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Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview (2022)

Chapter: Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings

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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter 6 - Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26503.
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97   Introduction and Methodology This chapter summarizes the approach, responses, and findings of the case study meetings undertaken with rail transit and commuter rail agencies. The objective of the case studies was to capture a more in-depth understanding of how agencies are approaching and mitigating trespassing and suicides on their networks. This chapter presents the interviews conducted and follow-up responses received through primary and secondary case studies. The information presented in this chapter reflects the research team’s interpretation of the interviewee statements and does not necessarily reflect actual agency policies, procedures, or guidelines. Case Study Methodology Originally, the primary case studies were planned for four in-person case studies with U.S. agencies and one virtual case study with a non-North American agency. COVID-19 travel, social distancing, and agency policies restricted the ability for in-person meetings. All case studies were performed virtually. With the modified approach to reducing project expenses, the case studies were expanded to include five U.S. agencies and two non-North American agencies. The following sections describe the methodology for selecting case study locations as well as the case study format and protocols. Recommended Case Study Locations Considering the attributes of each rail transit and commuter rail system and panel recom- mendations, the research team conducted the primary case studies with the following agencies: • U.S. Agencies – MTA, Baltimore, Maryland – Metropolitan Transportation Authority MNCR, New York, New York – UTA, Salt Lake City, Utah – DART, Dallas, Texas – LACMTA, Los Angeles, California • Non-North American Agencies – ProRail, the Netherlands – Transport for London’s London Underground, London, United Kingdom Case Study Questions and Protocol The following sections describe the development of possible case study questions as well as the case study protocol. Case Study Questions. As part of the Task 1 literature review summary, the research team developed a list of 15 countermeasures categorized into three main categories: engineering, C H A P T E R 6 Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings

98 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way education, and enforcement (see Table  40). This list remained the running list of counter- measures throughout the project. The possible questions provided to each agency included questions related to these 15 countermeasures but also included questions that might identify additional countermeasures. The case study summaries are organized by these strategies. Case Study Protocol. Figure 43 summarizes the basic case study protocol. All U.S. case studies involved at least two meetings per agency. The two non-North American case study meetings involved a single meeting per agency with the point of contact. The last step of the primary case studies was to submit follow-up questions and requests to assist in filling in gaps of understanding. In addition to the primary case study discussions, the research team conducted secondary case studies with additional agencies to capture supplementary information on trespassing miti- gation strategies. Secondary case studies were conducted with LIRR, Amtrak, SEPTA, and the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) Rail Division. Last, the research team conducted observations of the METRORail system in Houston, Texas, which is reported as part of the secondary case study discussions. COVID-19 Impact on Case Study COVID-19 impacted the team’s ability to conduct face-to-face case studies. This resulted in the team being able to conduct additional case studies with the unused travel funds. One limita- tion of not being able to travel was the representative photographs of utilized countermeasures that the research team could not obtain. The research team contacted agencies and identified other sources of imagery for the project. Engineering • Fencing and channelization • Landscaping • Anti-trespass guard panels • PSDs • Video analytics • Camera systems and track surveillance • Electronic detection and sensors • Audible warning • Lighting Education • Signage • Community-based collaboration • Public and industry events and campaigns • Employee intervention training • Educating youth Enforcement • Law enforcement and patrol Table 40. Trespass and suicide countermeasure strategies. Schedule introductory meeting with point of contact Determine best approach for each agency and groups/ departments to be included with the point of contact Schedule meetings and provide attendees with project description and possible questions Conduct scheduled case study meetings Submit follow- up questions and requests Figure 43. Primary case study protocol.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 99   Primary Case Study Summaries This section contains the summaries of each case study: • Light Rail, Heavy Rail, and Commuter Rail—MTA, Baltimore, Maryland • Commuter Rail—Metropolitan Transportation Authority MNCR, New York, New York • Light Rail and Commuter Rail—UTA, Salt Lake City, Utah • Light Rail and Commuter Rail—DART, Dallas, Texas • Light Rail and Heavy Rail—LACMTA, Los Angeles, California • Non-North American Agencies – ProRail, the Netherlands – Transport for London’s London Underground, London, United Kingdom MTA, Baltimore, Maryland Agency Overview The MTA system includes light rail (Light RailLink), heavy rail (Metro SubwayLink), and commuter rail (MARC) and extends over 586 track-miles. Table 41 contains the characteristics of the system. Figure 44 and Figure 45 illustrate the MTA rail transit and commuter rail system, respectively. Case Study Format The MTA case study was completed through one overview meeting and five division-specific in-depth meetings with the MTA police department; Metro SubwayLink and MARC; commu- nications and marketing; Light RailLink; and the safety department. Those in attendance included the following: • Douglas “Chase” Aiken-Brown, assistant chief safety officer • Eric Bowser, maintenance supervisor for Metro • George Brooks (position unknown) • William Brown, police captain • Catrice Davis, superintendent for Metro • Dean Del Peschio, director of the MARC train service • Linda Edy, marketing • Royland Fraser, deputy director for Metro SubwayLink • Forrest Freeland, deputy chief safety officer Operation Type Light Rail Heavy Rail Commuter Rail Track Mileage Total guideway track-miles 60.8 33.5 492.5 • At grade with access restrictions 49.7 23.1 479.5 • At grade without access restrictions 2.7 0 0 • Elevated 8.4 0.9 8.1 • Below grade 0 9.5 4.9 Subtotal of at-grade track-miles 52.4 23.1 479.5 • Percent at-grade track-miles to total guideway track-miles 86% 69% 97% Number of Crossings Total number of grade crossings 44 1 1 Operation Characteristics Annual passenger miles Fixed guideway directional route miles 57.6 29.4 400.4 Source: Federal Transit Administration, NTD (6). 275,491,54544,778,153 36,790,501 Table 41. MTA rail transit and commuter rail system characteristics.

100 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Source: Maryland Transit Administration, Transit Maps (124). Figure 44. MTA rail transit system map.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 101   • Michael Gilhooly, manager of facilities maintenance and environmental services for Metro • Steve Gladstone, director of digital marketing and content • Dale Green-Worrell, light rail safety officer • Wesley Hackley (position unknown) • Jeff McCormack, assistant vice president for transit rail engineering • Joshua McCormack, director of light rail operations • Tim Tyran, chief safety officer • Wilson Wallace, railcar maintenance for Metro Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. MTA finds that trespassing is a challenging issue that is attributed to many different causes, including the following: • Trying to retrieve belongings on the track (e.g., cell phone) • Accidentally jumping down on the track • Intoxication • Individuals taking shortcuts • Intentional trespassing (e.g., suicide) Source: Maryland Transit Administration, Transit Maps (124). Figure 45. MTA commuter rail system map.

102 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Overall, for light rail, the case study found that trespassers do not seem to be considered in the station design process. The agency is addressing the trespassing issues using external mea- sures, such as putting up signs. During the MTA case study meetings, participants consistently identified two areas with trespassing concerns: Patapsco Station, which experiences a high level of trespassers across the tracks and requires additional enforcement activities; and the central business district in downtown Baltimore, which has mixed traffic. It is at street level with the property owned by MTA, the city, and the state. The central business district area requires com- munication and cooperation across multiple stakeholders to address trespassing. Other areas of concern are identified through reports from employees, safety risk assess- ments, and field observations by safety officers. Operators are obligated to report trespassers to the operation control center, which will contact the MTA police department as appropriate. In addition to the operation control center, employees can report to a 24-hour Safety Report- ing Hotline. Another source for identifying locations of concern is through safety committee meetings with frontline employees and light rail staff to obtain feedback on trespassing areas of concern. Next, MTA performs safety assessments if warranted based on the entire system due to liability concerns. Last, field observations can provide useful feedback. It was reported that one of the best ways to get feedback is to ride in a cab and listen to the operators. The Metro system reports that there are many ways for trespassers to get into the system. For example, people can get into the station at the end of the platform by unlocking the gate, which, although this will trigger an alarm, will still allow people to access the railroad right-of-way. Suicide Summary. Suicide was discussed as a concern that varied by each system. More suicide activities are detected on the Metro system than on the light rail system. The Metro system has station attendants trained to monitor the platform to detect unusual behavior, such as getting too close to the platform’s edge. The light rail system managers reported that they do not receive specific employee training or education program for suicide prevention. As part of their regular training, light rail operators are required to report any suspicious behavior. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the MTA case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforcement, other countermeasures, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing. Light rail has detected people walking between trains. It reported using intertrack fencing to deter this activity and keep passengers out of train operators’ blind spots. Reported benefits of intertrack fencing include the following: • It does not typically have issues with cutting since the fences are heavy metal. • It can be installed at semi-exclusive rights-of-way. Reported limitations to intertrack fencing include the following: • Some stations are not designed for intertrack fencing. • Fencing is expensive. • Careful investigation and well-documented study are required to determine locations where fencing is needed, especially due to the liability issue of placing fencing in one location but not in others. In comparison, Metro reported that fencing plays a significant role in preventing people from getting on the railroad’s right-of-way. Metro is increasing the perimeter fencing detection system that it uses to address yard trespassing issues. In addition, Metro reported using guards to patrol areas with fencing issues, including the Wabash yard area. At the portal, train operators call the

