4
Challenges and Opportunities

As an evolving family of systems construct, the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) requires both technical and non-technical solutions. While significant progress has been made to transition ABMS from on-ramp demonstrations and experimentations to fielding specified solutions through capability releases, the evolving nature of the threat environment necessitates continuous security enhancements, software and hardware refreshes and upgrades, and the introduction of newer and more advanced technologies. As such, the committee is able to provide only an assessment of ABMS technology and planned system integration architecture as it exists during the committee’s review. The committee has identified two high-level areas for further consideration. Additional insights are provided in the accompanying classified annex.

INTEROPERABILITY

There are many barriers—technical, organizational, cultural, and procedural—to achieving universal interoperability, which have been discussed in preceding chapters. One of the greatest technical hurdles is linking all systems to all domains and ensuring their interoperability. A 2015 study found that interconnected systems are subject to the CACE principle: changing anything changes everything.¹ “Op-

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¹ D. Sculley, G. Holt, D. Golovin, E. Davydov, T. Phillips, D. Ebner, V. Chaudhary, and M. Young, 2015, “Machine Learning: The High-Interest Credit Card of Technical Debt,” Advanced in Neural Information Processing Systems 28 (NIPS 2015).

erational reliance on the combination of separate systems increases vulnerability to emergent effects. It creates a strong entanglement: improving an individual component model may actually make the system accuracy worse if the remaining errors are more strongly correlated with the other components.”²

Moreover, joint integration does not equate to interoperability, and past evidence has shown that joint integration only results in deconfliction or synergy.³ For ABMS and other contributors to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) framework, developing an elegant solution that would integrate all systems across all domains remains challenging.

To achieve JADC2-level interoperability, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should consider the following:

• Establish a DoD executive agent (EA) or joint program office (JPO) to set common operational and data standards. This does not mean that all systems need to be built to the same technical specifications. However, it does require the systems to have the ability to interoperate outside of their Service-centric domains. The EA or JPO would provide guidance and oversight for the systems in development; prioritize requirements in concert with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC); and promote the use of open architecture standards.
• Promote the use of open system architecture (OSA) to facilitate modularity and interoperability among the systems. To achieve cross-Service and multi-domain compatibility, the DoD EA or JPO needs to identify an adaptable and customizable OSA that can be tailored specifically to the Service’s unique requirements, while also permitting the system to interoperate with other systems in the JADC2 framework.
• Promote the use of model-based systems engineering (MBSE) to reduce development risk and improve system performance across all systems.
• Partner with industry and other government agencies to adopt best practices, particularly from organizations that have successfully executed large-scale, enterprise-wide digital transformation. This may include becoming members of industry associations, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), Object Management Group (OMG), among others.

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² R. Danzig, 2018, “Technology Roulette: Managing Loss of Control as Many Militaries Pursue Technological Superiority,” Center for New American Security, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Technology-Roulette-DoSproof2v2.pdf?mtime=20180628072101&focal=none, June.

³ See W.O. Odom and C.D. Hayes, 2014, “Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness,” Joint Forces Quarterly 73(2nd quarter):123–128.

• Coordinate with multi-national partners and allies to test their systems to ensure that they are complementary with the U.S. military’s ecosystem.

INTELLIGENCE

The adversaries of today and the future are highly sophisticated, diverse, and unpredictable. The range of military missions and operations that the Department of the Air Force (DAF) will have to undertake will require a broad spectrum of capabilities from tactical to strategic. “This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.… These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of the threats we face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and a transformation of how the Department conducts business.”⁴

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, technology in itself is insufficient for addressing challenges to the nation’s security. Technology, coupled with an understanding of the threats imposed, will enable improvements and shorten the timeline in the DAF’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop cycle. To achieve a realistic assessment of adversarial capabilities and intent, the DAF should consider the following:

• Establish a DAF net assessment capability (similar to OSD’s Office of Net Assessment) that could identify emerging trends, threats, and opportunities; red team and conduct wargames to test DAF capabilities; and provide independent research and analyses that leverage latest thinking and relevant historical lessons to better understand the adversaries’ doctrines, operational concepts, and technical capabilities.⁵
• Work with the U.S. Strategic Command and other Combatant Commands to connect ABMS mission requirements, to include nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), with the threat environment, and enhance the ecosystem’s capabilities as the threat environment evolves.

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⁴ DoD, 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, p. 2.

