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34 INSTITUTE OBJECTIVES AND PLANNING: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS The observations and conclusions i n t h i s s e c t i o n do not exhaust the many issues t h a t could be r a i s e d , but they do represent e a r l y judgments we t h i n k can and should be made. These p r e l i m i n a r y conclusions concern p o l i t i c a l pressures, the lack of basic research, the r o l e of the I n s t i t u t e ' s service f u n c t i o n , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between planning and funding, a sense of f r u s t r a t i o n , and the pressures of a new agency. The p o l i t i c a l pressures on the I n s t i t u t e have been strong and pervasive and have come from several d i r e c t i o n s . F i r s t , there i s the requirement of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o Congressional oversight committees t h a t I n s t i t u t e s t a f f have o f t e n f e l t have been h o s t i l e t o research o b j e c t i v e s (see Appendix A). Second, the l o c a t i o n of the I n s t i t u t e , which i s s t r u c t u r a l l y one of the d i v i s i o n s w i t h - i n LEAA, o f t e n puts the I n s t i t u t e i n the d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n of having t o serve the agency's a c t i o n mission d i r e c t l y . The SPAs, as w e l l as the f e d e r a l r e g i o n a l and c e n t r a l o f f i c e s , have expected the I n s t i t u t e t o t e l l them what programs w i l l work and i n general t o focus on pr o v i d i n g quick s o l u t i o n s t o immediate problems. T h i r d , the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of LEAA has dis r u p t e d the c o n t i n u i t y of I n s t i t u t e programming (e.g., from a plece-by-piece approach i n Phase I t o large-scale e f f o r t s i n Phase I I t o more piece-by-piece funding i n Phase I I I ) and prevented
35 the development of strong leadership f o r the research r o l e . * P o l i t i c a l demands and pressures are normal and proper f o r a mission agency, but research and de- velopment i s a long-term e n t e r p r i s e ; i t r e q u i r e s some i n s u l a t i o n from claims f o r Immediate s o l u t i o n . Further, when there i s no independent base there i s no Independent s p i r i t . The I n s t i t u t e has s uffered from i t s lack of independence. The I n s t i t u t e ' s task has been defined from the beginning as applied research. There has been occasional t a l k about basic research, but l i t t l e a c t i o n . The Committee cannot yet make a judgment about the q u a l i t y of the applied research. However, the consequences of the lack of focus on basic research are s t r i k i n g t o anyone who reviews the l i s t of I n s t i t u t e grantees over time. U n t i l D i r e c t o r Caplan's recent e f f o r t s , the I n s t i t u t e had been i s o l a t e d , t o a large degree, from the research community t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e s the kinds of ques- t i o n s underlying basic s o c i a l problems such as crime and deviant behavior. With a few exceptions, the best people i n basic research have not been I n s t i t u t e grantees. Gerald Caplan has devoted much e f f o r t t o r e c t i f y i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n but the payoff i s only beginning t o show.** The I n s t i t u t e ' s s e r vice f u n c t i o n s sometimes seem t o overwhelm the whole. Evaluation and technology t r a n s f e r , both important a c t i v i t i e s , have been t i e d i n t o R&D planning and funding i n many ways, but one consequence appears t o be a tall-wagglng-the-dog s i t u a t i o n . Instead of s t a r t i n g w i t h ideas t h a t are *The i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of LEAA i s a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e t o p i c . I n s t i t u t e s t a f f have o f t e n mentioned t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t , over the whole h i s t o r y of the I n s t i t u t e , the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e hierarchy of LEAA has shown l i t t l e sympathy w i t h or understanding of the requirements f o r managing and conducting research. This s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o continue, according t o these opinions, as long as the I n s t i t u t e has no independent base outside of LEAA. I n an i n t e r v i e w . D i r e c t o r Caplan expressed the view t h a t the most productive approach to advancing the research r o l e i n LEAA i s t o maintain a low p r o f i l e . **The Committee w i l l address t h i s issue i n depth i n i t s f i n a l r e p o r t .
