3
Governance

Governance of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) requires both a command structure and decision structure. Command structure determines organization hierarchy and interrelationships across organizations, whereas decision structure focuses on decision-making and execution. As a multi-platform, multi-system construct, the command structure of ABMS falls under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ). When Department of the Air Force (DAF) leaders in 2019 reintroduced ABMS as an integrated system of systems in support of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) framework, they selected a Chief Architect to “create and manage family of systems trade space, design margins, and define interfaces and standards to ensure interoperability across domains and permissive to highly contested environments.”² He was also tasked with coordinating the disparate

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¹D. Allvin, 2021, “Why We Need the Advanced Battle Management System,” DefenseOne, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/why-we-need-advanced-battle-management-system/173861/, May 6.

² A. McCullough, 2019, “ABMS Expected to Pick Up Speed with New Chief Architect in Place,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/abms-expected-to-pick-up-speed-with-new-chief-architect-in-place/, March 10.

activities of individual programs (that feed into ABMS) led by program managers with their own funding and performance schedules.

In November 2020, the former SAF/AQ directed that ABMS management be transferred from the Chief Architect’s Office to the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (DAF RCO) as the integrating Program Executive Office (PEO). “Warfighters are now ready to field and operationalize specific ABMS capabilities across their mission areas. Consequently, ABMS is now graduating into a steady-state demonstration-deployment phase.”³

Under this new command structure, the DAF RCO, tasked as the ABMS PEO, is responsible for:

• Drafting the ABMS acquisition strategy and subsequent changes in coordination with the Chief Architect;
• Accomplishing a comprehensive business review conducted by the Air Force Audit Agency that will inform the ABMS acquisition strategy;
• Drafting overarching ABMS architectures and standards for the Chief Architect’s approval, while the ABMS PEO will have approval authority for all lower-level standards not at the system level;
• Chairing all design reviews below the ABMS architecture review board (ARB);
• Delivering and integrating all ABMS capabilities for inclusion in architecture evaluation on-ramps; and
• Executing the ABMS program according to the approved ABMS acquisition strategy and ARB decisions.

The Chief Architect will:

• Codify ABMS technical requirements derived from the Air Force and Space Force Service Chief-approved requirements documents and on-ramp results;
• Facilitate an integrating enterprise digital architecture and standards across the DAF, Combatant Commands, partnering Services, agencies, and other mission partners;
• Chair the ABMS ARB between on-ramps;
• Provide inputs to the ABMS acquisition strategy;
• Engage with both DAF senior stakeholders and external senior stakeholders to ensure unity of effort and division of engagement responsibilities; and

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³W. Roper, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System Management Construct,” Memorandum for Record, https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2020/nov/11242020_abms.pdf, November 24.

• Establish and provide model-based systems engineering (MBSE) and other collaboration tools across the DAF to enable digital engineering.

The Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) will:

• Retain decision authority for all aspects of ABMS to include approving both the ABMS technical architecture and acquisition strategy and all subsequent changes; and
• Resolve differences between the Chief Architect, ABMS PEO, and related PEOs.⁴

The committee supports this governance structure and considers it a positive progression consistent with the evolving nature of a complex system like ABMS. The DAF RCO has a solid record for developing, acquiring, and fielding critical combat capabilities through the use of commercial technologies and equipment, defense-wide technology development efforts, and accelerated acquisition methods to counter the increasing pace of the threat evolution. In its nearly 20-year history, the DAF RCO has successfully developed sophisticated and advanced weapons systems to include the X-37B orbital test vehicle, B-21 Raider long-range strike bomber, an unmanned space test platform for the U.S. Space Force, a surface-to-air missile system, and other highly classified systems.⁵

Beyond the roles and responsibilities detailed by the SAF/AQ, it is important to note that the command structure to maintain and sustain ABMS also needs to be defined and established before the end of the initial deployment. Roles, responsibilities, and funding schemes for maintenance and sustainment need to be defined for the system to thrive past initial deployment.

