Accelerating Decarbonization in the United States: Technology, Policy, and Societal Dimensions (2024)

1

Introduction

This is the second of two reports from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee constituted in 2020 to analyze possible ways for the United States to decarbonize its energy system. The committee interpreted “deep decarbonization” in the statement of task (see Box 1-1) to mean a decline to net-zero U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050, consistent with the target announced by most developed nations.¹ The committee that wrote the first report included approximately the same number of policy experts—particularly those focused on how policy affects equity, fairness, and justice—as it did scientists and engineers. Importantly, the committee was convened to study how the nation might achieve an equitable transition to net zero, not whether it should do so. Policies to reduce impacts of climate change and to promote climate adaptation are outside the committee’s task, even though their human dimensions overlap with mitigation policy in multiple ways, including normative commitments to equity, justice, economic development, and place-based issues.

Like previous large-scale technological revolutions, the transition to a net-zero emissions energy system will create new industries and jobs throughout the U.S. economy, while leaving older technologies behind. It is difficult to imagine how such a transition could maintain public and political support for 3 decades without an equitable and fair sharing of benefits and costs and a focus on supporting workers and communities. The study’s focus on equity and fairness can thus be motivated on purely pragmatic grounds, in addition to ethical or moral grounds. Furthermore, our current energy system has significant injustice built into it, such as the disproportionate exposure to air pollution from combustion of fossil fuels suffered by communities of color (Liu et al. 2021), in part because of redlining and other discrimination (Fears 2022; Lane et al. 2022). These issues of environmental and energy justice must be redressed to gain the trust and support of the large number of people who have been harmed.

___________________

¹ Net-zero emissions mean that any ongoing atmospheric release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and several fluorinated gases, must be balanced by removals of CO₂ from the atmosphere. Under the UNFCCC, positive emissions balance negative emissions if the two have equal 100-year global warming potentials (GWPs). This report primarily covers CO₂ emissions, with some discussion of non-CO₂ GHGs where relevant (Chapters 3, 7, 8, 10, 12).

This second committee study was conducted during a period of unprecedented and revolutionary change in U.S. climate and energy policy—caused primarily by the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in August 2022, in combination with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) in November 2021, the CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS) in August 2022, and federal executive and regulatory actions. Although the IRA is the primary mechanism that will directly impact GHG emissions, it is the combination of these policies that remakes the federal science and technology landscape in the United States. The committee’s first report was released before this revolution, and the second (this report) was written after.

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REPORT

The first report, released in February 2021, almost 9 months before the passage of IIJA and 18 months before the passage of the IRA and CHIPS, was written by a committee of experts in technology, policy, and social sciences, and included many of the committee members that also wrote the second report.² The committee held its first meeting in March 2020, which was an in-person meeting, and subsequently held three additional virtual committee meetings and many subgroup calls. The committee’s report focused on federal and executive branch actions needed during the 2020s to put the nation on a fair and equitable path to decarbonization by midcentury.

Contents of First Report

The first report offers a technical blueprint and federal policy manual for the first 10 years of a 30-year effort to replace the current U.S. energy system with one that has net-zero anthropogenic GHG emissions (NASEM 2021). It begins with discussions of the current U.S. GHG emissions inventory, the historical and potential future changes in emissions within different sectors, and the committee’s choice of a 30-year timeframe to net zero as its emissions reduction goal. It provides an illustrative pathway to this overall emissions goal and notes the role of four key ingredients to meet that goal: deep reductions in CO₂ emissions, declines in non-CO₂ GHGs, maintenance or expansion of land carbon sinks, and expansion of negative emissions technologies. The 30-year timeframe is justified

___________________

² Some members from the original committee resigned and other new members were added to the committee after the first report was published.

on two fronts: first, analysis shows that reaching net-zero global anthropogenic emissions eliminates the most severe impacts of climate change (IPCC 2018), and second, a 30-year horizon for the energy transition leverages the normal pace of much asset replacement and avoids significant premature retirement of existing assets. The report also discusses the economics and capital requirements of a transition to net zero; sectoral targets, technology options, and uncertainties; and the societal dimensions of deep decarbonization. It shows how decarbonization can provide a net economic benefit, take advantage of the country’s unique assets, and be accomplished in a manner that improves equity and opportunity. Within the report, the committee identifies “no-regrets” actions that would be robust to addressing uncertainties about the energy system’s final technological mix and hedging actions designed to keep open as many viable paths to net zero as possible. It also identifies sector-specific research priorities and technological goals for expanding the innovation toolkit, particularly for sectors where low GHG emissions alternatives are in pilot stages or nascent industries.

First Report Goals and Policies

The first report laid out five technology goals and four socioeconomic goals critical to achieving midcentury decarbonization. On the technology side, the committee set goals for producing carbon-free electricity; electrifying energy services in transportation, buildings, and industry; investing in energy efficiency and productivity; planning, permitting, and building critical infrastructure; and expanding the decarbonization toolkit through investments in clean energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D). The committee’s four socioeconomic goals were to strengthen the U.S. economy; promote equity and inclusion; support communities, businesses, and workers; and maximize cost-effectiveness.

The committee further recognized that a strong social contract would be essential to maintain support for an energy transition covering 3 decades. It proposed policies “to build a more competitive U.S. economy, to increase the availability of high-quality jobs, to build an energy system without the social injustices that permeate the current system, and to allow those individuals and businesses that are marginalized today to share equitably in future benefits” (NASEM 2021, p. 1). The diverse portfolio of policy recommendations (shown in Appendix C) called for both system-wide and sector-specific policies that would establish the U.S. commitment to a rapid, just, and equitable transition; set rules and standards for technology planning and deployment; invest in research, technology, people, and infrastructure; and assist and build capacities for families, businesses, communities, cities, and states to ensure that disadvantaged

communities³ do not suffer disproportionate burdens. The committee continues to endorse the goals and policies recommended in the first report, while acknowledging that the list of new policies needed today is fundamentally shaped by the radical changes to the policy landscape since its publication.

Overarching policies in the first report included an emissions budget, an economy-wide price on carbon, a national Green Bank, education and training programs to develop a clean-energy workforce, and increased federal investments in clean energy RDD&D. The committee also called for the establishment of groups both within the federal government and an independent corporation to help ensure a just and equitable transition through analysis, evaluation, capacity building, and investment. The recommended sector-specific policies included regulations for clean electricity generation; requirements for labor employed with government funding; standards for zero-emissions vehicles and efficient electric appliances; actions to improve the regulation, design, and functioning of clean electricity markets; and investments to increase energy efficiency in low-income households, expand rural broadband access, and electrify tribal lands. Some—but not all—of the committee’s first report recommendations have been incorporated into recent legislation (as discussed in Table 1-1 below).

Dissemination of First Report

Throughout the spring and summer of 2021, committee members held approximately 50 briefings on the first report with philanthropic organizations sponsoring the study, congressional staff and committees, federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders. Notably, the committee convened several listening sessions with climate and environmental justice experts and groups focused on fairness, equity, and justice in the energy transition, which led to an expansion of the committee to include more such expertise. These discussions and others led to the list of topics covered in the second report—including state and local decarbonization efforts, terrestrial carbon sinks, health impacts of the energy system, workforce and employment economics, and sector-specific technologies and policies—and to the addition of new committee members with expertise in these areas.

___________________

³ This report typically uses the term “disadvantaged communities” to maintain consistency with federal agency guidance issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy (Climate Policy Office [CPO]). Disadvantaged communities are those that are marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution and have other socioeconomic burdens (e.g., low income, high unemployment) (CEQ n.d.). To identify a disadvantaged community for federal programs and funding, CEQ recommends using the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST), an interactive mapping tool that qualifies a census tract as a “disadvantaged community” if it is above the threshold for one or more environmental or climate indicators and above the threshold for the socioeconomic indicators (OMB et al. 2023).

First Report’s Role in the Second Report

This first report provides the guideposts for the second—the fundamental set of goals, conclusions, and priority recommendations. It also defines the focus of the study to be on the near- to mid-term timeframe—specifically, what needs to be done in the 2020s to meet the interim goal of ~50 percent emissions reduction from 2005 levels by 2030 and put the nation on a trajectory to meet the net-zero goal by midcentury. In particular, the first report concluded that the technology pathway with the lowest uncertainty, a “no-regrets” pathway, is one that over the next decade focuses on decarbonizing electricity, electrifying end uses, increasing energy efficiency, and undertaking a robust RDD&D agenda to prepare for the additional technological and societal solutions needed for the 2030s and beyond. The contents, context, and framing of the first report serve as the foundation and basis for the discussion and analysis in the second report. Consistent with the first report and the tasking for the committee, the second report focuses on deep decarbonization just within the United States.

