Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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TCRP LRD 58 17 shop manager’s description of the individual, Officer Rocket be- lieved that Kirk was the suspect. When Officer Rocket arrived at the office of the mechanical department, the officer did not believe that he had a “sufficient foundation” to arrest Kirk.188 A scuffle ensued when Officer Rocket attempted to pat down Kirk for any weapons. Although the shop manager confirmed that Kirk was not the suspect, Officer Rocket informed Kirk that he was “still under arrest” and placed him in a cell at the police base in Grand Central.189 Kirk was charged with resisting arrest and third-degree assault, but, on the day of the trial, the prosecution dismissed the charges.190 Kirk brought a § 1983 action against the MTA and Officers Anderson and Rocket for the use of excessive force, false imprison ment, and false arrest. The individual defendants moved for a summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In considering the defendants’ motion, the court stated that, based on the evidence presented, “a jury could find that there was no probable cause to arrest Kirk for the incident at Zaro’s at the time he was handcuffed because the only link between him and the incident was his description, which matched that of many others in the area….”191 However, because the mate- rial facts of Kirk’s and Rocket’s interaction in the Mechanical Department’s office were in dispute, it was “premature to decide whether probable cause existed to arrest Kirk or whether the ac- tions of the officers were objectively reasonable.”192 VI. LIABILITY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN § 1983 ACTIONS FOR UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF PROPERTY A. Whether a Search of a Person or a Person’s Property Is Consensual The Fourth Amendment declares that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef- fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ- ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”193 In officer-citizen encounters, a person may consent to a search of his or her person or property. However, even if a per- son consents to a search, [t]he permissible scope of a consensual search is limited by the terms of the consent. . . . “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objec- tive reasonableness’ – what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”194 188 Kirk, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *7. 189 Id. at *10. 190 Id. at *13. 191 Id. at *20-21. 192 Id. at *21 (citations omitted). 193 U.S. Const., amend. IV. 194 Padilla, 143 F. Supp.2d at 470 (citations omitted). of a § 1983 action. Figueroa had used a railpass, known as the Patriot Passport, that purportedly had expired. On the day of his arrest, although transit authorities had instructed Figueroa to use the handicapped gate while displaying his railpass, no one was stationed at the handicapped gate. After Officer Huerta observed Figueroa entering without paying the fare, a scuffle ensued when Huerta attempted to arrest Figueroa. At trial, Figueroa was found not guilty of resisting arrest without vio- lence, and a charge of petit theft was dismissed.182 Figueroa, in addition to a state law claim for false arrest against Miami-Dade County, brought § 1983 claims against Officer Huerta for false arrest, use of excessive force, and malicious prosecution, as well as for the initiation and pursuit of the prosecution of Figueroa without probable cause.183 Officer Huerta’s motion for a summary judgment argued “that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, which would entitle him to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.”184 Additionally, the officer argued that, because he did not use excessive force, he was entitled to a sum- mary judgment on Figueroa’s claim under § 1983 for the alleged use of excessive force. The court held that, under the circumstances, Officer Huerta did not have probable cause to arrest Figueroa. For example, another officer (Brown) had told Huerta that she believed that Figueroa’s pass was valid.185 Rather than determine whether Figueroa’s pass was valid, Officer Huerta, “ignoring potentially exculpatory information,” arrested Figueroa.186 Because Officer Huerta was not entitled to qualified immunity, the court de- nied the officer’s motion for a summary judgment on Figueroa’s § 1983 claim for false arrest. In another case, Kirk v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,187 supra, two police officers (Anderson and Rocket) were working at Grand Central Station in New York City when Officer Anderson received a report of a confrontation at Zaro’s Bread Shop ( Zaro’s) in the vicinity of Track 19. After the individual threatened to return to the shop with a gun, the manager of the bread shop reported the incident and, thereafter, described the suspect to Officer Anderson. Kirk was a supervisor in the mechanical department of Metro-North Railroad at Grand Central Station. Based on the 182 A later investigation revealed that “that Miami-Dade Transit had signs posted in the Metrorail stations which read ‘Attention: Patriot Passport Patrons, Patriot Passports bearing the expiration date of June 30, 2007, have been extended to November 30, 2007.’” Id. at *7. 183 Id. at *1. 184 Id. at *9. 185 Id. at *12. 186 Id. 187 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *1, 20, 21 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). Com- pare with Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding “that the issuance of a pre-arraignment, non-felony summons requiring a later court appearance, without further restrictions, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure”). However, at least two courts have ques- tioned the validity of the holding in Burg. See Cross v. City of Albany, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144681, at *1, 16 (N.D. N.Y. 2016) and Oxman v. Downs, 999 F. Supp.2d 404, 413 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).