From a decision-making structure, ABMS requires more than just internal-DAF coordination and approvals. As a contributor to the JADC2 framework, ABMS requires inter-Service and multi-national coordination with America’s partners and allies guided by a set of mutually agreed upon operating standards and policies. This will require a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)-level governance structure with true decision-making authorities. The current JADC2 cross functional team (CFT) led by the J6 includes too many participants and is not sufficiently empowered to make needed high-level decisions. Instead, a higher-level, joint decision-making body needs to be established to provide cross-Service decisions regarding command authorities for all domain operations, human-machine decisions, interoperability, and shared technologies. The challenge that JADC2 presents is that each

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⁴W. Roper, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System Management Construct.”

⁵ See U.S. Air Force, 2020, “Rapid Capabilities Office Fact Sheet,” https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2424302/rapid-capabilities-office/, November 23.

Service, combatant command, and DoD agency is developing its own command and control (C2) system with minimal coordination and deconfliction. The end result is a multitude of disconnected, stove-piped networks that may not interoperate in a multi-domain environment.

Governance during operations is also of concern. While the new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) has been developed, it remains unclear how data flows to desired actions will be prioritized using JADC2 supported systems. For example, a central thrust of JADC2 is to compress the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop by optimizing the flow of data. However, in the context of a global positioning system (GPS)-denied, electronic warfare (EW), or cyber-compromised environments, it is unclear how decision-making will be conducted, particularly if data is transported through automation.

Moreover, tactical level integration requires that all-domain operations continue after communications with the joint headquarters have been denied. Distributed units must possess both the understanding and authority to act under general commander’s intent in the absence of more-specific command orders. This will require significant rethinking of the distribution and assignment of authorities, particularly when operational decisions have the potential to escalate conflicts between nuclear powers. More importantly, considerations of trust must be evaluated and balanced against risks: Where and how will the military rely on and accept the information and abilities of unknown or new agents, especially when lives and major assets are at stake? Can lower echelons be entrusted to make strategic-level decisions? These issues are further complicated when multi-national partners are factored into the decision-making space.⁶

Another issue of concern is that each military Service is developing and selecting C2 solutions outside their domain of control with the intent of resolving joint mission requirements. Already, Army leaders have expressed concerns that ground troops cannot adopt an air-centric command system for future all-domain operations. According to the former Deputy Commanding General of the Army Futures Command and the Director of the Futures and Concepts Center, “ABMS cannot be the sole solution, because it doesn’t account for, in some cases, the scale or the unique requirements of all the other services. … Army scaling issues have to be considered in any kind of framework that’s put together in the future. Other services might be looking at the scale of hundreds, where the Army is looking at

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⁶ See W. Perkins and A. Olivieri, 2018, “On Multi-Domain Operations: Is NATO Today Sufficiently ‘Joint’ to Begin Discussions Regarding Multi-Domain Command and Control?” The Journal of the (JPACC) Joint Air Power Competence Centre, (26):16–23, https://www.japcc.org/on-multi-domain-operations/.

a scale of thousands.”⁷ The committee sees the resolution of these issues as central to ABMS and the larger JADC2 framework.

FINDING 15: The current JADC2 CFT led by the J6 is a positive first step, but it includes too many participants and is not sufficiently empowered to make needed high-level decisions.

RECOMMENDATION 20: The Joint Staff J6 or a designated U.S. Department of Defense executive agent should establish an authoritative Joint-level body to address and resolve technical, operational, and command decisions for all contributors to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework.

ORGANIZATION INTEGRATION

Beyond the technical challenges of establishing a joint C2 environment, integrating the wide-ranging ABMS ecosystem within JADC2 will require both organizational and human considerations. From an organizational perspective, ABMS requires the ability to work across military Services, defense agencies, and multi-national partners, each with its own distinct culture and operating norms. Incompatibility between organizations will require the commitment of the military Services—both individually and collectively—to resolve. To break down these vertical silos and achieve meaningful and effective joint interoperability at all levels, from tactical to strategic, DoD needs to create a unified vision supported by common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The J6 CFT is positive first step in advancing a common understanding of joint interoperability and setting universal standards, but more needs to be accomplished. This is an area where industry practices may provide a useful guide.