COMMITTEE’S APPROACH TO SECOND REPORT

Development of Second Report

The statement of task mandates that the second report “will assess a wider spectrum of technological, policy, social, and behavioral dimensions of deep decarbonization” than the first report. Given the evidence in early 2021 that a majority in Congress intended to pass comprehensive climate legislation, the committee realized that the second report would be most useful if its wider assessment were to include a detailed analysis of any new comprehensive climate and energy policy portfolio. While waiting for the new legislation, the committee prepared to rapidly finish a draft for review of its second report once new legislation was passed by Congress or when it became clear that there would be none.

During 2021 and the first half of 2022, the committee reviewed injustices embedded in our energy system and the history and preferred policies of the environmental justice movement. The committee developed detailed sectoral analyses of options to decarbonize electricity, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture, forestry, the financial sector, and the fossil fuel industries. It analyzed possible roles for non-federal actors—including state and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private companies—and examined technologies and policies to reduce emissions of methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases. Last, the committee studied policy options to accomplish five objectives that cut across sectors: emissions reductions,

equity and fairness, health, employment in good-paying jobs, and public engagement. The last of these is critical to build and maintain public support but should also be thought of as a separate objective, as studies show that people value the ability to participate in decision-making, no matter what the outcome. Public consultation is often more important than providing monetary benefits through revenue sharing in successfully siting new infrastructure (Chapter 5).

During this interim period, the committee held information-gathering webinars and workshops to hear from additional experts. Webinar topics were wide-ranging and included leveraging financial systems for decarbonization; soil carbon offsets; government, nonprofit, and philanthropic perspectives on implementing a just and equitable energy transition; manufacturing and industrial decarbonization; public engagement strategies; and priority research and development for building technologies. (Appendix D provides a list of these webinars.) The committee also hosted a one-day workshop, Pathways to an Equitable and Just Transition: Principles, Best Practices, and Inclusive Stakeholder Engagement, that convened researchers and stakeholders focused on public health and safety, jobs and workforce, equitable access, and energy affordability to discuss “actionable recommendations to operationalize equity and justice in the energy transition with inclusive stakeholder engagement” (NASEM 2022).

Because of this preparatory work, the committee was able within a short timeframe to analyze the radically altered landscape created by the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS, and develop a draft of its second report.

Structure and Key Issues for Second Report

Report Structure

Each of the 12 chapters that follow includes an analysis of gaps and barriers, which requires an assessment of the efficacy of the relevant provisions in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS against their goals. Each chapter also offers recommendations about how to close gaps and overcome barriers. Gaps, barriers, and recommendations cover actions required under the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS during the 2020s as well as actions needed to prepare for the subsequent 2 decades.

Chapters 2–5 correspond to the final four of the five crosscutting objectives. Chapter 2 focuses on equity and energy justice. It offers a scholarly review of the environmental justice movement and the inequities that have been built into our current energy system, some because of past or ongoing discrimination. Chapter 3 focuses on health, Chapter 4 on employment, and Chapter 5 on public engagement. While the emissions

reduction objective does not have its own chapter, it is the singular issue that cuts across every chapter in the report. Chapters 6–13 focus on sectors: electricity, buildings and the built environment, land use such as agriculture and forestry, transportation, industry, the financial sector, the fossil fuel industry, and non-federal actors. Each sectoral chapter assesses how well current policies will achieve the carbon emissions objectives for the sector, identifies gaps and barriers, and provides recommendations to close or overcome them. Owing to the complexity of emissions from this sector, the land use chapter includes discussion of the spectrum of GHG emissions and mitigation options from agriculture, the uptake of carbon from terrestrial sinks, and land requirements for renewable energy. This includes discussion of the GHG impacts of dietary choices. Where appropriate, each sectoral chapter also assesses likely progress toward equity, employment, health, and public engagement objectives—creating some intended redundancy with the material in Chapters 2–5. The report can best help sectoral experts who do not read Chapters 2–5 by emphasizing that among the greatest risks to sectoral progress are loss of public support and institutional constraints, both of which can affect the viability and durability of climate policies. Sustained public support requires public perception that the transition is fair and equitable, that it brings material benefits to health and employment that compensate for inevitable losses, and that people have sufficient say in decisions affecting their lives and communities.

Approach to Key Overarching Issues

Key elements of the committee’s approach to its charge included how it addresses system interactions and cross-sector impacts; how it deals with key vulnerabilities and uncertainties, including those related to politics and polarization; and how it incorporates the role of non-federal actors. The approach to these issues and others is guided by the study charge, information gathered from the public during webinars and listening sessions, committee expertise, and the literature. The report covers what the committee concluded to be the most critical technology, policy, and societal dimensions of accelerating decarbonization within the energy and related sectors. Given the inevitable limitations of time and resources, there are many issues only briefly covered in the text, each of which could be expanded into a full treatise.

The committee’s report structure recognizes the most important system interactions and cross-sector impacts. The recognition that decarbonization would have vast impacts on justice and equity, public health, and jobs motivated chapters devoted to these system-level impacts. The requirement for a strong social contract for the systemic transition to clean energy motivated a chapter devoted to public engagement. And the

recognition that decarbonization itself provides an existential challenge to fossil fuels motivated a single chapter on that sector. Each of these chapters considers a few critical system interactions. For example, the health chapter discusses the need for expanded analysis of emerging occupational health risks associated with clean energy technologies, and the transportation chapter highlights connections between transportation and energy justice, public heath, and the built environment. However, discussing the full litany of potential ways that policies or technologies adopted in one sector in the future might impact another sector, the full energy system, or society at large was beyond the scope and time constraints of the study. Moreover, such interactions can be very difficult to predict or evaluate in advance. This underscores the report’s inclusion of policies that would comprehensively evaluate progress, in part to facilitate adaptive management.

The key vulnerabilities and uncertainties emphasized in this report are the implementation of existing decarbonization policies and the closing of gaps between policy commitments and the level of effort required to meet 2030 and 2050 emissions reductions and climate goals. These issues are discussed throughout the report and are the focus of findings and recommendations; however, they are not the only vulnerabilities and uncertainties affecting the transition to a decarbonized energy system. For example, recognizing the role of the politics of climate change in executing current policies and adopting new ones, especially in this time of polarized political and public discourse, the committee discussed at length the need for public engagement and a strong social contract and value proposition. Although such steps will clearly not guarantee success, to not undertake them would doom this effort to failure. Geopolitical concerns related energy and national security also influence decisions about decarbonization; it is outside the scope of this study to address these concerns fully, but key components are highlighted in relevant chapters. Furthermore, as noted in the Preface, the study took place amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, both of which profoundly impacted the energy system. The committee recognizes that changes outside the energy systems (e.g., wars, famines, pandemics, and natural disasters) will fundamentally alter the trajectory of the energy system. While these types of events will occur over the decades-long transition, it is beyond the committee’s expertise and resources to unravel the potential magnitude and duration of impacts from these external forces.

The report discusses climate mitigation efforts by a diverse set of actors, including federal and subnational governments, private sector, and philanthropy. Much of the general discussion of non-federal actors is contained the final chapter, but roles for the private sector in specific technology areas are described throughout the report. The chapter on public engagement recognizes the importance of mobilizing the participation and support of the public; however, the report does not address the role of individual voluntary efforts to mitigate emissions. It also does not consider the complex

behavioral issues that motivate individuals and the private sector to act in the absence of mandates or incentives. The committee leaves the behavioral elements, including the equity implications, to others who could do these complex topics justice.

Changes in the Federal Policy Relevant for the Second Report

The current comprehensive decarbonization policy portfolio of the United States did not come together until August 2022, with the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169) and CHIPS and Science Act (P.L. 117-167), to complement the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58), which passed in November 2021.⁴ Of these three, the IRA contains by far the most significant and wide-reaching policies to decarbonize the U.S. economy, with climate and energy related investments totaling approximately $271 billion to $1.2 trillion in tax credits and $121 billion in direct spending, loans, and other investments (Bistline et al. 2023; CBO 2022; Goldman Sachs 2023; Jiang et al. 2022). It provides incentives for purchasing, producing, and developing clean energy technologies, and makes investments in disadvantaged communities. CHIPS appropriates $54.2 billion to incentivize domestic semiconductor manufacturing and authorizes $170 billion over 5 years for investments in science, technology, engineering, and medicine (STEM) programs, workforce development, and technology R&D (Badlam et al. 2022; Senate Commerce Committee 2022). The IIJA provides funding for a range of infrastructure projects including repairing roads and bridges; upgrading power and public transit infrastructure; expanding broadband; deploying electric vehicle charging stations; and cleaning up Superfund sites (White House 2021a). It includes appropriations for approximately $62 billion for Department of Energy (DOE) climate and energy programs (DOE 2022a). It also increases the scope and authorization for DOE’s Loan Programs Office—for example, by establishing the CO₂ Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (CIFIA) program—and authorizes regional clean hydrogen and direct air capture hubs funded via public–private partnerships and managed by DOE’s new Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations.

