Continuity of Operations Planning for Small Airports (2016)

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16 CHAPTER FOUR CASE EXAMPLES This study includes nine case examples, selected from airports ranging from large hubs to general aviation (GA) airports and representing a broad range of business continuity and continuity of operations planning practices. In many cases, larger airports have developed tools that are readily accessible and easily scaled to small airports. Examples and materials from larger airports are therefore provided as a resource that can be easily adapted for use by smaller airports to improve business continuity planning. Case Examples 1 through 5 represent airports that have existing BCPs or COOPs; they include two large hub airports, two reliever airports, and one GA airport. These airports have intentionally developed a BCP/COOP for a variety of reasons to address organizational deficiencies in business continuity preparedness. Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) is the fourth busiest airport in the United States and has developed a sophisticated and costly business continuity model. However, this model includes continuity practices that can be applied by airports of any size or complexity. Case Example 2 (also involving a large hub airport) explores how continuity planning flows across a large airport authority with a system of interconnected reliever airports. Case Example 6 involves a small hub airport that values business continuity planning; although the airport has no stand- alone BCP or COOP, it incorporates continuity planning practices into existing functional plans. The airport has taken an innovative approach considered by airport officials to be appropriate for their particular set of circumstances. Case Examples 7 through 9 represent airports that have no BCP or COOP; however, they employ innovative, highly effec- tive business continuity practices that may be applicable to small airports. These airports include a non-hub primary airport, a reliever airport, and a GA airport. The procedures and tools they use are scalable and can be adapted to meet the needs of any size or category airport. The nine case examples represent a diverse group of airports, selected on the basis of effective operational recovery approaches that can be tailored to meet the needs of small airports. The information from interviews has been supplemented with survey responses and documentation provided by the airports. AIRPORTS WITH BCPs OR COOPs (CASE EXAMPLES 1 THROUGH 6) Case Example 1: Dallas/Fort Worth DFW, a large hub, is the fourth busiest airport in the United States and the eighth busiest in the world. This case example is based on an interview with Alan Black, DFW director of public safety; his responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development The trigger for the development of the airport BCP/COOP was the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or avian flu threat and the need for a pandemic plan. A consultant advised the airport to develop a BCP, including a pandemic plan as an annex. Initially, DFW wanted only a pandemic plan; however, officials made the determination to initiate an in-house effort to follow best practice by developing a more comprehensive BCP. DFW has had a BCP/COOP for 3 years (A. Black, personal communication, Oct. 14, 2015).

17 Airport BCP/COOP Planning and Coordination DFW considers its BCP/COOP to be adequately developed and implemented; the plan is maintained in an ongoing fashion. The airport’s director of public safety is the facilitator for BCP/COOP development; other staff members involved in the process are the airport manager/executive director, director of operations, Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) chief, risk manager, director of finance, director of IT, and property manager. Each department develops its own plan using a com- mon template/worksheet (Sample 4, Appendix J). A steering committee evaluates the individual plans, and the public safety department integrates them into an overall BCP/COOP. The DFW BCP/COOP is an internal document; however, the airport receives copies of all BCPs developed by tenants and other stakeholders, such as airlines, TSA, and U.S. Customs. These organizations also participate in the review of the airport’s plan. DFW critical systems and core business functions are all under the control of the airport; however, the airport does not exercise any control over tenant airline BCPs. A number of airport functions are contracted by commercial tenants and other agencies that are not under the direct control of the airport. The individual stakeholder BCPs/COOPs are coordinated with the airport’s BCP/COOP through communications and exercises. The airport is governed by a joint board that includes the mayors of Dallas and Fort Worth, but there is no specific coordination of the airport’s BCP with those of the two cities. Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity Disruptive events over the past 5 years included special events or security threats (five); aircraft accident, natural disaster, major snow event (two); regulatory concern; and activation of the AEP. DFW has also experienced utility outages, construc- tion disruptions, breakdown of critical equipment, and tenant issues. Other essential airside operational disruptions impacting runway operations have included soil and sinkhole problems, technical shortages, and other short-term disruptions. None of these events has been serious enough to trigger activation of or improvements to the airport BCP/COOP. Operational Recovery Tools and Resources Resources used by DFW for operational recovery include backup generators, essential equipment backup plans, the AEP, IROPS plans, emergency communications plan, and other stakeholder plans, coordinated with the airport as required. Airport staff receive guidance from a combination of tools such as checklists, templates, SPMs, mutual aid agreements, and SOPs. DFW values its involvement with airport-to-airport mutual aid programs such as the Western Airports Disaster Opera- tions Group (WESTDOG) and the Southeast Airports Disaster Operations Group (SEADOG). Through its participation in SEADOG and through mutual aid agreements with smaller airports and other agencies, the airport can access additional operational recovery resources in the event of a large emergency or disruption. Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluation and Maintenance The airport’s director of public safety reports that there have been no opportunities so far to assess the effectiveness of the BCP/COOP; however, if any gaps are observed regarding capabilities or limitations, plans are updated to the extent possible to address those gaps (A. Black, personal communication, Oct. 14, 2015). DFW reviews a third of the plan each year and seeks feedback to make any needed updates. The effort is coordinated by the airport’s public safety department, and interdepart- mental inputs are evaluated to address current needs. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Large hub Governance: Joint board Number of operations (2014): 679,820 annual Number of airport employees: Approximately 30,000 badged employees Part 139: Yes Budget for BCP: The cost is primarily related to staff hours devoted to maintaining the BCP/COOP. Approximate annual expenditure of $60,000.

18 The airport’s involvement with WESTDOG and SEADOG has been useful for review of airport procedures. The airport coordinates quarterly exercises with TSA, the local Public Works Department, the state Energy Department, the state Trans- portation Department, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Effective Continuity Planning Practices DFW considers the following to be effective continuity planning practices: 1. The plan is supported by top executives. 2. The plan is comprehensive, robust, and flexible. 3. The plan accounts for all essential functions. Lessons Learned The ability to hypothesize disruptive scenarios and forecast related impacts has helped clearly identify roles and responsibili- ties. Proper planning and review ensure that the airport is adequately prepared to address a wide range of operational and business disruptions. Advice to Smaller Airports Advice to smaller airports includes the following: 1. Don’t overthink it. 2. Look for the “big rocks.” 3. Have a plan (not necessarily a comprehensive or complex plan) right in the beginning. 4. After the initial plan is developed, continue to work on it as a living document and update it as needed. Summary DFW values its BCP/COOP and engages numerous individuals and departments in plan development, implementation, review, and updating. The airport allocates significant funding for this purpose. The importance of formal continuity plan- ning is summed up by Alan Black, DFW director of public safety: “I don’t know how an airport can remain profitable without one” (A. Black, personal communication, Oct. 14, 2015). Although DFW is a complex organization, every one of its continuity planning practices can be modified to meet the needs of a small airport. For example, the COOP worksheet used by DFW (Sample 4, Appendix J) can be easily scaled and adapted for use by smaller airports. The DFW’s BCP/COOP results in increased preparedness, improved recovery and response, reduced liability, decreased downtime, better relationships with tenants, and improved coordination with emergency response organizations. The entire organization benefits from transparency, collaboration, and consistency, resulting in quicker return to normalcy of the air- port’s core operational and business functions in the event of a significant disruption. Case Example 2: Metropolitan Airports Commission System The Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) owns and operates the Minneapolis–St. Paul Interna- tional Airport (MSP) and six smaller airports; the system is governed by a 15-member commission. Twelve commission members and the chair are appointed by the governor of Minnesota: eight members representing metropolitan area districts and four members representing outstate areas. The remaining two commission members are appointed by the mayors of St. Paul and Minneapolis.

