Marine Salvage Capabilities: Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Ports — Actions to Improve Readiness (2004)

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1 9 Committee Assessment of Response Capabilities Based on Workshop Discussions In this chapter several key issues are discussed thatresulted from the committee’s review and evalua-tion of workshop discussions and from the break- out group results. Also presented are the committee’s assessment of the status of existing marine salvage response capabilities based on workshop results and the committee’s evaluation of what is and is not known about that capability (in terms of both physical and organizational response). Physical capability addresses equipment and personnel; organizational capability focuses on current response plans as well as organiza- tional structures. In the final section of the chapter, sal- vage response exercises or drills are addressed. From workshop discussions, the committee believes that these procedures offer the best opportunity to develop a more detailed and accurate evaluation of capabilities and thus to determine the most pressing issues that need to be addressed to improve the nation’s marine salvage response readiness posture. STATUS OF PHYSICAL SALVAGE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES The U.S. marine salvage industry has significant capa- bilities to respond to seaport terrorist incidents, but it is not known if that capability is adequate for a wide range of specific threats and can be sustained over time to meet future threats. The historical role of the marine salvor has been to save property, typically the vessel and its cargo, at sea. This role has expanded to include efforts to minimize environmental damage and wreck removal and harbor clearance. The latter functions may be of particular importance in the event of terrorist acts involving U.S. marine waterways because such actions may be specifically designed to inflict economic distress by impeding or blocking use of the waterway. The mod- ern salvor has a responsibility for minimizing the pub- lic (e.g., economic) consequences of an event, which places increased importance on rapid and effective response. In its expanded role, salvage capabilities include • Emergency towing of a stricken vessel, • Ability to patch and refloat a sunken vessel, • Ability to right and refloat a capsized vessel, • Internal transfer operations to mitigate stress in the vessel’s hull and to enhance seaworthiness, • Lightering of liquid cargo and offloading of other hazardous cargoes, • Dredging to free a stranded vessel or open an impeded waterway, • Heavy lift capability, • Firefighting, and • Deep water search and recovery. Over the last two decades, there has been a steady decline in marine incidents, resulting in a reduction in requests for traditional marine salvage services (NRC 1994). This issue was raised by many salvors at the workshop, who stressed the difficulty of maintaining appropriate physical resources and trained personnel should the reduction in salvage workload continue. Unfortunately, data on salvage response efforts in U.S.

waters were not collected during this period. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maintained a marine accident database (CASMAIN) through 1990 and replaced it with the Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) database. It is difficult to assess trends in salvage needs on the basis of these data since they were not collected consistently over the time period. USCG has collected data on large oil spills in a rea- sonably consistent manner since 1973, and these data provide an indication of accident rates and salvage needs. The decline in spills is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the number of oil spills over 1,000 gallons in size that have occurred in U.S. waters since 1973. The statistics suggest that the decline in incidents has accelerated following the implementation of regulations associated with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). The recent adoption of additional international mar- itime safety codes such as the International Safety Management Code (ISM) and Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) suggests that the number of maritime casualties could continue to decline in the coming years. The decline in demand for traditional salvage has led to fundamental changes in the way the salvage industry operates. Representatives from the major U.S. salvage companies attending the workshop indicated that only 10 to 25 percent of their business comes from marine salvage. The diversification of the salvage companies is likely a result of both reduced demand and the sporadic nature of incidents. Since compensation for salvage is not sufficient to sustain personnel and salvage resources during the growing interval between salvage incidents, salvors have sought other sources of income and now provide a variety of services including towing and marine engineering. This diversification may be a posi- tive development because it allows companies to main- tain physical assets and personnel that can respond in times of need. Other ways that the salvage industry has adapted to the reduced demand for its services and the increased public expectation for quick and effective response is through enhanced cooperation between salvage compa- nies and the use of pre-positioned fly-away packages (equipment designed for rapid mobilization and ship- ping by air). The sharing and dissemination of salvage- related information has been fostered through the establishment of the American Salvage Association (ASA). The major U.S. salvors are members of ASA and participate in its meetings, at which salvage-related commercial and technical issues are openly discussed. When the size of a job exceeds the capabilities of a com- pany or there is a need for specialized skills, the U.S. salvage companies regularly cooperate and share resources. The salvors maintain an awareness of outside resources and are prepared to contract for equipment and personnel to supplement their own assets. Fly-away packages are strategically located around the United States. These packages, consisting of salvage equipment such as pumps, oil spill booms, firefighting equipment, and diving systems, are maintained by the oil spill removal organizations (OSROs) as well as by the U.S. Navy Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SupSalv) and USCG. Another way salvors have enhanced their response capability is through the increased use of advanced tools for salvage engineering. Although there is no substitute 2 0 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S 73 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 YEAR N UM BE R 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 Over 100,000 gal 10,001–100,000 gal 1,001–10,000 gal. FIGURE 1 Oil spills of more than 1,000 gallons in U.S. waters. (SOURCE: NRC 1999.)

