Compounding Disasters in Gulf Coast Communities 2020-2021: Impacts, Findings, and Lessons Learned (2024)

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5 Lessons Learned This chapter focuses on lessons learned by the Committee on Compounding Disasters in Gulf Coast Communities, 2020–2021 about the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) region in the 2020–2021 time frame. The committee defines lessons learned as the identification of either shortcomings or successes in disaster preparation, response, or recovery modifications to implement for future events. It acknowledges that some lessons are merely recognized, some are embraced and implemented, and some are forgotten with the passage of time, but the committee includes all phases of that process in this chapter. Generally, the ability of communities, governments, and systems to identify lessons learned and to carry those lessons forward through to implementation depends on the strength of their respective adaptive capacities. The committee derived these lessons learned primarily from the information-gathering sessions in Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama. Because the committee conducted those sessions in 2022–2023, insufficient time had passed to fully assess the incorporation of lessons learned into policies and procedures. Panelists indicated that some adjustments had occurred, but it is not possible at this time to gauge how much further the implementation phase will go or how effective it will prove to be, particularly for compounding disasters. Based on research and experience in other communities, 4–5 years is often necessary for postrecovery modifications to be made and integrated into preexisting plans and procedures (Colten, 2012, 2020; DeRobertis, 2024). LESSONS RECOGNIZED AND LEARNED The committee approaches this topic of lessons learned with caution. While it is important to capture and relay these ideas, the next and essential step is to incorporate them into disaster policies, procedures, and protocols and ensure their perpetuation for future events. A 173 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

point of ongoing criticism is that postevent assessments more often than not represent a compilation of “lessons recognized,” not “lessons learned.” Cutter and colleagues (2008, p. 603) note the distinction, writing that “debriefings after the event is over are used to identify what went right and what went wrong in the response. In reality, lessons learned are merely lessons identified [recognized]. They are commonly formulated as recommendations that may or may not be implemented.” Other studies described below note the gap between recognition and implementation of lessons, specifically considering the long-term value of lessons learned. Participants in the committee’s information-gathering sessions acknowledged most of these gaps. Opportunities for Broader Adoption of Lessons Learned More effective coordination of leadership, the creation of incentives to share duties and responsibilities, preparation of mutual aid agreements among agencies, and improved communication among agencies and between agencies and the public present opportunities to shift lessons recognized to learned (Donahue and Tuohy, 2006). This can be facilitated by tailoring lessons learned reports to multiple agencies, not just an internal audience, as a way to penetrate the silos of both agency responsibilities and technical expertise (Donahue and Tuohy, 2006). Development of a process for institutionalizing change is an essential ingredient of moving a lesson toward implementation. A regional or national repository of lessons learned reports could aid in the dissemination of findings across the jurisdictional silos of state boundaries. The committee’s information-gathering sessions revealed successes in multijurisdictional and interagency communication and cooperation. Local, state, and federal participants also noted that room remained for improvement in more thoroughly integrating planning and response. Impediments to Implementing Lessons Learned In examining lessons learned and repeated failures to learn from disasters, Donahue and Tuohy (2006) note that it is common to identify the same lessons postdisaster repeatedly 174 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

without improving response and recovery procedures and outcomes, and that local officials, community members, and others consistently identify communication, command structure, and resource deployment as elements needing improvement. Among the gaps in the process that progresses a lesson from recognition to implementation are (1) isolating findings within separate and uncoordinated organizations, (2) not sharing the findings with those on the ground and building them into training, (3) focusing on what went wrong and not what went right, (4) not ensuring that procedures and practices are designed to facilitate flexibility, and (5) not sustaining a commitment to change long enough for it to be implemented. Kahan and colleagues (2006) cite the erosion of a sense of urgency as memories of a past event fade as another impediment to incorporating lessons learned. Although they do not address compounding events, their concept of erosion can be replaced by an eclipse of concern with prior events as new challenges emerge. Delays in or a lack of implementation can also occur in the face of conflict between what policymakers seek to implement and what the public desires. Session panelists pointed to yet another fundamental challenge to implementing lessons learned: those lessons are frequently tied to local situations, but they must be implemented in the context of regional and even federal systems that may not be attuned to or responsive to these lessons, particularly when multiple events impose demands on different public agencies with related but distinct responsibilities. When one or more disasters overwhelm local capacities, the absence of an effective regional strategy inhibits cooperation and coordination across geographic jurisdictions, complicating documentation of a potential lesson learned. Shifting local priorities are also among the factors contributing to the erosion of lessons learned. Burby (2006) asserts that economic priorities sometimes eclipse “safe development.” In the years following Hurricane Camille’s landfall along the Mississippi Gulf Coast in 1969, local policies restricted development near the shore to avert the devastating storm surge. Over time, however, an anticipated bonanza from floating casinos encouraged the permitting of facilities on the same shores that had suffered serious damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Colten and Giancarlo, 2011). Although local leaders modified public policies to reflect the lessons learned from Hurricane Camille, the lure of economic gains with the rise of casino gambling prompted changes that cast lessons learned aside. Freudenburg and colleagues (2011) recount the arrival and rise of what they call the “growth machine” (or economic development priorities) to New Orleans, and how it created conditions that amplified Hurricane 175 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Katrina’s impacts. While Louisiana strengthened building codes after Hurricane Katrina (and Rita) by adopting the 2012 International Residential Code in 2013, 1 high wind design requirements were omitted and eventually the 2015 edition of this code was suspended in 2017 by executive order (IBHS, 2018). These examples come from events that occurred well before 2020, yet they illustrate the slow pace of governance and policy implementation—and even the reversal of lessons learned—that can influence the outcomes of sequential hazard events (Colten, 2005, 2009). The pace of incorporating lessons learned is a vital factor in whether changes have been implemented when a subsequent event occurs. For example, investments in structural mitigation followed several hurricanes that damaged New Orleans in 1915, 1947, and 1965. The protracted processes for approving, funding, and then constructing these features left the urban area susceptible to events that occurred years after decisions had been made to fortify the city (Colten, 2015; Horowitz, 2020). Levees approved after Hurricane Betsy in 1965 had not been fully completed when Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed the region in 2005 (Colten, 2009). There is also a tendency to prioritize restoring local economic functions immediately, bringing evacuees back to their homes, and regenerating the local tax base. Such decisions can leave safety considerations languishing (Burby, 2006). It has taken Louisiana parishes that were damaged by the floods of 2016 more than 7 years to impose restrictions on certain land uses in flood-prone areas (DeRobertis, 2024). Therefore, this study of the events of 2020–2021 may miss some of the secondary actions taken to implement lessons learned and does not capture their long-term erosion. Connecting Professionals with Lay, Local Expertise Lessons learned that are documented may not incorporate local, experiential knowledge. McEwen and colleagues (2017) focus specifically on locally based knowledge of flood risk and mitigation, or what might be considered a repository of lessons learned, which they refer to as “flood memory.” They underscore that flood memory is built on collective 1 The International Residential Code is a comprehensive, stand-alone residential code that establishes minimum regulations for one- and two-family dwellings and townhouses using prescriptive provisions. It is founded on broad-based principles that make possible the use of new materials and is designed using model code regulations that safeguard the public health and safety in all communities, large and small (International Code Council, 2018). 176 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