36 then tested and t r a n s m i t t e d , i t o f t e n seems tha t the expectations f o r t r a n s - mission and t e s t i n g have generated the ideas. For example, the i n t e r e s t i n environmental design as a basis f o r funding a c t i o n programs by SFAs has le d t o f u r t h e r R&D funding t h a t w i l l i n t u r n feed i n t o p r e s c r i p t i v e packages or some other technology-transfer mechanism. Whether the idea i t s e l f i s s i g n i f i c a n t seems less important than i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r dissemination. S i m i l a r l y , package- able items receive major emphasis, e s p e c i a l l y i n the technology and t r a i n i n g program areas and i n the evalua t i o n program. The issue i s not whether the I n - s t i t u t e should be concerned w i t h pursuing u s e f u l ideas or not; the issue i s rathe r which end of the process should d r i v e the r e s t . From the beginning. I n s t i t u t e research agendas have come l a r g e l y from im- mediate problems t o solve and some p r a c t i t i o n e r s ' requests r a t h e r than from those whose business i s science and research. I n a program t h a t i s mostly ap- p l i e d research, t h i s may be only n a t u r a l . But the perspective of basic r e - searchers would c e r t a i n l y be a healthy a d d i t i o n . There i s a se r i o u s â a n d unansweredâquestion about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between planning and a c t u a l funding. Do they do what they say they do? And more im- p o r t a n t , can they do what they say they do? The question i s unanswered because t h i s r e p o r t i s based only on inte r v i e w s and documents concerned w i t h planning and not on a close examination of a c t u a l funding p a t t e r n s . This issue may be s i g n i f i c a n t because the Committee's work t o date suggests t h a t the o f t e n impos- ing claims i n the annual program plans are not supported when grants i n v e n t o r i e s and grants f i l e s are s c r u t i n i z e d . The issue i s not one of doubting anyone's i n t e g r i t y , but rath e r of the I n s t i t u t e ' s capacity t o implement i t s planned pro- gram.
37 A sense of f r u s t r a t i o n pervades the I n s t i t u t e s t a f f , both past and c u r r e n t , probably caused by the many c o n s t r a i n t s under which they have operated. P o l i - t i c a l pressures are f r e q u e n t l y mentioned m i n t e r v i e w s . The constant need t o J u s t i f y the research r o l e i n an operating agency, and t o j u s t i f y a p a r t i c u l a r kind of research t o i n d i v i d u a l s who do not understand research, i s obviously d e s t r u c t i v e of morale. C e r t a i n l y , s t a f f are f r u s t r a t e d by the sense t h a t r e l a - t i v e l y l i t t l e of what was o r i g i n a l l y planned has been accomplished. The brave beginning has been scaled down t o a more r e a l i s t i c l e v e l of expectation, but t h a t s c a l i n g down has l e f t a d i s t u r b i n g sense of r e s i g n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , the b r i e f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i s t o r y we have presented i s t y p i c a l of a number of f e d e r a l agencies i n recent years. The pressures of gearing up, w h i l e a t the same time spending money, are d i f f i c u l t and p r e d i c t a b l e . I n the I n s t i t u t e ' s case, spending money w i t h an inadequate base of knowledge of causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w i t h minimally developed research resources a v a i l a b l e i n the na- t i o n , and w i t h a management t h a t was not research o r i e n t e d , presented p a r t i c u l a r - l y d i f f i c u l t problems. The "going t o the moon" syndrome, i n which s o c i a l prob- lems are t r e a t e d as i f they were engineering problems, was a common character- i s t i c of f e d e r a l programming i n the 1960s, as was t r y i n g t o solve s o c i a l prob- lems by simply throwing money a t them. The f a i l u r e t o achieve announced objec- t i v e s produced p r e d i c t a b l e behaviors (e.g., r e s i g n a t i o n and scaled-down expecta- t i o n s ) and a c l a s s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e â p r o j e c t i n g new, "more r e a l i s t i c " ob- j e c t i v e s t o j u s t i f y the I n s t i t u t e ' s continued existence. The I n s t i t u t e i s now going through a process of r e d e f i n i t i o n t h a t the Committee recognizes and i n - tends t o address c o n s t r u c t i v e l y i n i t s f i n a l r e p o r t .