for good judgment refined by prior hands-on experi- ence, analysis is playing an increasingly important role in salvage response. Traditionally, salvors have relied on back-of-the-envelope calculations, but today there are suites of commercially available software for personal computers that can perform a wide range of analyses such as stranding calculations, lightering evaluations, oil outflow projections, and hull girder residual strength assessments. Examples of commercial salvage engineer- ing packages with widespread use within the United States are Herbert Engineering Corporation’s salvage software (HECSALV) and the General Hydrostatics Sys- tem (GHS) developed by Creative Systems. The salvage companies and their engineers have become skillful in using these packages and applying them to a variety of salvage scenarios. SupSalv has sponsored development of the Program of Ship Salvage Engineering (POSSE), one such software program that is used to perform real- time engineering analyses of complex ship salvage situa- tions, including assessment of ship stability, draft and trim, structural strength, ground reaction and freeing force, oil outflow and flooding, tidal effects, and so forth. POSSE is used by the Navy, USCG, and the British Ministry of Defense. The traditional approach, in which salvage compa- nies maintained large, dedicated vessels and personnel trained to operate the vessels, is no longer commercially viable, and few such vessels remain in service. Similarly, over the last two decades, the Navy has disposed of nearly all its salvage tugs. To some extent, this loss of dedicated salvage tugs is offset by the introduction of escort tug requirements, particularly on the West Coast. For example, the states of California, Washington, and Alaska have implemented requirements for escorting laden tankers in state waters. These tugs tend to be high powered and highly maneuverable and are frequently fitted with firefighting equipment. However, the geo- graphic location of escort tugs is dependent on oil transport paths (e.g., Long Beach and San Francisco Bay, in California; the Strait of Juan de Fuca, between the United States and Canada; and Valdez, in Alaska) rather than the perceived need for salvage capability. Furthermore, there is no certainty that such vessels would respond to a stricken vessel other than the vessel under escort. Notwithstanding this phasing out of dedicated sal- vage vessels, the 1994 NRC report Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States found that “in general, the nation’s salvage capability and readi- ness appears to have increased in the decade since 1982” (p. 1). Similarly, the commercial salvors who participated in the workshop believed that they cur- rently have sufficient salvage equipment to effectively carry out a salvage response in U.S. waters. However, both in the 1994 NRC report and among the salvage community attending the workshop, concern was expressed about the future; it was noted that further declines in salvage activity could negatively affect the ability of the industry to respond in a timely manner. Availability of Personnel There is considerable concern in the salvage industry that salvors are a graying community and that the next gen- eration of salvors is not being groomed to take over. The 1994 NRC study concluded that with “few opportunities to practice the salvage profession, the next generation of salvors is not being trained or attracted to the industry” (p. 5). This, of course, is a problem for any industry in decline, but it is exacerbated in the salvage industry, in which on-the-job training is critical to success. SupSalv maintains a training program at its facility in Panama City and regularly trains its engineering design officers in salvage engineering. This program, combined with opportunities to participate in salvage operations related to government and commercial ves- sels, has produced some experienced salvors within the Navy. The Supervisor of Salvage and Diving is selected from this group of experienced personnel within the Navy and is a valuable resource when the government is called upon to make salvage-related decisions. Similarly, USCG trains its strike team members in sal- vage engineering, although USCG personnel generally have less continuity of service in salvage-related areas. Unfortunately, upon retirement from the military, few Navy and USCG personnel assume positions in the commercial salvage industry. Salvage Assets and Readiness Salvors who participated in the workshop could not recall an incident in which they were unable to respond effectively because of a shortage of equipment. However, salvage and firefighting equipment is gener- ally located in regions where vessel traffic is concen- trated, and there is concern that rapid and effective response may not be possible in all geographical areas. Salvage-Capable Tugs To effectively tow a large tanker or similar vessel in heavy weather, a tug of at least 6,000 horsepower is needed. The 1994 NRC study concluded that the management of dis- abled vessels within U.S. waters could in large part be accomplished using existing tug assets. These tugs are in commercial use, usually engaged in point-to-point service, and can be diverted for emergency salvage service. The 2 1C O M M I T T E E A S S E S S M E N T O F R E S P O N S E C A P A B I L I T I E S