19 Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport MSP is a joint civil–military, public use, large hub international airport located in Hennepin County, Minnesota. It is the 15th- busiest airport in the United States and the 44th-busiest airport in the world. MAC Reliever Airport System The MAC is a system of seven airports anchored by a large hub airport, with six smaller airports that relieve congestion at MSP and provide infrastructure for corporate and general aviation needs in the area. The MSP plans for continuity of operations and continuity of business have been developed separately, although the MAC is evaluating the feasibility of combining them in the near future. This process might also involve developing a strategy to bring the six reliever airports under the umbrella of MSP’s emergency management and continuity plans. This case example is based on an interview with Phil Burke, director of operations, and Kristin Rollwagen, emergency program manager; responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: The MAC is a seven-airport system anchored by a large hub. Governance: Authority Number of operations (2014): 412,695 annual Number of airport employees: Approximately 580 Part 139: Yes Budget for BCP/COOP: Costs for maintaining the BCP and COOP are minimal for MSP. Costs are primarily in terms of staff time to perform review and maintenance on the plans. The original BCP was developed by a contracting firm, but the exact cost was not known at the time of the interview. MAC reliever system: Six airports Number of aircraft operations: 400,000 Number of aircraft based: Approximately 1,600 Number of jobs: Approximately 2,200 Reliever system economic impact: $250,000,000 FIGURE 6 MAC reliever airports. Source: MAC website photo (http://www.macnoise. com)

20 History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development The business and operations continuity planning process evolved as an airport initiative, through which MSP also rec- ognized the need to address risk and financial management and the potential for departure of key staff members. The airport developed a BCP in 2004, hiring an outside contracting firm to develop the plan. The airport COOP was developed separately following the National Security Presidential Directive regard- ing continuity planning (NSPD-51). Planners used the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) COOP guidance and followed the criteria set forth in a 2015 Minnesota Governor’s Executive Order for COOP (MN State Executive Order 15-14). The COOP was approved in April 2015. MSP is currently revisiting its BCP, using the ACRP 93 software tool that was developed specifically to create a basic BCP for airports and is included in ACRP Report 93: Operational and Business Continuity Planning for Prolonged Airport Dis- ruptions (Corzine 2013). Both the 2004 BCP and the 2015 COOP are currently being evaluated with the intent of combining them in the near future. Airport BCP/CCOP Planning and Coordination The emergency program manager oversees the management of the COOP, while the BCP is managed by the airport’s Risk and Safety Department. The airport manager/executive director, director of operations, ARFF chief, risk manager, director of finance, and director of IT are also engaged in continuity planning, and the process has involved the airport’s Internal Audit and Compliance Office. MSP considers its BCP and COOP to be adequately developed, implemented, and maintained. The process of developing the airport COOP was very involved and took place over a 6-month period (see Sample 5, Appendix K). One person has been dedicated to the review and revision of the BCP from July 1, 2015, until the end of 2016. The process employs the ACRP Report 93 tool to involve and coordinate all airport departments. All aspects of the BCP and the COOP as they relate to airport operational and business functions are under the control of the airport; however, the airport does not control tenant plans. MSP officials foresee much challenging work ahead to coor- dinate its plans with those of airport tenants, especially as the airport is in the process of turning over the concession agree- ments to five to six operators who will oversee approximately 100 stores. The airport is coordinating business and operations continuity planning with all its tenants and hopes to incorporate the requirement into future leases, requiring tenants to plan for and meet the challenges of foreseeable disruptions. Phase I will reference continuity planning in airport lease agreements, while Phase II may require tenants to have COOPs. The airport will initiate this process with the major airlines and continue with the remaining tenants, working on emergency response procedures and coordinating/developing recovery procedures. Airport officials have visited the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, to draw on the experience of mall managers, who have coordinated with store owners for evacuation, shelter-in-place, and lockdown procedures. Each MSP reliever airport is assigned an airport manager who is responsible for working with reliever staff to bring the airport back online after an incident or disruption. The MAC is committed to providing the reliever airports with tools and support from the emergency management department to help minimize the impacts of disruptions to normal operations and business functions. Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity Over the past 5 years, MSP has experienced the following disruptions more than five times: special events, major snow events, security threats, capital improvement project funding disruptions, temporary flight restrictions, and tenant issues. On one occa- sion, the airport was unable to monitor security card readers for 6 hours, which required placing several people in strategic positions to handle the technological deficiency and enable continuity of operations. Another incident involved an unattended backpack on a ticket counter, which affected both the TSA and airline areas and disrupted operations. This situation was handled internally at first; an after-action discussion concluded that outside resources could have been called in earlier to assist. Operational Recovery Tools and Resources MSP has used backup generators, IROPS plans, and an emergency communication plan in its continuity planning. The airport has also invested in a permanent and portable floodwall system to protect against the recurring threat of flooding (see text box.). The BCP/COOP process evolved as an airport initiative, through which MSP also recognized the need to address risk and financial management and the potential for key staff departures.

21 MSP Reliever Operational Disruption St. Paul Downtown Airport St. Paul Downtown Airport (STP, Holman Field) is a busy MSP reliever airport that was affected by Mississippi River flooding in 1997 and 2001 to the point of shutting down most of the airport for multiple days. Significant flood events in both years essentially rendered the airport unusable. The 1997 flood was a 50-year event; the 2001 flood was even higher and was determined to be a 75-year event. Continuity of operations planning was used to craft a short-term and long-term recovery plan to bring the airport back online. Although STP had no formal COOP, the airport used a variety of measures and recovery practices to restore service once the floodwaters abated. In 2007, the MAC began construction of a combination permanent and portable floodwall system as a mitigation measure to reduce future losses and reduce the impact of flooding on the operation of the airport. The MAC invested millions of dollars in the floodwall system; it continues to be used as a mitigation tactic to stop the repetitive loss of service. The highest priority is to ensure a level of service at the airport, even if it means that STP has to shorten a runway or close one runway to ensure the viability of another. The MAC reports that the biggest cost for deploying the floodwall system is the amount of dedicated staff time required for planning, constructing the wall and putting the pumps in place, daily monitoring when the wall is up, and coordinating with all airport tenants during a flood. Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluations and Maintenance Although airport officials recognize the importance of the plans, they are not sure how effective they were in the past. The BCP and COOP are now on the radar in every airport department, and both are currently under review, with plans to revise them in the near future. One measure of the effectiveness of the plans is operational or business system downtime. The airport’s major flight opera- tions, numerous passengers, and commerce all contribute to an economic impact that cannot sustain disruptions. The plans will be reviewed in conjunction with the 3-year cycle of the airport’s emergency exercise program. They will be used with the exercise to determine critical recovery functions and measured against lessons learned. The plan for future exercises is to focus on more recovery processes and implementation of the BCP and COOP during events. Effective BCP/COOP Practices In addition to emergency management, the airport has involved four other primary departments with continuity planning: law enforcement, fire, operations, and field maintenance. Relying on a unified command that coordinates resources is the most effec- tive approach to minimize disruptions. Practicing and reviewing scenarios in a tabletop environment has been very beneficial. Lessons Learned Disruptions and operational shutdowns cost money. A well-developed BCP and COOP will minimize the length of time an incident or emergency will impact operations. Many people and businesses count on the airport. Merging and integrating programs appears to be beneficial in developing the overall plan. MSP is developing a strategy to bring its six reliever airports under the umbrella of the MSP emergency management plan and the COOP. This will enhance coordination and planning efficiencies among the airports in the system and provide additional resources to the smaller airports. Advice to Smaller Airports MSP considers collaboration and coordination among all parties to be very impor- tant for business and operations continuity planning. MSP recommends that other airports use best practices, documents, and existing templates and that they work with emergency management peers who have already developed a COOP. MSP is developing a strategy to bring its six reliever airports under the umbrella of the MSP emergency management plan and the COOP. Work with your emergency management peers who have already developed a COOP.