experiences, which can bolster a community’s resilience when it faces extreme or unusual flood events. However, risk management and disaster recovery agencies make only modest attempts to draw on local, lay knowledge, and consequently neglect a valuable archive of expertise in flood risk and flood mitigation. The dissociation of local wisdom and external agency planning impedes the incorporation of lessons learned at the local level and the filtering of local expertise into higher levels of government agencies. Local adaptations to extreme events provided the primary means of coping with disasters long before the creation of federal and state emergency response agencies. Colten and colleagues (2012, 2015) underscore the role of social memory in enabling community resilience. They note that local expertise existed before the creation of both civil defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and has performed when other formal programs have failed. They also suggest the need to integrate this community-based wisdom with formal disaster planning and response, and the deliberate perpetuation of lessons learned between events. Hazard scholars often use the term resilience to denote the capacity to cope with disasters and extreme events and recover from the devastation they cause (Adger, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015; Colten et al., 2012; Wilbanks, 2008). Resilience is multidimensional and is built in part on a number of locally based social capabilities that fall under the rubric of social capital. 2 Adaptive capacity is a reflection, in part, of social capital and a fundamental element of resilience. Strengthening social capital, or social support, is therefore essential to fortify resilience. Comprehensive participatory planning for disasters offers several paths to strengthen social capital, including bringing in local experts at the outset of planning and preparation, which can take place between disasters, as well as during response and recovery efforts (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015). Panelists representing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) consistently advocated for more community-guided hazard planning that tapped local expertise. 2 For more information on social capital, see the Chapter 2 section entitled “Social Capital and Cohesion.” 177 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

LESSONS RECOGNIZED AND LEARNED: THEMES FROM THE INFORMATION- GATHERING SESSIONS Panelists in each of the information-gathering sessions spoke about the importance of implementing lessons learned and highlighted common themes from the lessons learned from their experiences in 2020–2021. These themes largely echo the studies cited above in their emphasis on (1) organizational structure and agency functional abilities and coordination, including advance planning alongside spontaneous training, flexibility, and adaptability; (2) funding, both existing sources and streamlined procedures to secure postevent supplemental funds; and (3) communication, vulnerabilities, disaster recovery service delivery, and housing needs. The following section organizes panelists’ lessons learned by these themes. Organizational Learning, Training, Agency Coordination, and Flexibility Participants spoke at length about the need for improvement in the area of cooperation and coordination among various government agencies, faith-based organizations (FBOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) and volunteers, and spoke of what they had learned in this regard during the 2020–2021 time frame. Panel members from Louisiana commented on how cooperation among the parishes and between the parishes and state/local actors was well coordinated for the storms of 2020. They spoke of brokering informal arrangements to direct mutual aid and creative problem solving, which enabled responses that at times went above and beyond the call of duty. Panelists noted the importance of improving mechanisms and procedures for coordination with and accommodation of NGOs and volunteers in these engagements to ensure their integration in the disaster response and recovery processes. The nationwide push for tracking data and analytics to monitor and lessen the spread of COVID-19 facilitated greater coordination among local NGO, CBO, and various governmental sectors. The pandemic spurred improved capacity for data-informed decision-making; more streamlined operations; enhanced coordination and communication within and across organizations; and even the ability to repurpose pandemic aid, resulting in 178 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

immediate benefits. According to several panelists, the pandemic forced some organizations to create new systems for generating and tracking data to support reporting and decision-making for the first time. These new systems ultimately led to a wealth of collective knowledge and industries designed to assist organizations in data monitoring and virtual modes of operation. The new collaborations established among government representatives, NGOs, and CBOs in response to the pandemic enhanced unity, productivity, and efficacy during ensuing hurricane responses. The capacity to track, report, and make pandemic data-informed decisions now guided disaster response and recovery in the pandemic era. Participants emphasized the importance of training and drills that enable staff to become familiar with plans and any lessons learned from prior events and that maintain a sense of readiness. Accordingly, new trainings, including surprise mock trainings with stormwater damage and blocked roads, are on the docket in Alabama. Alabama panelists also observed that full mobilization for even a tropical storm served as a means to practice for a Category 3+ hurricane. Beyond training and drills, regular standing interactions help establish working relationships prior to disasters and facilitate effective operation during times of crisis. Those in greatest need of assistance, including marginalized, disadvantaged, and excluded groups, and specifically elderly, poor, and immigrant populations, are often the least connected and technologically ready for a disruptive event (Li et al., 2022). In response, panelists in Harris County described how their neighborhood groups and other organizations conducted trainings with these populations on the use of Zoom, FaceTime, WhatsApp, and other communication platforms. Learning how to work remotely and delivering services with tools such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams improved efficiency and adaptability. “It prepared us for what was to come,” said one panelist. “We learned to work from home; schools and daycares were already closing, so we were learning how to build that flexibility into daily life, which helped for hurricane season—that prepared us to maintain services throughout the hurricanes.” These same systems that enabled learning during the lockdowns continued to function as schools were repaired. Panelists remained committed to maintaining plans for emergency operations, but they also stressed the need to allow flexibility when unanticipated conditions arise. This was particularly true for Winter Storm Uri in Texas and Southwest Louisiana. There were no plans for this unimagined event, and spontaneity and creative adaptations were essential. Panelists 179 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