study did identify a potential shortage of high-powered tugs in the Pacific region, noting the long distance between ports. OPA 90 authorizes USCG to require and regulate vessel response plans (VRPs). Currently, VRP regula- tions are focused on planning for oil recovery. USCG has decided to enhance the salvage and marine fire- fighting provisions of VRPs to ensure that salvage and firefighting resources are identified and available. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for VRPs, which was disseminated for comment in May 2002, is contained in 33 CFR Part 155, but implementation of the rule has been delayed. The proposed rulemaking sets response times for each salvage and marine firefighting requirement. For instance, for near-shore and inland areas, on-site resources would be required for emergency towing capability within 12 hours, for external emergency transfer operations and emergency lightering operations within 18 hours, and for specialized salvage operations, including heavy lift capability, within 72 hours. In its regulatory assessment for this proposed rulemaking, USCG concluded that current salvage and marine fire- fighting assets were inadequate to meet these response times and estimated an initial capital cost of about $130 million to finance needed physical assets. The most costly salvage equipment are tugs, vessels, barges, and heavy lift systems. In order to meet the proposed response times, the USCG regulatory assessment identi- fied the need for about 10 new high-powered tugs in the United States. Marine Firefighting Marine firefighting expertise within the United States is concentrated in a few companies, which have well- trained personnel and adequate assets. They maintain fly-away packages of firefighting equipment, ready for deployment. In the event of a major fire, it is expected that one or more of these larger companies would respond. These companies have been effective in han- dling fires that have occurred in U.S. waters over the last 20 years. In the 1994 NRC study, however, a lack of fireboats or tugs with fire monitors was noted in cer- tain port areas. The study also expressed concern that local fire departments frequently lack sufficient training in marine firefighting. There are notable exceptions— for instance, the Port of Houston has made significant investments in firefighting equipment and personnel training. Also, subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, communications between local fire depart- ments and ports have improved. However, in many areas there remains a lack of funds for training local firefighting personnel in marine firefighting. USCG proposed rulemaking for salvage and marine firefighting requirements in VRPs also sets minimum requirements for response to fires. The proposed regu- lation calls for external firefighting teams to be on site within 8 hours and for external vessel firefighting sys- tems to be on site within 12 hours. Pre-positioning of fly-away packages in locations on the East Coast, West Coast, and Gulf Coast and in Alaska and Hawaii should be sufficient to comply with these response times. This level of response can, in most cases, be achieved by existing companies and their assets. In the event of a fire on a passenger vessel or ferry, in which large numbers of people are at risk, quicker response times will be expected. The ability to respond to such incidents in a timely manner needs further consideration. Availability of Heavy Equipment Heavy lift equipment is needed for a variety of pur- poses: to assist in righting capsized vessels, to raise sunken vessels, and so forth. USCG regulatory assess- ment for the proposed rulemaking for VRPs identified deficiencies in heavy lift capability in inland areas, Alaska, and Guam. Because of the episodic nature of major salvage inci- dents, most heavy equipment suitable for marine sal- vage is employed for other purposes and requisitioned for salvage when needed. During the workshop, con- cern was raised as to availability of certain equipment for emergency response. For instance, in the Gulf Coast region heavy lift equipment is frequently under contract to oil companies and their contractors, and there are no guarantees that these assets could be secured for emer- gency purposes. However, in the event of a major inci- dent such as a significant terrorist attack, a release from contracts could likely be secured. Dredging Capability The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as well as private contractors maintain dredges at various loca- tions around the country. Dredging has important sal- vage uses, potentially to free a stranded vessel and also to open a waterway impeded by a sunken vessel or other debris. Dredging, however, can have negative impacts on the environment that may preclude a timely response in some areas. For the maritime terrorist scenario developed by the committee in which multiple vessels are sunk in the Houston ship channel, it was estimated that a patch- and-refloat salvage effort might be accomplished in two to three days. If the vessels were too severely damaged 2 2 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

