Role of Human Factors in Preventing Cargo Tank Truck Rollovers (2012)

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13 This task takes the findings of the root cause analysis to begin to identify other direct or indirect influences on drivers that could cause cargo tank truck rollovers. The initial intent of the research was to be able to identify from the crash data indirect influences such as corporate safety culture and a driv- er’s personal lifestyle. The analysis has confirmed what was identified in HMCRP Report 1 (Battelle, 2009): crash data- bases lack sufficient detail to properly identify such indirect influences. The analysis of PARs and TIFA and references from the LTCCS do help us to understand that many rollover crashes are caused by drivers making improper decisions and contributing factors that tie to driver training, fitness, and state of mind at the time of the crash. These contributing factors build up in the hours, days, weeks, and even months or years leading up to the crash. Interviews helped the research team identify the influences behind the contributing factors identified in Task 1. Tables 6 and 7 correlate contributing factors to potential influences. These are posed as examples or possibilities rather than an exhaustive and strictly defined list of contributing factors. These also reflect input received from the industry experts during interviews in Tasks 3 and 4. 3.1 PAR Analysis Conclusions Table 6 lists the key contributing driver factors, character- istics, and possible influences from the PAR analysis. 3.2 TIFA Conclusions Table 7 lists the key contributing driver factors, character- istics, and possible influences from the TIFA analysis. 3.3 Prior TRB Synthesis Research The effect of safety, management, and communication prac- tices on heavy trucking has been thoroughly studied many times by a number of skilled researchers. Much of what has been learned for commercial vehicle safety in general applies to cargo tank truck rollovers. This literature review highlights the major findings of the more significant studies. An exhaustive literature review was not necessary because that has been ably done by the sources that are cited. A number of prior studies for the TRB have examined safety, communication, and management practices from one view- point or another. Most notable are several in the Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program (CTBSSP). None of them was specific to cargo tank trucks or rollovers, but their findings certainly bear on the task at hand. Table 8 is a brief summary of the more relevant projects. Two of the CTBSSP studies deserve further discussion. Hickman et al. (2007), in CTBSSP Synthesis 11: Impact of Behavior-Based Safety Techniques on Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers, examined “behavior-based safety” (BBS), whose principles are becoming common in many safety-related industries. In short, the approach is to encourage workers not merely to try to avoid crashes but to refrain from behaviors that are prone to lead to crashes. A key element of BBS is observing behaviors and constructively correcting those that are risky. Peer observation is more difficult for drivers than for those in many other occupations because drivers tend to work alone. Three-fifths of the study’s respondents occasionally ride along with a driver to observe. Hickman et al. reviewed a number of onboard safety monitors (OBSMs). These elec- tronic devices record speed, braking force, and other param- eters for safety managers to examine. The review discussed their respective capabilities and how they are used by various fleets. A number of the approaches discussed in this study have been implemented, formally or informally, by companies inter- viewed for Tasks 3 and 4. Bergoffen et al. (2007), in CTBSSP Synthesis 12: Commer- cial Motor Vehicle Carrier Safety Management Certification, presented a number of management certification programs, some of which are specific to safety and some of which are unique to trucking. Perhaps the most widely known certi- C h a p t e r 3 Driver Cultural and Lifestyle Practices