emphasized that plans and structures need to allow for creative solutions that work. In Texas and Southwest Louisiana, experiences with Winter Storm Uri prompted recommendations to plan for the unexpected by considering events not included among high-probability hazards. Panelists voiced calls for dealing with unexpected scales of familiar events in locations hit by storms that moved exceptionally slowly (Hurricane Harvey) or intensified rapidly (Hurricane Laura). Alabama panelists praised their local elected officials for stepping back, asking what was needed, and allowing those working in response and recovery to do their jobs when storms unexpectedly intensified, such as Hurricane Sally, and/or wreaked more damage than expected. Flexibility was especially important in responding to tropical cyclones in the midst of the pandemic, underscoring its value in compounding disasters. Pandemic restrictions forced organizations across different sectors to increase agility and operational streamlining. These changes manifested in new modes of virtual and hybrid collaboration to accommodate lower- density operations (physical distancing required limiting, and in some cases, prohibiting, staff from convening physically to deliver services) and COVID-19 outbreaks in physical facilities. Panelists pointed to the newfound “readiness mindset” necessitated by the pandemic’s rapid evolution and ever-changing guidance, which demanded pivots on short notice and creative workarounds for new challenges. As one panelist from Mobile, Alabama, explained, “The word of the year for 2020 in our office is ‘pivot.’ And it has continued to be our word.” Communities also adapted services that could not be provided virtually. An NGO leader in Louisiana described how the pandemic forced their organization to close its main soup kitchen, instead using food trucks and door-to-door delivery services to continue serving meals to vulnerable populations and better preparing them for the seasonal hurricanes. One panelist noted that “COVID built our resilience. It showed us that the same things we learned surviving hurricanes could be used for pandemics and vice versa.” The transitions forced by the pandemic were burdensome for many organizations, particularly those with smaller budgets and limited capacity, as well as for individuals who were resource constrained with limited connectivity or technology readiness. Yet the same sectors and systems instituted to navigate pandemic lockdowns were vital to later navigating the compounding disaster recovery process once the storms struck. Still, the COVID-19 pandemic consumed much of the bandwidth that normally would have been directed to preparing for the hurricane season, challenging response and recovery 180 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

efforts, particularly when considering physical distancing. As a panelist from Mobile County, Alabama, explained, “We’re not supposed to be near each other. And the crux of . . . disaster recovery is being near each other.” Fortunately, the readiness and adaptability mindset fostered in the early months of the pandemic helped organizations make up lost ground for preparations and devise creative solutions to what would be a challenging sequence of evacuation, sheltering, and recovery decisions as the first hurricanes of 2020 struck during pandemic surges. As a panelist from Southwest Louisiana offered, “I think one of the major things that was discovered was that you could do a lot with a little creativity.” Funding Funding of emergency services and long-term recovery was a shared concern among panelists from all localities. Several funding issues relate to the provision of federal disaster funds. Panelists representing local governments repeatedly spoke of the need to accelerate access to supplemental federal funds, and Congress is considering legislation addressing this issue (Graves, 2023). Local governments have immediate needs to restore basic functions, and their contractors expect prompt payment, so that considerable cash must be on hand to launch recovery efforts, or at minimum, debris removal. Municipalities that directed any unobligated funding in their budgets toward the mounting costs of clean-up and restoration of essential services experienced difficulty covering those costs. For some local governments, the pandemic had already tapped those reserves well before the start of the 2020 hurricane season. Expedited delivery of federal funds in the aftermath of a disaster would allow municipalities to compensate local contractors and replenish the funds expended on a timetable that would permit paying for immediate debris clearance, followed by repairs and other recovery costs. Timely payment reduces the vulnerability and exposure to a second extreme event that are associated with incomplete recovery efforts (see Chapter 4). Local government panelists suggested that modifying the formula for cost sharing to reduce the local share would also enable more rapid recovery. This type of change would particularly aid small towns or counties with limited reserves for disaster recovery, much less a rapid succession of disasters. Box 5-1 describes recent federal efforts to advance the disaster recovery process. 181 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

BOX 5-1 Federal Efforts to Advance the Disaster Recovery Process Expediting Disaster Recovery Act In November 2023, U.S. Representatives Garret Graves (Louisiana) and Stacey Plaskett (U.S. Virgin Islands) introduced legislation designed to expedite the provision of immediate disaster recovery funds to states in the aftermath of a disaster. The Expediting Disaster Recovery Act (H.R. 5774, 117th Congress, 2021–2022) would require the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to immediately fund 10 percent of estimated grant assistance under Sections 406 (Repair, Restoration, and Replacement of Damaged Facilities) and 408 (Individual Assistance) of the Stafford Act (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 100-707) to respond to disasters within 30 days of a declaration (Graves, 2023). FEMA Announces Major Updates to Individual Assistance Program for Disaster Recovery In January 2024, the Biden-Harris administration announced extensive revisions to FEMA’s Individual Assistance Program aimed at reducing administrative barriers and accelerating the delivery of financial assistance to disaster survivors as necessary to enable faster recovery. These changes to administrative policy came following the analysis of several decades of disaster claim data and public comments solicited since 2021. According to official statements, FEMA expects the new policies to be effective for new federally declared disasters occurring on or after March 22, 2024*. Community Disaster Resilience Zones Act The Community Disaster Resilience Zones Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-255) amends the Stafford Act, requiring FEMA to use a natural hazard risk assessment index to identify the census tracts most at risk from the effects of natural hazards and climate change. FEMA used the National Risk Index datasets to identify the most at-risk and in-need communities to create resilience zones. The zones will provide geographic focus for financial and technical assistance from public, private, and philanthropic agencies and organizations for the planning and implementation of resilience projects that can help to reduce climate change and other natural hazard impacts. The first set of zones was announced in fall 2023; the next group will be announced fall 2024. 182 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

* See FEMA HQ-24-007 for further details Communities also discovered the importance of thorough documentation of damages and response/recovery expenditures for each sequential event given the event-based accounting required for federal reimbursement. A related lesson learned in Louisiana was the need for a dedicated response/recovery fund. Directing a set amount into a special account to be held until needed could provide small communities with a cash reserve when a disaster inevitably occurs. Rapid access to funds is especially important when compounding events occur. Lessons learned differed regarding the influx of funds during different phases of the pandemic. Panelists from communities in Louisiana dealing with extreme weather-climate events explained that some American Rescue Plan (P.L. 117-2) relief funds could be used indirectly to aid with longer-term recovery, especially in the areas of housing, utilities, and mental health. Participants from other places noted that restrictions on early-stage COVID-19 funds limited use of those funds for storm recovery efforts. The “pre-positioning” of flexible pandemic relief funds provided some municipalities with unexpected resources to meet acute needs such as emergency rental and utility assistance, localization of capacity to meet acute needs in vulnerable communities, and long-term recovery support for critical sectors such as housing. Communication Panelists from all six counties/parishes noted the need for regular communication among emergency responders, related public agencies, FBOs, CBOs, and NGOs before and during disruptive events. They also provided examples of different pathways for that communication. Situation awareness needs during the pandemic spurred more regular flows of data and communication across organizations, including regular multisector coordination calls, initially instituted for actors responding to the pandemic. 183 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