16 TCRP LRD 58 committed or was committing an offense.’”175 Because the facts did not support the plaintiff ’s claim that he was arrested without probable cause, the court held that Officer Burks was entitled to qualified immunity for all of the plaintiff ’s claims against the officer. In Dant v. District of Columbia,176 the Superior Court dis- missed a criminal case against Dant for fare evasion. Thereafter, Dant sued WMATA, the arresting officer for the transit author- ity, and the District of Columbia for damages and injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that there was probable cause for Dant’s arrest. Thus, Dant had no claim against the District of Columbia for false arrest and imprisonment, and absolute prosecutorial im- munity barred Dant’s claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against the District. In Davis v. Pavlik,177 Davis brought § 1983 claims alleging false arrest, the use of excessive force, and deliberate indiffer- ence to his constitutional rights. Davis claimed that on the day of his arrest, as he was exiting a WMATA train at the Suitland, Maryland station, Officer Estime of the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) prevented Davis from exiting the station and told him to return to the exit gate and tap his SmarTrip card. Davis was carrying several SmarTrip cards, but he was unsure which card he had used at the start of his trip. The officer tested the card Davis gave him and determined that the card had not been used that day. When Officer Estime accused Davis of fare evasion, Davis claimed that when he tried to explain, the officer, “without provocation, pepper sprayed Plaintiff twice in the face, beat Plaintiff with a MTPD-issued baton, and arrested him.”178 Although Davis was charged with theft of WMATA services and possession of counterfeit currency with unlawful intent, he was found not guilty. Thereafter, Davis filed an eight-count com- plaint against WMATA, the MTPD, and Officer Estime. Regarding the plaintiff ’s § 1983 claim of false arrest against Officer Estime, the court held that, based on the allegations of the complaint, there was probable cause for Officer Estime to arrest Davis. Moreover, even if Davis told the officer that he had additional SmarTrip cards, such a fact did not mean that there was no probable cause for Davis’s arrest. An officer is not “‘obli- gated to rule out the validity of a suspect’s claims of innocence prior to arresting him.’”179 Because there was probable cause for Davis’s arrest, the court dismissed the plaintiff ’s § 1983 claim for false arrest.180 In contrast to the Davis case, in Figueroa v. Miami-Dade County,181 a federal district court in Florida ruled that probable cause was lacking for an arrest that led to Figueroa’s later filing 175 Id. at *9 (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 176 829 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 177 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239693, at *1 (D. Md. 2020). 178 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 179 Id. at *11 (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 180 Id. at *12. 181 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78809, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2012). his handgun. It may be noted that, prior to the officer’s stop of Raissi, there had been several amendments to Georgia’s firearms laws that had become effective on July 1, 2008. One amendment allowed a person having a Georgia firearms license to “board a bus or rail vehicle while carrying a concealed firearm….”165 Raissi’s complaint asserted Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims under § 1983 on the basis that Officer Nicholas stopped Raissi without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court stated, first, that “not every encounter be- tween law enforcement officers and a citizen constitutes a sei- zure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”166 Second, since Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court “‘has recognized a lim- ited class of cases where the police-citizen encounter qualifies as a seizure within the Fourth Amendment but may be justified by less than probable cause.’”167 However, the MARTA “officers had reasonable suspicion that Raissi was committing the crime of boarding a vehicle providing public transportation with a concealed weapon.”168 The court held that the “possession of a firearms license is an affirmative defense to, not an element of, the crimes of boarding with a concealed weapon and carrying a concealed weapon.”169 The court granted the motion of the two defendant officers (Nicholas and Milton) for a summary judg- ment on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.170 Finally, as stated, under the Fourth Amendment, when an officer conducts an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual being detained is com- mitting, or has committed, a criminal offense.171 A person’s race, whether considered by itself or together with other factors, “‘does not generate reasonable suspicion for a stop.’”172 C. Whether a Finding of Probable Cause for an Arrest Precludes a § 1983 Claim for False Arrest A judicial finding that there was probable cause for an arrest likely precludes a later § 1983 claim for false arrest. Probable cause exists when there are sufficient circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that a suspect committed or is com- mitting an offense.173 In Laster v. Burks,174 supra, a federal district court in Georgia, stated that, although “[a] warrantless arrest without probable cause would violate the Constitution…, [i]f probable cause ex- ists at the time of [the] arrest, . . . it absolutely bars a §1983 claim. . . . Probable cause exists when there are sufficient circum stances ‘to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had 165 GeorgiaCarry.com, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117989, at *2. 166 Id. at *8 (citation omitted). 167 Id. (citation omitted). 168 Id. at *10. 169 Id. at *11. 170 Id. at *21-22. 171 United States v. Walker, 965 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2020). 172 Id. at 183 (citation omitted). 173 Laster v. Burks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103259, at 1, *9 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citations omitted). 174 Id. at *1, 11.