to be refloated, wreck removal could take months. However, workshop participants estimated that widen- ing the channel adjacent to the incident site could be achieved in as little as 24 hours. Minimum response times for dredging capability are not incorporated into the USCG proposed rulemaking for VRPs. Because of the potential role of dredging in emergency harbor and waterway clearance, the avail- ability of dredging equipment and personnel at major ports should be assessed further. Hazardous Materials Response The 1994 NRC report found that the marine salvage community lacked expertise in performing salvage in the presence of hazardous materials. The report noted that USCG strike teams are trained in hazardous mate- rials response, although their role in commercial sal- vage is not well defined. The events of September 11, 2001, as well as the subsequent anthrax incidents high- light the critical role that government teams play in sup- porting a response when hazardous materials are concerned. As a quick resource for information on the capabili- ties of the various government special teams to respond to incidents related to oil, hazardous materials, and weapons of mass destruction, the National Fire Protection Association produced the Hazardous Materials Response Handbook (2002). A summary of the salvage-related capabilities of these special teams is given in Table 1. SupSalv participants explained to the committee that their office does not have specific in- house expertise for response to biological or radiological 2 3C O M M I T T E E A S S E S S M E N T O F R E S P O N S E C A P A B I L I T I E S TABLE 1 Special Team Salvage Capability Matrix SupSalv NSF EPA/ERT USACE NOAA Vessel Fire Assessment Oil x Chemical Commercial x Chemical Warfare Agent x Biological x Radiological x Vessel Damage Assessment Oil x x x Chemical Commercial x x x Chemical Warfare Agent x x x Biological x x Radiological x x Vessel Salvage Oil x Chemical Commercial x Chemical Warfare Agent x Biological x Radiological x Vessel Plugging/Patching Oil x x x Chemical Commercial x x x Chemical Warfare Agent x x Radiological x Diving Expertise Oil x x x x Chemical Commercial x x x x Chemical Warfare Agent x x x Radiological x x x SupSalv: U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving NSF: U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force EPA/ERT: Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Response Team USACE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Rapid Response Team NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and Restoration, Hazardous Materials Response Division

incidents but can turn to appropriate military compo- nents to help formulate the best response. This capabil- ity to access specialized expertise as needed for biological and radiological incidents applies to all aspects of salvage response. According to SupSalv repre- sentatives at the workshop, the failure of the special teams handbook to properly reflect that capability for SupSalv in the area of vessel plugging and patching was merely an oversight (J. Wilkins, U.S. Navy, personal communication, August 6, 2003). Findings Salvage and marine firefighting companies in the United States have a proven track record over the last 20 years. Response has generally been timely and effective, although recent events such as the stranding and even- tual breakup of the M/V New Carissa suggest that rapid response could be enhanced if more salvage- capable tugs were available. The M/V New Carissa, a 639-foot bulk freight ship, was grounded off the coast of Coos Bay, Oregon, in February 1999. Within hours of the incident, various spill and salvage experts were en route to the scene. There were no salvage-capable vessels in the vicinity of Coos Bay, the closest being one based in Astoria, Oregon, approximately 170 miles to the north. Heavy weather in Astoria delayed departure of the salvage vessel for two days, thwarting efforts to quickly refloat the New Carissa. Eventually, the New Carissa broke apart, spilling a portion of its fuel oil. USCG proposed rulemaking for VRPs requiring on- site emergency towing capability within 12 hours of an incident would likely require the addition of up to 10 high-powered tugs. Promulgation of the final rule on VRPs will be helpful in setting performance standards for timeliness of salvage response and will provide important guidance in assessing salvage readiness capability. A complete inventory of available salvage assets that have access to U.S. waters is not maintained, and there- fore it is difficult to fully assess needs. Such an inven- tory would be valuable for identifying and allocating salvage assets in the event of a major salvage incident. There is also a need to conduct a gap analysis, match- ing available assets with needs. Such an analysis should include dredging and heavy lift capabilities, which might be needed to quickly clear an impeded waterway. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESPONSE PLANS Federal emergency response authority, responsibilities, and activities in the United States are found in a variety of contingency plans involving a wide range of federal agencies. For maritime contingencies, the National Maritime Search and Rescue Plan (NMSARP), adminis- tered by USCG, deals with locating and rescuing sur- vivors of maritime disasters; the National Contingency Plan, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), deals with response to spills of oil and hazardous substances, but USCG is the Federal On- Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in coastal areas; and the Federal Response Plan, administered by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), includes a number of annexes dealing with various dis- aster scenarios, including natural disasters (such as hur- ricanes and earthquakes) as well as response to pollution incidents and terrorist incidents. Although the NMSARP and the National Contingency Plan are implemented generally for any such contingency, the Federal Response Plan is only implemented in response to a Presidential Disaster Declaration. A recent addition to this family of response plans is the Initial National Response Plan (INRP), adminis- tered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (DHS 2003). DHS has been tasked with development of a single integrated National Response Plan (NRP) for all types of contingencies and disasters covered by the range of existing plans, including those outlined above. The INRP has been developed as an interim measure and is administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). CURRENT RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES Search and Rescue Operations Under the NMSARP, USCG is the principal federal agency with responsibility for maritime search and res- cue. The maritime search and rescue policy is developed at USCG Headquarters, in Washington, D.C. Field oper- ations are executed by a wide range of multimission ships, boats, and aircraft that are capable of search and rescue. These operations are coordinated from national, area, district, and local search operations centers depending on the scope and complexity of the situation. Pollution Response Operations In contrast to search and rescue operations, the National Contingency Plan involves the activities of a wide range of federal agencies with authority, responsibility, and expertise in the various aspects of pollution response. USCG, as previously noted, serves as the FOSC for coastal response operations. Overall response organiza- tion includes various federal, state, and local govern- ment agencies and the party responsible for creating the 2 4 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

pollution incident, known as the responsible party. Response operations are managed under the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) using the Incident Command System (ICS), Unified Command System (UCS) approach, in which the federal and state on-scene coordinators and the responsible party form a triangular command structure for decision making, with the FOSC directing the response and hav- ing ultimate decision-making authority. For spills of national significance that affect or threaten to affect a wide geographical area, a response organization reflect- ing an expanded UCS is used. Response planning and technical recommendations for decision making are vested in the National Response Team, Regional Response Teams, and area committees at the local level. Within USCG, the Chief of the Office of Response under the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection serves as the cochair of the National Response Team and develops overall response policy within USCG. SupSalv acts in an advisory capacity to the FOSC within the UCS if requested and works through the U.S. Department of Defense member of the National Response Team. Professional salvors have no specified role in the National Response Team or within the UCS structure. Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents Much like the National Contingency Plan, under the Federal Response Plan, Annex 10, numerous federal agencies have a role in the response to a terrorist inci- dent. In this case the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency. Under the new INRP, the NIIMS was created and employs the UCS for response; the FBI has the ultimate decision-making authority for a terrorist incident, as the FOSC does for pollution incidents. In a maritime terrorist scenario, USCG would be a principal supporting agency to the FBI and would carry out various roles, as required, involving law enforce- ment, search and rescue, pollution response, and water- ways management. Organizationally, within DHS, USCG homeland security prevention activities and planning for response activities are under the manage- ment of the Director of Homeland Security, on the staff of the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection. A National Maritime Security Advisory Committee has been char- tered by the Secretary of Homeland Security to advise USCG on maritime security prevention and response matters. Currently, the INRP simply provides an umbrella over existing plans until such time as a final National Response Plan may be promulgated. Response Plans and Organization In the case of an incident like that described in the workshop scenario involving the need for salvage after a terrorist incident has resulted in the sinking of a ship, existing plans such as the NMSARP, the National