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 103   operation center to report the train is entering the portal. Smart cameras are installed at portals to detect and report trespassing to the police monitoring center. The cameras can detect differ- ences between a train and a human. MARC, in collaboration with Amtrak, added security and intertrack fencing along the Penn Line, which is part of the Northeast Corridor, to address trespassing concerns. Other areas of concern are maintaining fences that are damaged. Recently, MARC found a hole and reported it to Amtrak for repair. The case study showed that fencing, from intertrack fences to security fences, was mentioned by light rail, commuter rail, and Metro. Based on the case studies, fencing installation and main- tenance often rely on the collaboration of partner agencies. Transit agencies should partner with these other agencies to discuss intertrack fencing and develop maintenance plans to address damage to fences (e.g., cut fence). Landscaping. Light rail and commuter rail reported challenges with using landscaping to address trespassing concerns. Light rail reported that trees are not an adequate deterrent due to the potential danger of obstructing the view of train operators when they come around the curve. Landscaping could ultimately impact a pedestrian’s sightline and signal visibility. Removing or trimming trees can be a challenge due to the need to coordinate with other agencies and the city or county. MARC reported that landscaping is not an effective strategy because people tend to ignore the landscaping or go through shrubs. In addition, landscaping can result in issues for security (e.g., creating areas for people to hide), maintenance (e.g., overgrown shrubs that need to be removed from walkways), and safety (e.g., certain plants may attract insects, such as bees). The case study showed that there are significant challenges and limitations to using landscap- ing to address trespassing issues. Anti-trespass Guard Panels. There was limited discussion of anti-trespass guard panels dur- ing the MTA case study. The light rail reported that anti-trespass guard panels might not be a good fit because the major trespassing concern does not occur at grade crossings. In addition, a potential concern of using anti-trespass guard panels is a liability concern related to injuries due to falls. Video Analytics. There was limited discussion of video analytics during the case study. First, the Metro system reported the use of a thermal camera in the yard that processes in real time using a machine-learning algorithm that builds a database for better detection over time. Sec- ond, the police department reported using Aralia Software, which alerts the police through an alarm, after detecting left-behind objects and anomalies in the camera’s field of vision. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. While video analytics was not largely discussed, the MTA case study showed that camera detection and surveillance systems are being widely used. The light rail system reported that its camera detection system is one of the agency’s strong suits. Cameras are installed throughout the system, with the intention to install more through Department of Homeland Security grants. The cameras are monitored in the control center and are available to the police, who can pull video immediately. In addition, each train is equipped with a camera. The MARC commuter rail and Metro reported using CCTV systems. Law enforcement indicated that the entire Penn Line is equipped with CCTV camera systems. The safety group and police department reported using infrared perimeter cameras and drones. The infrared thermal intrusion system is located in two rail yards. A current limitation is that it is a standalone system; however, the new video monitoring system can integrate with the thermal system. Another limitation identified during a pilot study with Confluence was a large number of false positives, such as maintenance workers falsely detected as trespassers.

104 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way The police reported using drones to assist with areas of concern, surveillance, and crime scene investigations. The police also reported using Genetec, an advanced security system that pro- vides more capability with video. The case study showed that infrared perimeter cameras and drones may be more widely used in the future as technology improves and the costs of these systems come down. Electronic Detection. The Metro system reported testing the Metro Station Track Intrusion Detection and Alert System, a Protran light detection and ranging (LiDAR) system, in one of its stations. The system, shown in Figure 46, detects people that might enter the track areas from the platform. Once the person is detected, the system notifies train operators and the Metro Opera- tions Control Center (125). Advantages of the system include that it covers the entire platform and covers from 5 to 20 feet into the tunnels. Another advantage is that it can be programmed to detect false positives, such as very small objects and the train. In addition, the system has an integrated AI camera for video recording and intrusion detection. Metro reported the Protran system is effective and a low-cost countermeasure; based on this, MTA plans to expand the system to four additional station platforms through a 2020 grant for $1.08 million. The safety group reported that a challenge with LiDAR is how to get the information to the operator in time to stop the train if a trespasser is detected. The MTA case study shows support for using LiDAR as a trespassing mitigation strategy, despite the potential limitations of the technology. The light rail system reported using a Protran wayside module, as shown in Figure 47, which emits an audible warning and flashing light when a trespasser is detected. A limitation of the Protran system is that it does not deter trespassers physically. It only provides visual and audible warnings, which people tend to ignore, especially in high trespasser traffic areas. Despite the limitation, the system is affordable and easy to install. Light rail reported exploring other miti- gation strategies as a supplement to this Protran system. Source: Maryland Transit Administration (125). Figure 46. MTA Protran Metro Station Track Intrusion Detection and Alert System.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 105   Platform Screen Doors. The Metro system does not use PSDs and expects that PSDs would be expensive to install and would present a significant maintenance challenge. Lighting. Lighting was discussed throughout all meetings with the agency. The MARC system reported using lighting on the commuter line for security purposes along the right-of- way and at stations near residential areas. A limitation of lighting is that due to light pollution, the lights may not be kept on all night. MTA is investigating other options, such as implement- ing a backlight, uplight, and glare (BUG) rating. The BUG rating is a luminaire classification system that could address light pollution. Implementing the BUG rating system could help identify the amount of light that goes to a certain angle range. The Metro system reported install- ing LED lights at some stations, which they believe creates a safer environment and comforts patrons through improved visibility. However, Metro reported a challenge to increased lighting is that coordination needs to occur with police because lights may impact camera and detection ability. The light rail system reported using lights that undergo safety inspections to make sure they are not filled with debris (a potential challenge). Lights being used by all lines show they may be a promising mitigation strategy; however, potential impacts on other strategies (cameras) should be considered before implementation. Education. A variety of educational approaches were reported during the MTA case study. The marketing group leads a majority of these efforts using a variety of platforms, including social media applications, MTA’s transit application, message boards at stations, and buses and rail using both stationary and dynamic messaging. The group does not advertise through third- party applications or platforms for disseminating messages. The marketing group identifies ideal social media platforms for each line. For example, commuter rail and bus passengers tend to use Twitter more than Facebook, but that is not true for the light rail and heavy rail system users, which are more likely to use Facebook. Source: Maryland Transit Administration (125). Figure 47. Protran device installed at Patapsco light rail station.

106 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way The marketing group reported collecting public comments that are analyzed for messaging content of safety issues, based on feedback from the public. In addition, the marketing group participates in a variety of safety campaigns. During rail safety week, the agency distributed goods, such as pens and pamphlets, and considered the event successful. Of note, the group tries not to distribute messaging on paper because the publications tend to be thrown away. This year’s rail safety week event was held virtually due to the impact of COVID-19. The campaign’s safety messaging signs were installed in collaboration with Operation Lifesaver out in the field. The group reported other collaborations in the past, including with Amtrak, because Amtrak operates the MARC Penn Line service. The light rail system reported that MTA targets educa- tional approaches to specific problem locations. For example, the Patapsco Station has resident trespassing issues, which were given special attention during rail safety week by the police dis- tributing materials to let residents know there is a train along the track. Enforcement. The MTA police department is extremely vigilant and fully aware of where enforcement is needed. The crime rate is low on the MTA system. The officers actively patrol stations and ride transit, as well as attempt to embed themselves in the community through outreach efforts. The police reported actively engaging in anti-trespassing-related activities; specifically, every call for service gets answered. In addition, the police reported conducting a vulnerability risk assessment, which is performed by all officers when they find an area of vulner- ability, such as a cut in a fence. All issues are documented and reported. In addition, the captain or lieutenant uses the CPTED approach, which is a comprehensive review of risks, hiding areas, locations with poor lighting, and so forth. This approach is vital to identifying vulnerability points for trespassing. Many of the approaches used by the police are based on the broken window theory, which is a criminology theory that says that any sign of crime or a problem encourages future crime and problems. Thus, MTA police believe it is essential to show they make an effort to address problems immediately. For example, they clean graffiti as soon as it is observed. In addition to responding to crime as soon as possible, CompStat performs a detailed trend analysis of criminal behavior. The MTA police noted that a police monitoring facility technician focuses on problem areas and addresses any alarms. If a problem is identified, a Be on the Lookout (BOLO) will be issued, and images and video clips will be captured. A collaboration of educational and enforcement efforts was discussed during the case study. Specifically, the Patapsco Station, discussed as a problem location, had police conduct outreach with residents in the area. In addition, the police department reported conducting commu- nity outreach and education through the See Something, Say Something campaign, which is a national campaign throughout the United States. Last, the police department reported partner- ing with school police to educate students. Enforcement was found to be an important trespassing mitigation strategy used by MTA. Other Countermeasures. The case study identified other countermeasures being used to address trespassing, including the following: • Online Mapping System • Pedestrian Overpasses • Genetec • Safety Management System (SMS) Online Reporting System The Office of Safety reported using mapping applications like Waze or Google Maps to dis- seminate information on grade crossing locations. Staff reported challenges and said they are investigating platforms and approaches to get this information out.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 107   MTA is currently designing a pedestrian overpass to reduce trespassing along a particular trouble area. It is anticipated that the overpass could result in 75% compliance depending on the design; however, potential limitations would be additional landscaping and cooperation with CSX, which owns portions of the property on which the overpass would be constructed. The safety group reported using reporting systems to identify problem areas. A hotline is available for employees to report issues, which are all discussed to identify solutions. Another reporting system is an SMS online reporting system for customers and employees to report problem areas. Figure 48 displays an image of the SMS card that is provided to employees. Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. The MTA case study resulted in potential future mitigation strategies to address trespassing, including the following: • Use mapping applications to disseminate information on grade crossings. • Develop a real-time reporting feature on MTA’s website, like ELERT, a See Something, Say Something third-party app developer. • Develop additional customer campaigns. • Install fencing in substations. • Place high-voltage stickers on the light rail system and upgrading overhead catenary poles with internal ground wires to reduce trespassing for copper. More funding was also identified as needed for future advancements. The police reported the need for more personnel and upgrades to available training. Source: Maryland Transit Administration (125). Figure 48. MTA SMS employee card.

108 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Other Comments. As part of the case study, MTA reported on trespassing mitigation strate- gies that other agencies are using. MTA reported anti-trespass guard panels used by Toronto’s GoTransit, PSDs being used in the United Kingdom with reported success, and suicide-specific approaches being used by Toronto and WMATA. Toronto has specific suicide prevention ads throughout its metro stations, and WMATA promotes a suicide prevention hotline at the end of the platform, which MTA hopes to do in the future. Other technologies being explored include the Protran system utilized by SEPTA and MARTA and infrared technologies used by the North Carolina Department of Transportation Rail Division. Metropolitan Transportation Authority MNCR, New York, New York Agency Overview MNCR is a commuter railroad that branches out of New York, New York, covering 867 track- miles, as shown in Table 42 and Figure 49. Case Study Format The MNCR case study was completed through one overview meeting and five in-depth meet- ings that included security, law enforcement, and emergency management; operations; safety education; transportation and labor; and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). Those in attendance included the following: • Ed Cassese, deputy chief security officer • John Kesich, senior vice president for operations • John Longobardi, chief transportation officer • Deidre Mitchell, safety education program coordinator and community outreach specialist for system safety • Matthew Mitchell, general chairman of locomotive engineers • Matthew Peloso, director of emergency management and fire safety for system safety • Chuck Pisanelli, lieutenant with the MTA police • Bruce Pollack, manager with EAP • Jami Spordone, deputy director of safety analytics and initiatives for system safety • Christopher Taft, general road foreman • Maureen Taylor, safety coordinator for system safety • Justin Vonashek, senior vice president for operations Operation Type Light Rail Heavy Rail Commuter Rail Track Mileage Total guideway track-miles 867 • At grade with access restrictions 826 • At grade without access restrictions 0 • Elevated 41 • Below grade 0 Subtotal of at-grade track-miles 826 • Percent at-grade track-miles to total guideway track-miles 95% Number of Crossings Total number of grade crossings 106 Operation Characteristics Annual passenger miles 2,154,521,183 Fixed guideway directional route miles 545.7 Source: Federal Transit Administration, NTD (6). Table 42. MNCR system characteristics.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 109   Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. MNCR is an extensive open system with many high-speed terri- tories and many access points from outside the right-of-way and stations. The agency has a protocol in place if an engineer detects someone on the railroad right-of-way; the engineer is to notify the operation control center, which sends an alert to all nearby trains and dispatches the police for investigation. The alert continues until the trespasser is apprehended or the subsequent trains report that the area is clear. The agency reported reviewing significant levels of analytical data regarding trespassing hotspot locations and is currently collaborating with the Volpe Center to prevent trespasser incidents. Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro-North Railroad Map (126). Figure 49. MNCR railroad map.