Each of these pieces of legislation will ultimately have unique and substantial impacts on U.S. climate, energy, and technology policies. For example, the IIJA, although not

___________________

⁴ It should be noted that the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS are not equivalent in funding mechanisms. The IRA primarily consists of spending programs (appropriations) and tax expenditures. Spending programs can allocate federal resources to projects and activities up to the amount of their appropriation. By contrast, tax expenditures, such as the production tax credits in IRA, typically have no limit on the amount that could be claimed by taxpayers. The IIJA consists of a mix of authorizations and appropriations, while CHIPS contains primarily authorizations. Authorizations are laws that establish or continue a federal program or agency and are typically passed by Congress for a set period of time, but authorizations require appropriations before funds can be spent. Appropriations are laws that actually provide the money for government programs and must be passed by Congress every year in order for the government to continue to operate.

expected to provide significant emissions reductions (Larsen et al. 2022; Larson et al. 2021; Mahajan et al. 2022), has caused a fundamental shift within DOE, with the addition of a new undersecretary position focused on clean energy infrastructure, and with the adoption of a new strategy prioritizing demonstration and deployment (DOE 2022a). The new DOE Under Secretary for Infrastructure oversees several new offices—the Office of Clean Energy Demonstration, Grid Deployment Office, Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, and Office of State and Community Energy Programs—as well as several existing offices. CHIPS, with $280 billion in funding authorized over 10 years (Badlam et al. 2022), is an investment in the future of U.S. innovation and manufacturing, emphasizing R&D in cutting-edge technologies, especially semiconductors, and establishing programs to support a robust, diverse STEM workforce. It also establishes regional technology hubs to spread technology innovation across a wider geographical area in the country. Last, the IRA is widely considered the most significant piece of climate legislation in U.S. history. Its more than $390 billion in energy and climate investments (Bistline et al. 2023; CBO 2022) encompasses a wide variety of technologies, prioritizes low-income and disadvantaged communities, and—as discussed further below—makes significant progress toward national 2030 emissions goals and moves the nation much or most of the way to a trajectory that reaches net zero at midcentury (Larsen et al. 2022; Larson et al. 2021; Mahajan et al. 2022; Chapters 6–12).

In addition to legislation, several executive orders support the nation’s equity and climate priorities. In January 2021, with Executive Order (EO) 14008, the White House made “Justice40” official U.S. policy when it announced that 40 percent of benefits of federal investments in “climate change, clean energy and energy efficiency, clean transit, affordable and sustainable housing, training and workforce development, remediation and reduction of legacy pollution, and the development of critical clean water and wastewater infrastructure” will be directed to people and “disadvantaged communities that are marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution” (White House n.d.). The Biden administration further signaled its commitment to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) through EO 13985, which provides direction to federal agencies to advance DEI practices in hiring and training of employees (White House 2021b). Justice40, together with the equity, justice, and fairness provisions in the IRA and executive orders, represent a step change in energy and climate policy. In response, agencies have created new offices (e.g., DOE’s Office of Energy Justice Policy and Analysis and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Office of Public Participation) and are actively hiring staff focused on energy justice and equity.

EO 14057, issued in December 2021, enlists the federal government’s procurement power as a catalyst for developing a domestic clean energy economy and sets the following national targets for the operations of the federal government: “100 percent

carbon pollution-free electricity by 2030, 100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, net-zero emissions from procurement by 2050, net-zero emissions building portfolio by 2045, and net-zero emissions from overall operations by 2050” (White House 2021c). It further outlines overarching objectives for federal procurement and operations, which include “building a climate- and sustainability-focused workforce” and “advancing environmental justice and equity” (White House 2021c).

Continuing regulatory efforts also play an important role in meeting decarbonization targets. For example, NHTSA and EPA have released new vehicle fuel economy and GHG emissions standards, respectively, under their existing legislative authorities. In April 2023, EPA proposed more stringent, performance-based GHG and criteria pollutant standards under the Clean Air Act for model year 2027–2032 light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. EPA projected in model year (MY) 2032 that the standards could result in nearly 70 percent BEV sales in the light-duty fleet, 40 percent in the medium-duty van and pickup fleet, 50 percent ZEV sales in vocational vehicles, 34 percent ZEV sales in day cab tractors, and 25 percent ZEV sales for sleeper cab tractors in MY 2032 (EPA 2023a–d). Following a review mandated in EO 13990, DOT revised the fuel economy standards for MY 2024–2026, which would result in a fleet-wide average fuel economy of 49 miles per gallon for MY 2026, and, according to DOT projections, yield an 8 percent reduction in CO₂ emissions from passenger cars and light trucks between 2021 and 2100 compared to the alternative of leaving the less stringent Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient Vehicles Rule in place (EO 13990 2021; NHTSA 2022). Under the same regulatory review required by EO 13990, in 2022 EPA restored its waiver of preemption of California’s GHG and ZEV standards, allowing their Advanced Clean Cars (ACC) program to continue as well as allowing other states to adopt the California standards pursuant to Clean Air Act Section 177 (EPA 2022). In July 2023, NHTSA continued to update its regulations under its existing authority from the Energy Policy and Conservation and Energy Independence and Security Acts, proposing an 18 percent increase in fuel economy from MY 2027–2032, with trucks requiring greater yearly fuel economy increases than cars (NHTSA 2023). As another example, in May 2023, EPA proposed new standards for regulating CO₂ emissions from new and existing fossil-fueled power plants, which are projected to yield 617 million metric tons of CO₂ emissions reductions and $85 billion in climate and health benefits through 2042 (EPA 2023e).

Table 1-1 compares the policies recently adopted by Congress, the executive branch, and federal agencies with the recommendations in the committee’s first report. The color-coding in Table 1-1 indicates where implemented policies fully align with the committee’s recommendation (green), where implemented policies are related but different from the committee’s recommendation (yellow), and where no relevant policies have yet been implemented (red). Individual chapters of this report offer detailed analysis of the information in Table 1-1.

TABLE 1-1 Comparison of Policies from Committee’s First Report with Those Implemented in Legislation and/or Executive Action

NOTE: Red shading indicates no related policy implemented, yellow shading indicates policy implemented related to but different from the one recommended, and green shading indicates implemented policy is the same or very similar to the one recommended.

While the IRA is strikingly comprehensive, with nearly the same emissions reduction impacts and technology objectives as the committee’s first report (as discussed further below), its policy portfolio (like those in IIJA and CHIPS) was strongly shaped by political constraints, including the budget “reconciliation” rules under which it was passed and the types of policies that attracted a voting majority. Consequently, the largest difference between the IRA’s policy portfolio and the portfolio in the committee’s first report is that the IRA relies almost exclusively on tax credits and other incentives, whereas the committee recommended a variety of standards and incentives, as well as a carbon tax⁵ and statutes to create new institutions. Nonetheless, the portfolios in the first report and IRA are broadly similar in that both contain policies with the same goals and intent (Table 1-1). For example, both contain policies designed to decarbonize electricity and transport, and to electrify buildings and industry at about the same rates. Both would establish a Green Bank, expand electric vehicle charging networks, and increase funding for tribal electrification and for energy expenses, home electrification, and weatherization of low-income households.

The committee’s broad policy portfolio in the first report was specifically formulated to include some redundancy and complementarity in case some components do not work as intended. For example, the clean power standard would only have an impact if the recommended carbon tax proved insufficient to decarbonize power generation at the accelerated rate necessary. Moreover, each kind of policy brings a different set of advantages and risks. Taxes are politically difficult to enact and sustain but are economically efficient and reach every part of an economy affected by a tax. Standards and incentives are easier to enact and sustain, but are less cost-efficient, and risk disrupting technological progress by diverting resources from a path that subsequently proves to be better. In addition, incentives carry the risk that they might fail to elicit the intended response by consumers or businesses. Under existing statutory

___________________

⁵ In its first report, the committee recommended a carbon tax of $40 per ton CO₂ starting in 2021 and rising at 5 percent per year, a level that could ameliorate equity and competitiveness concerns and generate about $200 billion per year in revenue. For more details, see NASEM (2021, pp. 184–186).

authorities, regulators may not have the ability to promulgate ambitious climate-change-related standards.

These additional provisions would backstop the incentives in current policy and help fill gaps between incentives. In particular, the recommended carbon tax would backstop all of the incentives for emissions reductions in the current bills and extend beyond the IRA sunset date of 2032, thus accelerating coal-fired power plant retirements relative to the current policy landscape of subsidizing renewables and existing nuclear. Other recommendations included in the committee’s first report and also repeated later within this report include an independent National Transition Corporation (Chapter 2), regional planning initiatives that would lay the groundwork for just and inclusive energy transitions (Chapter 5), standards to limit emissions from the electric sector and vehicles (Chapters 6 and 9), and manufacturing standards for appliances (Chapter 7).