⁵ See Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense, 2020, “DoD Directive 5111.11: Director of Net Assessment,” https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/511111p.pdf, April 14.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize, the committee has categorized its recommendations into two broad categories: technical and non-technical.

Technical

RECOMMENDATION 1: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should define the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) architecture at the Joint All-Domain Command and Control level to ensure interoperability with other ABMS-like systems being developed. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 2: The Joint Staff J6 or a designated U.S. Department of Defense executive agent should establish interoperability requirements and performance metrics for all participants in Joint All-Domain Command and Control to allow for eventual integration of all capabilities. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 3: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should design the Advanced Battle Management System architecture to be modular and include open standards and interfaces that would enable configuration with other Service variants. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 4: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should design the Advanced Battle Management System’s architecture with specific technical requirements and solutions for ensuring that communications, data, and computation may continue to operate in degraded or denied access environments. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should adopt an array of data-exchange technologies that could support the entire spectrum of capabilities, from tactical to strategic. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 6: To the maximum extent possible, the Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should design and execute a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy that would encompass all elements, to include

doctrine, chain of command, policy, authorization for weapon release in a joint environment, interfaces to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, and not just select capabilities of the Advanced Battle Management System. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Joint All-Domain Command and Control cross functional team should reach immediate agreement on a common data fabric and security levels of the data with data standards and tools defined at the Joint level. Without a common set of agreed upon open standards with known interface exchange requirements that do not limit innovation, the military Services risk developing incompatible and stove-piped solutions. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 8: In coordination with the Department of the Air Force Chief Software Officer, the Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should expand the use of containerization and Kubernetes for continuous Advanced Battle Management System development and for detecting and mitigating security vulnerabilities. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 9: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should adopt development, security, and operations as the common development environment using containerization and continuous integration/continuous delivery across all of the Advanced Battle Management System. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 10: For modular open-system designs with robust interface specifications, the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should acquire performance and interface requirements instead of all intellectual property rights. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 11: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should design resilience into the Advanced Battle Management System architecture and specify dynamic criteria for needed performance. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 12: The Joint Staff’s J6, the Department of the Air Force, and the broader U.S. Department of Defense community should establish and implement a robust enterprise-wide offensive and defensive

cybersecurity strategy for Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the Advanced Battle Management System. Security is a fundamental requirement that must be designed and fully integrated into the all JADC2-supporting systems’ architecture from the start. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 13: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should apply zero trust (ZT) trust in stages as technologies mature and integrate ZT services to include the use of multi-factor authentication across all of the Advanced Battle Management System. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 14: In addition to adopting zero trust, the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should leverage the best available mature cybersecurity practices and capabilities, including multi-factor authentication; identity, credential, and access management; encryption; penetration testing; managed detection services; behavior monitoring applications; among others. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 15: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (DAF RCO) should employ the Air Force’s Mission Defense Teams to red team the Advanced Battle Management System’s cyber defenses against attacks from malicious actors. Based on these red team exercises, the DAF RCO should address vulnerabilities by bolstering and enhancing cyber defenses accordingly. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 16: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should work in partnership with the U.S. Cyber Command to address Internet of Things defense and other cyber vulnerabilities and exploits that are highlighted in the “United States Cyber Command Technical Challenge Problem Set” document. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 17: The Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should work with the Department of the Air Force’s Digital Engineering Enterprise Office to apply model-based systems engineering (MBSE) methods across Advanced Battle Management System engineering and sustainment activities and to enable MBSE to serve as a bridge between operator requirements and development teams. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 18: Building on existing activities in digital engineering and modeling and simulations, the Department of the Air Force Chief Architect’s Office and the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should expand the use of digital twins in Advanced Battle Management System development, particularly as new capabilities and technologies are introduced. (Chapter 2)

RECOMMENDATION 19: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should consider scaling the Common Mission Control Center and designate it as phase zero for the Advanced Battle Management System. (Chapter 2)

Non-Technical

RECOMMENDATION 20: The Joint Staff J6 or a designated U.S. Department of Defense executive agent should establish an authoritative Joint-level body to address and resolve technical, operational, and command decisions for all contributors to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework. (Chapter 3)

RECOMMENDATION 21: The Joint Chiefs and military department secretaries should tackle the cultural, social, and emotional barriers to true Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) horizontal integration if the Advanced Battle Management System and the larger Joint All-Domain Command and Control constructs are to enable the truly joint and multi-national integrated operations envisioned by the JWC. (Chapter 3)