Large organizations tend to be characterized by autonomous units that are either unwilling or unable to coordinate and integrate with other units.⁸ Individuals within a division tend to interact more within their own units than with outside groups. This results in fragmentation, division, and disconnection within the broader organization—in essence, creating organizational silos. There are three

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⁷ S.J. Freedberg, Jr., 2020, “ABMS Can’t Be ‘Sole Solution’ for Joint C2, Army Tells Air Force—Exclusive,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/abms-cant-be-sole-joint-c2-solution-army-tells-air-force-exclusive/, January 22.

⁸ See A.C. Edmondson, S. Jang, and T. Casciaro, 2019, “Cross-Silo Leadership,” Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2019/05/cross-silo-leadership, May-June, and S. Billingsley, 2021, “Organizational Silos,” LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/organizational-silos-scott-billingsley/, May 27.

common influences that result in silos: internal, organizational, and external, which interact to further reinforce the strength of the silos.⁹

Within the DoD community, internal influences are characterized by each military Service’s and agency’s structure and culture; organizational influences are the TTPs and operating norms that are specific to the program unit; and the external environment comprise of requirements from combatant commanders, multi-national partners, other military Services, federal agencies, among others. Each influence imposes on the core unit that ultimately reinforces an insular, parochial, and stove-piped structure. When overlaid with a complex framework like JADC2, the process of overcoming Service-centric silos becomes more challenging.

In order to achieve an effective and interoperable (not just complementary) joint C4 enterprise architecture, organizational and cultural barriers need to be lowered through horizontal integration. The challenge of interconnecting cross-Service networks may be resolved through technological advancements, but the challenge of interconnecting cross-Service organizations requires social integration to develop cooperative partnerships and trust. Effective horizontal integration requires leaders to “connect the [organization’s] knowledge bases, build social relationships among people and shape a shared sense of identity, all supported by a standardized technological infrastructure.”¹⁰ This may be accomplished through four areas of action:

• Operational integration through standardization of the technological infrastructure;
• Intellectual integration through the development of a shared knowledge base;
• Social integration through collective bonds for performance; and
• Emotional integration through the creation of a common identity and purpose.¹¹

Figure 3.1 provides a framework for considering organizational integration. To further decompose vertical silos, industry employs six basic steps:

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⁹ Select Strategy, LLC, 2002, “Improving Performance by Breaking Down Silos: Understanding Organizational Barriers,” https://selectstrategy.com/download/Breaking%20down%20organizational%20barriers.pdf.

¹⁰ S. Ghoshal and L. Gratton, 2002, “Integrating the Enterprise,” MIT Sloan Management Review, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/integrating-the-enterprise/, October 15.

¹¹ S. Ghoshal and L. Gratton, 2002, “Integrating the Enterprise,” MIT Sloan Management Review, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/integrating-the-enterprise/, October 15, p. 33.

1. Communicate a unified vision;
2. Create shared accountabilities;
3. Bring teams together;
4. Get leaders on board;
5. Incorporate collaboration tools; and
6. Shift mindsets and behavior with training.¹²

For ABMS and other contributors to JADC2, the shared mission to sustain the Joint Force’s military advantages by helping decision makers to act on information well inside the adversaries’ OODA loop provides a unifying vision upon which to act. Leaders across all of DoD are fully supportive of JADC2 and have worked jointly to advance the concept through inter-Service agreements and ex-

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¹² I. Cornett, 2018, “6 Strategies for Breaking Down Silos in Your Organization,” Eagle’s Flight, https://www.eaglesflight.com/blog/6-strategies-for-breaking-down-silos-in-your-organization, October 25.

perimentations.¹³ For example, the Air Force and Naval Studies Boards at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are hosting an inter-Service meeting between the Air Force and Navy to discuss their contributions to JADC2. The meeting builds on the ongoing partnership between the DAF RCO and the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) to establish integrated approaches between ABMS and Project Overmatch.¹⁴ The J6’s leadership on JADC2 and the participation of various stakeholders in the CFT encourages even greater collaboration and shared accountabilities. What is missing, however, are shifting individual mindsets and behavior with training and incentives to forego entrenched organizational cultures and control for the wider good of the joint and multi-national defense ecosystem.