The committee fully recognizes how difficult it would be at present for Congress to pass the policies in Recommendation 1-1 and those cited above. However, the committee views these policies as key enablers of an efficient, equitable, and affordable path to decarbonization.

Impact of Legislation on Emissions Trajectory

Prior to the passage of the IRA, U.S. GHG emissions had been slowly decreasing since 2005, despite approximately flat primary energy consumption. A linear extrapolation of the historical trajectory between 2005 and 2022 hits zero sometime after 2100. This pace of decarbonization is well short of three widely discussed targets requiring nearly identical emissions reductions: (1) the U.S. target under the Paris Agreement; (2) the Biden administration’s announced goal to reduce GHG emissions by just over

50 percent from 2005 levels by 2030; and (3) a trajectory that falls linearly to net-zero emissions in 2050. Meeting the near-term (2030) target would put the United States on a trajectory generally consistent with the long-term (2050) target of net-zero emissions. Figure 1-1 shows this linear trajectory to net zero in 2050 and projections of the emissions impacts of IRA and IIJA policies from a multimodel analysis (Bistline et al. 2023).

Six modeling studies—by Energy Innovation, the REPEAT Project at Princeton University, Rhodium Group, Brookings, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and a multi-model analysis using nine independent models—conclude that the IRA would yield approximately 70–80 percent of the emissions reductions necessary to achieve the first two of the above targets, and the first 10 years of the third (Bistline et al. 2023; DeCarolis and LaRose 2023; Jenkins et al. 2023; Larsen et al.

___________________

⁶ The use of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e) is a metric for describing the global warming potential of different GHGs in a common measure by defining the number of mass units of CO₂ that would have the equivalent global warming impact of one unit of another GHG. While simple to describe, GWPs depend on timeframe. The committee has adopted a 100-year timeframe for reporting CO₂e, the standard used in the Paris Accord and other climate agreements. The committee recognizes Ocko et al. (2017) and others recommend reporting estimates using the CO₂e metric for multiple timeframes.

2022; Mahajan et al. 2022). As summarized in Figure 1-2, these groups project between 32–43 percent reductions in GHG emissions below 2005 levels by 2030, compared to approximately 25–35 percent reductions in a business-as-usual (BAU) case. In addition, all six groups predict that most reductions as of 2030 will come from the electricity sector. The committee believes that with effective implementation of the provisions of the IRA, the United States is likely to be close to the trajectory required to achieve the 2050 emission reduction targets set by the White House. However, there are significant risks.

RISKS AND OBJECTIVES FOR MEETING POLICY OBJECTIVES

The IRA’s climate and energy provisions were formulated to put the nation on, or nearly on, the first 10 years of a 3-decade path to net-zero emissions. However, four categories of risks—technological, political/public resistance, execution, and external events—could prevent the nation from achieving this goal. A primary objective of this report is to identify those risks and propose solutions for overcoming them.

Risks

Technological Risk—the risk that essential non-emitting technologies might not be ready in time at the right price. A technological revolution over the past 2 decades has already brought humanity renewable electricity and electric transport that is cost-competitive or cheaper than fossil alternatives, which explains the IRA’s focus on deployment of clean electricity, electrification of heating, and electric vehicles during the 2020s (Chapters 6 and 9). However, after the IRA’s 10 years of tax incentives wind down and the investments that they have stimulated have put much new capacity into operation, the nation will still need a host of zero-emissions technologies, which are in various stages of readiness, in order to reach its 2050 net-zero emissions commitment. These include non-emitting options for dispatchable electricity generation, such as advanced nuclear reactors; methods and machinery for net-zero manufacturing, such as the use of hydrogen to produce high-temperature industrial heat; ways to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere, such as direct air capture (DAC); and options for zero-emitting heavy trucks, marine shipping, and aviation, such as batteries or hydrogen fuel cells for heavy trucks, and biofuels or net-zero synthetic fuels for shipping and aviation.

Four factors significantly reduce technological risk (Chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10).

• Most technological gaps (i.e., need for on-demand electricity, long-term energy storage, fuels for aviation/shipping/freight) have multiple options in advanced stages of research and development.
• There is a massive international RDD&D effort on zero-carbon technologies, including large new expenditures in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS.
• Learning by doing will accelerate progress because the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS include funds for rapid deployment of many of the needed technologies at considerable scale during the 2020s.
• Addressing and developing solutions for solving these technological challenges are magnets for the innovative and entrepreneurial.

Political, Judicial, and Societal Polarization Risks—the risk of a change in policy landscape. This could include, for example, repeal of climate and energy provisions in the IRA, federal executive branch or state agency action that limits IRA implementation, or new legislation that inhibits climate mitigation efforts. Such changes could come about owing to electoral changes in government and/or judicial review. The risk of political reversal is lower for congressional statutes than for executive actions. Legislation to repeal the IRA would require united support of the president, Senate, and House of Representatives, or two-thirds support in the Senate and House to override a presidential veto. However, even if the IRA remains intact, its incentives may not be extended beyond the law’s 2032 sunset date. This could ultimately deter

investment in technologies eligible for tax credits, as their lifetimes typically exceed the current tax credit duration. Judicial challenges to legislation or regulation could also slow or roll back decarbonization policies. Notably, Supreme Court decisions in West Virginia v. EPA and Biden v. Nebraska, which use the “major questions” doctrine to argue for clear, specific congressional authorization for agency action, may limit agencies’ ability to implement regulations that are not explicitly called for in legislative text.

More fundamentally, public sentiment against climate mitigation policy could inspire federal, state, and local politicians to create roadblocks or outright opposition to such policies. The committee is cognizant that the public and political discourse around topics like climate change is often polarized. The energy transition must be seen as just, equitable, and fair, or public support for it will ultimately be lost, followed inevitably by lost political support. The committee is also cognizant that mitigation policies must be durable, reflecting the simple fact that activities required to greatly reduce emissions will continue long after the coalition that enabled the policies to be adopted are no longer around (Carlson and Burtraw 2019; Patashnik 2008). This brings us to the third category of risk.

Execution Risk—the risk that the nation will be unable to execute the energy and climate policies in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS and the related regulatory initiatives at the intended pace and scale, or that the policies will not work as intended because of a wide variety of behavioral, organizational, and political factors. The White House and federal agencies clearly view these execution risks as the most important and daunting vulnerabilities facing the current policy portfolio, given their public statements and the focused energy of their implementation effort. The committee concurs with this view, and so has focused its second report on barriers and gaps. A barrier is anything that stands in the way of successful implementation and that might prevent the nation from accomplishing the first 10 years of a fair and equitable 30-year path toward a net-zero energy system. A gap is a missing component in the legislation. Because the IRA is such a comprehensive bill for the first decade of the transition, most gaps are not as simple as, for example, an omitted sector or GHG. Instead, most reflect the absence of policy that could overcome an anticipated barrier or an effort that must be undertaken during the 2020s to continue decarbonization during the 2030s and beyond. Some examples of gaps and barriers are as follows:

• Gap: To meet a net-zero trajectory, national emissions will need to drop by nearly 2 GtCO₂e/y by 2030, and modeling analyses to date conclude that current federal legislation will leave approximately 20–30 percent of this job undone (Bistline et al. 2023; DeCarolis and LaRose 2023; Jenkins et al. 2023; Larsen et al. 2022; Mahajan et al. 2022). Could state, local, and voluntary private actions fill this gap, or is additional federal legislation required?