110 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Reported trespasser characteristics include the following: • Individuals who want to self-harm, called willful decision • Homeless encampments • Seasonal access for recreation purposes, including summer fishing along the Hudson River and hiking from Breakneck • People using the railroad right-of-way as a pedestrian shortcut • Impaired or intoxicated individuals taking shortcuts, which is a unique problem because they may not take the same level of caution as a non-impaired individual In addition, MNCR has a right-of-way task force consisting of the security and police depart- ments that actively go out in the field to identify issues on a regular basis. Task force members identify trails and pathways that people take for trespassing, examine the infrastructure for defects or vandalism, and evaluate the right-of-way for possible safety enhancements. The task force also obtains information on issues through reported crew sightings and data obtained from camera views at different locations. In addition to the task force, local fire departments also perform periodic right-of-way reviews that can identify issues. The police department operates an internal dashboard that keeps track of indicators, such as the duration of work tickets being open, the number of work tickets closed, the total linear length of fencing, and the number of trespassers. Suicide Summary. MNCR collaborates with other entities to address suicide, including a partnership with the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, the Crisis Text Line, and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the MNCR case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforcement, other countermeasures, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. The use of fencing was widely reported during the case study meetings with MNCR. The agency has installed miles of fencing over the last 5 years, with a focus on replacing dilapidated fences and adding fences in areas where trespassing is a known issue. MNCR attempts to install as much fencing as possible but cannot fence the entire property because it could trap people in the right-of-way. In addition, the agency has to determine when to install high-security fencing, which is very expensive and needed in security-sensitive areas. MNCR reported that fencing is an effective measure for known trespassing problem areas. MNCR installed 600 feet of fencing in one location where it had trespassing issues, and the num- ber of trespassing events reduced considerably after the installation. Despite the known benefits, a potential challenge could be a fence inadvertently diverting a trespasser to cross from one location to another undesirable location. Another issue to consider is making sure that fencing does not disrupt wildlife. MNCR works with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation to provide wildlife access. Anti-trespass Guard Panels. MNCR reported it investigated anti-trespass guard panels for Breakneck Station, where it observes many hikers trespassing along the right-of-way. The area also has lots of people from the city who are not familiar with trains. Anti-trespass guard panels could deter people from getting onto the right-of-way. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. Cameras are widely used throughout the system and are considered a useful tool for detecting trespassers (MNCR has over 1,400 cameras in the system). As of the case study, 37% of stations have camera coverage, and there is a program to install cameras at all stations.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 111   Electronic Detection. The agency has a tripwire system at emergency exits at some of its terminal locations to detect suspicious movements. A limitation to the tripwire is that this tech- nology cannot be used at busy stations because it sounds alarms continuously. Education. Education was also widely reported during the case study, with the following three educational programs mentioned: • The TRACKS Program. The program is done through a partnership with Operation Life- saver and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority police department and is a free pro- gram that is offered to the community. The program delivers rail safety presentations to community groups, including schools, retailers, and whoever requests it. The covered topic area is extensive, such as grade crossings, pedestrians, bridges, emergency preparedness, and suicide prevention. The program also posts customized suicide prevention materials at station platforms (see Figure 50). • A Suicide Awareness QPR Training. The training is offered to all employees and is targeted more toward customer service department employees or employees who physically face pas- sengers in stations. The QPR training was initially provided to customer service department employees but is now being offered to all employees. MNCR considers the QPR program to be a good platform for informing people who need help that there is help. The agency offers two sessions per month; however, the presentations are provided virtually at this point due to COVID-19. • The See Something, Say Something Program. The program instructs workers along the tracks to report any suspicious activity to the control center. Workers include roadway workers, supervisors, and customer service employees. Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro-North Railroad (127). Figure 50. Example TRACKS suicide prevention material.

112 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Other educational approaches reported during the case study included signs/messages, safety ambassadors, and community outreach. The agency implemented electrical billboard messag- ing regarding suicide prevention and mental health awareness, especially at grade crossings and station platforms. Law enforcement reported installing No Trespassing signs every 100 to 200 feet along the right-of-way depending on accessibility. Signs are written in both English and Spanish with pictograms (see Figure 51 for an English message and pictogram). MNCR reported using safety ambassadors in stations. The ambassadors directly interact with the passengers and provide safety, train, and direction-related information. The agency reported significant community outreach. First, the agency has many contacts with schools in New York and Connecticut that receive periodic emails and events, such as poster contests for annual rail safety week. Promotional giveaways like coloring books, crayons, and customized materials are prepared for those events. It is challenging due to COVID-19 to interact with people on a face-to-face basis. Therefore, MNCR is seeking ways to provide presentations virtually and recruit more people to enhance the program. In addition, MNCR has its own social media group in which safety messages, posters, and weekly safety tweets are disseminated. Safety messages range from rail-specific items to overall safety-related materials. Last, large community outreach efforts occur during rail safety week, which includes multiple events. This year, rail safety week included videos due to COVID-19. MNCR held a safety poster contest for pre-kindergarten to 12th-grade students and selected one winner per grade-level category. Winners were recognized with banners and goodies. The customer safety day at the Grand Central Terminal was an interactive event including a safety wheel with prizes, and Metro Man handed out masks. Metro Man is the highly visible safety ambassador used in safety videos who hands out promotional material at special safety events. MNCR reported having metrics to identify locations for outreach. The metrics would con- sider locations where people are struck by trains and why they cross the tracks. Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro-North Railroad (127). Figure 51. Example No Trespassing sign in English with a pictogram.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 113   Enforcement. Law enforcement reported that it is notified by the rail traffic control center of suspicious trespassing activity. The limitation to this approach is the control center may wait until a second train reported a trespasser, indicating an elevated risk situation, before reporting and dispatching the police. The police reported that during the week before the case study, they received 18 calls and made contact with four of those people. Others were gone on arrival, which indicates that trespassing events happen quickly before the police get there. As needed, the police coordinate with other local police departments and local municipalities. The police reported using the CompStat tracing system, but the reports generated are not very detailed and are difficult to search. In response, the agency is working on developing an agency- wide dashboard for performance indicators. Law enforcement reported that the two main causes of trespassing are graffiti and copper theft. Regarding graffiti, the police respond and have it cleaned as soon as possible. The police also noted that the prevalence of graffiti is not necessarily indicative of high trespassing events. Copper theft occurs in the Bronx area, where there is limited camera coverage. Other Countermeasures. The case study identified other countermeasures being used to address trespassing. MNCR uses a retrieval tool that allows station attendants to retrieve items dropped from the platform onto the track. This reduces the need to de-energize the third rail to have an attendant climb down to retrieve the item and prevents people from trespassing to obtain personal items. The agency also believes it is important to tell its employees what to expect—both emo- tionally and physically—after a trespassing incident. For example, people may get dehydrated because of the adrenaline rush, so they need to know that drinking lots of water is crucial. In addition, the agency believes that it is vital to thank and recognize employees for doing their job during difficult circumstances. MNCR offers an EAP that assists employees directly involved in a trespassing incident. Under FRA’s requirement, “directly involved employees” refers to crew members of the train. The EAP provides three days off following an incident, which can be extended by an outside healthcare provider. The protocol is followed by the Code of Federal Regulations Critical Incident Stress Plans. In addition, the EAP trains people in the field to control trespassing-related situations and directly informs individuals involved in an incident of available EAP services. In addition to the EAP, train crews also have access to a chaplain service that provides the opportunity to talk and receive comfort. Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. In addition to continuing many of the reported mitigation strategies, MNCR reported it is interested in having better security systems within the agency, such as laser or other intrusion detection systems, especially at tunnels. Current plans are to adopt a laser intrusion detection system for bridges; however, one such system installed on the Harlem River Lift Bridge is reportedly difficult to configure due to passing rail equipment of different sizes. Important factors that can impact the cost of implementing an intrusion detection system are the connectivity at the location, location size and configuration, and whether there is already an established monitoring system that will be used (127). Other future improvements will include installing more cameras with analytics. The agency is also currently working on an automated download of video footage by having a wireless mesh network at the Grand Central Terminal. Other potential mitigation strategies were discussed during the case study, including the following: • Install suicide prevention signs with hotline numbers to call at railroad crossings. • Use global positioning system (GPS) navigation systems to warn people who enter the crossing.