22 The airport suggests searching “Planning” and “Templates” on the FEMA COOP website (https://www.fema.gov). MSP used templates listed under “Federal Departments/Agencies” and “Non-Federal Entities,” incorporating appropriate guidance from both. Planners gathered feedback and questions from all airport departments, identified shortcomings, and developed a spreadsheet of issues to address. The next step is to establish the budgets and capital improvement projects necessary to accommodate potential disruptions. This may include planning for relocation to alternative offsite facilities, using alternative telecommunications, and other IT department arrangements. MAC officials strongly suggest that a small airport can benefit from having a champion in the organization who can lead the effort. Persons involved with continuity planning should not be afraid to ask colleagues how they have handled it or to beg, borrow, and steal from others who have completed the process (K. Rollwagen, personal communication, Oct. 13, 2015). Summary MSP is looking into implementing the tool developed under ACRP Report 93 and could provide useful guidance to other airports regarding that experience. Also, the airport is considering combining its BCP and COOP, an exercise that could be of use to other airports. And MSP’s plan to develop a strategy to bring its six reliever airports under the umbrella of its own emergency management and BCP/COOP could be useful for many smaller airports seeking to cooperate with larger airports to address their continuity needs. Case Example 3: Minden-Tahoe Airport Minden-Tahoe Airport (MEV) is a general aviation airport serving the Carson Valley in Douglas County, Nevada, including the towns of Minden, Gardnerville, and Genoa. This case example is based on an interview with Bobbi Thompson, airport manager, and responses to the survey. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: General aviation Governance: County department Number of operations (2015): 90,000 annual Number of airport employees: 8 Part 139: No Budget for BCP/COOP: The cost has been less than $10,000 per year. Costs are primarily related to staff hours required for the COOP and occasional investments required for improving communication infrastructure or acquisition. History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development Business and operations continuity planning started as part of a strategic planning initiative at the county level. MEV devel- oped the airport-specific part of the countywide COOP. The plan was developed in-house; it required coordination with the county and considerable staff hours over a period of 6 months. Airport BCP/COOP Planning and Coordination Douglas County has a committee that oversees the review and update of the countywide COOP. One section of the COOP is devoted to continuity of operations planning for the airport. The committee is assisted by the airport manager, director of operations, and the ARFF chief at Minden-Tahoe Airport. The overall COOP is a county-held document, and many of the core business support functions at the airport are provided through the county. No core functions are contracted to commercial tenants or agencies. The airport lease agreements require FBOs, 20 commercial businesses, and other tenants to comply with the countywide COOP. Compliance is monitored by air- port management in consultation with the county emergency management department. The airport tenants do not have their own continuity plans. The airport does coordinate with outside agencies such as security, fire, and medical services, as well as with airports in the area.

23 Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity The types of events and disruptions experienced at MEV over the past 5 years were aircraft accident, natural disaster, major snow or ice event, significant growth in aviation activity, utility outage, IT issues, construction disruptions, critical equipment outage or breakdown, temporary flight restriction, and airfield system or navigational aid failure. The only operational disrup- tions MEV experienced more than five times over the past 5 years were special events; however, none of these was disruptive enough to activate the COOP. There were some capital improvement funding disruptions related to project closeouts, but these occurred before the COOP was implemented. Current construction disruptions are related to conflicts between construction activities and normal airfield operations, but they are addressed by construction phasing plans. The airport has been able to address some continuity issues by using its emergency plans. Operational Recovery Tools and Resources The COOP includes checklists, templates, communication details, memos, recovery priority determination decision tree and scale, mutual aid agreements, and SOPs. The COOP is not available for public viewing, and the airport does not release any specific information related to it, as it contains sensitive details on the management of threats. For operational recovery, MEV also includes planning and other recovery resources such as governing body (city, county, municipality) BCPs, data recovery systems/services, essential equipment backup plans, alternative facilities, AEP, emergency communication plan, and mutual aid agreements. Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluation and Maintenance MEV considers its COOP to be adequately developed, implemented, and maintained. It devotes about 24 hours a year to continuity of operations plan- ning. The county steering committee meets once a year to review input from stakeholders, including the airport. Each stakeholder examines the relevant section of the COOP and provides feedback to the committee. Any significant issues are incorporated into tabletop exercises. Examples of issues that have led to improvements in the airport section of the COOP were the need to review plans for equipment storage and identification of isolated staging areas. There have been no significant situations in which the effectiveness of the COOP could have been assessed. Tabletop exer- cises are carried out once a year, and live exercises are carried out every 5 years. MEV coordinates live exercises with fire, medical, and police organizations. Effective BCP/COOP Practices The COOP has effectively identified roles, responsibilities, and assignments, and has improved awareness of capabilities and limitations. Lessons Learned It takes time to develop and update a comprehensive COOP. For MEV, this process involves close coordination with the county offices. The COOP maintenance and review process provides an opportunity to improve airport preparedness by looking at continuity issues before they happen and incorporating them into exercises. Advice to Smaller Airports “Have a plan, even if it is just a page long” (B. Thompson, personal communi- cation, Oct. 14, 2015). The cost to develop a plan is often the most significant barrier. The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) Grant Oversight Risk Model Policy (Sample 1, Appendix G) may motivate airports to adopt continuity of operations policies as a requirement for obtaining federal grants. But these policies may not be fully comprehensive, as they pertain only to grant management and many airports do not seek grants, so developing a plan may not be a high priority. MEV believes that business and operations continuity planning is valuable for all airports. Critical elements of successful continuity plan development and implementation include coordination with emergency service provid- ers, tabletop exercises, and mutual aid or memorandums of understanding. The committee meets once a year to review input from stakeholders. “Have a plan, even if it is just a page long.”