• Barrier: Commercial-scale renewables projects in the United States take an extended time to plan, permit, construct, and connect to the electricity grid. One study estimates that projects currently require 5–8 years for completion and 89 percent are abandoned before completion, many because of the difficulties of permitting and siting (Jenkins et al. 2021; Chapter 6). The record annual deployment of new wind and solar capacity is approximately 25 GW in both 2020 and 2021, but the average pace must accelerate by 100–300 percent during the 2020s to put the nation on a path to net zero, with the larger number corresponding to a 100 percent renewable energy system, and the smaller corresponding to a cheapest system that includes some nuclear electricity and fossil assets with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Jenkins et al. 2021). Organized opposition to commercial-scale renewable infrastructure and new transmission lines has already emerged and can be expected to accelerate as landscapes in different parts of the country are visually transformed (Chapters 2 and 5). Identifying policy reforms that can effectively transform permitting processes to facilitate both meaningful public engagement and infrastructure deployment at pace is a major challenge. Meaningful public engagement takes time and is likely to slow deployment, at least initially (Chapter 5). On the other hand, inadequate public participation risks escalating conflicts that can frustrate total progress over the longer term and is a major existing factor in environmental injustice (Chapter 2). This dilemma represents more than simply tension between technocratic and societal objectives. For example, slowing deployment of clean infrastructure in the interest of fairness also prolongs fossil air pollution deaths, which disproportionately afflict disadvantaged communities (Chapter 3). How can inclusive and consultative processes be implemented to speed rather than slow deployment, and in so doing, simultaneously address technocratic and societal goals?
• Barrier: During the energy transition, most locations will become primary energy producers for the first time, because wind and solar are present everywhere to a greater or lesser degree, whereas commercial fossil resources are concentrated in a smaller number of locations. For most locations, the shift to renewables will increase economic activity and employment, as well as bring other changes to landscapes and communities (Chapters 4 and 12). However, as legacy industries shut down, some communities will see net job losses, like those that have experienced the closure of a coal mine or coal-fired power plant in recent decades. They may also face rapid and abrupt changes in tax revenue that threaten the

• viability of critical public services (Chapter 12). Political and financial interests that oppose the policies in the IRA will use these losses to organize and build opposition. Does the current policy portfolio do enough to minimize this risk by providing opportunities for workers and communities to make a fair and equitable transition?
• Gap: The IRA earmarks direct investments into disadvantaged communities that range from $40 billion–$42.5 billion (Chi 2022; EELP 2022), with other estimates as high as $60 billion going to environmental justice priorities (out of total expenditures estimated to range from $400 billion to more than $1 trillion). However, the ambiguity of the tax credit provisions makes calculations of direct benefits difficult, and expenditures that do not directly target disadvantaged communities may benefit them (e.g., air quality improvements from accelerated vehicle electrification and renewable power deployment as a result of EV and zero-carbon electricity tax credits). Will this achieve the administration’s goal that 40 percent of benefits flow to low-income and historically marginalized people and communities? Are these funds sufficient to gain the trust of communities that have suffered unjust and discriminatory harm? Will these funds be effectively deployed to advance decarbonization in a manner that addresses historical injustices, poverty, and the need to support local economies?
• Barrier: Federal, state, and local governments currently lack the staff and expertise to effectively spend and administer IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS funds (Chapters 2 and 13). Moreover, because the country is politically and economically heterogenous, some state and local governments will rapidly build capacity and use it to pursue and spend these funds, while others will not build sufficient capacity and offer support ranging from indifference to active resistance (Chapter 13). Are the provisions in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS sufficient to overcome this barrier? What additional actions could federal, state, and local governments take to increase capacity at all levels of government and to garner state and local support?
• Gap: Note that Recommendation 1-1 is designed to fill an execution gap. Specifically, will tax credits and other incentives in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS deliver the required pace of change, given behavioral inertia by consumers, organizational inertia in the electricity sector, and inevitable targeted messaging by entrenched financial interests? This gap would be filled by the more diverse policy portfolio in Recommendation 1-1, as well as the more detailed recommendations in Chapter 5 to strengthen public engagement in the transition.

Risk from Events Outside of the Energy System—as noted in the Preface to this second report, the committee’s work occurred during a time of disruptions within national and global energy systems caused by outside events such as the invasion of Ukraine and the global COVID-19 pandemic. While it appears that activities within the U.S. energy system are returning to normal with the receding impacts of COVID-19, there will undoubtedly be some mixture of wars, disasters, and other disruptions that will punctuate the decades-long transition to net zero. Furthermore, geopolitical considerations of energy and national security will often underlie decisions about decarbonization policy. These risks are unpredictable and will have to be managed during the clean energy transition as they arise.

Objectives

To clarify the analysis of gaps and barriers, it is important to define as explicitly as possible the objectives to be addressed by the committee’s recommended actions. The committee defines five objectives: (1) carbon and GHG emissions by sector, (2) equity and fairness, (3) health, (4) employment, and (5) public engagement and acceptance.

Carbon Emissions Objectives

There is an infinite number of net-zero emissions trajectories that the country could follow between now and 2050. Examples include Larsen et al. (2021), Larson et al. (2021), Lempert et al. (2019), and Williams et al. (2021). Most assume a roughly linear decline in emissions until 2050. They also tend to focus on meeting anticipated BAU demand for energy services,⁷ rather than asking that Americans do with less. Most of these scenarios are similar because prices of available technology and current emissions strongly constrain the cheapest pattern of deployment. Unless otherwise stated, this report uses the sector-specific scenarios in “The Long-Term Strategy of the United States: Pathways to Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050” issued by the White House in late 2021 because these encompass most published scenarios and reflect current U.S. policy goals (Figures 1-3 and 1-4). It is important to note that while this report references the updated emissions pathways published by the White House, the overall emissions trajectories laid out in the committee’s first report and the key

___________________

⁷ The projected energy demand is derived from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling System, which incorporates continued improvements in energy efficiency (e.g., for vehicles, appliances, and other equipment) over time.

ingredients of the net-zero transition for the U.S economy described in that report are fundamentally the same (see Figure 2.2 in NASEM 2021).

The policies recommended in this report are consistent with the projected emissions objectives illustrated in Figures 1-3 and 1-4. The anticipated rapid emissions reductions during the 2020s in the electricity sector and during the 2020s and 2030s in the transport sector reflect the current relatively low costs for renewable infrastructure and lithium-ion batteries (Chapters 6 and 9). The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for onshore wind has decreased between 62–63 percent globally from 1983–2021 and 2009–2023, respectively (IRENA 2022; Lazard 2023), and 70 percent in the United States between 1998–2021 (LBNL 2022a). The LCOE of utility-scale solar decreased by 83–88 percent globally in 2009–2023 and 2010–2021 (IRENA 2022; Lazard 2023), and 85 percent in the United States from 2010–2021 (LBNL 2022b), with the global price of solar photovoltaic (PV) modules dropping 99.8 percent between 1975 and 2021 (Our World in Data n.d.). DOE (2023) estimates an 89 percent decline in cost of EV lithium-ion battery packs between 2008–2022, while other sources estimate a 79 percent decrease in lithium-ion battery pack and cell price between 2013–2022 (BloombergNEF 2022) and 98 percent decline in lithium-ion battery prices between 1991–2018 (Ziegler and Trancik 2021a,b).

The slower emissions reductions during the 2020s and 2030s for industry reflect both the high costs for decarbonization options and slow turnover of industrial infrastructure. The slow turnover of this infrastructure is important because retrofit or replacement is most economic when equipment becomes obsolete (Chapter 10). The relatively slow decline of emissions from buildings in Figure 1-3 reflects slow stock turnover and limited retrofits because of anticipated property-owner inertia (Chapter 7).⁸ In contrast, the rapid decline in emissions from the electricity sector in Figure 1-3 reflects the robust deployment of renewable electricity owing to the reductions in costs for those technologies and the tax credits provided within the IRA.⁹ It should be noted, however, that non-cost barriers to the deployment of these technologies—including supply chain development, need for skilled labor and enhanced public engagement, regulatory approvals, and engineering, procurement, and construction of both generation and transmission—will have to be addressed to achieve the projected emissions reductions. The relatively slow reductions for nitrous

___________________

⁸ Chapter 7 makes the case that much more could be done in the buildings sector over the next 10 years, and that this would reduce the need for a rapid deployment of carbon dioxide removal technology during the 2040s (Figure 1-2), which is risky to count on given current prices and technology.

⁹ While Chapter 6 reflects this optimism toward the decarbonization of electricity, it does recommend a national emissions limit for the electricity sector to ensure the outcome shown in Figure 1-3 as well as the need for an omnibus solution to support expansion of the transmission grid.

oxide and methane reflect agricultural emissions from ongoing agricultural demand (Chapter 8). The White House Long-Term Strategy report (DOS and EOP 2021) also has a scenario for the net sink from land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF), which grows from 759 MtCO₂e/y today to 940 MtCO₂e/y in 2050 (see Chapter 8). The midpoints (darkest-colored lines) within the ranges for 2050 sectoral emissions in Figure 1-3 and for GHG-specific emissions in Figure 1-4, together with an LULUCF net emission of −940 MtCO₂e/y, sum to zero net emissions.

While the overarching emissions reduction goal of 50 percent by 2030 and net zero by midcentury is a singular objective, the discussion above makes clear that it is really the summation of sector-specific emissions reductions. This overarching goal will necessarily be met by sector-specific policies and technologies, and cost minimizations within sectors and across the whole system. In this way, the objective to reduce emissions to net zero by midcentury (or 50 percent by 2030) can be thought of as a constraint with the goal to minimize cost while maximizing desirable societal objectives of equity, employment, health, and public engagement. Indeed, technology analyses are typically formulated as constrained optimizations that solve for the mix of technologies needed to meet various emissions goals, with social welfare as the objective function in the constrained optimization (often specified as per capita consumption in economic models). While this formulation is useful to develop effective policies, once policies are in place, they must be evaluated in part by how well they achieve emissions reductions. Thus, the constraint in the mathematical analysis supporting a policy becomes, in practical terms, an objective of the policy once it is implemented.