114 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way • Use an intercom system to help someone who seeks assistance retrieving something that has fallen onto the track. • Modify pedestrian bells to remain on as long as the island circuit is active at grade crossings. Other Comments. In 2018, MNCR won the APTA Safety Gold award for its TRACKS pro- gram and outreach to the community, and other efforts. MNCR indicates that, to address tres- passing, the agency has to identify how trespassing issues fit within the strategic plan, which has three main themes: customers, infrastructure, and employees. UTA, Salt Lake City, Utah Agency Overview UTA operates streetcar (S-Line), light rail (TRAX), and commuter rail (FrontRunner) rail systems. The total track-miles of the TRAX and FrontRunner networks is 236 miles. Table 43 contains the characteristics of the systems, and Figure 52 illustrates the UTA rail transit and commuter rail systems. Case Study Format The case study included one overview meeting and three in-depth meetings with UTA focusing on commuter rail, light rail, and safety and security. Those in attendance included the following: • Carolyn Anderson, commuter rail operations personnel supervisor • Tina Bartholomew, rail projects administrator • Martin Cocker, rail safety administrator for FrontRunner • Ron Kendell, video administrator • Travis King, TRAX safety administrator • Sheldon Shaw, director of safety and security Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. Commuter rail representatives reported trespassing issues at loca- tions near homeless shelters, schools, and residential areas with a high senior population. These problem areas are primarily identified through locomotive engineers’ reports. UTA is also unique in having the longest quiet zone in North America, so train engineers only sound the horn when there is a problem. Figure 53 displays a “No Train Horn” sign along a pathway adjacent to a pedestrian crossing. Operation Type Light Rail Heavy Rail Commuter Rail Track Mileage Total guideway track-miles 112 124 • At grade with access restrictions 85 114 • At grade without access restrictions 22 0 • Elevated 5 8 • Below grade 0 2 Subtotal of at-grade track-miles 107 114 • Percent at-grade track-miles to total guideway track-miles 96% 92% Number of Crossings Total number of grade crossings 145 65 Operation Characteristics Annual passenger miles 89,112,550 129,673,508 Fixed guideway directional route miles 93.9 174.5 Source: Federal Transit Administration, NTD (6). Table 43. UTA rail transit and commuter rail system characteristics.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 115   Source: Utah Transit Authority, Schedules and Maps (128). Figure 52. UTA rail transit and commuter rail system map.

116 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Light rail reported that trespassing is a growing concern. TRAX is an open system that presents many challenges as the city grows. The light rail corridor was originally a freight rail corridor with limited space to install stations. Also, long city blocks to go around could make people take short- cuts. The agency has been involved in many transit-oriented developments because of the high population density and residential areas near the railroad right-of-way. UTA tries to respond vigilantly to the continually changing needs of access points. Suicide Summary. UTA reported that, although trespassing is still an issue, approximately 70% of fatalities systemwide have been related to suicides since the system opened in 2008. The agency declared the need to address suicide-related fatalities. Due to commuter rail’s operational characteristics with high speed and rural area coverage, more suicide incidents are observed on the commuter rail system. The agency collaborates with Operation Lifesaver but also other state partners, such as the Department of Health. To respond to suicides, the agency reported using Hope Poles, which are installed approximately 20 feet from the grade crossing. Each pole has a suicide prevention sign with a message and phone number, as shown in Figure 54. The agency is expecting to install more Hope Poles within the system. UTA estimates the Hope Pole cost to be $400 per pole, which includes the sign, solar light, mounting hardware, and concrete (129). The cost estimate does not account for the crew time for installation. In addition to the Hope Poles, UTA reported several other approaches used to respond to suicides, including the following: • Participate in the week of awareness for suicide prevention in September through community events, social media, and face-to-face interactions with riders. • Collaborate with the media to post suicide hotline information with every news story regard- ing a suicide on the line. • Provide Operation Lifesaver, which promotes rail safety and suicide prevention. An online version of the program is now being created, and outreach includes booths at events and media spots on television and radio. The program is backed by state government officials. Source: Utah Transit Authority (129). Figure 53. UTA “No Train Horn” sign along pathway.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 117   • Provide a Confidential Close Call Hotline. • Provide employee assistance programs for post-incident help, including counseling, leave from work, incident tracking per person, feedback, clergy, and peer group support. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the UTA case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforcement, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. UTA reported that most of the light and commuter rail net- works are open and easy to access. UTA also has an issue with railcars getting tagged with graf- fiti at rail yards, which are also open. The agency reported it has been actively installing fencing along the right-of-way, including non-climbing fences. UTA also has fencing installed between the UTA commuter rail right-of-way and Union Pacific Railroad (UP) right-of-way (the UTA commuter rail service operates in its corridor immediately adjacent to the UP rail corridor). The agency reported that fencing is effective and successful overall. A reported limitation with the non-climbing fences is that UTA already has instances of people tunneling under the fence. The light rail system consists of two types of areas, including street-running and downtown- running systems. The type of fencing varies by area type. For example, the street-running area uses natural fencing or chain-link fencing (see Figure 55). Natural fencing is landscaping shrubs, which are usually owned and maintained by the local jurisdiction. The downtown area uses delineators with wires, which UTA reported are a good deterrent to guide people to proper cross- ing locations. Locations for fencing are determined by rail operators’ weekly generated reports as well as employee safety hazard reporting forms. Light rail reported that there are jump-over issues and that fencing effectiveness varies by each location, but overall UTA observed reduced trespassing incidents following the installation of fences. The same strategy may not work the same way at other locations. Source: Utah Transit Authority, Rail Trespass and Suicide Prevention: Safety, Research and Demonstration Grant (45). Figure 54. UTA suicide prevention hotline sign and Hope Pole.

118 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way UTA reported fencing to be a successful trespassing mitigation strategy. UTA is continuing to add more fencing to its system and is currently investigating areas where short fencing should be replaced with taller fences. UTA provided estimated costs for various fences, including the following: • Sleeve over existing posts to raise the height of a fence from 40 inches to 8 feet: $18.56 per linear foot • 6-foot chain-link fence, including new footings: $28.50 per linear foot • Pole and cable delineation: $29.75 per linear foot (see Figure 56) • 4-foot gate in 6-foot chain-link fence: $1,350 • 42-inch black vinyl chain-link fence: $31.50 per linear foot (129) Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 55. UTA TRAX light rail train with fencing along the right-of-way. Source: Utah Transit Authority (129). Figure 56. UTA pole and cable delineation at a station.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 119   Video Analytics. The agency does not consider cameras with video analytics effective due to too many false positives. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. UTA has three different video security systems within the agency: Milestone XProtect, Safety Vision’s Wi-Fi-enabled cameras, and SmartDrive systems. Milestone XProtect is used on infrastructure, such as platforms, buildings, parking lots, and other properties. TRAX light rail and FrontRunner trains are equipped with Safety Vision’s Wi-Fi-enabled cameras, and SmartDrive systems have been deployed on buses and paratransit vehicles. The agency also reported having cameras at grade crossings; UTA is scheduled to install cameras at seven crossings every year until all are covered. The agency uses both stationary and PTZ cameras. PTZ cameras allow for changing views and zooming to the right-of-way. UTA plans to use more PTZ cameras in the future. At this time, the agency does not have enough staff to monitor all cameras. Overall, cameras are widely used by the agency and are considered a successful mitigation strategy. Electronic Detection. UTA received a Safety Research and Demonstration grant from FTA to install an innovative radar/camera surveillance and detection system. UTA is collaborating on thermal imaging radar (TIR) for stationary applications. While the system is stationary, it could be installed on a trailer or a movable pole. The radar system is connected to the Milestone XProtect system and installed adjacent to or on top of existing cameras. The TIR detects objects through the thermal profile and programs profiles of interest. If suspicious behavior is detected, the system waits until the behavior is spotted on two or more consecutive rotations and alerts rail dispatch with video footage. The radar spins 360 degrees and can detect up to 1,600 feet. Representative images are provided in Figure 57. The grant was for $280,000, with the total camera system cost equaling $200,000. The camera system costs about $35,000 per unit. The agency expects to put three radar units on each light rail and commuter rail system, targeting low-light and low-visibility areas that have a history of attempted suicides, trespassing, and homeless encampments. A gap analysis determined the problem areas. Source: Utah Transit Authority, Rail Trespass and Suicide Prevention: Safety, Research and Demonstration Grant (45). Figure 57. UTA example images of the TIR.

120 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Lighting. The agency has installed lighting in specific problem areas. The lights have a motion sensor, but the sensor does not always work properly. UTA reported it is exploring additional lighting options but has to evaluate each product and the agency’s ability to tie into a power source (129). Education. The agency reported multiple educational approaches being used, ranging from information for the general population to the training of employees. UTA offers QPR training as one of the ongoing employee education efforts, part of the national program sponsored by the State Health Department. The training is required for all operational positions, and the situation awareness module is added for operational positions as part of the training. UTA reported it has an overall agency communication strategy to point staff to resources and train them to be part of the solution. Community education includes signage, Operation Lifesaver training, and community out- reach with local apartment complexes. Signs are installed at every station and provide safety messages before a train comes into the station. The police department stated that the system does not have enough signage, and there is currently work to add more signage within the system and install different signage at grade crossings and along the right-of-way. A reported limitation of signage is that it tends to be ignored. In Utah, it is mandated by state law that all schools have driver’s education training that includes 1 hour of Operation Lifesaver training, which covers trespassing topics. In addition, the agency is actively involved in teaching high school classes for those preparing to get driver’s licenses, including how to navigate the system safely. The agency believes education efforts make a huge difference, especially for children. In addition, the agency has reached out to apartment managements to share a safety message with their residents, which seemed to be effective 18 months after the agency reached out. Last, during planned safety ambassador blitzes, the agency staff visit high-incident inter- sections to interact directly with the public, hand out information, and be a positive presence. Enforcement. UTA has a good-sized law enforcement staff that cover all modes. Police are informed of the top 10 locations for safety breaches so they can increase enforcement efforts. If someone is identified as a suicide risk, the police will monitor and transport them to a local hospital. In addition to general enforcement, UTA reported that police educate trespassers first and then give citations if necessary. Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. UTA reported it is interested in having more cameras and lighting with an associated center dedicated to camera surveillance and monitoring. The agency would also like to investigate the viability of drones tethered to the front of trains. DART, Dallas, Texas Agency Overview The DART rail system profile includes a streetcar (Dallas Streetcar), light rail (DART Rail), and commuter rail (Trinity Railway Express [TRE]), with connections to other commuter rail systems. Combined, the DART Rail and TRE systems exceed 254 track-miles. Table 44 con- tains the characteristics of the DART rail system, and Figure 58 illustrates the Dallas area rail system map. Case Study Format The DART case study was conducted through one overview meeting and three in-depth meetings.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 121   Those in attendance included the following: • Paul Bourzikas, TRE assistant vice president for commuter rail • Tammy Doran, assistant to the assistant vice president • Anthony Fuller, TRE chief operating officer • Kris Gandham, assistant vice president for rail operations (light rail) • Bonnie Murphy, vice president for commuter rail and railroad management, and director of TRE • Jessica Powers, director of safety and regulatory compliance • Jerry Reynolds, manager for train control • Megan Tang, TRE chief engineering officer Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. Trespassing was discussed throughout the case study as a problem for the agency. The commuter rail reported a trespassing concern with homeless encampments because the homeless use the railroad right-of-way for walking and traveling. DART reported that clearing some landscaping around the area may be effective at reducing the problem. DART also reported that responding to homeless encampments involves collaboration with DART police, Herzog (the contracted operator for the commuter rail service), city police, and homeless advocacy shelters. DART also reported it has trespassing issues with pedestrians and bicyclists taking shortcuts. DART has found that having pedestrian trails along the railroad track helps to reduce trespassing. In addition, DART has an issue with driver navigation systems guiding people to drive in the middle of the track. The commuter rail reported that many of the trespassing events occur on single-track bridge structures where there are old or no existing walkways, which present a clearance issue. Many of these areas also have homeless camps. DART plans on replacing these bridge structures with walkways. The agency also reported that grade crossings are a concern due to geometry design and lack of signage around the locations. The agency is working with TxDOT to secure Section 130 funds for safety improvements at grade crossings. The commuter rail also reported that engineers are guided to report if any suspicious behaviors are observed. DART has also found that contractors provide good sources to identify trespassing problem locations, such as reports from the maintenance-of-way and train operators. Source: Federal Transit Administration, NTD (6). Operation Type Light Rail Heavy Rail Commuter Rail Track Mileage Total guideway track-miles 46.6 • At grade with access restrictions 40.8 • At grade without access restrictions 0 • Elevated 5.8 • Below grade 0 Subtotal of at-grade track-miles 40.8 • Percent at-grade track-miles to total guideway track-miles 88% 88% Number of Crossings Total number of grade crossings 45 Operation Characteristics Annual passenger miles 232,288,823 39,672,828 Fixed guideway directional route miles 207.6 20 162.6 21 4 182.6 136 182.4 72.3 Table 44. DART rail transit and commuter rail system characteristics.