FINDING 16: ABMS and JADC2 will require both horizontal and vertical integration across capabilities, functions, organizations, command echelons, among others. This is more than just a technical problem to be solved by technical systems but includes aspects of workforce-system integration, training, trust, ownership, and control as well as underlying social aspects that have yet to be addressed.

FINDING 17: Integrating the JADC2 enterprise will be a continuous and evolving process. This process will require two parallel streams. The first will be the system evolution that addresses changes in technology, the environment, emerging threats, mission requirements, and relevant tools needed to support the second stream: evolution of the TTPs and related organizational, social, and emotional challenges.

RECOMMENDATION 21: The Joint Chiefs and military department secretaries should tackle the cultural, social, and emotional barriers to true Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) horizontal integration if the Advanced Battle Management System and the larger Joint All-Domain Command and Con-

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¹³ See for example A. Eversden, 2020, “US Army, Air Force Sign Agreement to Develop Joint All-Domain Concept,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2020/10/05/us-army-air-force-sign-agreement-to-develop-joint-all-domain-concept/, October 5, J. Koester, 2020, “JADC2 ‘Experiment 2’ Provides Looking Glass into Future Experimentation,” Army News, https://www.army.mil/article/234900/jadc2_experiment_2_provides_looking_glass_into_future_experimentation, April 23, and T. Hitchens, 2020, “Air Force Chief Seeks Navy Chief’s Cooperation on JADC2,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/air-force-chief-seeks-navy-chiefs-cooperation-on-jadc2/, October 21.

¹⁴ D.W. Small, 2021, “Project Overmatch,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 3, and R. Walden, 2021, “ABMS Perspectives from the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 22.

trol constructs are to enable the truly joint and multi-national integrated operations envisioned by the JWC.

HUMAN FACTORS

While ABMS is intended to deliver the “decision advantage,” humans remain central to decision-making. According to the Vice Chief of the Air Force, “ABMS [is] a way for humans and algorithms to manage mass quantities of data securely from multiple sources through multiple domains that is ingested, fused, processed, and presented in a manner useful to commanders.”¹⁵ For highly strategic decisions such as NC3, humans are even more vital and cannot easily be replaced by machines.¹⁶

Evolving the current technical and operational environment to fulfill the vision of all-domain operations will require significant changes at both the human and technical levels. The extent of the changes in just one of these dimensions—let alone on both dimensions concurrently—will require increased and expanded levels of trust and verification. Examples of broadened activities requiring expanded levels of trust include sensors and shooter access and prioritized use of scarce communications, spectrum, and computing resources. Coupled with advancements in AI and technology that allow humans to take advantage of operations at machine speed, there are multiple implications for ABMS and future military operations.

Human Systems Integration

As highlighted by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), “AI cannot magically solve problems.… Harnessing data, hardening and packaging laboratory algorithms so they are ready for use in the field, and adapting AI software to legacy equipment and rigid organizations all require time, effort, and patience. Integrating AI often necessitates overcoming substantial organizational and cultural barriers, and it demands top-down leadership.”¹⁷ To integrate humans with AI/machine learning (ML) in the context of ABMS and JADC2, considerations must be given to training, tools and methodologies, system operations, occupational health and safety, and ethics.¹⁸

According to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,

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¹⁵D. Allvin, 2021, “Why We Need the Advanced Battle Management System.”

