Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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40 TCRP LRD 58 shown the existence of “the continuing injury predicate,” a nec- essary finding for granting injunctive relief.571 The plaintiffs’ argued, moreover, that the Matrix Program violated the Due Process Clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, because the program “employ[ed] punitive policing measures against the homeless for sleeping in public parks….”572 However, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claim that they were being denied the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.573 PART V – Policing and § 1983 Claims Arising under the Second Amendment XV. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND WHETHER PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITIES MAY REGULATE OR PROHIBIT THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS A. Whether Public Transportation Authorities May Regulate or Prohibit the Carrying of Firearms in or on their Facilities In District of Columbia v. Heller,574 in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court invalidated certain District of Columbia gun control laws on the ground that they violated the Second Amendment to the Constitution.575 The Court held that the Constitution protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense; thus, the District of Columbia had to permit Heller to register his handgun and had to issue a license to him to carry it in his home.576 However, Justice Scalia’s opinion clarified that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and gov- ernment buildings….”577 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,578 the petitioners challenged laws enacted by the city of Chicago and the village of Oak Park that effectively banned the possession of handguns in their juris dictions. For example, the Chicago Municipal Code Section 8-20-040(a) provided that “‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm” but also prohibited the “registration 571 Id. at 861. 572 Id. 573 Id. at 858. 574 554 U.S. 570, 628, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818, 171 L. Ed.2d 637 (2008). 575 See D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), and 7-2502.02(a) (4). 576 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S. Ct. at 2822, 171 L. Ed.2d at 683-684. 577 Id., 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-2817, 171 L. Ed.2d at 678 (footnote omitted). 578 561 U.S. 742, 750, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 177 L. Ed.2d 894, 904 (2010). of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”579 The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amend- ment, thereby making the Second Amendment binding on the states: “It is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”580 Notwithstanding the foregoing, landmark holding, Justice Alito’s opinion for a plurality of the Court reaffirmed the Court’s opinion in Heller, supra, that “recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon what- soever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’”581 The Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and re- manded the case for further proceedings. Some states prohibit the possession of firearms on a means of public transportation.582 As a federal district court stated in Torraco v. Port Authority,583 [i]n many states, either by statute or regulation, different kinds of fire- arms are regulated in different ways, e.g., by caliber, or barrel length, or even age (of either the firearms or the owner, or both). In addi- tion, many states have varying regulations within the State, either by county or municipality (as does New York). An Illinois statute provides that even an individual having a license issued pursuant to the state’s Firearm Concealed Carry 579 Id. 580 Id., 561 U.S. at 778, 130 S. Ct. at 3042, 177 L. Ed.2d at 921. 581 Id., 561 U.S. at 786, 130 S. Ct. at 3047, 177 L. Ed.2d at 926 (cita- tion omitted). 582 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-118 (2022) (“A person commits a class 6 felony if, without legal authority, he has any loaded firearm or explosive or incendiary device, as defined in section 9-7-103, C.R.S., in his possession in, or carries, brings, or causes to be carried or brought any of such items into, any facility of public transportation, as defined in section 18-9-115(4));” 430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 66/65(a)(8) (2022) (prohib- iting a licensee from knowingly carrying a firearm on or into “[a]ny bus, train, or form of transportation paid for in whole or in part with public funds, and any building, real property, and parking area under the con- trol of a public transportation facility paid for in whole or in part with public funds”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.305(4) (2022) (providing in part that “[a]ny passenger who boards a bus with a dangerous or deadly weapon or other means capable of inflicting serious bodily injury con- cealed upon his person or effects is guilty of the felony of “possession and concealment of a dangerous or deadly weapon” upon a bus. Posses- sion and concealment of a dangerous and deadly weapon by a passenger upon a bus shall be a class C felony….”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-13(A) (2022) (stating that “[i]t is unlawful for any person without prior approval from the company to board or attempt to board a bus while in possession of a firearm or other deadly weapon upon his person or effects and readily accessible to him while on the bus. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor”); and S.C. Code Ann. § 58-23-1830(a)(3) (2022) (providing that “[i]t is unlawful for any passenger to commit any of the following acts in a bus or any other public transportation vehicle . . . (3) carry or possess any weapon….”). 583 539 F. Supp.2d 632, 644 (E.D. N.Y. 2008) aff’d, 615 F.3d 129 (2nd Cir. 2010).