24 Summary MEV is an example of a small airport that has effectively used its governing body, the county, as a resource to develop its COOP. This approach improves MEV’s ability to coordinate airport and associated business support functions with the county and to obtain assistance from the county if the COOP is activated. Working through the process helped the airport effectively address the AIP Grant Oversight Risk Model Policy, which requires airports to demonstrate their continuity of operations capability. Case Example 4: Ohio State University Airport Ohio State University Airport (OSU) is a reliever airport owned by Ohio State University. The airport serves the university and is a public use airport located in Franklin County. OSU is a busy facility, with more than 180 based aircraft and its longest runway at 5,004 ft. This case example is based on an interview with Doug Hammon, airport director; his responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Reliever Governance: Institute of higher education Number of operations (2012): 72,635 annual Number of airport employees: 88 Part 139: Yes Budget for BCP/COOP: Minimal cost to airport; expenditures run through the university and the risk management office. History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development OSU is owned by the university. Five years ago—motivated by the need to reduce liability and for insurance coverage purposes—the university mandated that all business and academic units have business continuity plans. A central com- mittee led by the university’s risk management office oversaw the effort and provided resources and expertise to develop the airport’s BCP/COOP. Airport staff educated the committee about the airport’s core operational and business functions. Airport BCP/COOP Planning and Coordination The risk management office at the university leads the business continuity planning effort and seeks input from the airport through the airport manager. The airport director of operations, risk manager, director of finance, and director of IT are also engaged in the overall process to provide review and feedback. Currently the airport has specific continuity plans for administrative continuity, line of operations continuity, aircraft maintenance continuity, customer service continuity, and flight education continuity. (For the details of the administrative and line of operations plans, see Sample 6, Appendix L, and Sample 7, Appendix M.) Coordination is required with a variety of airport tenants and agencies. The facility coordinator coordinates with the more than 180 private aircraft owners with aircraft based at the airport and with other stakeholders regarding facility issues, such as closing down a runway. The FBO general manager deals with coordination related to service issues; communication is primarily through emails, the monthly newsletter, and updates on the airport website. The overall university and airport-specific BCP/COOP is self-sufficient. Functions that are not under the direct control of the airport include wildlife control, which is contracted out, shifting the associated risks and liability to the contractor. The airport control tower is contracted to Midwest Air Traffic Control through a letter of agreement (LOA) among the airport, Midwest, and the FAA. If for some reason the control tower is not functioning, the airport can operate as an uncontrolled airport. The division of fire, which operates a joint-use fire station located on airport property, is also subject to a letter of agreement with OSU. The fire station houses a fire truck to respond to aircraft incidents. Emergency planning is coordinated among fire, police, and medical services.

25 Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity Certain special events affect the operation of the airport. For example, OSU has been the host site for the Safety and Flight Evaluation Conference, attracting more than 100 industry experts and students from 30 schools. The Memorial Golf Tourna- ment in central Ohio draws corporate aircraft and golfers, and it is not unusual for university football games to bring in many private aircraft. Typically, all these events are scheduled and planned for in advance. The security plan has been activated, but the continuity plan has not. Many of the airport’s core business functions are handled by the university’s business office, which can help if the airport’s payroll or accounting systems experience any disruptions. Operational Recovery Tools and Resources The airport uses specific continuity plans for specific functions. For business continuity, the administrative continuity plan employs an integrated incident management structure that provides an organizational structure to deal with business function disruptions. The structure includes area continuity teams that will formulate action plans to help the airport recover from disruptions and resume key business functions. The structure also identifies the relationships and roles of area crisis teams and crisis coordinators, and the university crisis team (Sample 6, Appendix L). Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluation and Maintenance Any proposal for a new activity at the airport is reviewed by the central COOP committee, led by the university’s risk manage- ment office, which assesses whether the activity would expose the university to an increased level of risk. The risk manage- ment office also receives regular updates on airport personnel changes and the implementation of new procedures. The university conducts an annual review of the continuity plans of all units, including the airport. Participating in such meetings allows the airport to better understand its operational needs under both normal and disruptive conditions. The AEP and the security plans have proven effective during disruptive events, but so far the BCP/COOP has not been activated. Effective BCP/COOP Practices There are many overlaps among the various plans dealing with airport response and recovery from disruptions, as well as Part 139 requirements. These plans include the AEP, security plans, and an anticipated effort regarding the safety management system. Consolidating these plans under one umbrella may reduce redundancy and eliminate the need for multiple plans. Lessons Learned “Whenever we sit down and discuss continuity needs and review continuity plans, a better understanding regarding airport operational needs is developed. The process helps to identify what is important, what is not important, and if there is a better way of performing any airport functions in both normal and disruptive situations” (D. Hammon, personal communication, Oct. 15, 2015). Advice to Smaller Airports OSU offers the following advice to smaller airports seeking to develop continuity practices: 1. See what is already out there. Look at other airports or similar businesses to see if they have a plan; if so, obtain their template and adapt it for your airport. Do not reinvent. 2. Check with the entity that governs the airport to ascertain whether it already has a plan. You may find that its govern- ing entity already has templates, guidance, expertise, and even resources to help you develop an airport-specific BCP/ COOP. 3. Use the process to assist with meeting the FAA-required AIP Grant Oversight Risk Assessment.

26 Summary OSU operates in a somewhat unique university setting that has required its departments to work through the business continuity planning process. This has allowed the airport to coordinate operational and business func- tions with the university and use university resources to assess continuity needs and processes. The airport also coordinates its regular review of the BCP with the university, enhancing communication and supporting the relationship between the university and the airport. The sample plans from OSU (Sample 6, Appendix L, and Sample 7, Appendix M) can be readily adapted for use by smaller airports. OSU suggests that small airports considering BCP/COOP development start by seeking guidance within their own governance structure. Case Example 5: Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE) is one of the busiest general aviation airports in the United States; it serves the Fort Lauderdale area in Broward County, Florida. The airport is designated as a reliever facility for Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. It is also the busiest GA facility for U.S. Customs passenger and aircraft clearance. FXE is home to more than 800 based aircraft, five FBOs, numerous commercial tenants, and more than 400 hangar facilities. This case example is based on an interview with Carlton Harrison, operations supervisor; his response to the survey; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Reliever Governance: City department Number of operations (2014): 149,710 annual Number of airport employees: 17 Part 139: No Budget for BCP/COOP: Costs are minimal to maintain the BCP. Costs are primarily in terms of staff time to perform annual maintenance of the plan, which typically takes no more than 40 hours. History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development The airport’s continuity planning evolved as part of a city initiative. As it developed a COOP to be coordinated with the overall city plan, the airport began by looking for answers to simple questions about what resources would be required to address basic operating needs during, for example, a power outage. Airport BCP/COOP Planning and Coordination The city manager has been the champion of the overall city COOP. On the basis of his direction, the airport took deliberate steps to develop a site-specific plan. One airport staff person attended FEMA course IS-547.A, “Introduction to Continuity of Operations,” which provided train-the-trainer guidance; this staffer became the airport’s point person on plan development. Many of the airport’s core functions are handled offsite by city departments; for example, IT, human resources, finance, and risk management. These departments have their own COOPs, which must be coordinated with the airport’s plan. Building relationships with these offsite departments facilitates a better understanding of their respective operational needs and departmental priorities. Coordination of COOPs with stakeholders can be challenging. FXE has five FBOs. The larger FBOs have business continu- ity practices that are internal to their own recovery actions; they communicate with the airport as needed to ensure coordina- tion with airport functions. The airport also uses LOAs to coordinate and has found them to be effective. For example, FXE has an FAA control tower. In the event that a disruption causes loss of this agency-controlled function, the LOA and the COOP provide guidance on the use of an alternative location. Building relationships with stakeholders is important and encourages communication. The airport is exploring the possibility of bringing even more stakeholders into the annual review process. OSU suggests that small airports considering BCP/COOP development start by seeking guidance within their own governance structure.