Equity and Fairness Objectives

What actions in the pathways to decarbonization would adequately address historical, eliminate current, and prevent future injustices? These objectives are much more difficult to quantify than emissions targets. The committee came up with four specific objectives, however inadequate. First, new infrastructure built under the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS should not replicate the disproportionate exposure to fossil-related health and safety hazards suffered by disadvantaged communities (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, an adequate fraction of the benefits of spending under the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS should go to low-income and historically marginalized groups and communities, with the current federal goal being 40 percent. Where benefits are difficult to quantify, the fraction of IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS spending that goes directly to these groups and communities provides an alternative objective to assessing benefits in the near term, but historically unprecedented efforts to assess actual benefits are still necessary (Chapter 2). As discussed further below, rigorous

evaluation will be needed to understand and quantify the benefits of widespread clean energy deployment to disadvantaged communities. Third, historically marginalized people and communities should have equitable access to new jobs and not suffer disproportionately from job losses (Chapter 4). Fourth, policies should attempt to minimize the harms that displaced fossil fuel workers suffer during the transition (also a component of the Employment Objectives below).

Health Objectives

The objective is to maximize health and minimize harm, including illness, disability, and death caused by fossil fuel-related pollution (Chapter 3). Other health risks include the mental and physical impacts related to the losses of employment and livelihoods in fossil fuel communities. Major health benefits are possible in the transition, particularly in reduced exposure to air pollution from fossil fuel combustion. Other health benefits, both physical and mental, can also accrue through active transportation, changes in nutrition policies, and improvements in the characteristics of the built environment, like urban tree cover and improved walkability. As the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies increases, health harms across the full life cycle of these technologies should be minimized, including risks from new clean energy industries (e.g., in mining and manufacturing operations) and from the introduction of these new technologies to the public (e.g., safety concerns).

Employment Objectives

These objectives are to maximize employment in high-quality jobs that are created by the transition and to minimize the disruption caused by losses of fossil-dependent jobs (Chapter 4). Modeling analysis suggests that although gains will exceed losses in most locations and in the nation, losses will be concentrated in three areas of the country that produce most of the gas, oil, and coal—Appalachia, the Gulf Coast and adjacent areas, and the inter-mountain west (Chapter 4; Mayfield et al. 2021, 2023). However, most of these losses will occur later than 2030, except in coal producing areas in Appalachia and the inter-mountain west that have seen contraction for decades (Chapter 4; Larson et al. 2021; Mayfield et al. 2021, 2023). At smaller scale, some communities will suffer net losses throughout the country—for example, in small towns that lose a dominant employer such as a coal-fired power plant. Also, losses will likely occur in some occupations sprinkled at low density throughout the country, such as in automotive repair shops that do not transition

successfully to electric transport or experience lower demand owing to lower maintenance needs of EVs, but most of these losses will occur after 2030 because of the average lifetime of fossil vehicles.

Public Engagement Objectives

These objectives are to develop robust public engagement practices that involve people and groups across the country in the goals, design, and implementation of the energy system transition. Such practices are fundamental to develop and maintain a robust social contract for deep decarbonization with the people of the United States (Chapter 5). The committee chose to emphasize public engagement rather than public acceptance or support for several reasons. First, people, communities, and regions have heterogeneous preferences. Some communities may remain against components of a net-zero energy system, such as nuclear electricity because of perceived danger, or large-scale wind and solar because of the visual transformation of the landscape. Public support for the transition as a whole may thus hinge on respecting public rejection of parts of it. Second, as stated above, people value having a say in decisions that affect their lives, independent of the final outcome (Chapter 5). Third, the committee heard from officials in cities such as Fresno, California, that inclusive participation in siting decisions initially slows deployment and may result in some kinds of projects being can-celled at the outset (Bedsworth et al. 2023). Nonetheless, inclusive consultation speeds subsequent infrastructure deployment, both because officials are aware of what the community will support, and because they have gained the public’s trust.

NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

The scope, scale, and pace of the transition that will be required to decarbonize the U.S. energy system—and the associated uncertainties—are unprecedented. Thus, adaptive management and governance—that is, an iterative learning process producing improved understanding and management over time—is crucial to coordinate and monitor implementation and feedbacks in the face of the complexity and uncertainties associated with climate change and societal transition throughout the country. In order to stay on the trajectory to an equitable net-zero emissions goal, there is a need to respond where policies and technologies do not work as intended, where current policies fall short of achieving the full set of objectives, and where emergent issues create unanticipated problems and opportunities (e.g., larger than anticipated cost reductions for renewables). There is also a need for not just ex post evaluation and monitoring, but also for ex ante estimates or “scoring” of new proposals. As the nation implements the

policies laid out in the IRA, IIJA, CHIPS, and other actions, the challenge of collecting and reporting on the use of federal and other dollars and the outcomes accomplished with those investments and expenditures should be front and center. Comprehensive and system-wide evaluation of decarbonization policies and programs is essential to cross-sector and systems level impacts, as well as to sustain a social license to operate.

Given the untrammeled ground that transitioning to net-zero emissions must traverse, a high degree of humility and commitment to learning and adjustment is in order. The committee acknowledges its limited ability to anticipate the many possible ways in which decarbonization could be at least partially derailed. As a result, adaptive management guided by continuous monitoring and evaluation offers the most likely path to success. Such efforts will be possible only if the nation makes a significant investment to gather the information necessary across all programs and activities fundamental to decarbonization, has the opportunity to modify programs based on these evaluations, and accommodates changing technological and socioeconomic conditions. To maintain public support and engagement, it is critical that monitoring and evaluation cover socioeconomic aspects of the transition in addition to emissions and technology deployment. This includes the need to develop data collection and evaluation into program design and expedite and expand data collection activities.

The committee’s first report recommended that Congress establish an executive-level Office of Equitable Energy Transitions to serve as the designated centralized authority to establish criteria to ensure equitable and effective allocation of energy transition funding and monitor progress. No such authority was included within the IRA, IIJA, or CHIPS, although, as shown in Table 1-1, elements of EO 14008 establish some aspects of the committee’s recommended office. An executive-level, designated authority would ensure that the nation’s approach to monitoring, evaluation, and communication aligns with the scope of the challenge and investment of decarbonization.

Nonetheless, the current administration is clearly focused on implementation of the recent legislation. The federal government now features many new staff, working groups, task forces, and committees to facilitate implementation of recent bills, provide oversight both within and across departments and agencies, and produce information to the public on descriptions and application processes of funding opportunities. For example, upon passage of the IRA, the Biden administration’s White House appointed a Senior Advisor for Clean Energy Innovation and Implementation specifically to oversee implementation of the act’s clean energy and climate provisions, including developing the regulations required to distribute funding (White House 2022b). The administration released a guidebook for the public and local, state, and tribal governments to take advantage of the funding available through the legislation

and maintains an updated list of available funding opportunities (White House 2022c, 2023a). It also established the “Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Maps Dashboard,” which depicts locations of announced and awarded funding and provides information about each funded project (White House 2023b).

The Biden administration has also taken significant steps to address key elements necessary for tracking and evaluating impacts of decarbonization policy, as shown in Table 1-2. Notably, the White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council (IAC), established by EO 14008, is tasked with developing performance metrics to ensure accountability and publishing an annual public performance scorecard on the implementation of Justice40. As discussed in Chapter 2, an evaluation of clean energy spending would illustrate the distribution of the benefits of all programs, including those covered by Justice40. Many IRA tax expenditure policies do not target disadvantaged communities, but as they transform the energy system, they will deliver benefits to these communities.

In addition, the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act (Evidence Act) (January 2019, P.L. 115-435) is currently being implemented by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as directed by the law. The Evidence Act requires each agency to develop an evaluation policy, evidence-building plan (i.e., learning agenda), evaluation plan, and capacity assessment. The purpose of learning agendas in particular is to develop evidence to answer questions about how the agency meets its mission and how the agency’s programs, policies, and regulations function (OMB 2019, p. 14). Thus, the law “institutionalizes program evaluation as a critical element of learning agendas throughout the federal government” (Aldy 2022). The emerging portfolio of products assessing the performance of the American Rescue Plan (White House 2022a,b) and their influence on recent policy implementation suggest that the agency learning agenda offers an effective model for policy evaluation. See Table 1-2 for additional information on the Evidence Act and OMB’s important role in implementation of the law.

