fur- ther releases, and proper disposal of firefighting waste. Human health issues arise in the context of potential impacts on the general public as well as on responders to hazardous materials from both direct contact and airborne contaminants. Many in the group believed that it is important to factor environmental concerns into the decision process for salvage response to terrorist events. Specifically, it was recognized that integrated crisis decision making lends itself to the inclusion of environmental considera- tions. It was suggested that such a process be explored as an effective approach for resolving potential envi- ronmental and economic trade-offs in the context of salvage operations in response to incidents. Participants also recognized that decisions regarding the priority of salvage operations and response must carefully account for the environmental consequences from the incident itself as well as those from the response efforts. In addition, it was acknowledged that environmental concerns must be accounted for throughout the response to a terrorist event. Many thought that public health impacts are of paramount importance in responding to terrorist events. The need for transparency in decision making and integration of interagency roles and responsibilities to ensure appropriate consideration of human health and environmental factors in response and salvage operations were also discussed. It was suggested that critical opera- tions including salvage, mass rescue, and public health and environmental concerns should all be managed at the operational level. With regard to effective planning and decision making, the group also expressed concern about personnel turnover, especially in agencies like USCG. Many believed that the importance of building and preserving long-term 1 7S U M M A RY O F W O R K S H O P D I S C U S S I O N S 5 The Marine Board Roundtable on Salvage Responses to Air Crashes at Sea describes this process of NTSB leadership in the initial response while the question of whether a crime was committed is being determined (NRC 1997).
expertise for maintaining readiness was frustrated by frequent personnel changes. The group discussed the issue of a âsalvage gapâ in two contexts. One is the question of whether there is a significant gap between needs and capabilities in salvage response. Many considered that there was a need to get more information about existing salvage capabilities and that any salvage gap should be closed. Another form of salvage gap was raised by some participants, who defined it in the context of a prevention and response continuum under the circumstances of a pollution incident. This continuum begins with the occurrence of an event that may not immediately result in pollution but ends with a pollution incident. The gap between these two events was defined as a salvage gap because it represents the time period during which an effective salvage response may be utilized to prevent the pollution incident from occurring. Some suggested that the potential for timely and effective salvage to contribute to pollution prevention is not accounted for in current plans. In this context, many believed that the current regu- latory structure does not provide for adequate mainte- nance of salvage capacity and readiness. In order to provide the most effective response in a terrorist inci- dent and to thereby close the salvage gap, many partic- ipants suggested that readily available (e.g., standby) salvage assets could be strategically positioned for emergency response in vulnerable coastal areas. Many participants expressed the opinion that, from an environmental perspective, it is important to provide incentives for salvage operations that focus on pollution prevention. Several disincentives for salvors were identi- fied. First, the issue of potential criminal liability is a concern for salvors, who may inadvertently pollute in the course of a salvage operation. Therefore, there may be a need for immunity provisions in the event of a ter- rorist or other maritime incident. Second, the pollution prevention compensation provisions under current regu- lations may not be sufficient to provide an incentive for salvage operations aimed solely at pollution prevention. Third, it was noted that there is a need to address at the national, state, and local levels the provision of places of refuge or safe havens for vessels in dire situations. In the event of a maritime casualty, whether induced by terror- ism or some other cause, it may often be desirable to undertake salvage in a protected area. The failure to provide a safe haven in the case of the Prestige oil spill, for example, is recognized as a major contributor to the disastrous outcome of that incident. Many thought that this critical issue should be addressed in the short term to facilitate more effective salvage in maritime incidents and to avert more serious environmental and other con- sequences during terrorist attacks. The establishment of safe havens may increase the effectiveness of response operations (e.g., salvage, mass rescue) and thus reduce environmental consequences and public health impacts. REFERENCES DHS Department of Homeland Security NRC National Research Council DHS. 2003. Initial National Response Plan. September 30, 2003. Available online at www.dhs.gov/interweb/asset library/Initial_NRP_100903.pdf. NRC. 1997. Marine Board Roundtable on Search and Recovery of Air Crashes at Sea. A Summary of Meeting Discussions including Key Issues and Questions Related to Future Needs. Marine Board, Washington, D.C. 1 8 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S