27 The COOP also addresses internal city communication; for example, requiring the airport manager to “coordinate with public works and engineering departments to obtain operational status of runways to ensure emergency landing facilities are available” (Sample 11, Appendix Q). Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity FXE has not had to activate its COOP for any major disruption. Recovery practices identified in the plan have been used for minor disruptions, and the AEP has been activated for other events, such as an aircraft accident. Other disruptions in the past 5 years have included a utility outage and temporary flight restrictions. Priority determinations were situational for the different types of disruptions. For the utility outage, initial priorities included proper notification through issuance of Notices to Airman regarding impacts on essential airside facilities, repair actions, and restoration of utilities. Impacts were also mitigated through the use of a backup generator. For an aircraft accident, the airport used the AEP to formulate incident action plans (IAPs), following National Incident Management System (NIMS) principles to ensure that prioritized actions such as safety, communications, and airport closures were addressed. In the event of a hurricane, the airport coordinates with the National Weather Service to determine the potential need for facility closure and the use of alternative sites. Impacts on human resources, physical plant and equipment, technology, and processes depend on the type of event. For extended disruptions, determining how to rotate limited staff resources is particularly challenging. Other resources—includ- ing backup generators, alternative facilities, and equipment—have been required, depending on the situation. Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluation and Maintenance The airport BCP/COOP is reviewed annually in coordination with the annual hurricane plan update. The process involves updating all contact informa- tion; reviewing and verifying resources (including alternative locations) to be used in the event of a disruption; and verify- ing human resources, technology, record retention, and other processes. All updates and revisions made as a direct result of the annual review are submitted to the city and other stakeholders on the distribution list. All materials are developed and maintained using electronic files. Having a continuity plan is effective in terms of preparedness. The airport has procedures in place that will increase pre- paredness and reduce downtime in the event of a normal operating function disruption. The “What do we do?” question has already been addressed (C. Harrison, personal communication, Oct. 12, 2015). Effective BCP/COOP Practices In developing a COOP, keep it simple and basic to start with and expand from there. Practice the plan during the annual review by creating tabletop exercise scenarios; this can be an effective way of walking through the process. Lessons Learned Communication is always a challenge. It may involve forwarding information to the city to be put out through the public information officer. The plan review and development process has underscored the importance of communication among internal and external stakeholders Advice to Smaller Airports FXE recommends starting simple and developing a basic plan to deal with disruptions. It is important to look at alternative resources, depending on the anticipated risk of disruption. It is also important to build relationships and awareness of the continuity plan among stakeholders. Summary FXE benefits from a formal COOP that addresses issues that may disrupt the normal business of operating the airport. The airport’s plan is coordinated with the city of Fort Lauderdale COOP and is based on a well-thought-out assessment of actual risk Start simple and develop a basic plan to deal with disruptions. The airport BCP/COOP is reviewed annually.

28 of certain disruptions, such as a hurricane. The “spectrum and scenarios” include airfield power outage, headquarters building incapacitation, aircraft accident, and acts of nature. The COOP provides detailed guidance and direction of resources for mis- sion-critical systems, including components such as telephone trees, succession, and alternative facility operations. FXE highly values building relationships with city departments that provide continuity support functions, as well as with other stakeholders. Case Example 6: Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (SAV) is owned by the city of Savannah, Georgia, and managed by the Savannah Airport Commission. It is located in Chatham County. The airport serves the Savannah area, with a significant percentage of passengers traveling on to Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. The small hub airport is also a military use airport. This case example is based on an interview with Fred McCosby, senior programs manager; his responses to the survey; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Small hub Governance: Airport authority Number of operations (2014–2015): 85,000 Number of airport employees: 165 Part 139: Yes Budget for BCP/COOP: The staff hours and related costs are incorporated into the cost of operation of the airport, because all aspects of continuity planning are incorporated into each functional plan. History and Motivation for BCP/COOP Development Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport initiated the process to address continuity of operations in existing plans. For example, the airport developed an H1N1 flu (swine flu) plan and a plan for infectious substances, both of which incorporate busi- ness continuity elements to deal with the potential of a 50% to 60% rate of staff absence. Similarly, the irregular operations plan ensures that enough concessionaires will remain open when the airport is overwhelmed by diversions or stranded passengers. The airport does not have a standalone BCP/COOP document; rather, it has identified likely local conditions and opera- tional concerns that would have a negative impact on airport resiliency and has incorporated continuity planning into existing functional plans. Airport BCP/COOP Planning and Coordination The airport’s senior programs manager facilitates business continuity planning. Because continuity of operations is addressed in existing functional plans, the police, security, airport operations, airfield operations, legal department, and executive assis- tant director (who is also the director of finance) are all engaged. The airport does not contract out its core operational and business functions and is self-sufficient for business and opera- tions continuity purposes. SAV has cooperative agreements with the Chatham County Emergency Management Department. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is also in place to locate resources (for example, a transformer) within or outside the state when local and regional options are exhausted. Airport tenant plans are congruent with the plans of the airport when it comes to addressing continuity of business and operations issues. For example, the appropriate tenants are briefed about the IROPS plan throughout the year. A hurricane briefing is held once a year, at the beginning of hurricane season, to ensure that tenant plans are consistent and congruent with the airport’s hurricane plan. The H1N1 business plan is referenced and reviewed before any potential pandemic incident. The airport is an active participant in the airport-to-airport mutual aid program SEADOG and coordinates with first responders and FEMA. It has a letter of agreement with the local emergency management agency. Communication is impor- tant; communication with first responders is by email rather than formalized documents.