And still, vesting the aggregation, synthesis, translation, and communication of metrics in a single, congressionally mandated entity and process is necessary to ensure that a decarbonization progress report is available to the U.S. public and the world on a consistent and sustained basis, regardless of which party controls the executive branch. Federal policy makers have previously seen fit to establish data-collection and/or forecasting entities (e.g., EIA, Bureau of Labor Statistics) when information has been viewed as important for public and private actors in the economy and societal goals. However, as noted in Table 1-2, these statistical offices do not span the whole of government. Given the broad changes likely to occur from the new federal

TABLE 1-2 Scorecard Detailing the Key Evaluation Elements of U.S. Decarbonization Policy That Are Covered by the Current Federal Policy Portfolio and Elements That Are Still Missing from the Federal Policy Portfolio

Key Evaluation Elements	Status	Comments
Accountability and oversight of spending		Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)—$25 million for GAO to support oversight of distribution and use of funds and evaluate whether impacts of funds are equitable. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)—The Infrastructure Implementation Task Force (Executive Order [EO] 14052) priorities include efficient and equitable investment of public dollars, including through the Justice40 Initiative and effective coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments in implementing investments.
Creation of indicators and establishment of targets		Each federal agency is responsible for creating indicators and establishing targets. EO 14008—To identify geographically defined disadvantaged communities for any covered programs under the Justice40 Initiative and for programs where a statute directs resources to disadvantaged communities, federal agencies are expected to use the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST). The White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council (IAC) is responsible for developing clear performance metrics to ensure accountability in the implementation of Justice40.
Data collection and tracking		Each federal agency is responsible for data collection and tracking. However, no entity ensures that data collection and tracking is consistent for the purposes of presenting an aggregate picture. The Evidence Act requires agency Open Data Plans to make federal data publicly available by default, and their data inventories searchable; designation of a Chief Data Officer in each agency; and establishment of an Advisory Committee on Data for Evidence Building and Chief Data Officer Council by OMB. Additional federal data collection efforts include the following: IIJA §40553 established the Energy Jobs Council under DOE to survey, analyze, and report on employment and demographics in the U.S. energy, energy efficiency, and motor vehicle sectors.

NOTES: The column on the left lists key evaluation elements of U.S. decarbonization policy; the column on the right lists federal entities and actions that are already carrying out specific evaluation elements; and the middle “Status” column indicates whether the listed federal actions align with the committee’s recommendations on evaluation and reporting. (The green check indicates that the evaluation component is being addressed via the current policy portfolio, and the orange diamond indicates a gap between the current policy portfolio and the committee’s recommendations.)

statutes, such information collection would also be valuable in terms of public and private investment and programmatic activities (e.g., tax credits and the consumer investments related to them, and Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund investments and lending activities) in infrastructure and clean energy. Moreover, only a consistent, comprehensive, and coordinated compilation provides the information necessary to inform future policy choices.

A full assessment of the adequacy of funding for robust evaluation as well as public-facing data reporting and communications lies outside the scope of this report. However, as an example, the separate $25 million allocated to both OMB and GAO (IRA §70004–70005) to track progress on the IRA amounts to roughly 0.013 percent of the projected $391 billion in IRA energy and climate-related funding, falling short of the 1 percent of program administration resources recommended by the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking in its 2017 final report, and the 3.7 percent norm for foundation spending on evaluation (Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking

2017; Twersky and Arbreton 2014).¹⁰ The Data Foundation, a nonprofit think-tank seeking to “improve government and society by using data to inform public policymaking,” recommends federal agencies determine and articulate evaluation funding needs to OMB because the scope and scale of data collection and evaluation will inevitably vary across agencies and programs (Fatherree and Hart 2019). Additionally, a so-called Evidence Incentive Fund¹¹ could be established as a potential funding mechanism for agency program evaluations and learning agendas, as was recommended by the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking in its 2017 final report. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that federal agencies using IIJA and IRA funds to administer programs, provide technical assistance, and perform monitoring and evaluation reduces the funds available to state and local governments, community-based organizations, and private sector actors who are implementing many of the programs mandated under these laws.

Furthermore, absent a clearly (and publicly) identified lead authority for streamlined, externally facing communication of multi-agency/multi-program funding outcomes, it is unclear how public stakeholders will access trusted, non-partisan, salient information about progress on and outcomes of decarbonization via the current model of tasking multiple agency-level as well as interagency task forces with related but separate missions. Ensuring the salience of the federal assistance portfolio to both groups and places in search of not only environmental but also climate, energy, and transition justice depends on integrating—or at least aligning—ongoing definitional and evaluation exercises in order to facilitate program implementation and evaluation and—vitally important—to communicate equity and mitigation outcomes.

While it is too early to assess their durability, credibility, and efficacy, the nascent communication efforts by the current administration and key agencies, notably CEQ—such as the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEQ 2022) and the proposed Environmental Justice Scorecard (Federal Register 2022)—are important experiments in streamlining information desired by public stakeholders. As much as possible, the information delivered should acknowledge the reality that people encounter federal investments through their lived experience as workers and residents

___________________

¹⁰ Some of the costs of program evaluation are fixed costs, and thus the percentages of program budgets dedicated to evaluation may reflect, in part, the scale of the programs.

¹¹ “Evidence Incentive Funds in each department are conceptualized by the Commission to operate similarly to Working Capital Funds or Salary and Expense accounts. The funds could be created by taking up to 10 percent of unobligated balances at the end of a fiscal year to be allocated for future evidence-generating activities” (Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking 2017, p. 104).

of places, not in terms of agency silos. This recognition should translate into easy mechanisms to enable public stakeholders to share and translate project information via trusted, existing communication tools.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

When this National Academies’ committee was first convened, a U.S. transition to net zero seemed far away. But then, Congress passed historic legislation that sets the nation on a fundamentally new course and establishes the United States as an international leader in the fight against climate change. The rest of this report shows how current federal legislation and executive actions, along with actions at the subnational levels, will touch nearly all facets of the energy economy, while providing the energy services the nation needs at a price it can afford. If it all works as planned, most Americans will still receive the energy services they expect but will live in a nation—and hopefully a world—with reduced impacts from climate change, with cleaner air, and with better health and employment. Many historically marginalized and low-income Americans will, for the first time, experience a fair, equitable, and just energy system. This path is risky because the task is complicated, vast, fast-paced, and never traveled before. It will take a national effort, involving all Americans and the commitment of our nation’s business, industrial, and energy sectors, as well as an adaptive policy approach, to successfully execute. This report documents gaps between current policies and likely barriers to implementation. Its recommendations are designed to fill gaps, overcome barriers, and prepare the nation for the adaptive management it will need over the next 30 years to achieve a net-zero energy system.

This report includes a particular focus on execution risks because there are so many ways in which execution could prove inadequate. The climate and energy provisions in the IRA, IIJA, and CHIPS are intended to create unprecedented changes that will affect all parts of the nation’s economy and many aspects of daily life. The portfolio is designed to shepherd what would arguably be the first deliberately fair and equitable technological transition in the nation’s history. It must rely on a mix of policy instruments and institutions that have never been tested at this scale and executed within a polity designed to limit centralized control.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

TABLE 1-3 Summary of Recommendations from Chapter 1

REFERENCES

EELP (Environmental and Energy Law Program). 2022. “Environmental Justice (EJ) Provisions of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act.” http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/EELP-IRA-EJ-Provisions-Table.pdf.

EO (Executive Order) 13990. 86 Federal Register 14 (January 25, 2021). “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.” Federal Register 86(14):7037–7043.

EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 2022. “California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Advanced Clean Car Program; Reconsideration of a Previous Withdrawal of a Waiver of Preemption; Notice of Decision.” Federal Register 87:14332. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-03-14/pdf/2022-05227.pdf.

EPA. 2023a. “EPA Proposes New Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants to Tackle the Climate Crisis and Protect Public Health.” https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-new-carbon-pollution-standards-fossil-fuel-fired-power-plants-tackle.

EPA. 2023b. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles—Phase 3.” Federal Register 88(81):25926–26161. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-04-27/pdf/2023-07955.pdf.

EPA. 2023c. “Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles.” EPA-420-F-23-009. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1017626.pdf.

EPA. 2023d. “Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles.”

Federal Register 88(87):29184–29446. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-05-05/pdf/2023-07974.pdf.

EPA. 2023e. “Proposed Standards to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Heavy-Duty Vehicles for Model Year 2027 and Beyond.” EPA-420-F-23-011. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P101762L.pdf.

Evaluation.gov. 2023. “Learning Agendas.” https://www.evaluation.gov/evidence-plans/learning-agenda.

Fatherree, K., and N.R. Hart. 2019. “Funding the Evidence Act.” Data Foundation. https://www.datafoundation.org/funding-the-evidence-act-paper-2019.

Fears, D. 2022. “Redlining Means 45 Million Americans Are Breathing Dirtier Air, 50 Years After It Ended.” The Washington Post, March 9. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/03/09/redlining-pollution-environmental-justice.