For the organizations themselves, coordination calls dedicated to tracking pandemic case counts had to be repurposed to triage the response to the latest weather-related disaster. A session panelist from Mobile, Alabama, described how “[NGOs] made connections with various organizations: municipalities, educational institutions, public health. They provided weekly updates . . . we had a conference every single week.” This practice had immediate co-benefits for those navigating the weather-climate events that followed. Weekly community resource calls continued in some regions even as COVID-19-related risks diminished. The calls brought fragmented groups together to share information on COVID- 19, disasters, schools, and other community concerns. Panelists described applying “gray-sky” lessons to “blue-sky and peace time.” One panelist summarized, “We know that we all need each other and are not trying to one-up each other; less competition, more collaboration.” Beyond the exchange of vital data, the consistent communications fostered relationships that would prove vital in confronting the compounding disasters that would follow. Panelists praised the new frontiers of communication that saw tremendous growth because of the pandemic. Telemedicine, distance learning, and remote work enabled the continuation of education and job responsibilities and the provision of essential health care. Church groups were able to minister to and communicate with members using faith-based group chats. The new communication tools enabled community leaders and government agencies to relay information to the public when offices had to be closed, particularly because of COVID-19. They enabled the delivery of vital medical and mental health services remotely when visits to offices were limited. And they provided a communication bridge when local newspapers, radio, and television were disrupted or unavailable to the public. The GOM region has experience with activating special medical needs shelters with auxiliary power generators to safeguard preregistered medically high-risk patients with such ailments as COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) who are dependent on electricity to operate the medical equipment on which they rely (e.g., oxygen concentrators). Registries have been established to monitor, track, and warn these populations (see Box 5-2 for an example). 184 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

BOX 5-2 State of Texas Emergency Assistance Registry One of the most sophisticated and comprehensive medical registry systems in the nation is the State of Texas Emergency Assistance Registry. STEAR registers people who are medically fragile; those with disabilities; and those with access and functional needs that may include communication barriers or limited mobility and therefore need additional medical, transportation, and personal care support during an emergency event. Together with structural reforms, such registries can help mitigate the inequities in disaster preparation, response, mitigation, and recovery for medically high-risk patients. The ability to collaborate virtually within and across organizations inspired other creative ways to share information with beneficiaries and constituents. NGOs in coastal Alabama assembled listservs to streamline communications and distribute “living” community resource guides that were continually updated. NGO staff manually monitored and responded to social media posts to direct individuals to resources for and information on essential community services. When possible, some organizations distributed physical cards to remind residents to call 2-1-1 for essential community services, and even mobilized word-of-mouth campaigns by planting key messages with well-connected intermediaries in communities. SMS (Short Message Service) notification systems and phone trees were developed and used to accommodate people without access to smartphones or data plans that could use providers’ apps. As one Louisiana NGO leader remarked, “There was not a sense of competition. There was just a huge amount of communication because we know each other at a community level.” Related to risk communication, but not in terms of technology or language, public reliance on both traditional media (newspapers and television/radio news) has declined, and disinformation and misinformation are more pervasive and influential today than ever before (Lipka and Shearer, 2023). Public officials and community leaders observed that misinformation made their jobs more difficult and contributed to frustration and erosion among trust of those in need of assistance. While social media played a vital role in disseminating information about impending weather-climate events and response efforts, these outlets also provided a medium for the distribution of misleading and inaccurate information. The erosion of trust among public 185 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

health and disaster professionals and the communities they serve was evident with information about COVID-19, which in turn led to skepticism toward authorities in the wake of other weather-climate events. Absent the COVID-19 pandemic, this situation might not have occurred. Panelists recommended the development and implementation of processes for contending with misinformation and disinformation such as trust building and participatory planning. Disaster Recovery Service Delivery The importance of equitable delivery of services to affected communities emerged as a powerful theme in the panel discussions on lessons learned. Some panelists in each session voiced the need to incorporate equity into planning for and recovery from future disasters. There was general consensus that vulnerable communities—communities of color; low-income, medically vulnerable, and elderly populations; those experiencing homelessness; and mentally and physically challenged individuals—fared the worst during extreme events, and that response and recovery programs needed to take this into account. “We have to lift the bottom up,” summarized one panelist. Another panelist from Alabama noted that conversations about inequities are becoming more inclusive. A refrain heard more than once from panelists was: “The greedy are first in line, the needy are at the end of the line.” Some of those directly providing services were convinced that the most vulnerable are least able to position themselves to take advantage of public and civil society services after a disaster, while those with the ability to access disaster aid facilities and websites are likely to get more than their fair share. This situation demands tools to ensure that people without transportation, phone/internet service, technological literacy, or language skills are not excluded or neglected. Local NGO and CBO participants repeatedly commented that residents with the greatest needs find themselves falling further behind in the wake of a disaster. This situation was particularly evident in 2020–2021 when COVID-19 forced virtual interactions that made it more difficult for those without computer access or skills to apply for aid. As the pandemic spread and compounded with other disasters, it tended to amplify these inequities. Numerous comments from panelists affirmed the academic research on the inequitable provision of relief aid to marginalized communities. 186 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Panelists expressed the view that government bodies need to better incorporate FBOs into disaster response. They also stressed the need for governments to develop better protocols for reducing postevent scammers from preying on desperate homeowners. While these concerns exist for all disaster responses, they become more acute when compounding disasters occur, a time when increased local capacity is needed and household vulnerability is heightened. There was an abundance, even an excess, of food available in Lake Charles after Hurricanes Laura and Delta. Some panelists suggested that other resources might have been more beneficial. Local leaders recommended establishing a management center for both internal and external aid groups to direct incoming donations toward unmet needs and allocate resources to the most vulnerable. Generous, yet ill-suited, donations such as excessive food complicate the role of NGOs in all circumstances and can be an unnecessary demand on staff in the increasingly complicated conditions of compounding disasters. NGO panelists noted the protracted process involved in securing funding for disaster relief and recovery, and that this support is tied to specific events. They suggested that FEMA issue new clear, concise, and intuitive policies and procedures for requesting and receiving individual assistance, and that the timing for appropriations for housing assistance to state governments be updated. By the time funding arrives, said one panelist, “many people have already left.” Government officials agreed with the timing challenges, adding that it was difficult to fund contractor and debris removal services in sequential disasters while awaiting FEMA reimbursements from a prior disaster. Housing Needs Housing is one of the most critical needs of those displaced by disruptive events (see Chapter 4). Since construction workers and supplies may not be able to meet the demand for adequate shelters in a timely way, families may be unable to complete repairs before temporary housing expires. As a Louisiana state official explained, “There’s just so much of a gap between where the response assistance ends and where recoveries begin.” State and federal programs provide temporary shelter, but local officials recommended adding transitional, longer-term sheltering options and advanced planning of staged temporary housing. Additionally, given the 187 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