¹⁶ See R.K.C. Hersman, E. Brewer, and S. Claeys, 2020, “NC3 Challenges Facing the Future System,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/207009_NC3_Challenges_Facing_Future_System_v7.pdf, July.

¹⁷NSCAI, 2021, “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” p. 21.

¹⁸ See National Research Council, 2007, Human-System Integration in the System Development Process: A New Look, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC.

Humans are included in their roles as operators, designers, maintainers, engineers, while systems include hardware, software, and design, acquisition, security, and other processes.²⁰

The dual goals of HSI are to (1) achieve human performance effectiveness during all stages of the system’s life cycle to include testing, operation, maintenance, support, transport, demilitarization, and disposal; and (2) ensure overall human performance possesses the necessary knowledge and competencies to support mission tasking.²¹ As a management framework, HSI facilitates trade-offs among its seven domains and other systems engineering domains, but does not replace individual domain activities, responsibilities, or reporting channels.²² More importantly, HSI enables the collection of quantifiable and measurable impacts to overall system design.²³

Within ABMS, the complexities of integrating almost 30 different product lines with operators, engineers, developers, testers, trainers, and others is a daunting challenge. “There’s so many people in between information, moving between different nodes in the decision chain … the idea with ABMS is that the people are no longer the glue. The information flows everywhere all at once. The people are the assessors, the analyzers, the feedback providers that help the analytics … to be better and better.”²⁴ HSI can thus provide a robust framework for ensuring that

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¹⁹ DDR&E (U.S. Department of Defense Research and Engineering Enterprise), “Human Systems Integration,” https://ac.cto.mil/hsi/, accessed September 18, 2021.

²⁰ DAU (Defense Acquisition University), “Human Systems Integration,” https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!489, accessed September 18, 2021.

²¹ Ibid.

²² DDR&E, “Human Systems Integration.”

²³ See USAF Directorate of Human Performance Integration, “Air Force Human Systems Integration Handbook,” https://www.acqnotes.com/Attachments/Air%20Force%20Human%20System%20Integration%20Handbook.pdf, and USAF Human Systems Integration Office, 2009, “Human Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide,” September.

²⁴ S. Maucione, 2020, “Air Force Using Agile Approach to Connect Systems for Battle,” Federal News Network, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/air-force/2020/01/air-force-using-agile-approach-to-connect-systems-for-battle/, January 21.

ABMS design and development can effectively integrate human capabilities and limitations.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should incorporate human systems integration methodologies into the Advanced Battle Management System to ensure that all human users are fully and effectively integrated with current and future systems elements.

Training, Culture, and Other Considerations

ABMS is more than just a technical problem to be solved by AI and advanced technologies. It requires training and an emphasis on culture and awareness, particularly because it involves working with sister Services and multi-national partners and allies. As previously discussed, organizational silos across the DoD limit effective communication, collaboration, and interoperability. However, this challenge is further compounded by rigid boundaries between select warfighting communities, because the TTPs within these communities are so distinct. When coupled with participation from multi-national partners and allies, cultural, geographical, and language barriers exacerbate the difficulties of achieving effective coordination, compatibility, and ultimately, interoperability.

Another area that demands further attention is ethical use in AI. The DoD introduced in 2020 five guiding principles for ethical development of AI capabilities:

• Responsible: DoD personnel will exercise appropriate levels of judgment and care while remaining responsible for the development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities;
• Equitable: The department will take deliberate steps to minimize unintended biases in AI capabilities;
• Traceable: The department’s AI capabilities will be developed and deployed such that relevant personnel possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development, processes, and operational methods applicable to AI capabilities, including with transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedures and documentation;
• Reliable: The department’s AI capabilities will have explicit, well-defined uses, and the safety, security, and effectiveness of such capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance within those defined uses across their entire life cycles; and
• Governable: The department will design and engineer AI capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the ability to detect and

• avoid unintended consequences, and the ability to disengage or deactivate deployed systems that demonstrated unintended behavior.²⁵

As ABMS seeks to leverage AI to enhance and accelerate decision-making, questions concerning ethical use will likely emerge. The level of human engagement in decision-making must continue to align with the DoD Directive on Autonomy in Weapons Systems²⁶ and the law of war.²⁷ Furthermore, the consideration of potential accidents, human-machine errors and miscues, and even sabotage need to be carefully evaluated. The challenge is balancing the need and associated risks for accelerated decision-making with accuracy, reliability, and precision.