Federal Register. 2022. “Environmental Justice Scorecard Feedback.” CEQ-2022-0004. Federal Register 87:47397. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/08/03/2022-16635/environmental-justice-scorecard-feedback.

Goldman Sachs. 2023. “The US Is Poised for an Energy Revolution.” Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/the-us-is-poised-for-an-energy-revolution.html.

IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2022. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2021. Abu Dhabi.

Jenkins, J., E.D. Larson, C. Greig, E. Mayfield, and S.W. Pacala. 2021. “Mission Net-Zero America: The Nation-Building Path to a Prosperous, Net-Zero Emissions Economy.” Joule 5(11):2755–2761. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2021.10.016.

Jenkins, J.D., E.N. Mayfield, J. Farbes, R. Jones, N. Patankar, Q. Xu, and G. Schivley. 2022. “Preliminary Report: The Climate and Energy Impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.” Princeton, NJ: REPEAT Project, Zero-Carbon Energy Systems Research and Optimization Laboratory. August. https://repeatproject.org/docs/REPEAT_IRA_Prelminary_Report_2022-08-04.pdf.

Jenkins, J.D., E.N. Mayfield, J. Farbes, G. Schivley, N. Patankar, and R. Jones. 2023. “Climate Progress and the 117th Congress: The Impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.” REPEAT Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. July. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8087805.

Jiang, B., M. Mandloi, R. Carlson, M. Hope, M. Ziffer, N. Campanella, A. Rosa, et al. 2022. “US Inflation Reduction Act—A Tipping Point in Climate Action.” Credit Suisse. https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/news-and-expertise/us-inflation-reduction-act-a-catalyst-for-climate-action-202211.html.

Lane, H.M., R. Morello-Frosch, J.D. Marshall, and J.S. Apte. 2022. “Historical Redlining Is Associated with Present-Day Air Pollution Disparities in U.S. Cities.” Environmental Science and Technology Letters 9(4):345–350. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.estlett.1c01012.

Larsen, J., B. King, E. Wimberger, H. Pitt, H. Kolus, A. Rivera, N. Dasari, C. Jahns, K. Larsen, and W. Herndon. 2021. “Pathways to Paris: A Policy Assessment of the 2030 US Climate Target.” Rhodium Group. https://rhg.com/research/us-climate-policy-2030.

Larsen, J., B. King, H. Kolus, N. Dasari, G. Hiltbrand, and W. Herndon. 2022. “A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean Energy Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act.” Rhodium Group. https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-energy-inflation-reduction-act.

Larson, E., C. Greig, J. Jenkins, E. Mayfield, A. Pascale, C. Zhang, J. Drossman, et al. 2021. “Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts, Final Report.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. https://netzeroamerica.princeton.edu/the-report.

Lazard. 2023. “2023 Levelized Cost of Energy+.” https://www.lazard.com/research-insights/2023-levelized-cost-ofenergyplus.

LBNL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory). 2022a. “Land-Based Wind Market Report.” https://emp.lbl.gov/wind-technologies-market-report.

LBNL. 2022b. “Utility-Scale Solar 2022.” https://emp.lbl.gov/utility-scale-solar.

Lempert, R., B.L. Preston, J. Edmonds, L. Clarke, T. Wild, M. Binsted, E. Diringer, and B. Townsend. 2019. “Pathways to 2050: Scenarios for Decarbonizing the U.S. Economy.” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. https://www.c2es.org/document/pathways-to-2050-scenarios-for-decarbonizing-the-u-s-economy.

Liu, J., L.P. Clark, M.J. Bechle, A. Hajat, S.Y. Kim, A.L. Robinson, L. Sheppard, A.A. Szpiro, and J.D. Marshall. 2021. “Disparities in Air Pollution Exposure in the United States by Race/Ethnicity and Income, 1990–2010.” Environmental Health Perspectives 129(12):127005. https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP8584.

Mahajan, M., O. Ashmoore, J. Rissman, R. Orvis, and A. Gopal. 2022. “Updated Inflation Reduction Act Modeling Using the Energy Policy Simulator.” San Francisco: Energy Innovation. https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Updated-Inflation-Reduction-Act-Modeling-Using-the-Energy-Policy-Simulator.pdf.

Mayfield, E., J. Jenkins, E. Larson, and C. Greig. 2023. “Labor Pathways to Achieve Net-Zero Emissions in the United States by Mid-Century.” Energy Policy 177(June 1):113516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113516.

NASEM (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine). 2021. Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

NASEM. 2022. “Pathways to an Equitable and Just Transition Workshop.” July 26. https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/07-26-2022/accelerating-decarbonization-in-the-united-states-technology-policy-and-societal-dimensions-pathways-to-an-equitable-and-just-transition-workshop.

NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration). 2022. “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Model Years 2024–2026.” Federal Register 87:25710. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/05/02/2022-07200/corporate-average-fuel-economy-standards-for-model-years-2024-2026-passenger-cars-and-light-trucks.

NHTSA. 2023. “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks for Model Years 2027–2032 and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Heavy-Duty Pickup Trucks and Vans for Model Years 2030–2035.” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Department of Transportation. https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2023-07/CAFE-2027-2032-HDPUV-2030-2035-NPRM-web-version.pdf.

Ocko, I., S. Hamburg, D.J. Jacob, D.W. Keith, N.O. Keohane, M. Oppenheimer, J.D. Roy-Mayhew, et al. 2017. “Unmask Temporal Trade-Offs in Climate Policy Debates.” Science 356(6337):492–493. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaj2350.

OMB (Office of Management and Budget). 2019. “Phase 1 Implementation of the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018: Learning Agendas, Personnel, and Planning Guidance.” OMB Memorandum M-19-23. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/m-19-23.pdf.

OMB, CEQ, and CPO (Office of Management and Budget, Council on Environmental Quality, and Climate Policy Office). 2023. “Addendum to the Interim Implementation Guidance for the Justice40 Initiative, M-21-28, on Using the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST).” Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/M-23-09_Signed_CEQ_CPO.pdf.

Our World in Data. n.d. “Solar (Photovoltaic) Panel Prices.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices. Accessed June 5, 2023.

Pasanen, T. n.d. “Monitoring and Evaluation: Five Reality Checks for Adaptive Management.” ODI. https://odi.org/en/insights/monitoring-and-evaluation-five-reality-checks-for-adaptive-management. Accessed January 19, 2023.

Patashnik, E. 2008. Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes Are Enacted. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Senate Commerce Committee. 2022. “CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 Summary.” https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/2699CE4B-51A5-4082-9CED-4B6CD912BBC8.

Twersky, F., and A. Arbreton. 2014. “Benchmarks for Spending on Evaluation.” William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Benchmarks%20for%20Spending%20on%20Evaluation_2014.pdf.

White House. 2021a. “Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal.

White House. 2021b. “Fact Sheet: President Biden Signs Executive Order Advancing Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Government.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/25/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-advancing-diversity-equity-inclusion-and-accessibility-in-the-federal-government.

White House. 2021c. “Fact Sheet: President Biden Signs Executive Order Catalyzing America’s Clean Energy Economy Through Federal Sustainability.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/08/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-catalyzing-americas-clean-energy-economy-through-federal-sustainability.

White House. 2022a. “Advancing Equity Through the American Rescue Plan.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Advancing-Equity-Through-The-American-Rescue-Plan.pdf.

White House. 2022b. “American Rescue Plan Equity Learning Agenda.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/American-Rescue-Plan-Equity-Learning-Agenda.pdf.

White House. 2022c. “Biden-Harris Administration Releases Inflation Reduction Act Guidebook for Clean Energy and Climate Programs.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/biden-harris-administration-releases-inflation-reduction-act-guidebook-for-clean-energy-and-climate-programs.

White House. 2022d. “President Biden Announces Senior Clean Energy and Climate Team.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/02/president-biden-announces-senior-clean-energy-and-climate-team.

White House. 2023a. “Inflation Reduction Act Guidebook.” January. https://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/inflation-reduction-act-guidebook.

White House. 2023b. “Maps of Progress.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/build/maps-of-progress.

White House. n.d. “Justice40: A Whole-of-Government Initiative.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40. Accessed January 20, 2023.

Williams, J.H., R.A. Jones, B. Haley, G. Kwok, J. Hargreaves, J. Farbes, and M.S. Torn. 2021. “Carbon-Neutral Pathways for the United States.” AGU Advances 2(1):21. https://doi.org/10.1029/2020AV000284.

Ziegler, M.S., and J.E. Trancik. 2021a. “Data Series for Lithium-Ion Battery Technologies.” Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9FEJ7C.

Ziegler, M.S., and J.E. Trancik. 2021b. “Re-Examining Rates of Lithium-Ion Battery Technology Improvement and Cost Decline.” Energy and Environmental Science 14(4):1635–1651. https://doi.org/10.1039/D0EE02681F.