RECOMMENDATION 22: The Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should incorporate human systems integration methodologies into the Advanced Battle Management System to ensure that all human users are fully and effectively integrated with current and future systems elements.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The Department of the Air Force’s Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements should consider and weave personnel, cultural, training, and other non-materiel doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy issues into designs and implementation plans for the broader Advanced Battle Management System ecosystem. (Chapter 3)

RECOMMENDATION 24: Civilian and military leaders in the Department of the Air Force, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the ethical use of artificial intelligence is examined and addressed in the Advanced Battle Management System’s (and in other systems supporting the broader Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework’s) design, operation, staffing, and training, as dictated by policy and the law of war. (Chapter 3)

RECOMMENDATION 25: The Air Education Training Command should establish a curriculum that would train or recruit highly qualified experts in artificial intelligence/machine learning, model-based systems engineering, cybersecurity, intelligence assessment, and test and evaluation for information technology, software, and hardware who can work with experts in military operations and culture. (Chapter 3)

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The vision and motivations for ABMS largely reflect conceptual and strategic needs in general terms. DoD often lacks the level of commonly available commercial information processing, storage, analysis, and sharing capabilities. ABMS on-ramp experimentations have demonstrated that such capabilities could be readily acquired to increase DAF and larger DoD capabilities.

However, the actual shortfalls of current systems in real terms, the potential gains from specific investments, and their operational implications are often classified, not clearly articulated, or yet to be determined. The ABMS effort would benefit greatly by making these more explicit—clearly articulating the as-is system (with its level of communication bandwidth, interconnectivities [or lack thereof], organizational and social interoperations, and the operational implications of the shortfalls) and the specific proposed investment options with their costs and operational benefits when proposing the next increment of the to-be system.⁶ These are the type of specific investment options being considered by the DAF RCO in their capability releases, but a broad sense of this option space needs to be developed and articulated to all stakeholders, including Congress.

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⁶ Descriptions could include these example patterns. Weapon system X cannot currently talk to weapon system Y; the operational implication of this limitation is I, and here are the cost and benefits of solving this tactical communication shortfall. Operations Center A must manually correlate information from sensors Z and W to detect incoming threats, but this takes L times longer than it takes for the threat to complete its attack. The bandwidth of Operations Center O can handle only P percentage of available intelligence and sensor information, but capacity can be readily augmented through cloud services at cost C with the improved capacity to detect and process T more threats.

In addition to the technical and governance challenges laid out in this report, there are examples of specific operational gaps and shortfalls that reveal and reinforce the need to improve joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), and sensor-to-shooter capabilities. The committee is concerned, however, that the inability to articulate the magnitude of these operational shortfalls, their implications for national defense, the range of investment options (mature and developmental), and their costs and operational benefits may lead to insufficient attention and resources, as well as inadequate attention to the larger non-technical challenges that must be addressed if the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is to be realized. The magnitude of the C4ISR shortfalls may not be reflected in the size or urgency of investments in ABMS and JADC2—in part because of a lack of clarity.

The committee also notes that DoD is often criticized for not being agile in acquiring and keeping pace with new technologies. The ABMS on-ramp experiments demonstrate the DAF’s engagement in diverse, non-traditional commercial software and infrastructure companies through agile development and prototyping. Part of the challenge of fixing requirements, design, and budgets for ABMS is that such agility conflicts with more static approaches to acquisition. Nevertheless, some level of specificity is possible (often at the classified level). For example, what are the bandwidth and processing shortfalls at specific commands, what is the cost for acquiring secure cloud (or on-premises) capabilities to bring the commands up to modern levels, and what are the resulting increases in operational capabilities? Some specificity is needed for Congress and DoD to make trade-offs and understand exactly what ABMS can and should do.

ABMS and the larger JADC2 is a major undertaking—not only technically but also organizationally, socially, and ethically. Truly joint and seamless military operation has been a vision for many decades. New advances and insights have brought the DAF and the larger DoD to the verge of realizing this vision. However, it will take dedication, cooperation, grounded reality, planning, budgeting, and a willingness to seriously tackle the broader social and ethical aspects of such an endeavor. Experiments have shown the feasibility of some steps in this direction. The rest resides with leadership and teams to address these challenges.