Contingency Plan, and potentially the Federal Response Plan would be implemented under the INRP. Although salvage would be a critical function to reestablish the use of the navigation channel, no formal consideration of salvage needs and capabilities forms any part of the existing planning process, nor do salvors or SupSalv take any formal part in that process. There is currently a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking dealing with salvage and firefighting planning requirements for tankers trad- ing in the United States, but no other requirement for salvage contingency planning exists. UTILITY OF EXERCISES OR DRILLS The complexity of coping with the aftermath of any ter- rorist attack is daunting, and the economic impact of closing a port or ports will only compound that com- plexity. Terrorist attacks could be coordinated to affect more than one port, could cause extreme damage, or could simply close a channel. The planning to enable a response effort that is flexible enough to address differ- ent scenarios in different geographic locations must therefore be diligently pursued, particularly since there are myriad agencies and organizations involved. The conduct of carefully planned exercises and drills has proved to be extremely helpful in the past for preparing for a disaster response. The utility of holding exercises or drills emerged from discussions in two of the workshop breakout groups (the one on physical salvage and harbor clear- ance issues and the one on legal, forensic, and human casualty issues). The problems of initiating interagency actions necessary to coordinate, assess, and handle the aftermath of the closings of major ports can best be understood by using these exercises or drills, involving the relevant local, state, and national agencies as well as organizations outside government. In particular, the issues involved in the mobilization of the proper salvage and harbor clearance resources might also be best understood by well-planned exercises. The interagency aspects of any response must be a precursor to the mobilization of salvage assets. Different scenarios involving different geographic loca- tions must be a part of any overall plan since the agen- cies and organizations involved are, to some extent, dependent on the location and the nature of the inci- dent, as is the response itself. This aspect is especially true for salvage response and will determine the type of 2 5C O M M I T T E E A S S E S S M E N T O F R E S P O N S E C A P A B I L I T I E S

salvage assets needed. Therefore, exercises that are undertaken should be designed to allow interaction at two levels: one high enough to enable all relevant agen- cies to interact and the other low enough to allow detailed-enough interactions to assess the issues involved with supporting matters such as the mobiliza- tion of the proper salvage assets to restore port traffic in the most efficient fashion. It is envisioned that a high-level exercise be conducted initially as a tabletop interaction and involve decision- making high-level representatives from the key agencies and organizations literally gathered around a large table and connected by telephonic communications to relevant support from their individual organizations. On the basis of these considerations, the committee had the following suggestions for designing such an exercise: • Allow participants to self-organize, establish leadership, and develop a response; • Identify conflicting priorities among commercial interests (which want to open the port), security forces (which must deal with an ongoing potential threat), and forensic organizations (which are investigating and reconstructing the crime scene); • Include environmental and public health interests, which want to minimize loss of lives, public health impacts, and ecological impacts; • Demonstrate the importance of having sufficient salvage capability available when needed and demon- strate the coordination required to allow salvage assets to clear the port efficiently; • Consider the financial and legal (liability) issues; • Include participants who are actual decision makers from participating organizations; • Establish working relationships between command- level personnel who will work together during an event; • Assign facilitators to keep the exercise on track; and • Identify a funding source or assign fair-share assess- ments of common costs to participating organizations. Suggested participants (including federal organiza- tions with an interest or that would participate in an actual event) were the following: • DHS-TSA: USCG–Captain of the Port/On-Scene Coordinator; • FEMA; • FBI; • NTSB; • Navy: – SupSalv; – Salvage community; • Department of Commerce; • USACE (for dredging); • EPA; • Public affairs specialists; and • Experienced facilitators from organizations well versed in interactive gaming exercises, such as the National Defense University or the Naval War College. Steps to establish the exercise starting point should be as follows: • Select a major port or ports (e.g., Houston, New Orleans) that is – Vulnerable to blockage and – Nationally prominent; • Assume a breach of port security (shoreside, waterside, or both); • Assume suicide terrorists; and • Feature successive