One way to ameliorate misguided AI conclusions is to provide more diverse data samples and broader context to the data. Another approach is to use hyper-

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²⁵ C.T. Lopez, 2020, “DoD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” DoD News, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics/, February 25.

²⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” DoD Directive 3000.09, Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017, pp. 2–3, https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf, November 21. This directive states, “It is DoD policy that … autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.… Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE).… Human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to select and engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as targets, for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for: (a) Static defense of manned installations. (b) Onboard defense of manned platforms.… Autonomous weapon systems may be used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force, such as some forms of electronic attack, against materiel targets in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.03E.… Autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon systems intended to be used in a manner that falls outside the policies … must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)); the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); and the CJCS before formal development and again before fielding.”

²⁷ General Counsel of the DoD, 2015, Department of Defense Law of War Manual updated December 2016, p. 353, https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/department_of_defense_law_of_war_manual.pdf, June, which states that “Although no law of war rule specifically restricts the use of autonomy in weapon systems, other rules may apply to weapons with autonomous functions. For example, to the extent a weapon system with autonomous functions falls within the definition of a ‘mine’ in the [Convention against Chemical Weapons] CCW Amended Mines Protocol, it would be regulated as such. In addition, the general rules applicable to all weapons would apply to weapons with autonomous functions. For example, autonomous weapon systems must not be calculated to cause superfluous injury or be inherently indiscriminate.”

parameter tuning to refine the algorithm.²⁸ Cross-validation may also be used to separate data into various partitions and train multiple algorithms on these partitions to improve the soundness of the model.²⁹ Furthermore, a different algorithm or sets of algorithms may be required to better fit the data set.³⁰ Last, to keep pace with increased computing power and emerging technologies that complement AI, streamlined acquisition processes and improved TTPs may also be warranted.

In spite of improvements with AI data accuracy, one industry survey on AI and big data found the primary obstacles for large organizations to successfully transition to modern, data-centric environments are cultural rather than technical.³¹ For this reason, training and the creation of a cadre of highly qualified experts (HQEs) that together bring a combination of policy, operations, and technical expertise is needed. Areas for specific focus may include the following:

• AI/ML: These rapidly developing technologies have a significant role in command, control, and communications (C3) at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Creating capabilities and using them effectively will require a broad range of knowledge and skillsets to include concepts of operations to data management, and from cybersecurity to testing.
• MBSE: As mentioned in the section on MBSE in Chapter 2, MBSE provides a robust framework for reducing development risk, improving system performance, institutionalizing rigor and precision into the design process, and enhancing knowledge transfer. This is particularly true for key cross-cutting capabilities, such as operational performance and cybersecurity. With ABMS’s reliance on DevSecOps, it will be important to ensure that developers do not make incremental improvements to obsolete and un-evolvable technologies or develop applications that are incompatible with the broader architecture framework. While even the most seasoned engineers cannot be

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²⁸ See A. Lee, 2019, “Why You Should Do Feature Engineering First, Hyperparameter Tuning Second as a Data Scientist,” Towards Data Science, https://towardsdatascience.com/why-you-should-do-feature-engineering-first-hyperparameter-tuning-second-as-a-data-scientist-334be5eb276c, April 21, and Prabhu, 2018, “Understanding Hyperparemeters and Its Optimisation techniques,” Toward Data Science, https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-hyperparameters-and-its-optimisation-techniques-f0debba07568, July 3.