122 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Source: Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Rail System Map (130). Figure 58. DART rail system map.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 123   The light rail system reported it is working with police for enforced patrolling to address trespassing issues. Light rail operators report trespassing to central control, which then notifies the local police department. The control center sends email notifications to a list of individuals that need to be aware of the trespassing incident status until the event is resolved (see Figure 59). In addition, DART collects incident details for all trespassing events, which allows it to obtain data on locations and who is trespassing (see Figure 60). Suicide Summary. It was mentioned that the agency does not have a significant suicide issue. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the DART case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforcement, other countermeasures, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. Commuter rail and light rail used different types of fencing (see Figure 61). The commuter rail uses standard 8-foot TxDOT fencing, primarily fencing around equipment and maintenance yards. The light rail system reported using fencing of varying heights that has been installed and maintained. The light rail system also reported that school children cut through the fencing instead of using the pedestrian grade crossing. DART provided images of fencing that was vandalized, which is a limitation of the chain- link fencing commonly used (see Figure 62). Landscaping. DART reported using bushes to impede people from entering the right-of- way. There were no comments on the strengths or limitations of this strategy. Video Analytics. DART received the FTA Real-Time Asset Management Program grant for $184,000 in November 2020 to use high-resolution cameras once a month to sweep the rail cor- ridors to monitor rail stations, tracks, bridges, tunnels, and highway-rail grade crossings. Using automated evaluation with AI assistance is expected to assist in identifying breaks in fences, trails, and other issues that might reflect a trespassing issue (132). Source: Dallas Area Rapid Transit (131). Figure 59. Example email notification for a trespassing incident.

124 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Source: Dallas Area Rapid Transit (131). Figure 60. Example trespassing incident report. Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 61. Example of fencing along the DART light rail right-of-way.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 125   Light rail also reported having an information technology department that views cameras on trains and around yards with advanced analytics. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. Cameras were widely reported. Light rail reported it continuously reviews camera footage to identify track issues. Light rail also reported it has cameras near streetcar operations to be reviewed by operation, safety, and maintenance staff. TRE reported having limited cameras at the Fort Worth Central and T&P Stations for the TEXRail project. In addition, TRE is looking to install cameras at stations. At this time, TRE does not have cameras at the front end of any trains and is looking to install onboard cameras. Education. Educational efforts reported included signage, employee training, and com- munity outreach. Signage along the TRE system includes signs installed every 250 feet on both sides of the tracks. DART has used a federal grant to install “Do Not Trespass” and “Look Both Ways” signs. DART is also planning to add signs at stations displaying phone numbers for people to call. Figure 63 displays signs DART has installed regarding no pedestrians and no clearance. Employee training includes encouraging operators to be vigilant while driving to avoid tres- passers. In addition, DART offers operator training and PTSD programs to mitigate incidents before and after. Last, community outreach includes meetings to discuss trespassing by school children, which seems to have reduced the number of incidents. Enforcement. DART police respond to trespassing scenes, but often the trespassers are gone before the officer can get to the location. Police for the light rail work with the control center until the issue is resolved. In addition to general enforcement, police also reported using educational approaches. Light rail reported that it posts customer information and other appro- priate messaging on social media. Both commuter and light rail police also discussed the Say Something Safety and Security App, a cell phone application that can be used for dispatching to Source: Dallas Area Rapid Transit (131). Figure 62. Vandalized DART fence.

126 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way the location of concern if a report comes in from customers (more information about the app is available at https://www.dart.org/riding/dartpoliceelerts.asp). Other Countermeasures. The case study also found additional countermeasures being used by DART, including the following: • A 1-inch-wide red strip at Union Station alerts passengers when the train is coming to the station. This strip is difficult to see during the daytime. There are plans to make the strip wider to increase efficacy. • Passenger announcement message boards announce when a train is entering a station. • Security doors at light rail stations alert the police after hours if a door is opened. Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. Commuter rail reported future mitigation strat- egies, including removing homeless encampments, adding more signs, installing radar or intruder detection systems, and conducting additional community outreach. Light rail reported it will address homeless encampments and will explore solutions for tunnels and obtaining dropped items on tracks (e.g., cell phones). In addition, DART reported that many trespasser events happen on a single-track bridge without walkways; therefore, DART is investigat- ing replacing the bridge structure with one including walkways to reduce the likelihood of a strike. Other Comments. DART reported it is aware of other agencies that are using flashing lights, including BART, WMATA, CTA, and Metrolink. Metrolink uses crossbucks with flashing lights and an audible indicator when a train is approaching. DART also reported that Japan uses a sound system to alert passengers of approaching trains. Last, TriMet has a trespasser detection system at specific parts of its light rail tracks and bridges. The corridors are monitored in a dis- patch center through cameras and infrared sensors. Source: Dallas Area Rapid Transit (131). Figure 63. DART example signs.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 127   LACMTA, Los Angeles, California Agency Overview The LACMTA rail transit system includes light rail and heavy rail. The system characteristics are included in Table 45, and Figure 64 illustrates the system. As shown in the map, the system is segmented into six lines: • Light Rail—Metro Rail A Line, C Line, E Line, and L Line • Heavy Rail—Metro Rail B Line and D Line Case Study Format The LACMTA case study was completed through one overview meeting and one in-depth meeting. Those in attendance included the following: • Jennifer Arndt, director of community relations • Rachel Barlow, rail transportation operations supervisor • Jonetta Burnette, manager of transportation planning for the Gold Line • Jacqueline Gonzalez, community education • Vijay Khawani, executive officer for risk, safety, and asset management • Stephen Lino, director of rail transportation for the Blue Line • Mike Moore, director of rail transportation for the Expo Line • Susan Walker, director of physical security Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. Trespassing is a problem that the agency said needs to be treated with a different mindset and approach for light and heavy rail. The agency’s heavy rail is an underground system, and its trespassing concerns focus on keeping people out of the tunnels because that is where many of the support systems are located (heating, ventilation, and air con- ditioning, and communication devices). The design and engineering group identified rooms at the end of platforms and on-street levels to be problem areas because people can open an emer- gency exit hatch and get to the track. Heavy rail also has a concern with people jumping off the platforms. To respond to this issue, heavy rail has implemented a variety of mitigation strategies, including security guards, cameras, platform gates, and alarms. The light rail system reported much of its trespassing is associated with shortcuts, copper theft, and homeless encampments. Source: Federal Transit Administration, NTD (6). Operation Type Light Rail Heavy Rail Commuter Rail Track Mileage Total guideway track-miles 193 42.9 • At grade with access restrictions 122.8 10 • At grade without access restrictions 24.4 0 • Elevated 35.9 32.9 • Below grade 9.9 0 Subtotal of at-grade track-miles 147.2 10 • Percent at-grade track-miles to total guideway track-miles 76% 23% Number of Crossings Total number of grade crossings 197 0 Operation Characteristics Annual passenger miles 495,011,734 210,105,497 Fixed guideway directional route miles 171.9 31.9 Table 45. LACMTA rail transit system characteristics.

128 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, How to Ride Metro Rail (133). Figure 64. LACMTA Metro rail system map.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 129   The light rail system holds monthly rap sessions with operators, which is an avenue for opera- tors to express their concerns, and trespassing is a common discussion topic. The agency also obtains trespassing information from law enforcement and the maintenance department. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the LACMTA case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforce- ment, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. The agency reported significant fencing being used. The design and engineering group reported using platform gates at the end of platforms, but passengers can open these gates. In response, the agency has replaced 3.5-foot-high gates with 6-foot-high gates to mitigate the issue (see Figure 65). Light rail reported that it mostly uses chain-link fencing (see Figure 66) but needs a better fencing system. As part of the Metro rail design criteria, the agency is expected to change the current fencing system to no-cut and no-climb fences in several locations (see Figure 67). The fencing system has to be long and wide enough to deter cutting, and high-security fencing is expensive. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. In the subway system, the agency is required to install a 30-inch-wide emergency walkway along the track so that staff can use the walkway to access ancillary rooms. Cross passageways are installed every 700 to 750 feet in the underground system to get to adjacent tunnels. The passageways are all equipped with CCTV cameras. While planning for the new line, the agency plans to install two CCTV cameras at every grade crossing because these are the easiest places to access the right-of-way. CCTV with analytics could detect individuals walking down the track. Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (134). Before After Figure 65. LACMTA before and after photos of the platform gates.