14 Contributing Driver Factor: Driver State Characteristics: Impairment, mental state (e.g., aggression, depression), drowsiness, sleepiness, fatigue, limited capacity. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver not fit to perform that day, may not be rested due to family or social schedules. Health Driver’s physical conditioning, general health, or weight may result in sleeping disorder, low mental acuity, or lack of endurance needed for the job. Safety Culture Driver may not see the importance of rest as the individual has not seen an adverse consequence or may be influenced by company or personal (financial or productivity) incentives to compromise in this area. Hiring Driver selection process or screening may not identify pre-existing conditions, behaviors, or impairments. Contributing Driver Factor: Physiological Characteristics: Physical health, vision, cognitive skill and response time, fitness to drive. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver’s physical condition may be deteriorating over time and may not be noticed or addressed by others within the organization. The driver may be an owner- operator or work at a remote terminal and have little, if any, face-to-face interactions with others in industry. Safety Culture Driver is not aware of, has not bought into the importance of, or does not participate in a wellness and conditioning program, or the company has not established a health and wellness program beyond the DOT medical and negative drug and alcohol screen as the criteria. Company may not be paying attention to the driver’s fitness over time. Hiring Driver selection process or screening may not identify pre-existing conditions or impairments. Contributing Driver Factor: Information Gathering Characteristics: Distraction, poor situational awareness, failure to recognize a hazard, inadequate visual surveillance. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver not fit to perform that day, may not be rested due to family or social schedules or distracted by family crisis. Safety Culture Driver is not aware of, or has not bought into the importance of, maintaining focus and concentration at all times on the road. Company has not stressed the importance to the driver in an ongoing and face-to-face manner. Operational Driver is over-reliant on technology to be paying proper attention; cab comforts may have caused him or her to no longer “feel the road.” Dispatch Driver is on an unfamiliar route or in an unusual situation, which has taxed his or her ability to focus on the situation, the road, and the load. Training Driver is not properly trained or is not utilizing defensive driving techniques. Table 6. Key contributing driver factors from PAR analysis.

15 Contributing Driver Factor: Obesity and Health (correlates to Physiological, see Table 6) Characteristics: Extreme obesity, sleep disorder. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver’s physical condition may be deteriorating over time and may not be noticed or addressed by others within the organization. Driver may be an owner-operator and have little, if any, face-to-face interactions with others in industry. Safety Culture Driver is not aware of, has not bought into the importance of, or does not participate in a wellness and conditioning program, or the company has not established a health and wellness program beyond the DOT medical and negative drug and alcohol screen as the criteria. Company may not be paying attention to the driver’s fitness over time. Hiring Driver selection process or screening may not identify pre-existing conditions or impairments. Contributing Driver Factor: Alcohol and Drug Involvement Characteristics: Alcohol and drug use, including prescription and over the counter (OTC) medications. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver is not fit to operate the vehicle. Safety Culture Company does not regularly reinforce the requirement to report medications, does not provide treatment, or lacks awareness of the driver’s addiction or use. Training Driver is not aware of requirement to report medications or is not aware of dangers of self-medication. Hiring Insufficient background screening. Contributing Driver Factor: Maneuvering and Control Characteristics: Oversteering, speeding, too fast for conditions, following too closely, overcompensation, poor situational awareness. Influences may include: Fitness for Duty Driver is not fit to perform that day. Safety Culture Driver is not aware of, or has not bought into the importance of, maintaining focus and concentration at all times on the road. Operational Driver is over-reliant on technology to be paying proper attention; cab comforts may have caused him or her to no longer “feel the road.” Dispatch Driver is unfamiliar with the route—for example, the dangerous curve or soft shoulder that has caused other rollovers in the past. Training Driver is not properly trained to handle the situation, has let instincts rather than training take over, or is not utilizing defensive driving techniques. Table 7. Key contributing driver factors from TIFA analysis.