lack of public transportation options in many rural communities and even small cities, they suggested that aid should extend to those who have lost not just houses but also cars, so they are able to maintain their jobs. Local officials noted further that they intended to eliminate future virtual home and building inspections to ensure that their residents will receive accurate damage assessments and avoid the complications, costs, and delays caused by inadequate and inaccurate remote inspections conducted during 2020–2021. Efforts to design and build sustainable, storm-resistant, and prefabricated housing were recommended after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Few examples of such housing were built, however (Alter, 2021). Integrating community guidance and priorities can facilitate better outcomes for temporary and replacement housing. Durable but quickly erected homes could both provide temporary poststorm shelter, serve as the core for long-term dwellings, and begin to address affordable housing and social isolation challenges (Alter, 2021; Moser Design Group, n.d.). This is one approach that could reduce the need for trailers as temporary and disposable shelters. A design competition might yield creative ideas for cost-effective homes that would provide quick and safe shelters while helping to retain local residents and the essential labor pool in the longer term. LESSONS RECOGNIZED AND LEARNED: NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS The information-gathering sessions drew on the expertise of officials and community leaders with different levels of authority, responsibility, and funding. The discussions during the sessions therefore highlighted not only the shared lessons learned summarized above but also distinct sector perspectives, as discussed below. All sessions exposed a keen awareness of the compounding impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on staffing and emergency response. NGOs and CBOs Panelists representing NGOs and CBOs tended to be most attentive to vulnerable communities. Poverty and job interruptions were identified as critical impediments to recovery 188 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

among those served by NGOs. NGO representatives emphasized the critical importance of community participation in planning and preparation for hazard events. Panelists cited communication through social networks—both in person and via social media—as a critical tool at the local level. Participants observed that funding, especially for housing, was slow to arrive and therefore delayed recovery. Overall, these organizations found strength in their communities and advocated for greater coordination with government bodies. Generally, panelists recognized the need to ensure that the most impoverished and least well-equipped to recover from compounding disasters are prioritized in mitigation investments. Government Officials Government officials tended to have a broader view than that of NGO panelists and often spoke about the regional scope of disasters. A common theme revolved around improvements needed in FEMA’s approach to valuing damages and its provision of temporary housing after a disaster. Government officials from Texas and Louisiana pointed out the need to improve supply chains to ensure efficient delivery of essential supplies during and following a disaster, which would demand greater regional and national coordination. Many panelists mentioned examples of improvements in interagency communication as lessons learned and implemented, but these panelists also recommended further refinements in communication among all levels of government, including better and more efficient localized data to prioritize recovery spending. Local and county/parish officials were particularly cognizant of impacts on local economies and recoveries due to the long-term departures of residents. They also expressed concern about the erosion of trust toward government officials and the need to address misinformation. Some officials observed that recognition of social and economic inequities had improved but that uneven delivery of aid and assistance in the wake of disasters had nonetheless continued. They cited the need to establish recovery goals and plans targeting resilient and equitable outcomes. However, representatives of more sparsely populated jurisdictions pointed to inadequate numbers of emergency management staff in the wake of compounding disasters, with ramifications for the effective implementation of preparation and recovery plans and achievement of goals. Box 5-3 gives examples of GOM states’ after-action reports and the role they play following a disaster. 189 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

BOX 5-3 After-Action Reports: Addressing Unmet Needs and Documenting Lessons Learned After-action reports are prepared by state and local agencies in the wake of a disruptive event. After-action reports include unmet needs assessments and detail how disaster recovery funds will be allocated to address remaining long-term recovery unmet needs. Additionally, the reports document the actions taken during the response and coordination of efforts among local, state, federal, and nongovernmental partners following a disruptive event and the results of those actions. They aim to identify shortcomings, unmet needs, and successes in the actions taken by governmental and community-based organizations to overcome the impacts of disruptive events, compare desired and actual outcomes, and document specific improvements needed for future incident responses. Serving as formal documentation of lessons learned, they typically report on lessons from a singular event rather than multiple, sequential events and are a common feature of disaster response and recovery actions and have been for decades. Louisiana Following Hurricanes Laura and Delta in 2020 and Hurricane Ida in 2021, the state of Louisiana prepared a Proposed Master Action Plan (State of Louisiana, 2022) that details how funds will be allocated to address unmet needs. Priorities identified included housing and public infrastructure. Unmet needs related to housing included rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged housing, construction/rehabilitation of affordable housing, temporary rental assistance, second mortgages for gap financing, and assistance with flood insurance payment. The state secured a hazard mitigation grant to address these needs. Among the infrastructure needs identified, the after-action report notes that disaster plans rely heavily on surface transportation networks that can often be inundated by flooding. Submerged roads can greatly impede rescue efforts and delivery of disaster services to those in need. In response to this identified unmet need and lessons learned following the 2016 and 2018 floods in Louisiana, the state designed the Watershed Initiative (State of Louisiana, 2023). This is not a report, but a strategic approach to coordinate funding, data, and resources among five state agencies to reduce flood risk. This initiative represents a framework for planning and executing preparedness and mitigation procedures to address unmet needs and reduce flood risk. Funds from the state’s Community Development Block Grant Mitigation funds are being targeted to address some of the identified infrastructure needs. Texas 190 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Following Winter Storm Uri in 2021, the city of Houston prepared a recovery action plan (City of Houston, 2022), which included an assessment of unmet needs. As with Louisiana’s unmet need priorities, officials identified housing and public infrastructure, but they also noted the critical role of community lifelines. The report specifically addressed the compounding impacts from previous disasters and acknowledged that they contributed to unmet needs. It noted that climate change may facilitate a storm comparable to Uri that might exceed the capacity of homes to protect people from such extreme temperatures. Houston’s housing stock was vulnerable to the freeze because it had yet to be repaired after the floods in 2015 and 2016, Hurricane Harvey (in 2017), and Tropical Storm Imelda (in 2019), since many homes were un- or underinsured. The report noted further that Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funds tend to go to homeowners or families living in single- family homes, and that this likely leads to undercounting and undervaluing the damage from disasters, rendering data insufficient for analyzing the true impacts of these events. The storm followed previous patterns where outstanding needs not covered by insurance were in majority-Black and majority- Hispanic zip codes. There were notable concentrations of housing that suffered “compounding damages,” (City of Houston, 2022, pp. 20–21) with impacts from multiple hazard events in areas with high social vulnerability. Some panelists cited improved insurance coverage as one way to accelerate recovery. Loss of power during Winter Storm Uri disrupted normal planning for and response to an extreme weather event. Critical infrastructure, particularly the water system, experienced disruptions and recovery challenges due to power loss. As a reflection of the after-action report, the city of Houston submitted requests for hazard mitigation grants for emergency generators for both its water delivery system and its emergency services (police and fire). Additional generators are also needed for drinking water and wastewater operations, traffic and stormwater controls, and emergency services. Houston’s mitigation plan focuses primarily on flood and wind risk and not winter storms. Uri proved that a winter storm can have dramatic impacts that require improvements in community lifelines such as transportation, essential services, health care, communications, and energy. Alabama In the wake of Hurricanes Sally and Zeta in 2020, the state of Alabama prepared an action plan that identified unmet needs (Alabama Department of Economic and Community Affairs, 2022). The report also noted the compounding impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Its aim was to mitigate the impacts of future disasters in accordance with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development Block Grants Mitigation Program. Outstanding needs include 191 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