130 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Electronic Detection. Several electronic detection systems were discussed during the case study. Light rail tunnel portals have laser intrusion detection systems that can differentiate between a person and an object. Once an intrusion is detected, the system alerts train operators through a strobe or stop hand at the tunnel entrance. Heavy rail is currently working on a tunnel intrusion device to detect people entering tunnels from the end of platforms. The LiDAR-based device can differentiate between a person and a train. If a person going into a tunnel is detected, the system alerts the rail operations control center and notifies the oncoming train to stop. Previously, LACMTA performed a pilot study for the platform track intrusion detection system. The cost of the application was $2.1 million. Heavy rail also reported using a laser system at tunnel portals as an intrusion system. It also reported previously using pressure mats for a platform detection system, but the system had to be removed because the performance was not promising. Specifically, the mats had limited coverage areas. Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (134). Figure 66. LACMTA example of a chain-link fence. Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (134). Figure 67. LACMTA example of a no-cut, no-climb fence.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 131   Platform Screen Doors. LACMTA reported that PSDs could be a great tool to address tres- passing. Reported limitations would be the length of time to implement PSDs on the system and the potential disruption to service that would result. Education. A significant number of educational efforts were reported to address trespass- ing. The agency uses rail safety ambassadors, retired rail operators who received special training. These ambassadors are sent out to inform passengers about the opening of new stations, ongoing special projects, trouble-prone areas, and densely populated areas. The corresponding depart- ment identifies incidents and determines target locations through the hotspot dashboard and reports from the safety department. The ambassadors could go out to the problem location and evaluate the incident’s details. The agency also reported using suicide prevention signs, as shown in Figure 68. In addition, LACMTA has installed pedestrian-prohibited and No Trespassing signs throughout the system (see Figure 69). The agency tries to reach out to as many community activity centers as possible, including schools, senior centers, and libraries. LACMTA goes into all schools and even covers parent groups and after-school programs. LACMTA focuses on areas within 1.5 miles of stations. The agency uses media advertisements to disseminate safety messages. LACMTA produces many media advertisements, such as on televisions at gas stations and on its recently revamped web- site. The agency purchased advertisements on Waze aimed at tourists. The agency uses a targeted marketing approach through social media, including Facebook and YouTube. The agency also tries to disseminate these safety materials to grade schools and colleges. LACMTA provides tours and field trips. The agency schedules a once-a-year rail safety campaign in September in which the agency targets different areas, gives away items, and advertises on social media. LACMTA mentioned that it is vital to understand the difference between crossings and walking/ biking environments to customize approaches to address the trespassing problem. Enforcement. Enforcement is an important mitigation strategy being used by LACMTA. The police work with light rail for targeted law enforcement at hotspot locations. In addition, the Metro Police collaborate with community relations and education, as well as other local law enforcement, for educational efforts. Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (134). Figure 68. LACMTA example of a suicide prevention sign.

132 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. The agency mentioned it hopes to use CCTV camera coverage throughout the property with advanced video analytics to detect passengers and vehicles. ProRail, the Netherlands Agency Overview ProRail is a railway manager that is responsible for the maintenance, renewal, expansion, and safety of the Dutch railway network, which includes both passenger and freight services. The ProRail website indicates it is an independent party that allocates space on 7,000 kilometers (4,350 miles) of track, arranges all train traffic (1.4 million journeys per working day), and builds and manages stations (135). The ProRail network extends throughout the country, as illustrated in Figure 70, which is a snapshot of the ProRail wall map available online. Passenger services Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (134). Figure 69. LACMTA example of pedestrian-prohibited and No Trespassing signs.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 133   Source: ProRail, Rail Map (136). Figure 70. ProRail system map.

134 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way are conducted by eight operators through 399 passenger stations. ProRail is unique in that the government owns the tracks, and ProRail contracts out the operations. The Dutch railway, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, is the largest passenger operator, servicing 80% of the passenger population. The Netherlands has a very high population density and an extensive network of rails with express stations where trains come through at high speeds at frequencies that can be as low as 1 or 2 minutes between trains. Case Study Format The case study included a single meeting with Roald van der Valk, policy officer for suicide prevention. Case Study Findings Trespassing Summary. ProRail reported that the older-generation tracks are located in city centers and tend to be more open, making trespassing more difficult to handle. To respond to this issue, ProRail is adding tunnels to reduce level crossings. In comparison, newer lines have everything fenced off, and stations are the only point of entry. Trespassing incidents are largely reported by operators who notify the control center. Near misses or trespassers are reported to the next trains so they can respond accordingly. In addition, operators release a slow order of 40 km/h (25 mph), which is not lifted until after two trains pass the area and report that the trespasser is no longer witnessed. ProRail estimates that slow orders result in an average delay of 4.5 hours per day. The agency reported that trespassing can be broken into three categories: suicide, security, and recreation. ProRail also reported that 60% of fatal incidents occur at level crossings, 20% at stations, and the rest down the line. Suicide Summary. To respond to this issue, the agency maps incidents to identify the most logical point of entry within 500 meters (1,640 feet). A challenge to addressing suicides is that both ProRail and Nederlandse Spoorwegen are responsible for rails, which makes it difficult to determine who exactly is responsible for addressing a problem. Current prevention initiatives have reduced suicide fatalities by 10% since 2017. At this time, ProRail collaborates with a Dutch agency to assist with suicide prevention, which includes a hotline. This Dutch agency also handles all media reporting of incidents. In addition, the agency has signage with suicide support messages, such as “I’m Listening,” and contact information (see Figure 71). Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the ProRail case study process. Subsections include engineering, education, enforcement, and other countermeasures. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. ProRail reported using fencing that is usually limited to a height of 2 meters (6.5 feet) because of local wildlife crossings. The metal fences are green, unclimbable, and mostly uncuttable (see Figure 72). ProRail also combines fencing with anti-trespassing mats at the end of stations to prevent potential hiding spots and access to the right-of-way. Landscaping. The agency reported using inclines and ponds to deter pedestrian access along portions of the right-of-way. Anti-trespass Guard Panels. Anti-trespass mats are used in combination with fencing. These mats prevent trespassers but also have known limitations; maintenance workers say that the

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 135   mats make their job harder. The traditional pyramid mats were found to be 30% to 40% effec- tive but were heavy and difficult to maintain. Therefore, ProRail is switching to newer, lighter models made of lighter carbon fibers with long tilted strips. Figure 73 displays anti-trespass guard panels being installed on ProRail. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. The camera system ProRail uses is basic and is largely installed near mental health facilities adjacent to rails. In addition, ProRail reported using a radio frequency identification system modeled from Small Business Innovative Research in the United States with an integrated detection system and LiDAR, which promotes faster intervention. Lighting. ProRail reported a pilot system is in place for blue lights at this time, but pas- sengers are having mixed reactions toward blue lights. Blue lights seem to have positive effects at stations as a form of art. However, people tend to find the color disturbing at level crossings because they do not recognize that the blue lights are for suicide prevention. Source: ProRail (137). Figure 71. ProRail suicide prevention sign— ”I’m Listening.” Source: ProRail (137). Figure 72. ProRail fence installation.

136 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Education. A variety of educational approaches were reported, including the following: • Media campaigns for the public explain the ripple effect that slows down trains and causes delays. • Educational programming for schools is used to prevent suicide by rail in two programs, one for younger and one for older children. • Consistent staff training identifies and communicates potential suicide risks. This day-long training educates staff on how to identify potential suicide risks, how to talk suicidal indi- viduals down, and how to transfer care to emergency services. The staff have a very emotional response to this training that seems to be positive. The class is followed by a 1-hour e-learning refresher course. ProRail reported it was using signs to highlight whether or not delays are trespasser-related, but these signs are now being removed over concerns that they may relay a message that trains could be used for self-harm. The signs are now more focused on delays. The wording states that delays are caused by an “accident” instead of a “collision with a person” so that people react more empathetically. Enforcement. Law enforcement is active on the system. ProRail reported it used to have issues with trespassers taking pictures or making film productions, but this is no longer a prob- lem because enforcement conducts heavy regulation and tracks down anyone who posts a pic- ture of the site. Other Countermeasures. Mental health facilities located near tracks are a major concern and are actively addressed through communication and collaboration with the Dutch mental health agency. ProRail is attempting to map where it has the most problems compared with loca- tions of mental health facilities. One example of the collaboration is the mental health facility alerting ProRail of a missing patient and asking if the rail surveillance cameras have spotted the person of interest. Transport for London’s London Underground, United Kingdom Agency Overview The London Underground system originated in 1863 and currently spans 402 km (250 miles) of lines and 270 stations across Greater London and beyond. The system typically handles up to Source: ProRail (137). Figure 73. ProRail anti-trespass guard panel installation.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 137   5 million customer journeys daily across 11 distinct lines and is part of Transport for London. The system is around 45% subsurface, with the remainder being above ground (138). The exten- sive network is illustrated in Figure 74. Transport for London is the integrated transport authority responsible for the day-to-day operation of London’s public transport network. The Transport for London website indicates that it is in charge of all aspects of the London Underground (often referred to as the Tube) operations including the following: • Running the trains, stations, and control centers • Making sure the Tube is safe and secure • Collecting and protecting fare revenue Transport for London is also responsible for maintaining and renewing most of the infra- structure (139). Case Study Format The case study involved one meeting with Simon Abernethy, suicide prevention lead. Case Study Findings Suicide Summary. Overall, suicides in the United Kingdom are decreasing. Since 2017, suicide has been reduced by 50% because of prevention programming. While there has been a drop in trespassing due to the reduction of pedestrians during the pandemic, suicide remains a high disruptor because interventions have also dropped due to COVID-19. The agency also said it has to address the British mindset that associates railways with suicide. Transport for London reported it looks for indicators that someone may be suicidal, includ- ing people sitting around the station looking sad or crying, reports from other customers, cus- tomers confessing they are afraid and might end their life, and someone pressing the Help Point button. Many times, however, there are no indicators before a person acts. The agency has an internal, confidential mapping of suicides. These are not hotspot locations because the incidents are spread out across the system. Transport for London collects data and reviews video surveillance recordings on successful suicides to identify patterns, which have found the following: • Half of the suicides are people walking into a station, and half come from people getting off trains. • Average time spent at a station before a suicide attempt is 4 minutes. To respond to suicides, Transport for London reported it has used the following strategies: • Television ads are placed by Network Rail for suicide prevention. • An employee Lifesaver Award recognizes staff who perform a proactive and appropriate intervention. • Staff are trained to recognize signs of unusual behavior. For example, in one instance, a cus- tomer said good morning to staff every day but one day did not, and staff intervened to pre- vent a suicide. • Samaritan’s Phones that are located in stations typically do not help because, by the time people come to the station, they are beyond help by phone. The system was not efficient, and people did not use them. • White message boards are used to provide positive messages. These are often posted on social media at @allontheboard (Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook). See examples in Figure 75. Transport for London reported several collaborations. Transport for London works with Samaritans to gain financial resources, conduct training, erect signage, review data, and reduce