16 CTBSSP Synthesis Number, Title, Year, and Authors Approach Recommendations Resources Included CTBSSP Synthesis 1: Effective Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Management Techniques 2003 Knipling et al. Twenty-eight management techniques, rated by safety managers and outside experts. Top Five picked by both groups. Discussion and R&D needs in four opportunity areas: 1. Health, wellness, lifestyle 2. High risk drivers 3. Behavioral safety management 4. Professionalism Appendix of aids on black ice, rewards, and much else. CTBSSP Synthesis 4: Individual Differences and the “High-Risk ” Commercial Driver 2004 Knipling et al. Surveys and literature review on whether 22 supposed risk factors are associated with crash incidence. Seven recommendations including identifying whether high-risk traits endure over time and documenting the best driver management practices for use by carrier safety managers and dissemination of this information throughout the industry. Appendix F has tools for improved driver selection and retention. Survey of risk opinions summarized in Table 3. Hiring practices summarized in Table 4. CTBSSP Synthesis 11: Impact of Behavior-Based Safety Techniques on Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers 2007 Hickman et al. Surveys and literature search. Asked managers to rate the effectiveness of certain BBS techniques. Table 4 on pg. 28 and subsequent pages. There are the BBS techniques. Recommendations for research included finding out why managers don’t exactly follow research in implementing programs, a naturalistic study on the effectiveness of specific BBS techniques, and whether following procedures or avoiding crashes should be incentivized. Appendix C has checklists contributed by interviewees. Appendix D has two slide sets on safety. CTBSSP Synthesis 12: Commercial Motor Vehicle Carrier Safety Management Certification 2007 Bergoffen et al. Literature review and carrier safety manager survey. Management certification may be ISO 9000, Responsible Care, insurance-mandated, government regulations, or other less known programs. Many of the programs seem to have been designed without an eye toward evaluating their effectiveness. “There is little evidence that programs have been designed with an evaluation process as an integral part or purpose.” Recommendation is to establish a committee to evaluate effectiveness. CTBSSP Synthesis 13: Effectiveness of Commercial Motor Vehicle Driver Training Curricula and Delivery Methods 2007 Brock et al. Literature search, survey, site visit. Outlines two research plans that could lead to higher standards for commercial vehicle operator training. Drew conclusions on training content, instructional methods, training the trainer, lack of systematic training design, lack of methods for evaluating effectiveness, and the abilities of individuals coming to training programs. CTBSSP Synthesis 14: The Role of Safety Culture in Preventing Commercial Motor Vehicle Crashes 2007 Short et al. Literature search. Interviews of carrier safety managers and drivers. Case studies of three carriers. Stage 1: Assess Safety Culture Stage 2: Identify Safety Culture Improvement Areas Stage 3: Develop Solutions to Improve Safety Culture Stage 4: Implement Safety Culture Improvement Plan and Reassess List of what works and what does not work is on pg. 23. Future research would be on labor stability, driver influences on culture, and the small carrier conundrum. CTBSSP Synthesis 15: Health and Wellness Programs for Commercial Drivers 2007 Krueger et al. Literature review, surveys, case studies of four freight carriers and an intercity passenger carrier. Better tools and off-the-shelf practices are needed for carriers interested in developing their own employee health and wellness programs. The transportation industry needs a paradigm change toward embracing integrated models of health, safety, and productivity as being the joint responsibility of drivers, their managers, and executives. Link to an OSHA web site on safety and health: www.osha.gov/dcsp/products/topics/ businesscase/index.html Table 8. Summaries of selected TRB CTBSSP reports.

17 fication program within the cargo tank truck business is the Responsible Care® initiative of the members of the American Chemistry Council. Through the International Council of Chemical Associations, Responsible Care is practiced in 53 countries. Responsible Care is a set of broad guidelines within which each company must write a set of policies to adapt the principles to its own situation. Some companies require that those doing business with them be certified to Responsible Care. Bergoffen et al. note that other companies have a less formal list of best practices but nevertheless require those prac- tices as a condition for doing business. Other types of programs allow preferential treatment, such as the privilege of bypassing an inspection station, and some are simply self-imposed stan- dards. Bergoffen et al. observe, “There is a rich and relatively settled set of best practice approaches and processes designed to improve motor carrier safety and reduce crashes and incidents.” The report goes on to recommend ways that the management certification programs could be quantitatively evaluated. Knipling (2009) is a comprehensive examination of the safety of heavy trucks, with several chapters devoted to various driver factors and behaviors and management involvement. The author observes that situational factors, such as driving in dense traffic, influence crash risk (p. 387). Car drivers are more likely to “misbehave” than are truck drivers. Among the human causes of crashes, recognition failures (e.g., inattention) and decision errors (e.g., choosing to go too fast) are significant, while physical factors (such as drowsiness) are also important. The final chapter of the book offers a list of suggestions for preventing large truck crashes (p. 572). Among those that are relevant to the safety, communication, and management prac- tices for preventing cargo tank truck rollovers are the following: • Good sleep hygiene is more important for alertness and performance than mere compliance with hours of service (HOS) rules. • Driver selection and evaluation are critical. • BBS is the most important framework for accident reduction. Onboard safety monitoring should be an integral element of a behavior-based effort, because it captures behavior, which is at the core of risk. • Risk avoidance strategies—for example, routing off local roads and onto freeways—rival direct crash prevention strategies. • Driver training, both for novices and the experienced, plays an important supportive role. • Compliance with regulations should be merely the beginning as a carrier moves toward its own initiatives and internally driven safety aspirations.