29 Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity The primary disruptions cited by SAV were hazard-specific threats such as natural disasters (hurricanes), pandemic events, and irregular operations caused by airline and weather delays. SAV has also encountered IT deficiencies and has discussed other typi- cal business disruptions, such as cash flow issues during an event and dealing with electronic transactions during natural disasters. The airport has experienced growth in aviation demand that requires both airport and local community involvement to address. Before 2007, SAV had had more than a million enplanements annually, but the tourism industry was depressed from 2008 through 2013 because of the recession. In 2014, Jet Blue started serving the area with two flights a day; the incremental boost in tourism from 800,000 to 1,000,000 annual enplanements spurred growth and had a multiplier effect. The community put up $1 million and the airport put up $2 million to have Jet Blue come in and address the growth in aviation demand. The infrastructure was already there, as the airport had previously handled more than a million enplanements a year. Airport Procedures for BCP/COOP Evaluation and Maintenance Business continuity practices had already been streamlined within existing functional plans; writing and review of these prac- tices is ongoing. Each airport functional plan is reviewed regularly and issues related to continuity of business and operations are incorporated and updated. At the time of the interview, the airport’s hurricane plan (Sample 8, Appendix M) and the H1N1 business plan (Sample 9, Appendix N) and infectious substance plan were under review by the Coastal Health Department as part of the plan review and agency coordination effort. Effective BCP/COOP Practices SAV did not develop a separate BCP/COOP. Instead, being a small airport, it decided to include business and opera- tions continuity practices in the existing functional plans. The airport makes the tenants, including airlines and FBOs, aware of its plans and coordinates actions. For example, SAV provides timely information to airlines and FBOs so they can quickly relocate their aircraft when a major disruption, such as a hurricane, is likely. By incorporating continuity into existing functional plans and briefing the tenants on the plans, the airport has been able to efficiently address continuity of operations. In the event of a major hurricane, credit cards and electronic transactions may not work. In this situation, the airport with- draws $500,000 to $1,000,000 cash to meet payroll needs and pay for essential services. SAV uses “ride-out crews” during hurricanes: 36 hours before the event these crews (60–75 people) are contacted. Employees are sent home early so they can return after the hurricane to take over from the ride-out crews. Incorporating business continuity planning into existing plans has helped streamline the recovery and reconstitution process. The SAV plans also address business systems (including a total disruption of the banking system) and communications systems during a hurricane. Lessons Learned 1. IT issues were not planned well, and this kind of inadequacy can have a major impact on airport functions and opera- tions. IT staff has been increased, IT infrastructure has been enhanced and expanded, and efforts are under way to develop an IT plan that will include needs for continuity of business and operations. The lesson learned was to provide enough support to the IT manager so that he or she can plan for the future needs of the airport and develop a long-term IT business plan. A business plan specific to IT infrastructure allows the manager to plan years in advance so the air- port is ahead of the curve in terms of IT resources. 2. In the past, there were instances in which airport operations managers did not communicate with concessionaires when the airport was overwhelmed with diversions. This led to travelers’ needs not being met. The IROPS plan has been updated to address continuity of operations and business during diversions. The plan involves coordination between the airport and Delta Airlines, so that the airline flies diversion crews to SAV to supplement Delta’s airport staff and deal with passenger needs. 3. Originally, a small group was responsible for addressing continuity of operations and business; airfield operations and security were left on the periphery. This has changed—more people are involved in discussing continuity of operations and business needs, and every two weeks airfield operations and security staff are included in the discussions. Being a small airport, SAV decided to include business and operations continuity practices in the existing functional plans.

30 Advice to Smaller Airports SAV staff members visited Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEATAC) in Washington State and looked at the huge binder that contained the airport’s BCP/COOP. They decided that a separate BCP/COOP might not work for a small airport like theirs, so they embedded and streamlined business and operations continuity needs within existing functional plans, the hurricane plan, the H1N1 business plan, and the IROPS plan. However, the template used by the Port of Seattle (Sample 2, Appendix H) can be relevant, applicable, and scalable for smaller airports. Imagine the worst-case scenario during a major disruption and address the business and operation continuity issues in a separate plan or by embedding them in existing functional plans as SAV did. The time to plan is before an event, be that IROPS, a hurricane, or a pandemic. It is important to look at alternative facility needs; for example, if the terminal is wiped out, what kind of modular facilities can be used to serve passengers? These facilities might not look pretty, but they can keep the airport operational. Summary SAV has taken a unique—and noteworthy—approach to business continuity planning: embedding business and operational continuity issues and plans in existing functional plans. Originally SAV intended to follow the Port of Seattle’s approach to develop a continuity plan; but planners decided that such a voluminous document would not serve the airport well. SAV’s approach demonstrates that smaller airports can successfully incorporate business continuity planning into existing func- tional plans to meet their resiliency demands. AIRPORTS WITHOUT FORMAL BCPs OR COOPs (CASE EXAMPLES 7 THROUGH 9) Three respondents were selected as case examples of airports that do not have standalone BCPs/COOPs but nevertheless incorporate effective operational and business continuity practices. These airports not only reported continuity practices but also demonstrated innovative approaches to operational recovery. The survey and interviews were fashioned to provide an understanding of why each airport did not have a formal plan, how it was handling continuity issues without a plan, how effective its practices have been, and what challenges it has faced. Case Example 7: Duluth International Airport, Non-Hub Primary Duluth International Airport (DLH) is a city-owned, public use, joint civil– military airport located 5 nautical miles northwest of the central business district of Duluth in Saint Louis County, Minnesota. This case example is based on an interview with Blaine Peterson, director of operations; his responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Non-hub primary Governance: Airport authority Number of operations (2014): 55,115 annual Number of airport employees: 16 Part 139: Yes Budget impact of business continuity practices: There are few direct coordination costs involved with operational recovery from significant disruptions besides the direct costs related to items such as human resources, equipment and materials, and other resources required to return the airport to normal operations. Continuity of Airport Operations/Business Functions DLH has no BCP/COOP; however, the airport uses computer backup systems and services, data recovery systems and ser- vices, backup generators, essential equipment backup plans, and alternative facility contingencies. The airport also uses vari-

31 ous plans and agreements dealing with incident response and recovery, including the AEP, terminal incident plans, IROPS plans, emergency communications plan, and mutual aid agreements to address its continuity needs. Current plans are generally reviewed annually. Effectiveness is assessed using a number of metrics, such as number of cancel- lations or significant delays, number of flight operations lost, and possibly the number of passengers rerouted to other airports. The city of Duluth provides a number of typical business support functions for the airport, such as payroll services. Depending on the disruption, the Duluth Airport Authority (DAA) staff can assume control of the situation and manage resources to correct it as soon as possible. Coordinator(s) and Coordination The DAA operations director, airside manager, and airfield foreman are key persons for coordination of all events requiring actions to respond to and recover from significant airport disruptions. Coordination efforts may also be required with the airline station manager, FBO manager, and air traffic control tower (ATC) staff. The DAA coordinates on a routine basis with affected airport tenants, and coordination meetings are scheduled as necessary. A number of core airport functions are contracted to commercial tenants or other agencies. For example, the 148th Air National Guard unit based at the airport provides emergency response services on the airfield through a use agreement with the airport authority. The airlines, FBO, and ATC also provide core service functions. Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations and Business Continuity DLH experiences a number of reoccurring, incident-specific disruptive events that affect airport operations, including snow and ice events, air shows, and VIP visits. The airport manages these events to reduce negative impacts. Snow and Ice Events It is not uncommon for DLH to experience snow and ice events that affect airport operations. On one occasion, significant freezing rain around the busy Christmas travel season disrupted flights, causing cancellations and delays and affecting air- port, airline, and traveler schedules. When DLH experiences heavy ice on the airfield, the snow and ice control plan is activated. DAA notifies tenants, commu- nicates with ATC regarding conditions, and issues the appropriate Notice to Airmen. To deal with the ice, DLH determines the appropriate use of equipment, which sometimes requires a switch from the usual snowplow blades to a serrated blade that cuts grooves into the ice in an attempt to soften it or break it up. Sand is applied, along with an FAA-approved dry chemical. The process is repeated until the ice breaks and is safely removed. Throughout the process, airline passengers are kept informed of schedule changes. This process has been effective for the most part; however, the airport does rely on current FAA plans such as the snow and ice control plan and the IROPS plan. Retuning the airport to normal operations can be a challenge during snow and ice events that disrupt operations for up to a couple of hours. DLH admits that a BCP/COOP might help in this situation; however, the DAA continues to rely on its current snow and ice control plan and the IROPS plan. ACRP Report 65: Guidebook for Irregular Operations (IROPS) Contingency Planning also addresses IROPS in great detail. Air Shows and VIP Visits DLH has hosted a number of air shows and VIP visits that have been extremely disruptive to normal airport operations. An air show typically affects airport functions for a full weekend; VIP visits vary in duration but generally last a few hours. Because these events limit the availability of certain airfield operations to the public, the DAA has to make decisions about priorities. For example, during an air show, priority and scheduled airline service is adjusted or accommodated as needed to ensure that little or no disruption of service occurs. Certain general aviation operations may be unable to operate during these times. These events are generally scheduled in advance and coordinated with airport users by various means, including through the Notice to Airmen system.