²⁹ See L. Quintanilla, N. Schonning, and N. Kershaw, 2021, “Train a Machine Learning Model Using Cross Validation,” Microsoft, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/machine-learning/how-to-guides/train-machine-learning-model-cross-validation-ml-net, October 5.

³⁰ See L. Quintanilla, B. Achtman, B. Ozdemir, N. Schonning, Y. Victor, and N. Kershaw, 2021, “How to Choose an ML.NET Algorithm,” Microsoft, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/machine-learning/how-to-choose-an-ml-net-algorithm, March 31.

³¹ See New Vantage Partners, 2021, “Big Data and AI Executive Survey 2021,” New Vantage Partners, LLC, https://c6abb8db-514c-4f5b-b5a1-fc710f1e464e.filesusr.com/ugd/e5361a_d59b4629443945a0b0661d494abb5233.pdf.

• expected to know all about this vast evolving ecosystem, training a cadre of experienced engineers who understands MBSE can provide an essential link between visionary concepts and planned architectures with executable operational and development baselines.
• Cybersecurity: ABMS is intended to be an Internet of Things (IoT). Shared access across dispersed networks, platforms, and classifications exposes the ecosystem’s vulnerabilities and subject it to potential cyberattacks. Training experts who are knowledgeable in cutting-edge cyber defense software and technologies is thus critical to protecting ABMS from malicious attacks and intrusion.
• Intelligence: The threat environment is changing rapidly with the influx of inexpensive and advanced commercial technologies that enable adversaries to adapt quickly to erode the United States’ decision superiority. The need for intelligence analysts and assessors (i.e., those who can accurately and credibly assess the threats posed by adversaries and other malicious actors) is vital. Technology in itself cannot solve the security challenge. It may help to shorten the OODA loop cycle, but a lack of understanding regarding true adversarial capabilities and intent will weaken America’s stance even further.³²
• Red teaming: ABMS is designed to evolve with the emergence of newer and more advanced technologies and with changes in the threat environment. As such, testing and evaluation methodologies must remain fluid and dynamic to adjust to changes in the technological and security environments.
• Military operations: Technical HQEs must be augmented by experts that understand what ABMS and JADC2 is trying to accomplish. These are the warfighters, commanders, operators, and end users who conduct military operations and understand their needs, challenges, functions, and TTPs.
• Culture: ABMS and JADC2 are intended to work as a globally integrated force without regard to geographic and organizational boundaries. This requires not only working with 11 combatant commanders, but the participation of multi-national partners and allies, as well. Establishing a cadre of analysts and operators who possess knowledge and understanding regarding the TTPs, cultural etiquette, languages, and norms of ally services and partners will be critical for ensuring seamless and coordinated operations within an all-domain operating environment.

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³² See D. Sukman and C. Davis, 2020, “Divided We Fall: How the U.S. Force Is Losing Its Joint Advantage Over China and Russia,” Military Review, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2020/Sukman-Divided/, March-April.

FINDING 18: ABMS cannot be resolved by technology alone. Non-materiel aspects of DOTMLPF-P must also be addressed.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The Department of the Air Force’s Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements should consider and weave personnel, cultural, training, and other non-materiel doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy issues into designs and implementation plans for the broader Advanced Battle Management System ecosystem.

FINDING 19: The broad applications of automation and AI envisioned in ABMS (and JADC2) raise ethical risks and considerations given they involve removing humans from phases in the kill chains and other significant operations.

RECOMMENDATION 24: Civilian and military leaders in the Department of the Air Force, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the ethical use of artificial intelligence is examined and addressed in the Advanced Battle Management System’s (and in other systems supporting the broader Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework’s) design, operation, staffing, and training, as dictated by policy and the law of war.

RECOMMENDATION 25: The Air Education Training Command should establish a curriculum that would train or recruit highly qualified experts in artificial intelligence/machine learning, model-based systems engineering, cybersecurity, intelligence assessment, and test and evaluation for information technology, software, and hardware who can work with experts in military operations and culture.