housing and public infrastructure. Hurricane Sally exacerbated existing housing shortages in Mobile and Baldwin Counties, especially for low-income households. Housing shortages after the storm were most acute in the rental market and affordable housing. In Mobile County, the majority of applicants for FEMA assistance were renters and did not have flood insurance, making unmet needs due to flood damage especially pronounced there. The Home Recovery Alabama Program prioritized these types of properties. After the 2020 storms caused damage to housing stock, roads, bridges, wastewater and public water facilities, public buildings, recreational facilities, and public utilities, the state’s report identified numerous unmet mitigation needs for public buildings and housing. These include retrofitting of public buildings to withstand severe storms (tropical cyclones); improvements in stormwater management; and security, elevation, and relocation options for coastal housing in advance of sea level rise and storm surge. The information-gathering sessions highlighted the need to build equity and climate change into the fabric of the disaster planning and response enterprise, particularly regarding disaster mitigation. Panelists stressed that addressing equity must begin with deliberate, comprehensive participatory planning that elevates community concerns before a disaster and not in its wake and emphasized that this type of planning must include frontline communities. Participatory planning processes open up space to discuss goals, values, adaptation and mitigation strategies, local observations, resources, and priorities. They are facilitated by providing convenient and/or multiple meeting times; offering language translation; and supplying transportation, food, and childcare (USGCRP, 2023). LESSONS IMPLEMENTED Despite shortcomings in implementation of lessons learned, communities in the GOM region have seen examples of improvement. Donahue and Tuohy (2006) assert that it is essential to identify successes and strive to repeat them in tandem with making improvements. If this was true in the days following Hurricane Katrina, it is even more pertinent as the GOM region faces the effects of compounding disasters. 192 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Innovations: Lessons Learned and Implemented Spontaneously As described in this report, spontaneous improvisations are a common ingredient of disaster response. It is folly, however, to rely on disaster to be the mother of invention. Documentation and effective distribution of lessons learned after disasters and the subsequent incorporation of these lessons into enduring protocols and practices is an essential building block of adaptive capacity. Moreover, the committee contends that even communities that consider themselves to be “resilient” must not be complacent or expect to endure future events without systematic investment in adaptive capacity at the community level. Session panelists made note of some lessons learned and implemented spontaneously in the face of the unprecedented nature of disruptive events in 2020–2021. In Houston, officials realized that providing residents with water shutoff tools and basic instructions helped them shut off water during Winter Storm Uri, thereby preventing ruptured pipes and preserving water pressure citywide—a spontaneous lesson implemented in the midst of crisis. Some NGOs in Texas developed a system that allowed residents to apply for and quickly receive gift cards so they could purchase necessary supplies in the wake of a disaster and before they were able to receive aid from FEMA. Although the gift card distribution system was overwhelmed when first implemented after Hurricane Harvey in 2017, it was revamped and operated successfully for Winter Storm Uri. In another example, the provision of non-congregate shelter in areas hit by tropical cyclones was an adaptation of necessity put into motion as storms approached coastal areas in the midst of COVID-19 social distancing restrictions. Prearranged agreements with hotels that were eager for business because of the decline in travel during the pandemic accelerated sheltering of evacuees. Using buses as warming shelters was a novel tool for Harris County during Winter Storm Uri. While municipal buses have been used as temporary shelters and cooling centers in the GOM region, their application for warming needy residents and charging cell phones was a lesson learned put into action during Uri. One panelist, echoed by others, described how, in combination with social distancing recommendations and the prompt return of residents to Cameron and Calcasieu Parishes, where nearly all the buildings were damaged by Hurricane Laura, parking lots served as important infrastructure and community gathering locations. Residents constructed a makeshift gas station 193 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

in the parking lot of a Dollar General store, where food, ice, and gas were available for anyone who needed them. The parking lot became the “territory of hurricane response,” one panelist summed up, where residents could grill, barbecue, and share what would quickly spoil in their freezers because of power losses. One panelist recalled that crawfish farmers trucked in more than 100,000 pounds of ice, where volunteers passed out multiple “18-wheeler[s] [of ice] in 2 days with a shovel and a 5-gallon bucket.” A creative Boy Scout project involved placing solar power charging stations made from plywood boxes on street corners. People left their phones at stations to be charged without fear of theft. Public septic services were set up around communities that otherwise lacked water or wastewater facilities. Lessons Learned and Implemented from Events Prior to 2020–2021 Lessons learned from prior events that proved useful included the importance of advance staging of emergency equipment and supplies. “Go-bags”—hurricane emergency kits packed with essentials including rechargeable battery packs and plastic bags in which to seal critical documents—were pre-positioned for swift distribution in the event of an emergency evacuation. Pre-positioning of other essential items throughout a city or county/parish enabled speedy distribution even when debris or iced roadways impeded movement of supplies. Baldwin County, Alabama, established advance contracts with debris removal contractors and maintenance agreements with the state for debris staging areas following the accumulation of an “unreal amount” of debris after Hurricane Sally. Plans to make advance arrangements for house inspections in Southwest Louisiana are a priority there. Advance arrangements to secure engineers with expertise in preservation of historic structures also have been put in place so these structures can be more swiftly repaired after a disaster. Parish officials mentioned that they now establish predisaster contracts for debris removal and home repair with contractors who are familiar with the architectural style of historic buildings to expedite the restoration process. Officials in Southwest Louisiana implemented a number of lessons learned from Hurricane Rita that paid dividends during Hurricane Laura. For example, local officials permitted residents to return home almost immediately after Hurricane Laura so they could assess damage and begin repairs. As a parish official said half-jokingly, “I think we would’ve 194 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