Source: Transport for London, Tube Map Showing Tunnels (140). Figure 74. London Underground system map.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 139   the stigma surrounding suicide prevention with staff. Thrive LDN helps to create and dissemi- nate prevention information more broadly focused on depression and well-being. The more general wellness messaging seems to be preferred over suicide-specific messaging due to con- cerns of implying that the rail system is a viable option to end one’s life. Figure 76 displays examples of Thrive LDN posters deployed across London Underground stations during 2020, directing people to the Thrive LDN website and its support services. Figure 77 displays a Thrive LDN folding support card issued to stations on the London Underground in December 2020. The cards fold to the size of a credit card, with the front shown on the top and the back shown on the bottom. Contact information for multiple support organizations is displayed on each card. Transport for London also reported that it works with Toronto on suicide prevention efforts. Mitigation Strategies Summary. This section summarizes the mitigation strategies reported during the Transport for London case study process. Subsections include engineering, educa- tion, enforcement, other countermeasures, and future mitigation strategies and needs. Engineering Fencing and Channelization. The United Kingdom has a legal requirement to fence the entire railroad but no standard. Fencing was reported to be used on all aboveground rail lines; however, fencing is not used largely on the underground because it is difficult to do so. The United Kingdom also uses fencing aboveground with signaling equipment on top that increases the fence height and adds an obstacle, thus reducing the likelihood of people accessing the lines. The agency reported it is trying to remove foot crossings to reduce traffic over and around rails. Transport for London redirects passenger platform flows to prevent people from accessing fast lanes by blocking entry to higher-speed lines and using mid-platform fencing with gates that are locked until needed. The agency also reported using platform end barriers to prevent pedes- trian access to the tracks at the end of stations, as shown in Figure 78. One unfortunate issue with platform end barriers is that people will push through the unlocked gates to urinate because of Source: @allontheboard Instagram (141).Source: London Underground (65). Figure 75. Examples of London Underground whiteboard positive messaging as seen at the station and on social media.

140 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Source: London Underground (65). Figure 76. Examples of Thrive LDN posters deployed at London Underground stations during 2020.

Source: London Underground (65). Figure 77. Thrive LDN folding support card issued to London Underground stations in December 2020.

142 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way the limited restroom facilities in the stations. Additionally, one concern is that increased fencing at one location may result in a displacement problem by moving people to other areas of the system, such as moving people from the surface stations to the underground stations. Video Analytics. The agency reported currently researching video analytics, including a digital box system that notifies authorities when people cross into a specific area. The system has been successful in depots but not in stations. Camera Detection and Surveillance System. Transport for London uses CCTV cameras that are monitored by dedicated staff, and everything is recorded in all stations 24/7. All London Underground stations must have a minimum of 95% of public floor space monitored by CCTV. Figure 79 displays the CCTV monitors in a London Underground operations room. The cameras monitor four types of stations, including the following: • Gateways and destination stations, which are big and have a dedicated staff control room • Metro stations, which are the main commuter stations with a supervisor control room • Local stations for far-out small towns, which have one staff member in a control room Platform Screen Doors. The use of PSDs is limited to one section of the Jubilee line (con- structed for the Olympic Games) (see Figure 80) and new Elizabeth line stations. Although believed to be effective at blocking access to the track, this strategy is not cost- or time-effective because it would take approximately £1 billion (approximately $1.36 billion) and 20 years to implement across all lines. Platforms would need to be completely rebuilt to accommodate platform doors due to the increased weight. The Elizabeth line installation was used largely as a ventilation mitigation measure. Lighting. The agency reported the use of blue lights in some stations, but they have not been shown to be effective. Education. Transport for London reported working with Comet and Nova to provide suicide prevention training. A 2-hour training course was created for staff to help them change suicidal passengers’ minds. It is believed that the training provided to 90% of the staff was responsible for the success in the reduction of suicides. Source: London Underground (65). Figure 78. London Underground platform end barrier with standard warning signage.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 143   In addition, Transport for London has the Travel Kind program, which encourages people to look out for each other. Transport for London also promotes the See It, Say It, Sort It program where customers report potential incidents. Transport for London also reported it has stopped using signage because it signaled poten- tial suicide areas for others. The agency also found that CCTV footage revealed that the people focused on suicide never looked at the signs. Enforcement. The British Transport Police have jurisdiction over the entire rail line, with one phone number to call or text and incentives to report. The police investigate the use of fencing under the Design Out Crime program. Source: London Underground (65). Figure 79. Example of CCTV monitors in a London Underground station’s operations room. Source: London Underground (65). Figure 80. London Underground PSD at Waterloo station on the Jubilee line.

144 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way In addition, Transport for London allows passengers to directly text the police, who can inves- tigate issues and reply with a status. Other Countermeasures. To decrease the number of individuals entering the track bed from station platforms to retrieve personal items, the agency uses a track retrieval device (see Figure 81). e device is a set of poles that, when connected together, enable the retrieval of the dropped items within a certain distance from the platform edge without the need to access the track. e poles and additional pads are stored in an orange bag kept in the station (65). Other suicide reduction countermeasures discussed include the following: • Playing classical music in some stations to foster a positive mood • Creating a bloom program to create gardens in stations to make them more welcoming Network Rail also works with the Samaritan organization for funding and resources to create television ads. Future Mitigation Strategies and Needs. Transport for London reported it will add more training because training is a cost-eective strategy at £35 per person (about $49 per person). e agency also reported it is looking to add more cameras and lighting, which will not keep people o the tracks but will allow for faster responses. e agency hopes PSDs will become more aordable and lighter. Secondary Case Study Summaries is section contains a description of each of the secondary case study interviews. e pur- pose of the secondary case studies was to capture additional strategies and activities under- taken to address trespassing, especially agencies performing innovative or creative activities. e Source: London Underground (65). Figure 81. London Underground track retrieval device.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 145   specific entities were selected through recommendations or content discussed during confer- ence presentations. Metropolitan Transportation Authority LIRR Background During the TRB/APTA Safety and Security Conference on November  18, 2020, Lori Ebbighausen, with LIRR, presented on its strategic risk mitigation process that includes collect- ing a large amount of data from many sources, using a hazard mitigation algorithm to evaluate rail right-of-way segments, and using high-security fencing to address safety concerns. A large component of the process is the use of a GIS to map and analyze the collected data. The research team discussed this approach to mitigate trespassing with Karl Meyer, director of safety operations, and Rachael Bishop, senior manager of geospatial technology, of LIRR. Case Study Findings LIRR reported that trespassing is a concern. It has 290 grade crossings, a major generator of trespassing as well as stations that are very open. Right-of-Way Task Force. LIRR reported that the Right-of-Way Task Force, which started approximately 20 years ago, physically inspects the entire right-of-way twice annually. The data the task force collects are fed into the hazard mitigation algorithm. High-Security Fencing. High-security fencing is a very expensive strategy, so the agency uses the hazard mitigation algorithm to identify the highest-risk locations. LIRR has transi- tioned to installing high-security fencing on smaller segments rather than on long stretches. Overall, high-security fencing installation has been found to dramatically decrease the level of trespassing. However, a limitation to implementing high-security fencing is that all stake- holders have to agree to it, which can be difficult because high-security fencing is not aestheti- cally appealing. Other Strategies and Considerations. LIRR reported other strategies, including using cheaper physical barriers (e.g., Jersey barriers), offering the TRACKS educational program (the same program used by MNCR), and partnering with local suicide awareness groups to train employees on identifying and interacting with people looking to self-harm. LIRR also reported removing landscaping from the right-of-way for operational improve- ments to reduce track slip-and-slide, which is opening up access to the right-of-way. This was an unintended consequence of this improvement. Amtrak Police Intelligence and Analysis Unit Background Michelle Jennings is a geospatial intelligence analyst with Amtrak’s Police Intelligence and Analysis Unit. She was referred to the research team by FRA trespass prevention personnel. Additionally, the research team attended a conference presentation in which she discussed her involvement in the intelligence-led policing at Amtrak. Case Study Findings Amtrak is always interested in improving safety, in this case, through crime and trespassing prevention. The Amtrak Police Intelligence and Analysis Unit uses intelligence-led policing to effectively direct resources. This method identifies indicators of trespassing and suicides to

146 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way properly address them through mitigation strategies. This approach requires good data, which are generally lacking, especially for suicide-related incidents. Ms. Jennings indicated that the amount of data FRA is collecting from railroads is not adequate to fully capture the high-risk locations. The two major strategies discussed were the placement of suicide prevention signs and the installation of fencing. Amtrak is using intelligence to determine the best places to locate suicide prevention signs throughout the system. Amtrak has always used GIS to map crimes and trespassing, with tres- passing and suicides increasing in importance over time. After several years, Amtrak began using higher-level GIS tools and began seeing trends in strike data. It was determined that placing suicide prevention signs would be a good mitigating strategy, and Amtrak found very good results after placing signs in identified hotspots. According to a 3-year average, strikes in California have seen an average reduction rate of 52%, and the Northeast has experienced an average reduction rate of 67%. Ms. Jennings does not believe the data indicate that implement- ing suicide prevention signs pushes the problem somewhere else; however, she does see this trend with crime prevention strategies. Amtrak creates a list of top locations based on trends showing strikes around homeless encampments, mental health facilities, recreation access points, and school locations. Figure 82 through Figure 85 show some aspects of the GIS analyses performed to identify problem loca- tions and the results of suicide prevention signs. Amtrak is currently evaluating the Northeast Corridor for possible fencing locations. Amtrak is developing an online mapping application that can turn on and off different layers. Focused on the Acela service, the methodology examines several criteria for each speed limit section in which the Acela service operates, including strikes, near misses, and right-of-way crimes. Addi- tionally, Amtrak is identifying stations, substations, nearby parks, and schools within a certain distance from the track while also evaluating the population down to the tract level. SEPTA Background Ed Abel is the director of operational safety at SEPTA, where he is in charge of rules and operations of vehicles throughout the entire SEPTA system. He is also in charge of fire and rescue safety. Most notably, he oversees audits and inspections as part of federal safety pro- grams, including the FTA PTASP and the FRA System Safety Program. The TCRP Project A-44 panel directed the research team to contact a legacy heavy rail agency as part of the case study process, with SEPTA qualifying for that designation. Additionally, the research team attended a conference presentation in which Mr. Abel noted many of the activi- ties SEPTA is undertaking to reduce trespassing on its systems. Case Study Findings The SEPTA system is very extensive, involving most public transit modes, including street- car, light rail, heavy rail, and commuter rail. Mr. Abel indicated that reducing trespassing and suicides requires the full commitment of the agency and the people that work there. Reducing trespassing and suicides cannot just be a process to “check the box.” He indicated that he has the full support of SEPTA leadership to pursue safety initiatives to reduce trespassing and suicides. Mr. Abel noted that although a few locations have required special attention, he considers trespassing and suicides as a systemwide issue, emphasizing the need to implement any counter- measures on a systemwide basis. He believes that suicides go hand in hand with trespassing.