32 In terms of their impact on human resources, equipment, facilities, and other resources, DLH reports that air shows and VIP visits require additional manpower to meet the event schedules. Airfield operations are limited, and landside issues such as spectator and parking facilities are modified or created. Air shows and VIP visits do not require much recovery planning, as they are scheduled events that end at a predetermined time. Effective Airport Continuity Practices DLH has found that existing plans—including the AEP, snow and ice control plans, and IROPS plans—are effective for dealing with airport disruptions. DLH coordinates certain business functions, such as payroll, with the city of Duluth and relies on the city for business continuity practices. The airport recognizes the benefits of a formal BCP/COOP but has not developed a standalone plan. Advice to Smaller Airports DLH suggests that smaller airports seeking to develop business continuity practices or considering development of a formal BCP/COOP may benefit from reaching out to larger airports or agencies that already have plans in place and tailoring those plans to meet the smaller airport’s operational needs. Summary DLH, a non-hub primary airport, uses functional plans such as the AEP, IROPS plan, and snow and ice control plans to address continuity needs related to the disruptions the airport encounters most often. This incident-specific approach has served the airport’s needs. Contingency planning has also proven to be useful, increasing efficiency by providing guidance on the types and quantities of resources that may be needed to cope with specific disruptions. Case Example 8: Lakeland Linder Regional Airport Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (LAL) is a reliever airport serving the Lakeland area in Polk County, Florida. The airport has more than 215 based aircraft and maintains FAR Part 139 certifica- tion. LAL has a substantial economic impact on the region: it is home to approximately 75 businesses and organizations that employ more than 1,000 people. LAL hosts the annual Sun ‘n Fun Fly-In, which draws more than 200,000 people for a weeklong event. This case example is based on an interview with Adam Lunn, operations coordinator; his responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: Reliever Governance: City department Number of operations (2015): 117,000 annual Number of airport employees: 16 Part 139: Yes. Holds certificate but currently does not offer commercial service. Budget for continuity practices: Costs depend on the nature of the disruption. Continuity of Operations/Business Functions LAL does not have a formal, written BCP/COOP to deal with events that cause significant disruptions to airport operations or business functions, although it has documented SOPs for many hazard-specific threats, such as severe weather, power outages, generator outages, and elevator malfunctions. (See the LAL Severe Weather SOP, Sample 13, Appendix S.) The airport has a current AEP and is compliant with NIMS. Airport staff are trained and efficient with airport emergency response through the use of incident action plans; they use IAPs to bring critical systems back online, not only for airport emergencies but also for loss of nonemergency functions.

33 A number of core airport support business functions are covered by city departments, such as the city finance department, risk department, and technology department. These departments have internal continuity practices; however, the practices or written plans are not coordinated specifically with the airport. Airport staff regularly interact with these departments to ensure that they have a complete understanding of airport needs. Coordinator(s) and Coordination The airport coordinates business and emergency recovery actions using a team-based approach. Lunn says, “It is a team effort, and critical functions are recovered with coordination between impacted departments—Operations, Maintenance, Admin- istration, Property, and Business Management for all financial and funding concerns” (A. Lunn, personal communication, Oct. 8, 2015). The air traffic control tower is handled through the federal Contract Control Tower program. These services are currently provided through Robinson Aviation. In response to recent federal funding issues and uncertainty about tower operations, the airport has taken steps to mitigate potential tower closure with specialized training of airport personnel. The airport participates in a citywide comprehensive emergency plan that is reviewed annually. This plan is coordinated with the AEP. Lunn explains, “Plans are cross-checked and provided to other city departments so they understand airport facilities or procedures” (A. Lunn, personal communication, Oct. 8, 2015). Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations/Business Continuity The most significant airport disruption in the past 5 years was the 2011 tornado, which occurred during the Sun ‘n Fun Fly-In. During this disruption, LAL followed the Incident Command System (ICS) structure to make recovery priority determina- tions through the use of IAPs. Prioritization included rescue, life safety, evacuation, airport closure, damage assessments, and security issues. IAPs, departmental coordination, and mutual aid resources were used to prioritize recovery actions. The tornado impacted the entire airport and an estimated 150,000 event attendees, and forced the airport to close down. Forty-one aircraft were overturned, buildings and hangar doors were damaged, temporary facilities such as tents and portable toilets were damaged, and participants lost personal items. Damage to LAL facilities such as pavements, terminal facilities, and other buildings was minimal, although a significant amount of foreign object debris had to be removed to restore the runways to safe operating condition. Security was required to ensure that totaled aircraft were not disturbed during insurance or EPA-required assessments. Using ICS principles, the airport quickly recovered its operational capacity and reopened at 7:00 a.m. the next day. Building repairs that were required to be operable were restored, depending on the damage assessment for each hangar facility. There was limited down time for restoring airport operations; however, some of the events were canceled as a result of the damage. The recovery from the tornado had a significant effect on human resources owing to overtime, on-call status, and airport staff rest periods. Since this event, the operations staff has been expanded from two to five employees. There was a limited impact on physical plant and equipment and none on technology. Daily processes were interrupted by the event. Process for Reconstituting Airport Operations/Business Functions After Disruptions LAL staff are highly trained in emergency procedures, primar- ily owing to a well-developed AEP and exercise program. ICS principles are part of the recovery culture at the airport and are applicable to most continuity scenarios. During and after the tornado, these principles were used to develop an IAP for each step of the response and recovery actions. After the emergency response, LAL continued to use IAPs for recovery issues. “Not all AEP hazard-specific sections have specified checklists for recovery actions. Many rely on hazard-specific Unified Command actions based on Incident Action Plans (IAPs) for disruption recovery involving activation of the AEP” (A. Lunn, personal communication, Oct. 8, 2015). For all airport disruptions, LAL brings department directors together as necessary, including operations, administra- tion, maintenance, business, and property managers. Recovery priorities are identified and coordinated as required and may include the use of specifically developed SOPs for critical functions. The ICS principles are part of the recovery culture at the airport and are applicable to most continuity scenarios.