had a mini revolt from people if you told them not to come back. Plus, you can’t stop them, they know the roads.” This course of action was intended to address the challenges faced by residents who were not allowed to return for lengthy periods after Hurricane Rita in 2005. Its implementation was preceded by an early evacuation to ensure that residents had time to depart the region safely (evacuation timing has been enhanced by improved hurricane forecasting), although residents were reluctant to evacuate based on their experience in Rita, which put lives at risk. However, there was a trade-off arising from the rapid return of residents. With rapid return, road clearance crews, utility repair teams, and other emergency response activities were hampered by the higher volume of traffic due to returning residents. In addition, this traffic placed greater demands on limited fuel supplies. Vehicles that ran out of gas or had flat tires due to road debris further hampered efficient response activities. But a benefit of the policy change was clear when residents readily evacuated for Hurricane Delta with the knowledge that they would be allowed to return early. Officials modified building codes following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Panelists reported that many of the newly constructed buildings survived Hurricane Laura. The call for resilience to future climate-related disasters echoes national agendas and also emphasizes the importance of proactive risk mitigation. 3 One panelist noted that “We’re really good at response, we’re really good at recovery... but we do need to start talking about mitigation first and figuring out how to fund the mitigation first. We don’t all start at the same place in a crisis. If we don‘t figure out how to get the baseline up... then we will not be able to be resilient as a community.” This is a significant development in a region where there is considerable skepticism toward climate change among elected officials and decision-makers. Cameron Parish buried its broadband cables after Hurricane Rita and reported that this service survived Hurricanes Laura and Delta. The 2-1-1 program, an emergency call center hotline established after Hurricane Rita to connect residents with active aid organizations that could assist with specific needs, proved effective following the 2020 storms. The program is based in Monroe, Louisiana, which is less susceptible than coastal Louisiana to hurricanes. Following Rita, residents learned how to be better prepared for the recovery process. 3 The term mitigation is used in the disaster risk field to describe improvements to structures and systems to improve their resistance to hazards. The term adaptation is used for such actions when discussing climate change, as the term mitigation is reserved in this field for actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 195 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Their disaster kits with water, canned goods, crank radios, and other essential supplies now included tire plug kits to contend with the widespread debris on the roads. One participant explained, “Nobody wants to spend money to be prepared. Then, after Rita, people started to understand the need to save money and be prepared for hurricane seasons, just like you saved for vacation.” More people now own backup generators, for example. In Louisiana, Cameron Parish (population 6,000) found that it was essential to have a full-time paid staff person with duties for managing emergency operations. Fire and police personnel, who commonly double as emergency managers in smaller communities, have other responsibilities and require a higher level of expertise needed to manage disaster responses. Drawing on neighborhood resources and programs also aided residents who were unable to evacuate. Neighborhood hub houses in Houston assemble essential provisions before events and provide water, both nonperishable and hot food, and other critical supplies to residents in certain neighborhoods. This concept is similar to the neighborhood “lighthouses” an NGO network called Together New Orleans is setting up in the wake of Hurricane Ida (Lakhani, 2023). The community lighthouse network consists of solar-powered disaster response hubs pre- positioned with emergency supplies, air conditioning, and battery power for use in the wake of power outages caused by disasters large and small; solar and battery power are also integrated into churches and schools for that same purpose (NPR, 2023). Lessons Learned over Time: Building Codes Table 5-1 chronicles the revisions to building code adoption and enforcement as captured by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) Rating the States reports from 2012 to 2024. The 2017–2018 scores, shaded in yellow, best encapsulate the code environment that was governing new construction at the start of the period covered by the study. However, these code environments can take years to affect practices or address the vulnerability of the building inventory, given the limited number of new buildings constructed each year. The new 2024 report (IBHS, 2024) may provide evidence of lessons implemented following the study period. For example, Louisiana is the highest-performing state in building code adoption and enforcement among the GOM states, and second only to Florida in the region, increased its 196 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

overall score 10 percent between 2018 and 2024 by adopting the latest International Residential Code (2018) and mandating training of officials. Rating the States now recognizes Mississippi as the most improved state, progressing from its initial rating of 4 (lowest ever) to 44 in the most recent evaluation cycle. The state now requires statewide licensing of contractors, though it remains deficient in other areas, particularly due to the ability of jurisdictions to opt out of the building code adopted in 2014. Texas and Alabama similarly remain among the lowest-performing states because of the lack of statewide code adoption and enforcement, even slightly backsliding after the study period. Alabama’s attempt to pass a statewide building code in 2023 failed in the state legislature, despite the recent experience with Hurricane Sally. Despite the deficiencies at the state level, 16 of the 24 permitting jurisdictions within Mobile and Baldwin Counties enforce the Coastal Construction Code Supplement, created after Hurricanes Ivan (in 2004) and Katrina (in 2005), and based on the IBHS FORTIFIED Home standard. Alabama is now home to the most successful voluntary windstorm mitigation program in the United States. See Box 5-4 for successful efforts to reduce housing vulnerabilities in the GOM states. TABLE 5-1 Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety Rating the States Scores for Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, 2012–2024 Alabama 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 Code adoption 0 8 9 8 7 Enforcement officials training 0 0 0 0 0 Contractor licensing 18 18 18 22 22 Total 18 26 27 30 29 Florida 2011 2014 2017 2020 2024 Code adoption 48 48 49 49 49 Enforcement officials training 22 21 21 21 21 197 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

Contractor licensing 25 25 25 25 25 Total 95 94 95 95 95 Louisiana 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 Code adoption 48 46 47 46 49 Enforcement officials training 16 14 14 14 20 Contractor licensing 10 22 22 22 22 Total 74 82 83 82 91 Mississippi 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 Code adoption 0 24 23 24 24 Enforcement officials training 0 0 0 0 0 Contractor licensing 4 4 5 5 20 Total 4 28 28 29 44 Texas 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 Code adoption 18 22 19 19 18 Enforcement officials training 0 0 0 0 0 Contractor licensing 0 14 15 15 15 Total 18 36 34 34 33 NOTE: IBHS’s Rating the States scoring system evaluates 47 components of building code adoption, enforcement, licensing, and education to assess the effectiveness of a state’s code program. States are assigned a composite score on a 0 to 100 scale, where 100 represents the highest possible levels of code adoption and 198 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

enforcement. The yellow-shaded column is the year treated as the reference frame preceding the study period; the green-shaded column is the year treated as the frame for potential lessons implemented following the study period. SOURCE: Component scores provided by IBHS derived from the five IBHS reports from 2012 to 2024. BOX 5-4 Strengthening Construction Standards Despite their deficiencies in adopting and enforcing building codes statewide, some Gulf of Mexico states have been successful in reducing housing vulnerabilities through other mechanisms. Coastal communities in Alabama have worked to raise construction standards at the county level. For example, 16 of the 24 permitting jurisdictions within Mobile and Baldwin Counties enforce the Coastal Construction Code Supplement created after Hurricanes Ivan (in 2004) and Katrina (in 2005), based on the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety, or IBHS, FORTIFIED Home standard (SHA, 2021). This, along with the Strengthen Alabama Homes grant program, has led to a growth in homes with FORTIFIED designations along the Alabama coast, approximately 95 percent of which incurred little to no damage (IBHS, 2021) from Hurricane Sally. Meanwhile, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association enforces code and inspection requirements for those seeking windstorm and hail insurance through the state’s wind pool (IBHS, 2021). LESSONS LOST Several examples of lessons lost or at least misplaced also emerged in the information- gathering discussions. GOM residents pride themselves on their awareness of hurricane risks and their capacity to cope with these storms. Nonetheless, the impact of a “generational” storm such as Hurricane Rita in 2005 led some residents of the region to assume there would not be another storm of that magnitude in their lifetime (before Hurricane Rita, the generational storm was Hurricane Audrey in 1957). As a public official in Cameron Parish stated, “We always prepared for hurricane season, but I just think there was this thought that we’re not going to see another Rita in our lifetimes. . . . And we were wrong.” Consequently, many let their guard down in advance of Hurricanes Laura and Ida. 199 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