disclosure of new information (to highlight conflicting priorities). Scenario results should include the following: • Blocked channel (with multiple ships if possible), • Restricted physical access to the casualty site, • Civilian casualties, • Landside issues such as transporting the injured to hospitals, • Pollution, • Contamination, • Impact (contamination and casualties) on local area, • Potential for ongoing activity (delayed explosives), and • Demand for interviews by the press. Questions to be answered are as follows: • How is the response funded? • What is the role of the National Response Plan (or Interim Plan) in this event? • Does another national plan suited for this disaster response exist already? • What organizations, groups, or plans are already in place or available to be implemented? • What organizations or groups need to be developed or planned for? • How are interagency communications handled? • What information is needed to establish priorities? • How are decisions made? By whom? Who sets priorities? • How are decisions promulgated and implemented? • How are assets brought to bear on the problem? • How is progress monitored? Evaluation of results should include these follow-up questions: 2 6 M A R I N E S A LVA G E C A P A B I L I T I E S

• What were the deficiencies in the existing plans? • How will deficiencies (e.g., organizational, financial) be addressed? Following the top-level interagency exercise, an exer- cise should be conducted to test the interactions neces- sary to mobilize the salvage assets required to restore the port or ports to normal operation. A series of exer- cises with differing scenarios and geographic locations will demonstrate the organizational issues as well as identify whether sufficient assets are available for the required response and whether these assets can be mobilized and brought into action in a fashion timely enough to meet the requirements for port restoration. Key features of this exercise are as follows: • The exercise should be specific to a particular area or port; • The scenario should be tailored to exploit local vulnerabilities in terms of – Port blockage, and – Ship types that have the most dangerous or vul- nerable cargoes (e.g., explosives, liquid natural gas, tox- ics such as chemicals and petroleum, and passengers and crew on cruise ships); • A salvage plan should be developed; • Specific salvage assets to be used should be identified; and • Impediments should be identified. Participants should include the following federal agency representatives and state and local officials who have an interest or who would participate in the case of an actual incident: • Federal representatives from agencies listed earlier (not necessarily decision makers but familiar with results of the top-level exercise, including public affairs specialists); • State agencies such as the Department of Emergency Services and environmental protection; • Local agencies such as the following: – Mayor’s office, – Port authority, – Police and fire departments, and – Pilots’ association; • Private-sector participants from the – Salvage industry and – Off-shore oil industry. Questions to be answered include the following: • How is the response to be funded? • Is there a national-level plan that incorporates state and local organizations? • What is the interaction of federal, state, and local officials and organizations? • What organizations, groups, plans, and equipment are already in place or available to be implemented? • What organizations and groups need to be developed or planned for? • How are interagency communications handled? • What information is needed to establish priorities? • How are decisions made? By whom? Who sets priorities? • How are decisions promulgated and implemented? • How are assets brought to bear on the problem? • What are the impacts of previously existing con- tractual and other agreements and commitments of the particular salvage resources identified as needed for this exercise? In general, how do previous commitments affect the availability of salvage ships and equipment, particularly those needed from other industries, such as off-shore oil? • How is progress monitored? Evaluation of results should cover the following questions: • What were the deficiencies in the existing plans? • What are the deficiencies in resource availability? • How will deficiencies (e.g., organizational, financial) be addressed? Additional similar exercises should be conducted at the agency or organization level, (e.g., FBI, USACE, USCG, TSA, state and local). REFERENCES DHS Department of Homeland Security NRC National Research Council DHS. 2003. Initial National Response Plan. September 30, 2003. Available online at www.dhs.gov/interweb/asset library/Initial_NRP_100903.pdf. National Fire Protection Association. 2002. Hazardous Materials Response Handbook. Quincy, Mass. NRC. 1982. Marine Salvage in the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1994. Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1999. Spills of Nonfloating Oils: Risk and Response. Committee on Marine Transportation of Heavy Oils. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 2 7C O M M I T T E E A S S E S S M E N T O F R E S P O N S E C A P A B I L I T I E S