34 Offsite coordination is required for certain off-airport functions, including finance and IT needs. This requires constant commu- nication to build relationships with offsite departments. Aircraft service and fueling is contracted to an FBO. The airport works closely with the FBO to make sure that operations are sustainable during any disruption. This is more of a partnership and operating understanding than a contractual lease provision. Effective Airport Continuity Practices LAL has effectively used a combination of airport SOPs, the AEP, NIMS principles, and relationships with the city and with external organizations such as the FAA to deal with disruptions. Communication among departments is essential, and the LAL business manager routinely interacts with the city risk manager to review potential continuity issues. LAL has no formal BCP/COOP. The airport acknowledges that it would likely benefit from a written BCP/COOP to deal with some disruptions; however, it is difficult to plan for all types of disruptions, and there may be some advantages in certain situations to remaining fluid and proceeding with recovery actions using well-practiced processes. Advice to Smaller Airports Examine internal practices and assess for weaknesses and the need for updates. Airports that are contemplating the develop- ment of a BCP would benefit by looking at what other airports are doing. It is critical to build relationships and ensure that offsite city departments and other stakeholders are involved in the planning process. Summary LAL values emergency preparedness. Although no formal BCP/COOP exists, the airport considers internal recovery prac- tices to be effective in dealing with all types of disruptions. “The Lakeland Airport understands that the purpose of [a] BCP is nonemergency management. However, the basic principles of NIMS and ICS are applicable to all disruptions. Using our basic AEP in conjunction with the principles of NIMS, we evaluate all situations and determine the most critical systems to be restored and proceed accordingly” (A. Lunn, personal communication, Oct. 8, 2015). The airport also uses written SOPs to efficiently address specific disruptions that affect both emergency and nonemergency airport functions. LAL recommends good communication and relationship building with offsite city departments that support the business operations of the airport. Airport staff maintain a high level of communication that leads to addressing continuity priorities with city departments, airport stakeholders, and emergency management. The airport demonstrates that effective continuity practices can be achieved through the use of NIMS principles and the development of IAPs that prioritize recovery actions, the use of SOPs and other airport functional plans, and communication with both external and internal stakeholders. Case Example 9: Watsonville Municipal Airport Watsonville Municipal Airport (WVI) is a general aviation (GA) airport serving the city of Watsonville, Cali- fornia, and the county of Santa Cruz. The airport is a busy GA airport with more than 300 based aircraft. WVI has been recognized for its function as an emergency response entity, primarily as a result of a pilot group that serves as a response team in the event of an area disaster. The activation of this group also reinforces the importance of maintaining the appropriate use of airport facilities that, during a communitywide disaster, may be used for other purposes than just the operational continuity of the facility itself. This case example is based on an interview with Rayvon Wil- liams, airport division manager; his responses to the survey; documentation provided; and other relevant documented sources. Airport Characteristics NPIAS category: General aviation Governance: City department Number of operations (2015): 65,100 Number of airport employees: 9 Part 139: No Offsite coordination is required for certain off-airport functions.

35 Continuity of Operations/Business Functions WVI has no formal BCP/COOP; airport staff plan primarily for continuity of operations and less for business continuity. Many airport business support functions (outside of functions such as point-of-sale transactions) are handled by other city departments. All facility operational functions and services are provided by the airport. For emergency or operational situations, WVI has two general plans of action, depending on the type of disruption. As of October 2015, the majority of operational disruptions had been minor aircraft-specific issues (e.g., aircraft flat tire, gear-up land- ing, loss of control off runway, ground loop, blocking runway) or major actions that affected the infrastructure (1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, 2008 wildfires). For minor disruptions, the airport has a first response plan of action followed by coordination with Watsonville fire or police to bring the airport back to normal operations. In the case of a major disruption, the airport works with the city of Watsonville’s Emergency Operations Center, but airport management and staff are ultimately responsible for restor- ing the airport to normal operations. The WVI Emergency Classification Grid is shown in Figure 7. FIGURE 7 Watsonville Airport emergency classification grid. Source: R. Williams, personal communication, April 19, 2016. The airport relies on the city of Watsonville for a number of finance functions, including automated clearinghouse pay- ments and payroll, that are handled offsite by other city departments. Other functions—such as legal, human resources, contracting, and risk management—are handled at city hall. Business continuity functions are handled primarily in other city departments; this arrangement requires close coordination and communication, but the airport’s focus is on the continuity of operations of the facility. Coordinator(s) and Coordination During minor disruptions, airport management and staff typically make decisions; during major disruptions, decision making is a combined effort between the airport manager and the Watsonville Emergency Operations Center (EOC). If the airport is secure and safe, and no life-threatening conditions exist, initial coordination is with Watsonville fire or police, followed by coordination with the EOC for power restoration via local utilities. For nonemergency disruptions, WVI determines recovery priorities on the basis of the situation. The airport may contact off-airport support services by telephone. Disruptions Impacting Airport Operations/Business Continuity The airport reports only limited business disruptions, but it enhances the continuity of operations by partnering with the Watsonville Emergency Airlift Command Team. WEACT is a community-based program involving the airport, its tenants, community members, the city of Watsonville, and Santa Cruz County. In the event of a large-scale community emergency, volunteers mobilize to provide airport, aircraft, and pilot services as needed; for example, moving people and goods to where they need to go. WEACT was modeled on a similar program developed by the South County Airport Pilots Association and based at nearby San Martin Airport. Both programs grew out of lessons learned from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and a desire to combine community needs with the airport asset. WEACT helps mobilize resources to assist the community as a whole with recovery and continuity while also establishing practices at the airport, which may also be affected by the emergency. The program helps to ensure that the airport not only maximizes its recovery role within the community but also maintains the use of its own facilities during a disaster.

36 WVI has experienced aircraft accidents, special events, temporary flight restrictions, and construction disruptions. While these events affected the operation of the airport, none of them required any actions to recover core business functions. Effective Airport Continuity Practices Although the airport has no formal BCP/COOP, it coordinates with other city departments to maintain awareness of business con- tinuity needs. This process is informal and requires airport management and staff to build relationships with offsite departments. WVI employs a simple Emergency Classification Grid (Figure 7) to differentiate between minor and major on/off airport emergency events; the grid helps guide airport staff regarding initial actions and communications. The airport has also devel- oped a simple one-page Initial Action Guide for employees; a laminated copy is in every airport vehicle and building location (Sample 12, Appendix R). Advice to Smaller Airports WVI suggests focusing on four elements in dealing with continuity issues: 1. Ensure timely and orderly continuous performance of essential functions during and after an emergency (keep the airport operational). 2. Reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations (see 1 above…keep the airport open). 3. Protect records and other assets that support essential functions (we still have legacy “paper” that must be preserved). 4. Minimize loss of life and injury to agency personnel. Summary WVI has an effective airport-based program for dealing with emergencies that impact the area. WEACT is a pilot-based organization that mobilizes assets to provide air resources for the community as needed. WEACT also enhances operational continuity at the airport when a disruption affects the overall community by ensuring appropriate use of airport facilities. Most airport business continuity actions are handled offsite by other city departments. The airport focuses on continuity of airfield operational functions that may need to be recovered in the event of a disruption. The airport has successfully devel- oped simple and easily accessible tactical/operational tools for dealing with emergency disruptions.