Source: Amtrak (142). Figure 82. Slide demonstrating Amtrak’s train strike analytics dashboard.

Source: Amtrak (142). Figure 83. Slide showing the relationship between train strike hotspots and homeless encampments and shelters.

Source: Amtrak (142). Figure 84. Slide showing Amtrak’s suicide prevention sign placement factors.

Source: Amtrak (142). Figure 85. Slide showing reduction in strikes following suicide prevention sign placement.

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 151   The largest effort to mitigate trespassing and suicides is through community outreach and education. SEPTA works collaboratively with Pennsylvania Operation Lifesaver to distribute rail safety messages, particularly in schools and through media outlets. Mr. Abel is the chairman of the state’s Operation Lifesaver organization. Normally, dedicated rail safety efforts average about 50–60 events per year. Perhaps the most notable symbol of rail safety is the safety education bus, as shown in Fig- ure 86. Developed internally, the bus is wrapped with safety messages and is set up inside with video screens and educational material. Mr. Abel was very proud of the maintenance depart- ment for coming up with the idea of using an old bus for this purpose and transforming it rela- tively inexpensively. The employees were honored with an award. The safety education bus is often brought to schools, where safety personnel team up with school children to develop posters for a given safety theme. The winning poster becomes the new bus wrap, and the winner gets a “Day with SEPTA” where the child sees the headquarters building, control systems, and simulator. Wanting to address suicides, SEPTA has begun several collaborations. A partnership with the Montgomery County Emergency Services in 2013 resulted in installing suicide prevention signs in every rail station. At least two signs are placed at the end of every station, each with a national lifeline phone number to call. Looking to do more, SEPTA joined the Regional Suicide Prevention Task Force of Southeast Pennsylvania in 2017, which resulted in the development of an annual Suicide Prevention Day. The 2018 day placed signs in all revenue vehicles. The 2019 Suicide Prevention Day included funding through a grant won by Pennsylvania Operation Lifesaver. It focused on the mental health of first responders and veterans. Other topics discussed include the use of fencing along the network. Fencing is largely applied as a security measure. SEPTA has installed fencing at a few specific locations to target trespass- ing; however, systemwide implementation is difficult because of the often narrow right-of-way. Narrow rights-of-way do not leave much room between the train and the fence. SEPTA monitors the cameras at stations. Additionally, the police department has access to every camera to respond to a report of an incident or activity. SEPTA has also investigated technological solutions, but Mr. Abel believes that nothing is foolproof. Reliability and false positives are major considerations because he strongly believes that if SEPTA is going to use technology, it needs to work as needed all the time. In general, he saw technologies struggling to adapt to the public transportation environment and felt that focusing on the human element through education is the best thing for SEPTA at this time. Source: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, SEPTA System Safety Twitter Page (143). Figure 86. SEPTA safety education bus.

152 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way SEPTA has a See Something Say Something app that is designed specifically for the police. The app allows for non-verbal interaction with the police, which Mr. Abel believes helps people report concerns without putting themselves in harm’s way. SEPTA already has officers on the system, so the app notifications get officers to the proper locations quicker, often assisted by holding trains in stations or other operational actions. Mr. Abel believes SEPTA has experienced a lot of success with the app. Finally, SEPTA is undertaking training employees to support identifying and handling tres- pass and suicide situations. SEPTA is training train operators to identify and report trespassing incidents, with the agency working to communicate back to the operator about how the report is being addressed. Closing the loop through communication back to the operator is seen as a posi- tive action to demonstrate to the operators that their reports are being taken seriously. SEPTA has seen trespassing reporting dramatically increase since initiating the training. Additionally, all police officers are trained in crisis intervention, basically providing them with the skills necessary to deal with trespassers and individuals who may be looking to do self- harm. Cashiers in stations are now being trained to identify suspicious activity and behavior and report them to the police. TxDOT Rail Division Background Luke Chisenhall is the current manager of the Texas State Rail Safety Inspections Program, which inspects rail activity covered by FRA regulations, including commuter rail. He was for- merly with DART and was the director of TxDOT’s Rail Safety Section, which included the State Safety Oversight program. He is also a member of the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices Railroad and Light Rail Transit and Signals Technical Committees. The research team contacted Mr. Chisenhall to gather information based on his experiences. Case Study Findings Based on his experience at DART, Mr. Chisenhall explained that DART used a risk matrix to identify hotspots and mitigation strategies to reduce risks to acceptable levels. He also reported during his time with the agency that trespassing issues were found with the following: • Joggers used the rail lines because much of DART’s system was built on old freight rail lines that had not been operational for years, so people were not used to trains being present. He found simply providing an easy-to-access dedicated trail or sidewalk can help with pedestri- ans on the right-of-way. • Grade crossings were handled by the installation of CCTV cameras. He also said that dedi- cated pedestrian crossings should be used and that they should be inviting to use. • Tunnels were also handled with CCTV cameras. • The population of those experiencing homelessness in the yard was monitored by CCTV cameras. Many of these issues are handled by the police, who are informed of issues by dispatchers who have been notified by the train operators. Operators could also use whistles, bells, and horns to warn active trespassers. He also reported that while he was at DART, the agency investigated the use of an intrusion detection system that could detect debris that falls on the track, usually from vehicle overpasses, as well as trespassers in tunnels. In addition, he reported that trespassing problems differ based on trespassing location, such as trespassing at a grade crossing versus entering randomly along the right-of-way. He also

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 153   found that having a dedicated police force is very important and that events need immediate attention so the behavior does not continue or expand, including children walking across tracks to get to school. He mentioned that if fencing is used, small gaps have to be eliminated. He had a situation where a small gap existed between the end of the fence and handrails of overpasses that allowed school children to fit through. He discussed that station designs should factor in end loading, which could invite people to act improperly. Last, he said that paving between tracks in urban areas makes them more pedestrian-friendly and recommended adding ballast or rock to reduce this issue. Houston Observations In early December 2020, the principal investigator, Jeff Warner, traveled to the Houston area, which allowed him to observe the Houston light rail line. Figure 87 through Figure 91 show some observations and images from that trip. Summary of Case Study Findings The research team held successful case study meetings with the five U.S. and two non-North American primary case study agencies and several additional secondary agencies. These case studies provided a wealth of information on trespassing and current mitigation strategies being used by agencies. The main mitigation strategy findings from the case studies include fencing, cameras, intrusion detection systems, and employee training. Almost all agencies mentioned the use of fencing for trespass prevention. This included inter- track fencing placed between rail tracks, along rights-of-way, and around certain facilities and equipment. Though fencing was generally considered effective, the agencies also highlighted particular concerns, including the trapping of trespassers within the right-of-way, maintenance requirements, and installation costs. Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 87. The raised median between vehicular traffic and tracks and fencing and landscaping to deter pedestrians from crossing mid-block.

154 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 88. Fencing to direct patrons to enter the station from the crosswalk and not cut across tracks. Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 89. Poles with chains between them to direct pedestrians to enter the station at the crosswalk. Most agencies were pursuing expansion of their camera installations, and a few were looking to install or pilot advanced intrusion detection systems. The major concerns with expanding both technologies were increased workload requirements due to increased monitoring require- ments and false positives. Conversely, smart cameras and detection systems could also reduce the workload burden if “smart enough.” False positives unnecessarily pull critical resources and reduce the confidence in the technology, and as a result, some agencies were removing previ- ously installed intrusion detection systems. Almost every agency was implementing employee training to assist in the recognition of suicidal behaviors. Because many people are impacted by suicide, the training seemed to be well received by employees due to its usefulness outside of work. At these training discussions,

Case Study Selection Methodology and Findings 155   Figure 91. Noticeable trail between landscaping and an electrical box. Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. stories of intervention by observant staff members were cited. The employees make a positive contribution to the overall environment of the organization, whether through their daily pres- ence or their one-time interaction with customers. These strategies are challenging to quan- tify, yet stories of staff members stepping in to help a regular customer who did not respond in the usual way when greeted with a “good morning” and a smile are evidence of lifesaving interventions. Trespassers can cause operational disruptions beyond those caused by strikes. ProRail noted operational requirements to reduce speeds to 40 km/h (25 mph) if a trespasser is spotted in the right-of-way. These types of disruptions cause ripple effects that impact the entire system. Photo Credit: Jeffery E. Warner. Figure 90. Poles with chains between them, along with landscaping between the tracks, to deter pedestrians from crossing over the stretch of line.

156 Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way Every agency relayed the urgent need to address problems as soon as possible. Unfixed fences, uncleaned graffiti, and unaddressed behaviors will likely result in more of those activities in the future. The importance of police department involvement was discussed by every agency. Several discussed recent initiatives to perform regular right-of-way assessments to identify and document concerns. Finally, reports by train operators, field supervisors, maintenance crews, and the public all contribute data that can be incorporated into risk assessments. There seems to be a shift away from concealing suicide events to providing a means by which people can get help instead. Many agencies have started this transition by partnering with local or national suicide prevention entities, usually through the placement of signs or public mes- sage campaigns. The QPR employee training efforts are an additional action that agencies are taking. The whiteboard messaging in the London Underground is a clever approach to offering positive messages. Last, although not part of this project, almost every agency mentioned, without being prompted, that they experience instances where cars are driving onto the tracks, most likely due to GPS directions. LIRR mentioned a collision a few years ago that resulted in the car and train both catching fire, so, understandably, this hazard is at the top of agencies’ concerns.

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Trespassing on rail transit and commuter rail rights-of-way is a longstanding issue impacting every agency.

The TRB Transit Cooperative Research Program's TCRP Research Report 233: Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 2: Research Overview provides guidance on strategies to deter trespassing on rail transit and commuter rail rights-of-way.

This report is a supplement to TCRP Research Report 233: Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way, Volume 1: Guidebook.

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