In addition, overall planning and preparations did not adequately address exceptional events such as Winter Storm Uri, despite a severe Texas freeze in 2011 that caused power outages. Panelists mentioned that one exception in Texas occurred in El Paso, a city not in the GOM region, but on the border of New Mexico and Mexico, where the electric company opted to winterize its equipment following 2011’s freeze. Residents there did not experience the extensive or damaging power outages (Busby et al., 2021) suffered by many other Texas residents. 4 Panelists described another lesson lost when rebuilding and issuing of permits for new construction in at-risk areas continued following floods. A Texas state official spoke at length about how “we rebuild the same buildings in the same places. Prices are going to rise because of supplies, but also because of disasters and stronger, wider storms. We need to tie resilience to recovery. We need to build back more resilient,” he emphasized. “I am tired of the phrase, ‘We will rebuild.’” After a flood, it was suggested, officials should determine how elevated houses and the surrounding developments fared, for example, and then adjust as needed. Another official on this panel replied that “it’s easy to provide federal money, but it’s the idea of how to build, rebuild, and coordinate that is hard.” This pattern reflects the loss of flood memory and lessons lost. See Box 5-5 for information on hazard mitigation. BOX 5-5 Investing to Withstand Extremes The merit of hazard mitigation is widely known, yet it is often not prioritized. In Louisiana, for example, on average, residents suffer nearly $260 in direct disaster losses for every $1 invested in mitigation, while the federal government spends $10 on Louisiana’s recovery for every $1 invested in mitigation (Gall and Friedland, 2020). These mitigation investments are wholly inadequate to counter the state’s damage losses. The Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council (2019) evaluated a broad suite of 4 The Texas State Comptroller (2021) reports several steps taken to address the power delivery crisis that resulted from Winter Storm Uri: The legislature has taken action to (1) revamp the Electric Reliability Council of Texas and require all members to be Texas residents; (2) require the creation of a statewide alert system to notify residents when the power supply is in jeopardy; (3) direct the Texas Energy Reliability Council to ensure that energy industries address human needs and critical infrastructure; (4) prepare a “supply chain map” to help better respond to shortages of critical supplies; (5) require winterization of energy facilities; and (6) modify the electric market structure so that customer costs are not inflated during a crisis. 200 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

mitigation measures and determined that federal mitigation grants save $6 for every $1 spent, while adopting minimum code requirements saves $11 for every $1 spent. With the many disasters that befall the Gulf of Mexico region, lessons can be learned and implemented. Building to withstand knowable extreme events allows families to evacuate but return back to a sound, durable home following the event. Whether through modern building codes that drive new construction practices or through grant dollars infused into low-/middle-income housing development and infrastructure, a better built environment can be the new norm. While federal agencies can nudge building codes through grant guidance, only states and local communities can adopt and enforce them. The small increase in construction costs to meet modern building codes through structures capable of withstanding the impact of extreme events pales in comparison with the direct— and indirect—costs of rebuilding. The commitment to risk mitigation wanes as more time passes after a disaster. Louisiana panelists noted the pattern of avoiding spending to prepare. Disaster relief funds available from the federal government also contribute to deferring mitigation investments because of agency budget demands for relief programs. Many of the lessons lost from prior events have been set aside or neglected. In some cases, lessons are just rediscovered. The repeated recognition of lessons learned underscores the tendency among hazard managers and society in general to allow for an erosion of readiness and a loss of the sense of urgency, and highlights the importance of taking steps to perpetuate and institutionalize lessons learned. Box 5-6 offers an example of a failure to perpetuate lessons learned in Louisiana. BOX 5-6 Example of a Failure to Implement Lessons Learned An after-action report following Hurricane Isaac (in 2012) identified one of the failures in a parish near New Orleans as the decision of emergency teams not to consult the procedural manual (Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 2012), which had been compiled in the wake of Katrina (in 2005) to contend with future hurricanes. This is an example of the failure to perpetuate lessons learned, which regular drills and training exercises could have prevented by reminding emergency professionals of these protocols. Moreover, personnel turnover and 201 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

unsynchronized revisions to disaster plans can allow for the erosion of institutional knowledge. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS Insufficient time has passed since the compounding disasters of 2020–2021 and the committee’s subsequent information-gathering process to fully assess the incorporation of lessons learned from those disasters into policies and procedures. Through its review of after- action reports from disasters that occurred prior to the time frame of the Statement of Task and its qualitative information-gathering process, it is clear that lessons learned remain in various states of adoption and implementation. While it is common to identify and document lessons learned through a disaster recovery process, it is also common to identify the same lessons repeatedly over time without improving planning, response, and recovery procedures to improve disaster outcomes. The evidence presented to the committee makes clear that robust adaptive capacity is required for communities, governments, and systems to first identify lessons learned and to then carry them forward toward implementation. A key finding by the committee is that the COVID- 19 pandemic spurred rapid innovation and improved capacity in some areas, including the increased ability for data-informed decision-making, streamlined operations, enhanced coordination and communication within and across organizations, and the ability to repurpose federal financial assistance to meet local needs. All of these innovations resulted in immediate benefits among community members and strengthened the relationships necessary for improved response to future disruptive events and disasters. Notably, the pre-positioning of flexible pandemic relief funds provided some municipalities with unexpected financial resources to meet acute needs of community members, such as emergency rental and utility assistance, and public health services. However, these funds are not indefinite, and many communities will scale back or discontinue this surge of activity as federal authorizations expire and financial resources are depleted. The committee’s information-gathering sessions also underscored the need to intentionally incorporate equity and climate change into the fabric of disaster management, particularly mitigation efforts that seek to reduce both community exposure and long-standing 202 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS 

vulnerabilities, including residential building codes, construction standards, and affordable housing. 203 PREPUBLICATION | UNCORRECTED PROOFS